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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2016

Covariance Manipulation for Conjunction Assessment

The manipulation of space object covariances to try to provide additional or improved information to conjunction risk assessment is not an uncommon practice. Types of manipulation include fabricating a covariance when it is missing or unreliable to force the probability of collision (Pc) to a maximum value ('PcMax'), scaling a covariance to try to improve its realism or see the effect of covariance volatility on the calculated Pc, and constructing the equivalent of an epoch covariance at a convenient future point in the event ('covariance forecasting'). In bringing these methods to bear for Conjunction Assessment (CA) operations, however, some do not remain fully consistent with best practices for conducting risk management, some seem to be of relatively low utility, and some require additional information before they can contribute fully to risk analysis. This study describes some basic principles of modern risk management (following the Kaplan construct) and then examines the PcMax and covariance forecasting paradigms for alignment with these principles; it then further examines the expected utility of these methods in the modern CA framework. Both paradigms are found to be not without utility, but only in situations that are somewhat carefully circumscribed.

Conjunction↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development of Risk Assessment Matrix for NASA Engineering and Safety Center

This paper describes a study, which had as its principal goal the development of a sufficiently detailed 5 x 5 Risk Matrix Scorecard. The purpose of this scorecard is to outline the criteria by which technical issues can be qualitatively and initially prioritized. The tool using this score card has been proposed to be one of the information resources the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) takes into consideration when making decisions with respect to incoming information on safety concerns across the entire NASA agency. The contents of this paper discuss in detail each element of the risk matrix scorecard, definitions for those elements and the rationale behind the development of those definitions. This scorecard development was performed in parallel with the tailoring of the existing Futron Corporation Integrated Risk Management Application (IRMA) software tool. IRMA was tailored to fit NESC needs for evaluating incoming safety concerns and was renamed NESC Assessment Risk Management Application (NAFMA) which is still in developmental phase.

Malone, Roy W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
DOE OSTI2024

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2006

Another Approach to Enhance Airline Safety: Using Management Safety Tools

The ultimate goal of conducting an accident investigation is to prevent similar accidents from happening again and to make operations safer system-wide. Based on the findings extracted from the investigation, the "lesson learned" becomes a genuine part of the safety database making risk management available to safety analysts. The airline industry is no exception. In the US, the FAA has advocated the usage of the System Safety concept in enhancing safety since 2000. Yet, in today s usage of System Safety, the airline industry mainly focuses on risk management, which is a reactive process of the System Safety discipline. In order to extend the merit of System Safety and to prevent accidents beforehand, a specific System Safety tool needs to be applied; so a model of hazard prediction can be formed. To do so, the authors initiated this study by reviewing 189 final accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) covering FAR Part 121 scheduled operations. The discovered accident causes (direct hazards) were categorized into 10 groups Flight Operations, Ground Crew, Turbulence, Maintenance, Foreign Object Damage (FOD), Flight Attendant, Air Traffic Control, Manufacturer, Passenger, and Federal Aviation Administration. These direct hazards were associated with 36 root factors prepared for an error-elimination model using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a leading tool for System Safety experts. An FTA block-diagram model was created, followed by a probability simulation of accidents. Five case studies and reports were provided in order to fully demonstrate the usefulness of System Safety tools in promoting airline safety.

Lu, Chien-tsug↗
DOE OSTI2021

Vind: A Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chain Provenance Framework for Energy Delivery Systems

Enterprise-level energy delivery systems (EDSs) depend on different software or hardware vendors to achieve operational efficiency. Critical components of these systems are typically manufactured and integrated by overseas suppliers, which expands the attack surface to adversaries with additional opportunities to infiltrate into EDSs. Due to this reason, the risk management of the EDS supply chain is crucial to ensure that we are knowledgeable about the vulnerabilities in software and hardware components that comprise any critical part, quantifiable risk metrics to assess the severity and exploitability of the attack, and provide remediation solutions that can influence a prioritized mitigation plan. There is a need to realize cyber supply chain risk management for industrial control systems’ hardware, software, and computing and networking services associated with bulk electric system (BES) operations. This article proposes a blockchain-based cyber supply chain provenance platform (“Vind”) for EDSs to realize data provenance in a cyber supply chain ecosystem.

