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At least 343 records · Page 19

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

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Results for the January 2023 Semiannual Tank 50 Salt Solution Sample

In this Technical Report, the chemical and radionuclide contaminant results from the January 2023 Semiannual sample of Tank 50 salt solution are presented in tabulated form. The information from this characterization will be used by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC) for the transfer of aqueous waste from Tank 50 to the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF), where the waste will be treated and disposed in the Saltstone Disposal Facility. This Technical Report compares results, where applicable, to SPF Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) LIMITS and TARGETS that were established at the time the Tank 50 sample was obtained.1 The chemical and radionuclide contaminant results from the characterization of the January 2023 semiannual sampling of Tank 50 were requested by SRMC personnel via a Task Technical Request (TTR)2 and details of the testing are presented in the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP).3 This Technical Report is part of Deliverable 2 relating to Task 1 from the SRMC request.2 Data pertaining to the regulatory limits for Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals per Task 2 from the SRMC request will be obtained semiannually for the January 2023 and July 2023 Tank 50 samples.

Crawford, Charles L.↗

Expediting Groundwater Sampling at Hanford and Making It Safer - 13158

The CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) manages the groundwater monitoring programs at the Department of Energy's 586-square-mile Hanford site in southeastern Washington state. These programs are regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The purpose of monitoring is to track existing groundwater contamination from past practices, as well as other potential contamination that might originate from RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities. An integral part of the groundwater-monitoring program involves taking samples of the groundwater and measuring the water levels in wells scattered across the site. Each year, more than 1,500 wells are accessed for a variety of reasons. Historically, the monitoring activities have been very 'people intensive'. Field personnel or 'samplers' have been issued pre-printed forms showing information about the well(s) for a particular sampling evolution. This information is taken from two official electronic databases: the Hanford Well Information System (HWIS) and the Hanford Environmental Information System (HEIS). The samplers traditionally used these hardcopy forms to document the groundwater samples and well water-levels. After recording the entries in the field, the samplers turned the forms in at the end of the day and other personnel posted the collected information. In Automating Groundwater Sampling at Hanford (HNF-38542-FP Revision 0, Presented at Waste Management 2009 Conference, March 1 - March 5, 2009, Phoenix, AZ), we described the methods, tools, and techniques that would be used in automating the activities associated with measuring water levels. The Field Logging and Electronic Data Gathering (FLEDG) application/database that automates collecting the water-level measurement data has now been implemented at Hanford. In addition to eliminating the need to print out documents, the system saves three-to-four man days each month for the field personnel taking the measurements and the scientists and administrators managing the data and the documentation. After the information has received technical review, FLEDG automatically updates the database for water-level measurements and loads the document management system with the completed sampling report. Due to safety considerations, access to wells is conditional. A spreadsheet with appropriate data not only lists the wells that are cleared for work, but also the safety personnel who must be present before work can start. This spreadsheet is used in planning daily activities. Daily plans are structured to ensure that the wells to be sampled are cleared for work and the appropriate safety personnel have been assigned and are present before the work starts. Historically, the spreadsheets have been prepared manually, and as a result, are potentially subject to human error. However, a companion database application has been developed to work with FLEDG - making the entire sampling process more efficient and safer for personnel. The Well Access List - Electronic, WAL-E, is a database that contains much the same information that was previously manually loaded into the spread sheet. In addition, WAL-E contains a managed work-flow application that shows the access requirements and allows for appropriate reviews of the compiled well. Various CHPRC organizations, including Industrial Hygiene, RADCON, and Well Maintenance and Sample Administration are able to enter and review the wells added or deleted from the WAL-E database. The FLEDG system then accesses this database information to identify appropriate support personnel and provide safety requirements to field personnel. In addition, WAL-E offers the assurance that wells have appropriate locks and are correctly labeled and electrically grounded as required, before well activities begin. This feature is an extremely important aspect of the FLEDG/WAL-E system because it adds another safety check to the work evolution and reduces the potential for unsafe conditions to exist that would lead to a stop-work situation. This paper will further describe the technical aspects of both electronic programs/databases and their successful application at Hanford. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

An Exploration of Mercury Soils Treatment Technologies for the Y-12 Plant - 13217

