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At least 343 records · Page 19

Technical Basis For Radiological Acceptance Criteria For Uranium At The Y-12 National Security Complex

The purpose of this report is to establish radiological acceptance criteria for uranium. Other factors for acceptance not considered include criticality safety concerns, contaminants to the process stream, and impacts to the Safety Basis for the affected facilities. Three types of criteria were developed in this report. They include limits on external penetrating and non-penetrating radiation and on the internal hazard associated with inhalation of the material. These criteria are intended to alleviate the need for any special controls beyond what are normally utilized for worker protection from uranium hazards. Any proposed exceptions would require case-by-case evaluations to determine cost impacts and feasibility. Since Y-12 has set rigorous ALARA goals for worker doses, the external limits are based on assumptions of work time involved in the movement of accepted material plus the desire that external doses normally received are not exceeded, and set so that no special personnel monitoring would be required. Internal hazard controls were established so that dose contributions from non-uranium nuclides would not exceed 10% of that expected from the uranium component. This was performed using a Hazard Index (HI) previously established for work in areas contaminated with non-uranium nuclides. The radiological acceptance criteria for uranium are summarized in Table 1. Note that these limits are based on the assumption that radioactive daughter products have reached equilibrium.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

FRMAC Interactions During a Radiological or Nuclear Event

During a radiological or nuclear event of national significance the Federal Radiological Emergency Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) assists federal, state, tribal, and local authorities by providing timely, high-quality predictions, measurements, analyses and assessments to promote efficient and effective emergency response for protection of the public and the environment from the consequences of such an event.

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Current Trends in Gamma Ray Detection for Radiological Emergency Response

Passive and active detection of gamma rays from shielded radioactive materials, including special nuclear materials, is an important task for any radiological emergency response organization. This article reports on the current trends and status of gamma radiation detection objectives and measurement techniques as applied to nonproliferation and radiological emergencies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Weld Repair of a Stamped Pressure Vessel in a Radiologically Controlled Zone

In September 2012 an ASME B&PVC Section VIII stamped pressure vessel located at the DOE Hanford Site Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF) developed a through-wall leak. The vessel, a steam/brine heat exchanger, operated in a radiologically controlled zone (by the CH2MHill PRC or CHPRC), had been in service for approximately 17 years. The heat exchanger is part of a single train evaporator process and its failure caused the entire system to be shut down, significantly impacting facility operations. This paper describes the activities associated with failure characterization, technical decision making/planning for repair by welding, logistical challenges associated with performing work in a radiologically controlled zone, performing the repair, and administrative considerations related to ASME code requirements.

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Reinforced radiological containment bag

Radiological containment bags for use in storing alpha particle emitting waste are described. The radiological containment bags are formed of a multilayer film with an inner layer of the film being a sacrificial layer that lies between the interior of the bag and a structural polymeric layer. The sacrificial layer includes a flexible composite material that in turn includes a polymeric matrix and an alpha particle energy absorber incorporated in the polymeric matrix. The sacrificial layer can include a chromophore that can detect early degradation of the sacrificial material.

Washington, II, Aaron L.↗

Spectral Advanced Radiological Computer System Applications

The Spectral Advanced Radiological Computer System (SPARCS) is a versatile, rugged, multi-platform radiation detection system. It is an easy-to-install and easy-to-operate, gamma radiation detection system for radiological emergency response. It has been designed and built on a foundation of mobile and aerial detection experience that spans four decades. This article reviews the scope and operational thrust of the SPARCS, making references to the versatility and capability of the system and its application under various threat conditions. SPARCS is a multiplatform global gamma ray detection system used at the international level.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗

DETECTION OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL AS CRIMINAL/UNAUTHORIZED THREATS TO MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTS

Major Public Events (MPEs), by their nature, draw great public interest and receive intense media attention. They can be anything from sporting events (e.g., Olympics, World Cups) to political summits to large festivals. The threat of nuclear or other radiological materials out of regulatory control during these events is of particular concern. A terrorist could use this material as a dirty bomb to disperse radioactive material in a stadium, or hide dangerous radioactive sources in a garbage can to expose people to harmful radiation, leading to fear and uncertainty. The requirements for nuclear security, preparedness, and operational capabilities for nuclear/radiological detection at MPEs have steadily increased in recent years. Many countries have gained considerable experience in recent years in nuclear security operations at MPEs when hosting these events. Dozens of MPEs hosted around the world each year now provide some level of nuclear security as part of their overall security plan. Several training workshops and courses, co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and conducted through bilateral agreements, are offered each year. These workshops and courses provide the opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned and aid countries to build capacity for nuclear security at their MPEs. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency provides guidance for the detection of radiological threat materials out of regulatory control through the Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 18.

