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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Commercial sealed sources and timely disposal: Challenges and incentives - 15456

It is widely accepted as a radioactive material management best-practice that storage of disused sealed sources should be a temporary measure. Effective end-of-life management, including timely disposition of disused and unwanted sealed sources, is an important way to address national security, public health, and safety concerns presented by long-term storage of disused sealed sources. However, significantly increased disposal access since 2012 has not led commercial sealed source generators in the U.S. to dispose of their disused and unwanted sources as quickly as many had expected. As a result, policy-makers and non-government stakeholders are considering ways to incentivize sealed source generators to make more timely decisions regarding the disposition of their disused and unwanted sources. To help ensure that ongoing efforts to develop sealed source management and disposal incentives are efficient and effective, NNSA/GMS is engaging both public and private sector partners to better understand generator considerations, motivations, and challenges with regard to sealed source management and disposal decisions. The results of these engagements to date indicate potentially effective ways to encourage sealed source waste generators to disposition their sources in a timely fashion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Joint Convention, Its Global Impact and U.S Continuing Involvement - 16645

The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (hereafter called the Joint Convention) is an international convention, conducted under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is one of a suite of international instruments dealing with nuclear safety and physical security, which serve to promote a global culture for the safe use of radioactive materials. Unlike other safety or security conventions, however, the Joint Convention deals exclusively with the end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Joint Convention focuses on the lessons to be learned from past experience and existing facility operations, which can be implemented in the policies and designs for future operating facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. The U.S. has participated fully in the review process, as well as setting forth initiatives to sponsor increased ratification. The U.S. holds the current Joint Convention presidency for the Fifth Review Cycle. Because of the important benefits associated with active participation, the U.S. has strongly supported a Regional Conference Initiative outreach program to increase membership. We also provided an expert for each of the conferences to assist in advancing the message to non-Member States, in particular developing nations considering ratification. The Joint Convention process also provides opportunities to identify future areas of bilateral and multilateral technical and regulatory cooperation with other Parties. Furthermore, the Joint Convention is consistent with U.S. foreign policy considerations to support, as a priority, the strengthening of the worldwide safety culture in the use of nuclear energy. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

French management model for sustainable transportation of used fuel - 15376

Safe and efficient transportation of radioactive material is key to the success of our industry. Used fuel transports are inherently complex due to the nature of the material and the high visibility. Only a few countries have developed comprehensive used fuel transportation systems that require a wide range of equipment, services and expertise. In the many countries, such as the Unites States, where interim consolidated storage, recycling or geological repository are not available yet, similar systems will have to be implemented. For more than 50 years AREVA TN has safely shipped more than 7,000 used fuel transport casks. The transportation system that was initially developed in the 1970's has been adapted and enhanced over the years to meet more restrictive regulatory requirements and evolving customer needs, and to address public concerns. The numerous 'lessons learned' have offered data and guidance that have allowed for also efficient and consistent improvement over the decades. Based on AREVA TN extensive expertise, this paper will describe the different phases and milestones that need to be met to set up, license and operate a successful used fuel transportation management system. Transportation of spent fuel in France could not be performed effectively and efficiently without strong collaboration with Electricite de France (EDF) who plays a critical role as the shipper. EDF will provide a nuclear operator's perspective on the most critical aspects of a successful used fuel transportation program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

The study of equivalent dose of uranium in long bean (V. U. Sesquipedalis) and the effect on human