There are a number of areas at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that have been contaminated with mercury due to historical mercury use and storage. Remediation of these areas is expected to generate large volumes of waste that are Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) characteristically hazardous. These soils will require treatment to meet RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) prior to disposal. URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) performed a feasibility assessment to evaluate on-site and off-site options for the treatment and disposal of mercury-contaminated soil from the Y-12 Site. The focus of the feasibility assessment was on treatment for disposal at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) located on the Oak Ridge Reservation. A two-phase approach was used in the evaluation process of treatment technologies. Phase 1 involved the selection of three vendors to perform treatability studies using their stabilization treatment technology on actual Y-12 soil. Phase II involved a team of waste management specialists performing an in-depth literature review of all available treatment technologies for treating mercury contaminated soil using the following evaluation criteria: effectiveness, feasibility of implementation, and cost. The result of the treatability study and the literature review revealed several viable on-site and off-site treatment options. This paper presents the methodology used by the team in the evaluation of technologies especially as related to EMWMF waste acceptance criteria, the results of the physical treatability studies, and a regulatory analysis for obtaining regulator approval for the treatment/disposal at the EMWMF. (authors)

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Sodium Components Maintenance Shop (SCMS) Carbonation Vessel – Partial HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification Report

This report documents the Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA)/ Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Partial Closure Certification of the Sodium Components Maintenance Shop (SCMS) Carbonation Vessel. The HWMA/RCRA Closure followed the multi step review and evaluation closure process identified in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) HWMA/RCRA Partial Permit Closure Plan, October 1, 2015. This closure certification report documents that the SCMS Carbonation Vessel was removed from the SCMS, packaged as hazardous waste and stored for future treatment and disposal, and therefore has met the closure performance standards in accordance with the Department of Energy Idaho National Laboratory Materials and Fuels Complex HWMA/RCRA Partial Permit Closure Plan (EPA No. ID4890008952, October 1, 2015).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Groundwater Monitoring Report Generation Tools - 12005

Compliance with National and State environmental regulations (e.g. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) aka SuperFund) requires Savannah River Site (SRS) to extensively collect and report groundwater monitoring data, with potential fines for missed reporting deadlines. Several utilities have been developed at SRS to facilitate production of the regulatory reports which include maps, data tables, charts and statistics. Components of each report are generated in accordance with complex sets of regulatory requirements specific to each site monitored. SRS developed a relational database to incorporate the detailed reporting rules with the groundwater data, and created a set of automation tools to interface with the information and generate the report components. These process improvements enhanced quality and consistency by centralizing the information, and have reduced manpower and production time through automated efficiencies. (author)

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Full Focus Needed on Finishing Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant - 12196

The United States Department of Energy's (US DOE's) Hanford Nuclear Site has 177 underground waste storage tanks located 19 to 24 km (12 to 15 miles) from the Columbia River in south-central Washington State. Hanford's tanks now hold about 212,000 cu m (56 million gallons) of highly radioactive and chemically hazardous waste. Sixty-seven tanks have leaked an estimated 3,785 cu m (1 million gallons) of this waste into the surrounding soil. Further releases to soil, groundwater, and the Columbia River are the inevitable result of the tanks continuing to age. The risk from this waste is recognized as a threat to the Northwest by both State and Federal governments. US DOE and Bechtel National, Inc., are building the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) to treat and vitrify (immobilize in glass) the waste from Hanford's tanks. As is usual for any groundbreaking project, problems have arisen that must be resolved as they occur if treatment is to take place as specified in the court-enforceable Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) and the Consent Decree, entered into by US DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology). At times, US DOE's approach to solving these critical issues seems to have caused undue wastes of time, energy, and, ultimately, public funds. Upon reviewing the history of Hanford's tank waste treatment project, Ecology hopes that constructive criticism of past failures and praise of successes will inspire US DOE to consider changing practices, be more transparent with regulatory agencies and the public, and take a 'lean production' approach to successfully completing this project. All three Tri-Party Agreement agencies share the goal of completing WTP on time, ensuring it is operational and in compliance with safety standards. To do this, Ecology believes US DOE should: - Maintain focus on the primary goal of completing the five major facilities of WTP. - Construct a supplemental low-activity waste (LAW) vitrification facility for the two-thirds balance of LAW that will not be treated by the vitrification facility under construction. - Prepare infrastructure for waste feed from the tanks and facilities to handle the WTP waste streams. To support this project track, Ecology expedites dangerous waste permitting by using a design-build approach to integrate WTP into the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit for Hanford. (authors)