Bandara, Eranga↗
DOE OSTI2020

Effects of social structure and management on risk of disease establishment in wild pigs

Contact heterogeneity among hosts determines invasion and spreading dynamics of infectious disease, thus its characterization is essential for identifying effective disease control strategies. Yet, little is known about the factors shaping contact networks in many 28 wildlife species and how wildlife management actions might affect contact networks. Wild pigs in North America are an invasive, socially-structured species that pose a health concern for domestic swine given their ability to transmit numerous devastating diseases 2 such as African swine fever (ASF). Using proximity loggers and GPS data from 48 wild pigs in Florida and South Carolina, USA, we employed a probabilistic framework to estimate weighted contact networks. We determined the effects of sex, social group, and spatial distribution (monthly home range overlap and distance) on wild pig contact. We also estimated the impacts of management-induced perturbations on contact and inferred their effects on ASF establishment in wild pigs with simulation. Social group membership was the primary factor influencing contacts. Between-group contacts depended primarily on space use characteristics, with fewer contacts among groups separated by >2 km and no contacts among groups >4 km apart within a month. Modeling ASF dynamics on the contact network demonstrated that indirect contacts resulting from baiting (a typical method of attracting wild pigs or game species to a site to enhance recreational hunting) increased the risk of disease establishment by ~33% relative to direct contact. Low-intensity population reduction (<5.9% of the population) had no detectable impact on contact structure but reduced predicted ASF establishment risk relative to no population reduction. Here, we demonstrate an approach for understanding the relative role of spatial, social, and individual-level characteristics in shaping contact networks and predicting their effects on disease establishment risk, thus providing insight for optimizing disease control in spatially- and socially-structured wildlife species.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Life Sciences at NASA: Spaceflight Health Policy and Standards

In January 2005, the President proposed a new initiative, the Vision for Space Exploration. To accomplish the goals within the vision for space exploration, physicians and researchers at Johnson Space Center are establishing spaceflight health standards. These standards include fitness for duty criteria (FFD), permissible exposure limits (PELs), and permissible outcome limits (POLs). POLs delineate an acceptable maximum decrement or change in a physiological or behavioral parameter, as the result of exposure to the space environment. For example cardiovascular fitness for duty standards might be a measurable clinical parameter minimum that allows successful performance of all required duties. An example of a permissible exposure limit for radiation might be the quantifiable limit of exposure over a given length of time (e.g. life time radiation exposure). An example of a permissible outcome limit might be the length of microgravity exposure that would minimize bone loss. The purpose of spaceflight health standards is to promote operational and vehicle design requirements, aid in medical decision making during space missions, and guide the development of countermeasures. Standards will be based on scientific and clinical evidence including research findings, lessons learned from previous space missions, studies conducted in space analog environments, current standards of medical practices, risk management data, and expert recommendations. To focus the research community on the needs for exploration missions, NASA has developed the Bioastronautics Roadmap. The Bioastronautics Roadmap, NASA's approach to identification of risks to human space flight, revised baseline was released in February 2005. This document was reviewed by the Institute of Medicine in November 2004 and the final report was received in October 2005. The roadmap defines the most important research and operational needs that will be used to set policy, standards (define acceptable risk), and implement an overall Risk Management and Analysis process. Currently NASA is drafting spaceflight health standards for neurosensory alterations, space radiation exposure, behavioral health, muscle atrophy, cardiovascular fitness, immunological compromise, bone demineralization, and nutrition.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Risk as a Resource: A New Paradigm

In the new NASA, risk management must be developed as a skill to a far greater degree than has existed in the past. Past approaches have produced great successes but at great cost and lengthy schedules. In the future, risk and its component contributors must be re-evaluated. There are three contexts of risk that will be addressed in this paper: risk as a resource, which expands and shifts traditional risk considerations; marginal cost of risk, which addresses the cumulative and time related effects of risk reduction; and an alternative definition or new meaning of success and how it relates to work.