In the case of accidental release of Uranium-238 ({sup 238}U) radionuclides in a nuclear facility or in the environment, internal contamination by either acute or chronic exposure has the potential to induce both radiological and chemical toxic effects. A study was conducted to estimate the {sup 238}U radionuclide concentration in the long beans using Induced Coupled Mass Plasma-Spectrometry (ICP-MS). {sup 238}U radionuclide is a naturally occurring radioactive material that can be found in soil and can be transferred to the long bean (Vigna unguiculata subsp. Sesquapedalis) directly or indirectly via water or air. Kidney and liver are the major sites of deposition of {sup 238}U radionuclide. The obtained dose exposed in the liver and kidney is used to assess the safety level for public intake of {sup 238}U radionuclide from the consumption of long beans. The concentration of {sup 238}U radionuclide measured in long bean samples was 0.0226 ± 0.0009 mg/kg. Total activity of {sup 238}U radionuclide was 0.0044 ± 0.0002 Bq/day with the daily intake of 0.3545 ± 0.0143 µg/day and the annual committed effective dose due to ingestion of {sup 238}U radionuclide in long beans was 0.2230 ± 0.0087 µSv/year. The committed equivalent dose of {sup 238}U radionuclide from the assessment in the liver and kidney are 0.4198 ± 0.0165 nSv and 10.9335 ± 0.4288 nSv. The risk of cancer of {sup 238}U radionuclide was determined to be (86.0466 ± 3.3748) × 10-9. Thus, the results concluded that {sup 238}U radionuclide in local long beans was in the permitted level and safe to consume without posing any significant radiological threat to population.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2014

This Nevada Nuclear Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts.This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2014 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is responsible for the oversight of these ER projects, and the Sandia Field Office of NNSA (NNSA/SFO) has oversight of all other TTR and NTTR activities. NNSA/SFO produces the TTR annual environmental report, which is available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.Major Site Programs and Facilities NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. The six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for weapons experimentation and nuclear test readiness. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site (known as the T-1 Site), Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

REGULATORY TESTING AND POSTTEST ANALYSIS OF THE DPP-3 TYPE B SHIPPING CONTAINER FOR NCT AND HAC TESTS

The safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed and certified transportation packages is important to protect the public and environment. Therefore, a comprehensive and rigorous system of packaging requirements are required. The purpose of this test protocol is to determine the effects of drop testing on package performance in a Type B shipping package (DPP-3). Required physical tests for the DPP-3 package include normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions test requirements. The preparation, regulatory testing, and post-test evaluation of a Type B shipping package tested to the 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73 requirements will be presented. Six packages were tested and the responses when subjected to the HAC sequence of free drop, puncture, and thermal tests according to 10 CFR 71.73 were measured. The posttest helium leak test showed a leak rate less than 1 × 10-7 He-cc/sec which means that the containment boundary was maintained after the regulatory testing, therefore maintaining a leak tight environment. To determine the amount of change in the package performance measurements, statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 26. The null hypothesis of the testing was that there would not be a change in the measurements from pre to post-testing large enough to find statistical significance. Therefore, a finding of statistical significance indicated too much variability in the package design and was deemed an unfavorable finding. A repeated measures t-test was used to analyze the drum lids and CV torques. A one-way ANOVA was used to analyze height and diameter packages. Results of the repeated measures t-test indicated that all six containment vessel lid torques were statistically significant. However only three out of the six drum lid torques were statistically significant. Therefore, design of the lids caused more variability than necessary when subjected to the following drop tests: 1.) horizontal and cold; 2.) vertical lid down; and 3.) corner with lid up. Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis on height indicated that four out of the six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, design of the CTUs caused more variability then necessary when subjected to the following drop tests: 1.) horizontal hot; 2.) horizontal cold; 3.) corner lid up; and 4.) corner lid down. Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis on diameter indicated that all six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, design of the CTUs caused more variability then necessary when subjected to all of the tests. The DPP-3 design has been shown to be an acceptable design for the transport of radioactive materials. However, results of the statistical analysis reveal a possible improvement in package and test design to reduce variability in package performance measurement before and after testing.

