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At least 343 records · Page 19

Machine-Learning for Safety Critical Airborne Applications Part II: Case Study

The exceptional progress in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, enabled by Machine Learning (ML) technology in recent years provides historic opportunities for the aviation industry. Current certification standards for avionics were developed prior to the ML renaissance and have several fundamental incompatibilities with the ML technology. WG-114 is working hard to release a new standard as soon as possible but for now there is no recognized means of compliance for ML based systems even of low criticality. In this talk, we present the custom ML workflow that can be used comply with all objectives of the current certification standards for a low-criticality (DAL D and C) ML-based system. To illustrate the practical application of the custom ML workflow we present a case study of a system based on a Deep Neural Network (DNN) intended to detect and identify airport runway signs. We present the system design, data generation, training, and verification in detail and describe how the design assurance objectives can be met for a DAL D and DAL C systems.

Johann Schumann↗

NASA’s Safety, Reliability, and Mission Assurance Digital Future

The evolution from “document-centric” to “data-centric” and “model-centric” information leveraging structured data and model-based approaches is at the heart of digital engineering transformational efforts underway across industry and government. It is these approaches that pave the way for data lakes, Authoritative Sources of Truth (ASOTs), and systems- of-systems interoperability and the corresponding transformational benefits thereof. Such benefits include increased data availability, data access equity, data traceability, real-time analytics, batch analytics, and (most importantly) acceleration of the time-to-value and time-to-insights associated with engineering products and analyses. The longer-term benefits of reusability, customization and traceability are even more promising. For Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA), and Mission Success (SMS) activities; realization of such benefits is essential to provide engineers and analysts alike vital information when needed to support critical decision making throughout the entire life cycle. The SMA community often operate in parallel with engineering activities, for which information exchange with relevant context is paramount. Far too often, such information lags key decision points and/or is absent of the robust, integrated, knowledge needed, given inherent barriers associated with traditional document-centric means to data sharing, analysis, and reporting. This paper provides an overview of how NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is evolving its policies, standards, guidance, and training to transform to eliminate such barriers, thus realizing the benefits emerging in this new digital era. A roadmap for achieving this digital future is presented along with key building blocks involving use and implementation of concepts such as: Objectives-Hierarchies, Objective-Driven Requirements, Accepted Standards, Safety and Assurance Cases, data digitization (i.e., ontologies, structured data, and model-centric data), FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, & Reusable) and/or FAIRUST (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable, Understandable, Secure, and Trusted) principles [1]. This paper also describes how OSMA, leveraging the Agency’s overall commitment to Digital Transformation (DT), is using the power of Policy, “Digital” Domain representation, Product Evolution, and Community Outreach and Engagement as part of a strategic vision and roadmap to evolve and transform its SMA organizations to become better able to serve its stakeholders and customers. Future publications will elaborate on these building blocks and deeper concepts.

Authoritative Source of Truth (ASOT),↗

Overview of New Tools to Perform Safety Analysis: BWR Station Black Out Test Case

Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) methodologies couple system simulator codes (e.g., RELAP, MELCOR) with simulation controller codes (e.g., RAVEN, ADAPT). While system simulator codes accurately model system dynamics deterministically, simulation controller codes introduce both deterministic (e.g., system control logic, operating procedures) and stochastic (e.g., component failures, parameter uncertainties) elements into the simulation. Typically, a DPRA is performed by: 1) sampling values of a set of parameters from the uncertainty space of interest (using the simulation controller codes), and 2) simulating the system behavior for that specific set of parameter values (using the system simulator codes). For complex systems, one of the major challenges in using DPRA methodologies is to analyze the large amount of information (i.e., large number of scenarios ) generated, where clustering techniques are typically employed to allow users to better organize and interpret the data. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a nuclear simulation dataset that is part of the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) station blackout (SBO) case study. We apply a software tool that provides the domain experts with an interactive analysis and visualization environment for understanding the structures of such high-dimensional nuclear simulation datasets. Our tool encodes traditional and topology-based clustering techniques, where the latter partitions the data points into clusters based on their uniform gradient flow behavior. We demonstrate through our case study that both types of clustering techniques complement each other in bringing enhanced structural understanding of the data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The R&D PERFROI Project on Thermal Mechanical and Thermal Hydraulics Behaviors of a Fuel Rod Assembly during a Loss of Coolant Accident