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Cementitious Grout for Closing SRS High Level Waste Tanks - 12315

In 1997, the first two United States Department of Energy (US DOE) high level waste tanks (Tanks 17-F and 20-F: Type IV, single shell tanks) were taken out of service (permanently closed) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). In 2012, the DOE plans to remove from service two additional Savannah River Site (SRS) Type IV high-level waste tanks, Tanks 18-F and 19-F. These tanks were constructed in the late 1950's and received low-heat waste and do not contain cooling coils. Operational closure of Tanks 18-F and 19-F is intended to be consistent with the applicable requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and will be performed in accordance with South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). The closure will physically stabilize two 4.92E+04 cubic meter (1.3 E+06 gallon) carbon steel tanks and isolate and stabilize any residual contaminants left in the tanks. Ancillary equipment abandoned in the tanks will also be filled to the extent practical. A Performance Assessment (PA) has been developed to assess the long-term fate and transport of residual contamination in the environment resulting from the operational closure of the F-Area Tank Farm (FTF) waste tanks. Next generation flowable, zero-bleed cementitious grouts were designed, tested, and specified for closing Tanks 18-F and 19-F and for filling the abandoned equipment. Fill requirements were developed for both the tank and equipment grouts. All grout formulations were required to be alkaline with a pH of 12.4 and to be chemically reducing with a reduction potential (Eh) of -200 to -400. Grouts with this chemistry stabilize potential contaminants of concern. This was achieved by including Portland cement and Grade 100 slag in the mixes, respectively. Ingredients and proportions of cementitious reagents were selected and adjusted to support the mass placement strategy developed by Savannah River Remediation (SRR) Closure Operations. Subsequent down selection was based on compressive strength and saturated hydraulic conductivity results. Fresh slurry property results were used as the first level of screening. A high range water reducing admixture and a viscosity modifying admixture were used to adjust slurry properties to achieve flowable grouts. Adiabatic calorimeter results were used as the second level screening. The third level of screening was used to design mixes that were consistent with the fill material parameters used in the F-Tank Farm Performance Assessment which was developed to assess the long-term fate and transport of residual contamination in the environment resulting from the operational closures. The cement and slag contents of a mix selected for filling Tanks 18-F and 19-F should be limited to no more than 125 and 210 lbs/cyd, respectively, to limit the heat generated as the result of hydration reaction during curing and thereby enable mass pour placement. Trial mixes with water to total cementitious materials ratios of 0.550 to 0.580 and 125 lbs/cyd of cement and 210 lbs/cyd of slag met the strength and permeability requirements. Mix LP no.8-16 was selected for closing SRS Tanks 18-F and 19-F because it meets or exceeds the design requirements with the least amount of Portland cement and blast furnace slag. This grout is expected to flow at least 45 feet. A single point of discharge should be sufficient for unrestricted flow conditions. However, additional entry points should be identified as back-up in case restrictions in the tank impede flow. The LP no.8 series of trial mixes had surprisingly high design compressive strengths (2000 to 4000/5000 psi) which were achieved at extended curing times (28 to 90 days, respectively) given the small amount of Portland cement in the mixes (100 to 185 lbs/cyd). The grouts were flowable structural fills containing 3/8 inch gravel and concrete sand aggregate. These grouts did not segregate and require no compaction. They have low permeabilities (≤ 10{sup -9} cm/s) and are consequently expected to be very durable. This series of trial mixes contained by-product materials, i.e., slag and Class F fly ash, and an admixture system initially specified for the grouts used to close Tanks 17-F and 20-F at SRS. The mix designs have low CO{sub 2} footprints because Portland cement contents are very low and can be considered environmentally friendly. (authors)

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Long-Term Stewardship at Hanford - 17023