risk management risk success mission risk↗
NASA NTRS2015

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program Lessons Learned

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the COTS Program. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

COTS↗
NASA NTRS2005

Qualification Strategies of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) for Space Application

This viewgraph document reviews the issue of using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in Space Application, and the some of the strategies for qualifying the FPGA. Qualification and risk management of such complex systems requires new approaches. The paper presents a matrix approach to qualification has been presented that: - Complements historical specifications - Highlights the importance of device physics as a cornerstone to qualification. - Provides levels of risk management that expressly document trade offs. - Stresses the role of the FPGA vendor as team member in the development of modern spacecraft.

Mil Standard 883↗
NASA NTRS2011

Ares Knowledge Capture: Summary and Key Themes Presentation

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the MSFC Chief Engineers Office. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Ares Knowledge↗
NASA NTRS2013

Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from Solar Array Structures and Mechanisms Deployment

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Engineering Directorate at LaRC. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Solar Array Structures↗
DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

CalWave - Reports and Plans for xWave Device Demonstration at PacWave South Site

CalWave has developed a submerged pressure differential type Wave Energy Converter (WEC) architecture called xWave. The single body device oscillates submerged, is positively buoyant, and taut moored to the sea floor and integrates novel features such as absorber submergence depth control. Since participation in the US Wave Energy Prize, CalWave has evolved the design and successfully concluded a scaled 10-month open ocean pilot. CalWave recently concluded the final design phase of a scaled up WEC version for PacWave and started component order/build of the WEC towards the grid-connected demonstration at PacWave. Documentation and data here includes: a system certification plan, a risk registry in the form of an FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) table, an updated LCOE content model, a report on performance metrics, and a risk management plan.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗
NASA NTRS1993

Software reliability through fault-avoidance and fault-tolerance

Strategies and tools for the testing, risk assessment and risk control of dependable software-based systems were developed. Part of this project consists of studies to enable the transfer of technology to industry, for example the risk management techniques for safety-concious systems. Theoretical investigations of Boolean and Relational Operator (BRO) testing strategy were conducted for condition-based testing. The Basic Graph Generation and Analysis tool (BGG) was extended to fully incorporate several variants of the BRO metric. Single- and multi-phase risk, coverage and time-based models are being developed to provide additional theoretical and empirical basis for estimation of the reliability and availability of large, highly dependable software. A model for software process and risk management was developed. The use of cause-effect graphing for software specification and validation was investigated. Lastly, advanced software fault-tolerance models were studied to provide alternatives and improvements in situations where simple software fault-tolerance strategies break down.

Vouk, Mladen A.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2022

Environmental Justice Needs Assessment for Disasters: Assessing the Landscape and Capacity of Organizations & Communities Working Towards Environmental Justice with Potential to Use NASA Earth Observations to Support Equitable Disaster Management and Risk Reduction

Natural disasters pose an increasing risk to communities worldwide. Marginalized populations, in particular, experience compounding vulnerabilities that contribute to unequal burdens of natural hazards as a result of systemic inequality stemming from historical disenfranchisement, disinvestment, and discriminatory policies such as racial redlining. This project connected with community organizations working at the intersection of environmental justice (EJ) and natural disaster management throughout the United States, to assess how NASA DEVELOP can leverage geospatial science to advance EJ efforts. Our team conducted a landscape analysis, which included a literature review, annotated bibliography, and identification of organizations working in EJ and disasters. We engaged EJ organizations in discussions to understand their current resources, challenges, and geospatial needs to inform how DEVELOP and NASA Applied Sciences can support their EJ and disaster work. Findings were compiled in a synthesis report and visualized in an ArcGIS StoryMap to showcase the work of EJ organizations, provide geospatial resources for them to explore, and provide examples of how remote sensing can be utilized in EJ and disasters work. The knowledge gained and end products created support the integration of EJ in future DEVELOP projects, and the expanded use of Earth observations by communities in support of a more just tomorrow.

Julianne Liu↗