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An Overview of Global Gender Initiatives for Women in the Nuclear and Radiological Fields

Currently, women make up less than a quarter of nuclear and radiological industry professionals; women are consistently underrepresented in leadership positions in the sector and are a minority in WMD1 and STEM classes. Recognizing this problem in our industry, a growing number of region-specific groups (the Black Sea Women in Nuclear Network2 and WiN Global subgroup Women in Nuclear Southeast Asia3 ), government created initiatives, and various fellowship and grant programs (the IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme4 and CFRD Global’s grant program5 ) work to increase female participation and success in this historically male-dominated profession. While these valuable initiatives exist, there is no single, consolidated collection of resources for women in nuclear and radiological fields. This paper will attempt to fill that gap. It will: provide an overview of gender-based initiatives and opportunities, investigate these organizations’ mission and purpose, highlight the lack of gender statistics at all working levels as a barrier for measuring gender parity improvement (site, state, country and international), and propose that these organizations leverage their networks and expertise to enhance gendered data collection in the field.

Arapoff, Julia↗

Radiological Modeling for Determination of Derived Concentration Levels of an Area with Uranium Residual Material - 13533

As a result of a pilot project developed at the old Spanish 'Junta de Energia Nuclear' to extract uranium from ores, tailings materials were generated. Most of these residual materials were sent back to different uranium mines, but a small amount of it was mixed with conventional building materials and deposited near the old plant until the surrounding ground was flattened. The affected land is included in an area under institutional control and used as recreational area. At the time of processing, uranium isotopes were separated but other radionuclides of the uranium decay series as Th-230, Ra-226 and daughters remain in the residue. Recently, the analyses of samples taken at different ground's depths confirmed their presence. This paper presents the methodology used to calculate the derived concentration level to ensure that the reference dose level of 0.1 mSv y-1 used as radiological criteria. In this study, a radiological impact assessment was performed modeling the area as recreational scenario. The modelization study was carried out with the code RESRAD considering as exposure pathways, external irradiation, inadvertent ingestion of soil, inhalation of resuspended particles, and inhalation of radon (Rn-222). As result was concluded that, if the concentration of Ra-226 in the first 15 cm of soil is lower than, 0.34 Bq g{sup -1}, the dose would not exceed the reference dose. Applying this value as a derived concentration level and comparing with the results of measurements on the ground, some areas with a concentration of activity slightly higher than latter were found. In these zones the remediation proposal has been to cover with a layer of 15 cm of clean material. This action represents a reduction of 85% of the dose and ensures compliance with the reference dose. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

The Role of Gamma-ray Imaging in Performing Radiological Characterisation at the Magnox Storage Ponds at the Bradwell Decommissioning Site - 13628

A gamma-ray imaging device has been used to perform radiological characterisation work at the spent fuel ponds complex at the site of the Bradwell Magnox Power Station, which is currently undergoing accelerated decommissioning. The objective of using a gamma-ray imaging system was to independently verify previous radiological survey work and to evaluate the adequacy of the random distribution of the destructive core sampling which had been performed. In performing this work the gamma-ray imager clearly identified the exact locations of the sources of radiation that gave rise to the elevated gamma dose rates measured by conventional health physics surveys of the area. In addition, the gamma-ray imager was able to characterise each hotspot as being either dominated by Cs-137 or by Co-60. The gamma imaging survey was undertaken with a RadScan gamma imaging system deployed on the walkways which run along the lengths of the ponds; this enabled the whole imaging survey to be performed with minimal dose uptake, demonstrating the ALARP principle within decommissioning. (authors)