The Hanford Site's Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program is responsible for 220 square miles of the Site's River Corridor, which includes 1,527 waste sites, 6 Manhattan Project Era production reactors that have been placed in interim safe storage, and 46 miles of Columbia River shoreline. More than 24,000 cleanup and historic documents have been identified, indexed, and tagged in the LTS records and document libraries. The LTS program, operated by the Mission Support Alliance, LLC (MSA) manages and provides surveillance and maintenance of facilities and institutional controls and all associated monitoring to ensure continued protectiveness of human health and the environment. Since 2010, through collaborative efforts with DOE and its prime contractors, land in 14 geographic areas and six cocooned reactor facilities were transitioned (mid-contract) from the River Corridor Closure Contractor to the LTS program. This accomplishment relied heavily on Site contractors and DOE working together to address challenges. Other stakeholders were informed of LTS progress through the Hanford LTS web site, presentations, and briefings. Hanford's LTS program is responsible for ensuring the protectiveness of cleanup remedies and the management of institutional controls once cleanup objectives have been achieved. LTS accomplishes this by adhering to post-cleanup requirements specified in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) cleanup decision documents. The LTS program conducted inspection and surveillance and maintenance (S and M) activities of the cocooned 105-F Reactor in October 2014 and the other five reactors in 2015 and 2016. Reactor entries and internal inspections typically are conducted at 5-year intervals to assess the condition of the structures and evaluate potential deterioration of the reactor core, shield walls, and roof. The cocooning process is designed to protect the reactor for 75 years while radioactive decay continues, ultimately making the structures safe for demolition and removal. The results of the recent 5-year inspections allowed DOE to negotiate an extended 10-year inspection cycle, which led to a $5 million avoidance in lifecycle inspection costs. Hanford's LTS program is successfully shifting from a program focused on transitioning land and waste sites to a program focused on data management and S and M activities for those buildings and waste sites within the program. This paper will highlight the accomplishments and collaborative efforts in addressing the challenges faced by Hanford's LTS program. (authors)

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Streamlining and Transparently Automating Complex Waste Determinations at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17286

Environmental programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) generate a large amount of sampling activities that can result in waste that needs to be characterized and properly disposed. Since 2011, sampling results are managed in the cloud-based Environmental Information Management (EIM) database, which contains over 16 million current and historical data records. In many cases, the database's analytical records are used to characterize and dispose waste from environmental operations. Three factors contribute to streamlining of the waste disposition operations: (1) if possible, use of the existing analytical data for waste characterization to avoid additional laboratory analysis; (2) reduction in time spent on data evaluation for various waste acceptance criteria; and (3) choice of the proper and least expensive disposal alternative. Use of the existing analytical data, when allowed by law, creates some paradoxical problems: when chemical analysis is requested with the purpose of characterizing waste, it creates only 100 to 400 analytical records. However, use of exiting analytical data at LANL may lead to evaluation of tens of thousands of analytical records, with many records for each single analyte. This occurs because data were collected for environmental characterization and not waste characterization. To streamline data analysis for waste disposition using existing data, LANL has created a Waste Data Summary (WDS) module in the site's EIM database. Recognizing that waste determination is performed by groups outside the environmental program at LANL, the WDS allows for logically guided data selection for a specific waste determination (solids, liquids, radiological, etc.) and reduces potentially thousands of rows of data into simple formatted data reports that are easy to comprehend and process. This allows the waste evaluators to review data using multiple approaches to make their own determination on the most appropriate disposal method. There are four basic principles of WDS operation: (1) The highest detected analytical result is evaluated for the selected samples (or the lowest undetected result if there are no detected results); (2) All approved disposal pathways are evaluated; (3) Any failures of the Waste Acceptance Criteria are visibly highlighted to focus the attention of the evaluator; and (4) The decision of the disposal path is left to the trained waste evaluator (WDS does not choose or suggest any disposal paths). The summary results are presented as the set of short data reports. These reports can be divided into two groups: general comparison reports and disposal pathway specific forms. The general comparison forms show all Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) analytes with pass/fail evaluation and with preference for toxicity characteristic leaching procedure (TCLP) results (or 20x rule) for solid samples, the potential RCRA hazard codes assignment for detected analytes, and all rad results. The detected chemical and radioactivity results are compared to the background values and to Soil Screening and Soil Action limits (SSL/SAL limits). Disposal pathway specific forms follow Waste Acceptance Criteria requirements for all disposal pathways available at LANL. The programming of the WDS tries to maximize existing data by analyte substitutions (like using gross alpha for necessary alpha emitting isotopes) or by making calculations when analytical results do not agree with legal requirements (like total chlordane in the RCRA regulations, which is most often analyzed and reported as individual isomers). All forms may be annotated by the waste evaluator to provide additional information to support decision making. Upon final decision of a disposal path, the complete dataset used in the evaluation and the WDS forms with annotations is 'frozen' as an un-editable PDF export to document the data used in the waste disposal determination. The streamlined process results in less work for waste evaluators and reduces overall labor and analytical costs. By comparison, a full review of a 10,000 record parent dataset may take a waste evaluator over a week to review, whereas with the WDS module, the task can be accomplished in less than one hour with clear, reproducible results. These results can be reviewed and checked at any time by quality assurance personnel, thus ensuring transparency in the decision making process. LANL believes this approach has broad applicability to other sites where waste determination is based on review of existing data collected for more generalized environmental purposes. (authors)