The safety principle in case of a LOCA is to preserve the short and long term coolability of the core. The associated safety requirements are to ensure the resistance of the fuel rods upon quench and post-quench loads and to maintain a coolable geometry in the core. An R&D program has been launched by IRSN with the support of EDF, to perform both experimental and modeling activities in the frame of the LOCA transient, on technical issues such as: - flow blockage within a fuel rods bundle and its potential impact on coolability, - fuel fragment relocation in the ballooned areas: its potential impact on cladding PCT (Peak Cladding Temperature) and on the maximum oxidation rate, - potential loss of cladding integrity upon quench and post-quench loads. The PERFROI project (2014-2019) focusing on the first above issue, is structured in two axes: 1. axis 1: thermal mechanical behavior of deformation and rupture of cladding taking into account the contact between fuel rods; specific research at LaMCoS laboratory focus on the hydrogen behavior in cladding alloys and its impact on the mechanical behavior of the rod; and, 2. axis 2: thermal hydraulics study of a partially blocked region of the core (ballooned area taking into account the fuel relocation with local over power), during cooling phase by water injection; More detailed activities foreseen in collaboration with LEMTA laboratory will focus on the characterization of two phase flows with heat transfer in deformed structures.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of advanced high rate Li-SOCl2 cells

Under NASA sponsorship, JPL is developing advanced, high rate Li-SOCl2 cells for future space missions. As part of this effort, Li-SOCl2 cells of various designs were examined for performance and safety. The cells differed from one another in several aspects, such as: nature of carbon cathode, catalysts, cell configuration, case polarity, and safety devices. Performance evaluation included constant-current discharge over a range of currents and temperatures. Abuse-testing consisted of shortcircuiting, charging, and over-discharge. Energy densities greater than 300 Wh/Kg at the C/2 rate were found for some designs. A cell design featuring a high-surface-area carbon cathode was found to deliver nearly 500 Wh/Kg at moderate discharge rates. Temperature influenced the performance significantly.

Deligiannis, F.↗

Operational Safety Analysis for Disposal Period of the Future Belgian Geological Disposal Facility - 19249

For more than 40 years, ONDRAF/NIRAS (the federal agency responsible for managing radioactive waste and enriched fissile materials in Belgium) has been studying the concept of a geological disposal facility (GDF) in poorly indurated clays as an option for the long-term management of both category B waste (low-level and intermediate-level long-lived waste - LILW-LL) and category C waste (high-level waste - HLW and spent fuel). In the absence of a policy decision, the proposed Belgian reference option for disposal of such waste is a GDF in poorly indurated clays, located at a depth between 200 m and 600 m. ONDRAF/NIRAS has developed a reference disposal concept for research, development and demonstration (RD and D) purposes. At the current stage of this program, the primary objective of ONDRAF/NIRAS is to establish the safety and feasibility of constructing, operating and closing a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) at the conceptual design level, without any presumption about the exact location of the facility. This will be evaluated in a first version of the safety and feasibility case (SFC-1 V1) for the geological disposal of category B and C radioactive wastes. Analysis of the operational safety is an important part of the SFC-1 V1. ONDRAF/NIRAS, supported by BGE Technology GmbH, has prepared an operational safety analysis of the current GDF reference design and the processes occurring during the operation and closure period. A SWIFT methodology (Structured What If Technique) is used to identify risks and the measures required to mitigate their consequences. In parallel to this SWIFT analysis, specific attention is also given to fire risk, especially in the blind-ending disposal galleries (DG). Based on understanding of fire risk analysis, recommendations suggest using exclusively electrically driven equipment to reduce fire loads and minimize the fire hazard. In addition, strict working procedures could prevent the presence of workers between the DG dead end and equipment presenting significant fire load. The use of mobile refuge chambers should also be part of the safety concept. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Framework for the Analysis of Deep Neural Networks in Autonomous Aerospace Applications using Bayesian Statistics

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are considered to be key components in many autonomous systems. Applications range from vision-based obstacle avoidance to intelligent/learning control and planning. Safety-critical applications as found in the aerospace domain require that the behavior of the DNN is validated and tested rigorously for safety of the autonomous system (AUS). In this paper, we present a framework to support testing of DNNs and the analysis of the network structure. Our framework employs techniques from statistical modeling and active learning to effectively generate test cases for DNN safety testing and performance analysis. We will present results of a case study on a physics-based Deep recurrent residual neural network (DR-RNN), which has been trained to emulate the aerodynamics behavior of a fixed-wing aircraft.