Martinez, Oscar↗
DOE OSTI2013

Pressure Build-Up During the Fire Test in Type B(U) Packages Containing Water - 13280

The safety assessment of packages for the transport of radioactive materials with content containing liquids requires special consideration. The main focus is on water as supplementary liquid content in Type B(U) packages. A typical content of a Type B(U) package is ion exchange resin, waste of a nuclear power plant, which is not dried, normally only drained. Besides the saturated ion exchange resin, a small amount of free water can be included in these contents. Compared to the safety assessment of packages with dry content, attention must be paid to some more specific issues. An overview of these issues is provided. The physical and chemical compatibility of the content itself and the content compatibility with the packages materials must be demonstrated for the assessment. Regarding the mechanical resistance the package has to withstand the forces resulting from the freezing liquid. The most interesting point, however, is the pressure build-up inside the package due to vaporization. This could for example be caused by radiolysis of the liquid and must be taken into account for the storage period. If the package is stressed by the total inner pressure, this pressure leads to mechanical loads to the package body, the lid and the lid bolts. Thus, the pressure is the driving force on the gasket system regarding the activity release and a possible loss of tightness. The total pressure in any calculation is the sum of partial pressures of different gases which can be caused by different effects. The pressure build-up inside the package caused by the regulatory thermal test (30 min at 800 deg. C), as part of the cumulative test scenario under accident conditions of transport is discussed primarily. To determine the pressure, the temperature distribution in the content must be calculated for the whole period from beginning of the thermal test until cooling-down. In this case, while calculating the temperature distribution, conduction and radiation as well as evaporation and condensation during the associated process of transport have to be considered. This paper discusses limiting amounts of water inside the cask which could lead to unacceptable pressure and takes into account saturated steam as well as overheated steam. However, the difficulties of assessing casks containing wet content will be discussed. From the authority assessment point of view, drying of the content could be an effective way to avoid the above described pressure build-up and the associated difficulties for the safety assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

First Road / River Barge Security Transport of SNF under the New German Transport Security Guidelines - 19102

A transfer of 342 spent fuel assemblies from NPP Obrigheim to NPP Neckarwestheim, both located alongside the river Neckar in the south of Germany, is required to promote the decommissioning process of NPP Obrigheim, which started in 2008 after the NPP had been shut down three years before. The spent fuel storage facility in Neckarwestheim offers sufficient storage space to accept the 342 SNF assemblies, stored in fifteen dry casks type CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK. After several transport feasibility studies had been conducted, Daher Nuclear Technologies GmbH was awarded the commission to plan, prepare and conduct the SNF transport. Since the combined road / river barge transport promised to be the most suitable mode of transportation Daher Nuclear Technologies started to prepare its security concept, a prerequisite to apply for and attain the transport license mandatory for transporting spent nuclear fuel in Germany. In March 2014 the company applied for the transport license, which, after more than three years and numerous amendments to the security concept, was finally granted to Daher Nuclear Technologies on May 16, 2017 by the German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (successor organization of the BfS). Simultaneously to the license application phase the transport equipment - amongst others the heavy-duty trucks and trailers, the pusher tugs, the river barge and transport frames - had to be provided and modified to meet the intensified requirements of the New German Transport Security Guidelines Road / Rail as well as several other legal regulations referring to the transport of dangerous goods by road and inland waterways (e.g. ADR - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and ADN - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). The planning process involved various meetings with representatives of different authorities and administrative bodies incl. accredited experts as well as subcontractors. Tremendous training efforts had to be undertaken to train more than 100 transport participants regarding security measures, health, safety and environmental measures, as well as the proper handling of radioactive material. This also included the training of the security staff, that had to be qualified in compliance with the new Transport Security Guidelines Road and Rail. Finally, in June 2017, when all preparations where complete, all requirements met, and all permits obtained, the first ever security SNF transport on a German river was performed. Three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK transport and storage casks were transported in one batch via heavy-duty truck-trailer from the NPP Obrigheim to the NPP's own harbor, to be rolled on to the river barge, that would carry the three casks upstream the river Neckar to the approx. fifty kilometer distant NPP Neckarwestheim. The journey on the river took about eleven hours, in which several bridges and locks had to be passed. The entire transport was escorted by qualified security staff and auxiliary police forces on waterways and alongside on roads. It attracted nationwide public attention, due to its pioneer status and the fact, that there hadn't been any SNF or HLW shipments in Germany since 2011. After the convoy safely arrived at NPP Neckarwestheim's pier the three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK casks were rolled off the river barge via heavy-duty truck-trailers to be stored in the on-site interim storage facility. This first transport was a success and was followed by four additionally successful security transports in September, October, November and December 2017. The public attention receded significantly during the transport campaign, which ended on December 19, 2017 with the transfer of the last three of fifteen casks to the on-site interim storage facility in Neckarwestheim. With the last cask safely transferred to the interim storage facility Daher Nuclear Technologies successfully completed the transport campaign on schedule, meeting one of EnBW's fundamental objectives to finish the transfer of the 342 SNF assemblies by the end of 2017. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Phyto-screening for Volatile Organic Compounds in a Clay-based Glacial Till at the Niagara Falls Storage Site, New York - 17372

The Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) and associated vicinity properties (VPs) occupy approximately 607 hectares (1,500 acres) of the original 3,035-hectare (7,500-acre) Lake Ontario Ordnance Works (LOOW). The NFSS was used to store radioactive materials, residues and waste from uranium ore processing between 1944 and 1952. The waste-handling practices produced an array of groundwater impacts throughout the site. Although the groundwater at the NFSS is naturally high in total dissolved solids that preclude untreated consumption, the groundwater contaminant levels in some areas of the site are very high and may pose risk to a Construction Worker receptor, as well as limit the options for future site re-use. Volatile organic compound (VOC) impacted soil in the northern portion of the site has produced a groundwater plume with significant concentrations of tetrachloroethene (PCE) and associated daughter compounds. Active groundwater remediation is impractical due to the clayey soils, as evident from adjacent property owners who have unsuccessfully attempted active remediation of their VOC plumes. Consequently, the Buffalo District may evaluate excavation options, with secondary phyto-remediative approaches as passive alternatives to lessen the groundwater impacts during the project's life cycle. A preliminary field-study in the VOC plume area sampled the interior of a Black Locust (Robinia pseudoacacia) tree using a Haglof tree corer. Detectable levels of tetrachloroethene (PCE), trichloroethene (TCE), and cis-1,2,-dichloroethene (cis-DCE) were found in the woody interior of the tree. Subsequent sampling and analyses were performed on proximal trees of varying species in and around the currently delineated VOC plume. The results indicate that poplar and native cottonwood variants preferentially contain the VOCs, whereas collocated hardwood trees produced non-detectable results. Additional sampling of Cottonwoods in the VOC-impacted area promoted further delineations of the impacts. The tree-sampling data can be considered a broad surrogate for soil sampling to optimally delineate the VOC plume without performing additional invasive sampling of the subsurface (e.g., drilling). The results also will be used to determine which native tree species preferentially uptake the VOCs from soil and groundwater. These species, and possibly other hybrid species known for VOC uptake and transpiration, would be propagated to promote interim phyto-extraction of the VOCs during the maintenance period between decision-document completion and likely remedial action under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Corrosion Testing of Carbon Steel Exposed to Sludge Heel Chemical Cleaning Solutions - 16109