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Defining Nature and Extent of Contamination for the Waste Management Area C RCRA Corrective Action Process at the Hanford Site in Southeast Washington - 17403

Determination of the nature and extent of contamination is a critical task in any Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Facility Investigation. Nature and extent are typically defined through field investigation results. In some cases, however, physical and/or programmatic limitations on field work can impede efforts to define nature and extent based on field work alone. Both physical and programmatic restrictions affected efforts to characterize soil contamination at Waste Management Area C, on the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site. As a result, fate and transport modeling was undertaken to enhance the definition of the nature and extent of soil contamination at Waste Management Area C. (authors)

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Macro-encapsulation as Manufactured Components for Disposal at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 16213

Macro-encapsulation as Manufactured is a relatively new terminology that supports the disposal of classified legacy weapon components at the Area 5 Disposal Cell at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These components are composed of hundreds and sometimes thousands of parts. Examples of this type of item include firing sets, trainers, radar assemblies, neutron generators and other similar components. Sometimes there are hazardous Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-regulated (RCRA) metals involved in the parts that make up the components. The typical regulated metals in the components can be lead and silver from circuit boards and wiring, cadmium or chromium from plating operations of the parts. To perform the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) components have to be completely disassembled and sanitized prior to being sent to laboratories for analysis. The results vary but the majority of times there are regulated metals present in these samples. The levels are relatively low and since analysis has been performed then a disposal process needs to be followed. A process needed to be developed and approved by governing boards to allow disposal of these items as long as this material meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) (No liquids, compressed gases, explosives, SNM, etc.) before being sent to the Nevada desert for disposal. (authors)

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Mechanical Failure Modes and Longevity of Geo-membranes - 16365

Estimates of the long-term performance of geo-synthetic liner and final cover components have traditionally relied on a small number of standard assumptions originally developed to address the needs of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle D solid waste industry. These past estimates demonstrated that, even under a series of highly conservative factors, the longevity of these components far exceeds the requirements for typical municipal solid waste (MSW) facilities. However, interest in the performance of these components for the disposal of low-level (LLW) and intermediate-level (ILW) radioactive waste landfills has led to additional study of geo-synthetic degradation to address longer assessment periods. These studies allow for the possibility of more rigorous, reliability-based risk assessments of landfill system performance. A particularly strong research need for LLW/ILW facilities is a complete enumeration of the various chemical and mechanical failures modes for geo-membranes serving as final cover and base liner barrier systems. For final covers, failure is defined as allowing an unacceptable flow of water into a containment system. Studies of the various mechanical modes of deformation and rupture for polyethylene sheet allow for a rigorous exploration of the potential causes of geo-membrane barrier system failure. Of particular interest in the performance assessment and engineering of these systems is the ability to use the resulting models to quantify the longevity of these systems with a probabilistic model. An example of this approach is used to illustrate how the consideration of the mechanism for stress cracking in final cover geo-membranes can be adapted for use in simulations of long-term landfill system performance. The results indicate that the effects of cover system design geometry and geo-membrane formulation on performance can be varied significantly by the cover system engineering to meet target performance goals. (authors)

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Unique Facilities, Innovative Treatment Processes, and a Talented Workforce Allow Fluor Idaho to Successfully Disposition Transuranic Waste - 18388