Deep Neural networks↗

Small CaH{sub 2} Moderated Thermal Reactor for Surface Power Generation II: Core Neutronics Design

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is considering to adopt a small nuclear reactor for the planned Mars surface mission. The required specifications of the reactor system are: 10- to 100-kW electric power with power density above 5 We/kg; 8-year stable operation. In the proposed study, stretch goals for this surface power system were set as: electric power of 20 kWe with total system weight below 1000 kg. Furthermore, nuclear security and nuclear safety in the case of launch accidents must be considered for surface power systems, therefore, selecting low enriched uranium (LEU, = 20 wt% of {sup 235}U/U) is preferable due to its lower criticality. However, the reactor core weight tends to increase in the case of a reactor with LEU fuel, because relatively larger-mass core is required to achieve the critical. The essential feature of the space reactor core neutronics design is to balance between the nuclear security and safety, and the mass reduction of the core. Some feasible methods to reduce the core mass in the case of the LEU core are: (1) optimized neutron moderation, (2) reduce neutron leakage, and (3) increase multiplication of neutron. A solid moderator has been proposed by Kimura et.al.: neutron leakage control and neutron multiplicity will be featured in the current study. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advances in Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment and an Unsaturated Alluvium Reference Case

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Depat ment of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (OFCT) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high level nuclear waste (HLW). Two high priorities for SFWST disposal R&D are design concept development and disposal system modeling (DOE 2011, Table 6). These priorities are directly addressed in the SFWST Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) work package, which is charged with developing a disposal system modeling and analysis capability for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. This report describes specific GDSA activities in fiscal year 2018 (FY 2018) toward the development of GDSA Framework, an enhanced disposal system modeling and analysis capability for geologic disposal of nuclear waste. GDSA Framework employs the PFLOTRAN thermal-hydrologic-chemical multiphysics code (Hammond et al. 2011a; Lichtner and Hammond 2012) and the Dakota uncertainty sampling and propagation code (Adams et al. 2012; Adams et al. 2013). Each code is designed for massivelyparallel processing in a high-performance computing (HPC) environment. Multi-physics representations in PFLOTRAN are used to simulate various coupled processes including heat flow, fluid flow, waste dissolution, radionuclide release, radionuclide decay and ingrowth, precipitation and dissolution of secondary phases, and radionuclide transport through engineered barriers and natural geologic barriers to the biosphere. Dakota is used to generate sets of representative realizations and to analyze parameter sensitivity.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developmental study of advanced HIS design method for digital I and C+HMIT of PWR plant - 277

A new conceptual frame of how to design and validate a digital HIS (human interface system) on an innovative numerical simulation basis is proposed for the support of plant operators' supervisory control of various types of automated complex NPPs (nuclear power plants). The proposed conceptual framework utilizes the object-oriented software for plant DiD (defense-in depth) risk monitor with the combination of nuclear reactor accident simulation by an advanced nuclear safety analysis code RELAP5/MOD4. The conceptual frame proposed in this paper will be applied for an example practice for the SBLOCA (small break loss of coolant accident) case of passive safety PWR (pressurized water reactor) AP1000. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrated Operations for Nuclear: Work Reduction Opportunity Demonstration Strategy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Plant Modernization Pathway has been working with industry for a number of years to leverage digital technology to extend the life and improve the performance of the existing fleet through modernized technologies and improved processes for plant operation and power generation. This includes development of modernization solutions to improve reliability and economic performance while addressing US nuclear industry’s aging and obsolescence challenges. The objective of these efforts is to deliver a sustainable business model that enables US nuclear industry to remain competitive. Digital Infrastructure (DI) research has established a technical foundation for these efforts. This effort began with technical analysis and support for a safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) pilot upgrade being performed at Constellation Energy Generation’s Limerick Nuclear Plant. The following publicly available reports were produced as part of this effort. • INL/EXT-20-61079, Vendor-Independent Design Requirements for a Boiling Water Reactor Safety System Upgrade [1] • INL/EXT-20-59371, Business Case Analysis for Digital Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control System Modernizations [2] • INL/EXT-20-59809, “Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Pilot Upgrade: Initial Scoping Phase Implementation Report and Lessons Learned [3] • INL/RPT-23-72105, Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Upgrade: Conceptual – Detailed Design Phase Report and Lessons Learned [4]