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Evaluation of Final Radiological Conditions at Areas of the Niagara Falls Storage Site Remediated under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program - 12184

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) methods and protocols allow evaluation of remediation and final site conditions to determine if remediated sites remain protective. Two case studies are presented that involve the Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) and associated vicinity properties (VPs), which are being remediated under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are a part of the former Lake Ontario Ordnance Works (LOOW). In response to stakeholders concerns about whether certain remediated NFSS VPs were putting them at risk, DOE met with stakeholders and agreed to evaluate protectiveness. Documentation in the DOE records collection adequately described assessed and final radiological conditions at the completed VPs. All FUSRAP wastes at the completed sites were cleaned up to meet DOE guidelines for unrestricted use. DOE compiled the results of the investigation in a report that was released for public comment. In conducting the review of site conditions, DOE found that stakeholders were also concerned about waste from the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) that was handled at LOOW. DOE agreed to determine if SPRU waste remained at that needed to be remediated. DOE reviewed records of waste characterization, historical handling locations and methods, and assessment and remediation data. DOE concluded that the SPRU waste was remediated on the LOOW to levels that pose no unacceptable risk and allow unrestricted use and unlimited exposure. This work confirms the following points as tenets of an effective long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M) program: - Stakeholder interaction must be open and transparent, and DOE must respond promptly to stakeholder concerns. - DOE, as the long-term custodian, must collect and preserve site records in order to demonstrate that remediated sites pose no unacceptable risk. - DOE must continue to maintain constructive relationships with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and state and federal regulators. After review of historical site documentation, DOE reports, and USACE radiological data, DOE concluded the following: - DOE had access to adequate documentation to evaluate site conditions at the former LOOW. This is important to confirm now, while institutional knowledge of early FUSRAP work remains available. - DOE remediated the completed VPs to conditions that are protective for unrestricted residential use. Sample and walkover gamma scan results indicate that no wastes remain that exceed cleanup criteria. - Process knowledge and field observations establish that Cs-137 is the predominant radionuclide in the KAPL waste stream. Cs-137, a strong gamma emitter, was used as an indicator for remediation of KAPL waste. Other radionuclides were present in much lower relative concentrations and were likely also removed during remediation of the VPs. - KAPL contaminants were removed during remedial activities at the former LOOW as either co-located or co-mingled with other radionuclides. - For the active VPs (VP-E, VP-E', and VP-G), results of DOE's cleanup of the accessible portions of these properties indicate that KAPL waste does not remain at concentrations greater than the DOE cleanup limit: - Inaccessible areas were not associated with historic KAPL waste handling. Therefore, it is unlikely that KAPL waste remains on the active VPs. - Because gamma activity was used by DOE during remediation/verification activities for excavation control, additional USACE cleanup of FUSRAP wastes on these properties will likely result in the remediation of any co-located residual KAPL wastes to acceptable levels or identification of KAPL waste that is not co-located. - Although USACE has not established a cleanup level for Cs-137 on the active NFSS VPs, DOE assessment and remediation data indicate that assessed Cs-137 was remediated and significant Cs-137 is unlikely to remain. Because of the low likelihood of encountering significant KAPL waste on the active NFSS VPs, additional remediation is not anticipated at these properties. - USACE assessment soil sampling results on the NFSS proper indicate that KAPL waste does not exceed the DOE cleanup level for Cs-137. USACE has not established a cleanup level for Cs-137 on NFSS proper. The USACE cleanup of FUSRAP wastes on the NFSS proper will likely result in the remediation of any co-located residual KAPL wastes or identification of KAPL waste that is not co-located. DOE is drafting a report of the investigation of KAPL waste at LOOW. The report will be released to the public for comment when the draft is complete. DOE responses to stakeholder inquiries resulted in a common understanding of site conditions and site risk. DOE expects additional interaction with stakeholders at the former LOOW as USACE completes remediation of the active VPs and the NFSS proper, and these relationships will hopefully have built trust between DOE and the stakeholders that DOE will perform its duties in an open and transparent manner that includes stakeholders as stewards for remediated FUSRAP sites. (authors)