Fluor Idaho is utilizing state-of-the-art equipment, treatment technologies, and employee expertise at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Idaho Site to treat contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste, as well as extremely challenging remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste forms, to prepare the material for shipment and permanent disposal at the Department's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Nowhere else in the DOE Complex - perhaps the world - will one find the compilation of tools and an experienced workforce with an unparalleled history of safely retrieving, characterizing, treating, repackaging, certifying, and shipping TRU waste. Since 2003, the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) has used both conventional and unique retrieval concepts, high-tech characterization equipment - including real-time radiography and radioassay - robotics, and automated treatment processes to retrieve and treat 65,000 cubic meters of above-ground CH-TRU waste. Additionally, engineered controls and specialized personal protective equipment have allowed employees to make thousands of entries into high-radiation areas without a skin or clothing contamination incident - evidence of the employees' commitment to safety. AMWTP has encountered and found solutions for many challenging waste forms, including polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated wastes, TRU waste containers with up to 1,000 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239, oversized TRU boxes, and partially absorbed organic sludge waste. By utilizing additional facilities and equipment at the Accelerated Retrieval Project V and VII, Fluor Idaho has developed new processing lines and capabilities to ensure worker safety and milestone completion. These two soft-sided buildings, located at a facility adjacent to AMWTP, were originally constructed to exhume Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) TRU wastes from a section of a 97-acre landfill. After a total of 1,150 cubic meters of targeted waste were removed, personnel, working in collaboration with state regulators, successfully implemented a unique regulatory strategy that allowed these CERCLA facilities to be modified and permitted to treat Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) wastes from the AMWTP - a savings of tens of millions of dollars over the cost of constructing new buildings. Adding to the AMWTP's technological uniqueness is its ability to treat wastes from other facilities in the DOE Complex. Two prior decision documents and an agreement with the state of Idaho have allowed AMWTP to treat wastes from 15 other DOE sites. It is the only project in the complex to have done so. At another project located next to AMWTP, targeted waste exhumation within the Subsurface Disposal Area is approximately two years ahead of schedule. Crews have removed more than 8,600 cubic meters of CH-TRU and hazardous wastes from eight exhumation areas that equal a combined footprint of 4.75 acres. Less than one acre remains to be exhumed to satisfy the 2008 Record of Decision waste exhumation end state between the DOE, Environmental Protection Agency, and state of Idaho. Construction of the final building where targeted waste exhumation will continue was completed during the summer of 2017. Exhumation will be completed within the next few years. Following exhumation completion, an evapotranspiration barrier (or cap) will be constructed over the entire landfill. Fluor Idaho continues to make progress on a more challenging project involving an inventory of RH-TRU waste that also contains the reactive metal sodium. Crews are utilizing hot cells, once used for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and high-level waste treatment at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, to render this challenging waste form safe for disposal in a national geologic waste repository. The treatment methods being employed on this RH-TRU waste are unique in the DOE Complex. Minute concentrations of water are sprayed onto the sodium-contaminated material in a process called 'spritzing' to chemically change the sodium from a reactive metal to a non-reactive salt. In other cases, sodium-contaminated waste is dipped in water to initiate a reaction in a process called 'immersion.' Lastly, for more challenging waste shapes that could not be successfully treated with the two prior methods, crews lower the sodium-contaminated RH-TRU waste into a one-of-a-kind distillation unit that uses high temperature and vacuum to volatilize the sodium and recapture it in a condenser unit for disposal. The RH-TRU waste treated with this technology is then safe for permanent disposal. Fluor Idaho is proud to operate DOE's CH- and RH-TRU waste treatment facilities, as well as use innovative processes and its talented workforce to complete this important work-scope. Such capabilities allow the contractor to meet the commitments made by the DOE to the state of Idaho. (authors)

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Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Wastes Using the GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) Process - 18639