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Transport of radioactive ion beams and related safety issues: The {sup 132}Sn{sup +} case study

The transport of intense radioactive ion beam currents requires a careful design in order to limit the beam losses, the contamination and thus the dose rates. Some investigations based on numerical models and calculations have been performed in the framework of the SPIRAL 2 project to evaluate the performance of a low energy beam transport line located between the isotope separation on line (ISOL) production cell and the experiment areas. The paper presents the results of the transverse phase-space analysis, the beam losses assessment, the resulting contamination, and radioactivity levels. They show that reasonable beam transmission, emittance growth, and dose rates can be achieved considering the current standards.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Regulatory Oversight of the Legacy Gunner Uranium Mine and Mill Site in Northern Saskatchewan, Canada - 13434

As Canada's nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is responsible for licensing all aspects of uranium mining, including remediation activities at legacy sites. Since these sites already existed when the current legislation came into force in 2000, and the previous legislation did not apply, they present a special case. The Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), was written with cradle-to- grave oversight in mind. Applying the NSCA at the end of a 'facilities' life-cycle poses some challenges to both the regulator and the proponent. When the proponent is the public sector, even more challenges can present themselves. Although the licensing process for legacy sites is no different than for any other CNSC license, assuring regulatory compliance can be more complicated. To demonstrate how the CNSC has approached the oversight of legacy sites the history of the Commission's involvement with the Gunnar uranium mine and mill site provides a good case study. The lessons learned from the CNSC's experience regulating the Gunnar site will benefit those in the future who will need to regulate legacy sites under existing or new legislation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MASTODON: An Open-Source Software for Seismic Analysis and Risk Assessment of Critical Infrastructure

Seismic analysis and risk assessment of safety-critical infrastructure like hospitals, nuclear power plants, dams, and facilities handling radioactive materials involve computationally intensive numerical models and coupled multiphysics scenarios. They are also performed in a strict regulatory environment that requires high software quality assurance standards, and in the case of safety-related nuclear facilities, a conformance to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA-1) standard. This paper introduces the open-source finite-element software, MASTODON (Multi-hazard Analysis of Stochastic Time-Domain Phenomena), which implements state-of-the-art seismic analysis and risk assessment tools in a quality-controlled environment. MASTODON is built on MOOSE (Multi-physics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment), which is a highly parallelizable, NQA-1 conforming, coupled multiphysics, finite-element framework developed at Idaho National Laboratory. MASTODON is capable of fault rupture and source-to-site wave propagation using the domain reduction method, nonlinear site response, and soil-structure interaction analysis, implicit and explicit time integration, automated stochastic simulations, and seismic probabilistic risk assessment. When coupled with other MOOSE applications, MASTODON can also solve strongly and weakly coupled multiphysics problems. This paper presents a summary of the capabilities of MASTODON and some demonstrative examples.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Structural Design of a 1/5th Scale Gravo-Aeroelastically Scaled Wind Turbine Demonstrator Blade for Field Testing

This paper presents the structural design of a 21-meter 1/5th scale SUMR demonstrator (SUMR-D) blade, which was designed to replicate the full-scale behavior of a 104-meter SUMR13 initial blade rated at 13.2 MW. This is a challenging structural design as two competing objectives were required including the traditional safety objectives and novel scaling objectives based on gravo-aeroelastic scaling (GAS) requirements. To satisfy the two competing requirements, the spar cap, shear webs and materials were optimized while also ensuring a manufacturable and cost-effective design solution. Based on the wind turbine operating conditions of the test site, which is the NWTC, the blade was analyzed under the extreme loading case and corresponding safety factors were applied. The final blade model had an acceptable maximum strain, buckling performance, and displayed a safe level of deflection under the extreme loading condition. The flutter speed and fatigue life of the blade were also vetted. The mode shape was analyzed for the installation of the blade sensors. This paper documents the structural design process of SUMR-D to achieve both the safety and scaling objectives. At the end, we provide an acceptable solution to control blade mass, limiting the blade deflection, blade max strain and buckling under extreme loading condition by optimizing spar cap, shear web, and core materials while satisfying scaling requirements.

17 WIND ENERGY↗