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Design of an effective radiological effluent and environmental surveillance program - history of Savannah River site environmental monitoring program design - 15308

An effective radiological effluent and surveillance program is critical for a nuclear facility to (1) comply with applicable regulations, (2) assess the potential impacts of operations to the environment and public, and (3) inform stakeholders and members of the public of any impacts. Radiological environmental monitoring includes three program elements - effluent monitoring, environmental surveillance, and dose assessments. The key to an effective program is defining the baseline and objectives based on regulatory requirements, identification of the critical exposure pathways, determining the spatial and temporal boundaries for the monitoring, and defining the reporting and action levels. Another key to an effective program is through continuous improvement by transforming the program based on operational facility changes and responding to technology advancements in the field of environmental monitoring. The history of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) environmental monitoring program is an example of an effective program that has transitioned, changed, and improved over the years based on the site missions and operations. From the beginning of five production reactors and two chemical separations facilities to the current Site missions of Environmental Stewardship, National Security, and Clean Energy, the SRS environmental monitoring program has evolved. SRS has a unique ecological environment with the Site area covering 80,300 hectares, five major streams that lead to the Savannah River, various water bodies, and varied meteorological conditions. Airborne and liquid pathways to human exposure are complex and it is necessary to use a graded approach when monitoring these pathways. The SRS environmental monitoring program is designed and effective in ensuring and verifying that there is a minimal exposure impact on the public and the environment from Site operations. (authors)

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Radiological data consolidation and 3D modeling of a building - 15473

A portion of a building at an industrial facility that conducted monazite sands-processing operations in the 1950's under contract to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) became contaminated. Subsequently the U.S. Department of Energy designated the facility for remedial action under the Formerly Used Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Remedial investigation, remedial actions and post-remediation surveys have been conducted in portions of the building. Radiological data for the interior of the building were compiled, evaluated and presented in a three dimensional (3-D) model (the model) created by AMEC Foster Wheeler in order to identify areas that meet the Record of Decision (ROD) cleanup criteria, and identity areas that may require remedial action or may require additional investigation due to data gaps. The data from different phases of investigation and remediation cover different portions of the building and in some cases overlap. In addition, the data were collected over a period of more than ten years, for different objectives, and thus the instruments and methods for establishing efficiency were not necessarily consistent. The data consolidation process included determining the relative quality of data points to include in the model and the development of rationale associated with assigning a quality level (i.e. ranking) to each data point. The rationale for ranking data quality included, as the primary determining factors, chronological order of the data (most recent was ranked as more reliable), certainty of the sample locations within the building, and analytical data quality. A 3-D model of the building was created using a laser point cloud scan which was then converted into a 3-D design model. Sample locations were then entered into the model and linked with the analytical database to allow display of the radiological results in the model. The visual model allows both strategic and tactical decisions to be made, depending on the level of detail examined. The evaluation process allowed maximum use of the historical data set, rather than requiring older data to be disregarded, and provided at a minimum a qualitative sense of data quality/confidence in the data. The (authors)process also highlights the importance of collecting high quality data from the very beginning with a consistent locational coordinate system, and the need for a good visualization model in order to assess contaminant locations during remedial action or post-remediation surveys.

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An evaluation of nearest neighbor averaging's improvements to the measurement sensitivity of wide-area radiological scanning instruments - 15560

Through the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) New Mexico Small Business Assistance (NMSBA) program, Sandia worked with the Environmental Restoration Group (ERG) Inc. to verify and validate a novel algorithm used to determine the scanning Critical Level (Lc) and Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) (or Minimum Detectable Areal Activity) for the 102F scanning system. Through the use of Monte Carlo statistical simulations the algorithm mathematically demonstrates accuracy in determining the Lc and MDC when a nearest-neighbor averaging (NNA) technique was used. To empirically validate this approach, SNL prepared several spiked sources and ran a test with the ERG 102F instrument on a bare concrete floor known to have no radiological contamination other than background naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). The tests conclude that the NNA technique increases the sensitivity (decreases the Lc and MDC) for high-density data maps that are obtained by scanning radiological survey instruments. It is further described in Sandia Laboratories document number SAND2014-16522. (authors)

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