Decommissioning of sodium cooled reactors and fast reactor technologies have generated a number of reactive metal waste configurations that are problematic to treat and typically lack cost effective treatment methods and disposition options. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions, under contract with Idaho National Laboratory (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) demonstrated its GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} technology to safely convert sodium metal to a non-reactive vitrified oxide form. The demonstration project, supported by glass formulation and crucible testing, consisted of a series of ICV{sup TM} melts that processed elemental sodium into stable non-reactive glass. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC is evaluating the GeoMelt{sup R} technology as a means to safely and reliably convert radioactive reactive metal residues that contaminate components from sodium cooled reactors into waste forms that comply with existing disposition pathways. Reactive metal wastes at INL require treatment in order to remove the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactivity and ignitability characteristics in order to comply with land disposal restrictions. GeoMelt{sup R}, which is an alternative to other potential treatment approaches, provides a robust approach that chemically converts the reactive metals to an inert oxide while also immobilizing radionuclides in a vitrified waste form with durability equal to or better than vitrified nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (very robust and inert waste forms). Most other treatment approaches generate hydrogen gas which is problematic. In 2016, Veolia Nuclear Solutions demonstrated the effectiveness of the GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} process in deactivating reactive sodium metal. Crucible, bench-scale, and engineering-scale demonstrations were conducted on several surrogate waste configurations with various ratios of sodium metal and glassformers. Each ratio and configuration demonstrated complete deactivation of the surrogate sodium metal. Follow-on work in 2017 demonstrated the deactivation of reactive sodium by GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} at a higher waste loading relative to previously demonstrated work performed in 2016. The higher waste loading optimized glass chemistry while enhancing the economical full-scale treatment of reactive metals. The GeoMelt{sup R} technology is a proven radioactive waste treatment technology capable of immobilizing radioactive wastes, including bulk rubble such as drums and other steel vessels usually without pretreatment. Utilizing the GeoMelt{sup R} technology to treat reactive metals eliminates pretreatment steps resulting from having to separate the reactive metal from steel containers or jackets as GeoMelt{sup R} can easily operate at temperatures sufficient to melt the steel and expose the reactive metal for treatment. Eliminating handling steps of reactive metals is a significant safety advantage since reactive metals are pyrophoric. The results of this two-year demonstration program and future planned activities are presented in the paper. (authors)

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Oxidizer Testing on Alternative Absorbents for Los Alamos National Laboratory - 18656

In the summer of 2016, during glovebox operations in TA-55, cheesecloth, a cellulosic material, was used to clean up a small spill of 9.8 molar nitric acid (oxidizer). Because cellulosic materials and oxidizers are incompatible, this prompted a chemical compatibility evaluation of the waste in TA-55 to determine if this waste was Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) ignitable waste (D001) or RCRA reactive waste (D003). After testing and consulting with the Carlsbad Field Office in Carlsbad (CBFO), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) NPI-7 decided to look for alternative absorbents to use in the gloveboxes that would not create an incompatibility issue with an oxidizer. While small spills are infrequent, they do happen and LANL wanted to be proactive and search for a material that would be compatible with an oxidizer. In December 2016, LANL NPI-7 requested LANL-Carlsbad's (LANL-CO) Difficult Waste Team to perform compatibility testing on potential alternative wipes for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The purpose for testing was to meet the Operational Experience Level 3 (OE-3) requirements that states 'any proposed use of organic absorbents or engineered absorbents in combination with potentially oxidizing TRU waste, wet or dry, should be evaluated and approved by the National TRU Program, Carlsbad Field Office' [1]. LANL NPI-7 requested LANL-CO to perform these tests because they were the group that performed all of the oxidizer testing for CBFO for the Basis of Knowledge (BoK) [2]. LANL NPI-7 chose nine fabrics and KMI Zeolite to be tested. The testing in Carlsbad took approximately 2 months to prepare the procedures, test plans and for the procurement of items. The burn rate testing was done in accordance with the requirements discussed in the BoK and approved by the LANL-CO Difficult Waste Team. Each absorbent was tested for 1) capacity limiting tests, 2) verifying the non-oxidizer threshold concentration of the oxidizer and 3) establishing the non-oxidizer concentration based on the experimental results. The effect of rinsing cheesecloth samples that have absorbed an oxidizer was also tested [3]. The burn rate testing provided three potential alternative absorbents (Spilfyter Hazmat Sorbent SM Pads Premium, Kimtech Pure W4 Wipers and Polybenzimidazole (PBI) Staple fiber) that produced a non-oxidizer result as defined by the BoK. Two wipes Spilfyter Hazmat Sorbent SM Pads Premium and Kimtech Pure W4 Wipers were able to absorb the highest concentration of potassium nitrite and still produce a non-oxidizer. TA-55 has used Spilfyter Hazmat Sorbent SM Pads Premium for a number of years in several of the processes and has ordered Kimtech Pure W4 Wipers for use in the facility. PBI fabric passed at 25 wt. % solution. (authors)

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Handling and Treatment of Sodium-Potassium Alloy (NaK) after the Loss of Key Personnel - 19002

In September 2010, during cleanup and removal efforts associated with a glovebox containing a sodium-potassium alloy (NaK) cooling system, a NaK reaction event occurred. Near the end of the evolution, which was at a Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) research facility at the Idaho National Laboratory, a 2 to 3-ounce sample of NaK was being transferred from a metal can to a polyethylene bottle so it could be sent to the disposal outlet for verification analysis. During the transfer, a reaction of the NaK with ambient air was observed in both the metal can and sample container. The potential for a reaction was identified during the planning of this activity and mitigating steps were included in the procedures. In response, the two containers were flooded with argon, closed, and observed overnight. No additional reaction was noted. The sample container and metal can were packaged into a 10-gallon drum and transferred to a permitted storage location pending disposal. While the other containers generated from the deactivation and decommissioning activity were sent off-site for disposal, the 10-gal drum remained due to concerns by a staff specialist that the material could contain potassium superoxide (KO{sub 2}) as a result of the reaction event. The intent at that time was to treat the NaK in a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-permitted treatment facility at MFC, instead of sending it off-site for disposal. The container was labeled, inspected, and managed as a hazardous waste. Due to the complexities associated with safely handling and treating NaK and KO{sub 2}, the container remained in storage. Treatment and disposal of the NaK and KO{sub 2} container was revisited in 2016, when researchers and chemists were consulted regarding the potential for superoxide formation and the best means to safely store and treat the container. The facility came to realize that due to the retirements of key personnel, it needed to provide current employees operational experience with the handling and treatment of NaK. An outside company was identified and contracted to provide training and consulting services. Several Battelle Energy Alliance, Inc. (BEA) personnel then attended an alkali metals safety training class. The training course provided participants with classroom and hands-on instruction associated with: - Hazards associated with handling and using sodium and NaK; - Proper personal protection equipment, spill control techniques, and first aid; - Common design approaches for buildings, systems, and equipment used to contain sodium and NaK; - What to expect in the event of a water reaction and how to respond; - How to properly prepare for a fire and contain/extinguish small metal fires; - A hands-on demonstration of NaK reaction and controls. Following the training, a procedure was developed to open the container, and inspect and treat the NaK. In June 2017, facility operations personnel successfully completed the inspection and treatment of the NaK drum, eliminating the legacy liability. (authors)

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Implementation of a Dose-based Compliance System for WCS - 19178

Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) operates a low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facility in Andrews, Texas. The site includes a compact waste facility (CWF) that began receiving waste in 2012, a federal waste facility (FWF) that started receiving waste in 2013, as well as a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) landfill and a byproduct facility. The current site license uses a complex system of concentration-based investigation levels and action levels (ILs and ALs) coupled with analytical decision levels (ADLs) that, when exceeded, require specific steps to be taken. These concentration-based ILs and ALs are media specific (i.e. air, soil, water), radionuclide specific, location specific, and disposal facility specific. This results in thousands of individual ILs, ALs, and ADLs that need to be managed and evaluated routinely in order to demonstrate compliance. Further, under the current system, each exceedance of an IL and AL can trigger comparisons to numerous additional isotopic ILs per sample, which is cumbersome, error prone, and costly. This paper describes implementation of a dose-based compliance system that has been developed to replace the existing system. The dose-based compliance system is implemented in RACER{sup C}, a cloud-based software developed by Risk Assessment Corporation (RAC). This system maintains all the analytical results related to the sampling and analysis conducted as part of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) together with the geo-spatial data allowing instantaneous trending and analysis of the data. Further, the system contains the information needed to compare the analytical results to the new media-specific screening levels that have been developed, and the parameters and routines to compute doses using prescribed exposure scenarios and dose coefficients for compliance evaluation. Once measurement data are entered into RACER, the routines for continuous screening of air, soil, groundwater, and dosimeter data are triggered, and any sample result failing the screening step or exceeding the dose IL/AL is identified and flagged automatically for further review or action, as appropriate. Because RACER is cloud-based, the data, screening, and dose calculations can be accessed remotely at any time, providing a timely and efficient method for identifying any possible releases from the site to the environment as well as determining the potential dose consequences associated with a release. Furthermore, the system is accessible by the regulator providing transparency and ensuring they remain fully informed in an efficient manner. (authors)

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