As efforts continue to treat and dispose of millions of gallons of legacy radioactive materials from the production of nuclear weapons, non-compliant waste storage tanks will gradually be emptied of the bulk waste volume leaving heel materials requiring removal prior to tank closure. The waste heel slurries are distributed on the floor of large, million gallon tanks, which frequently contain numerous obstructions that limit the effectiveness of mechanical removal methods. As a result, chemical cleaning methods are needed for the effective removal of the heels as well as chemical scales that are present on the tank walls and other interior surfaces. Two tank cleaning technologies have already been implemented at the Savannah River Site (SRS): Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) and Bulk Oxalic Acid Cleaning (BOAC). Recent chemical cleaning efforts on SRS Tank 12 were very successful with regard to bulk sludge heel (especially for Al, Fe, and U phases) and beta/gamma radionuclide removal. Although chemical cleaning using these technologies has been shown to be effective, no disposition path has been identified for oxalate added during BOAC, and insoluble oxalate salts are accumulating within the SRS tank farm and waste processing facilities (evaporators, etc.). Extensive sludge washing is also required to remove moderately soluble sodium oxalate salts prior to sludge vitrification in the SRS Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). As a result, oxalate additions to the tank farm need to be minimized by the use of supplementary acids to assist sludge removal in OA or the use of other cleaning reagents or processing strategies. Previous SRNL testing revealed the importance of pH control for BOAC and recommended the use of a supplementary acid (dilute HNO{sub 3}) with OA to minimize oxalate additions. Primary drivers in SRS Tank Closure Performance Assessments, which evaluate the fate and impact of tank sludge residuals on a geological timescale, are the removal of alpha emitting radionuclides present at low concentrations such as Pu, Am, and Np, which are not highly soluble in currently utilized chemical cleaning reagents. Scoping studies conducted at SRNL revealed promising methods to dissolve the actinides within the HLW tank heels. Oxidation of the actinides with permanganate in either strong caustic (10 M NaOH) or dilute acidic (0.2 M HNO{sub 3}) solutions was shown to result in dissolution of oxy/hydroxide phases of these metals in the absence of major sludge phases. The waste tanks at SRS and Hanford are constructed of carbon steel. Carbon steel corrodes rapidly in most acidic and/or oxidizing environments. Previous electrochemical corrosion testing indicated that the corrosion rates in dilute HNO{sub 3} with OA may result in manageable corrosion rates, over short exposure periods. Additional corrosion testing was performed to provide data for the nitric acid/OA blend as well as the acid/permanganate and caustic permanganate based chemical cleaning solutions. Corrosion rates from the passive coupon tests for the nitric acid/oxalic acid blend were significantly greater than those observed previously with the electrochemical testing. This result may be due to simultaneous electrochemical and chemical dissolution of the steel. The corrosion rate data from the coupon tests in the nitric acid/oxalic acid blend were evaluated to determine the degree of potential structural damage. The corrosion rates, although relatively high, would not be expected to cause damage that would reduce the capacity of the tank primary wall if the process is completed within a month. The corrosivity of sodium permanganate in four proposed cleaning solutions, 1 nitric acid solution and 3 sodium hydroxide solutions, was studied by electrochemical methods at room temperature. The corrosion rates were significantly less aggressive than in the nitric acid/oxalic acid blend corrosion tests. Passive coupon tests needs to be performed in these solutions to ensure that chemical dissolution of the metal is not occurring simultaneously. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Derivation of heterogeneous material distributions and their sensitivity to HM-coupled two-phase flow models exemplified with the LASGIT experiment

Abstract Advective gas transport in bentonite, a possible buffer material in repositories for radioactive materials, is difficult to simulate in numerical continuum models, partly due to the complicated microstructure of bentonite. To generate reliable models of repositories nevertheless, spatially distributed heterogeneous material properties can be used to allow localization of gas flow. In this study, a pore-size-dependent stochastic approach of the gas entry pressure is derived from Mercury Intrusion Porosimetry, which is used to replicate measurements from the LASGIT experiment. In addition, three benchmark tests are simulated to investigate the dependence of heterogeneous distributions of material properties on the mesh discretization, the temporal dependence, and the coupling between the processes influenced by the heterogeneous parameters. The numerical modeling results of the LASGIT experiment show that the onset of gas flow into the system and the subsequent increase in pressure and stress can be well reproduced using heterogeneous distributions. Compared to a model with homogeneous material properties, heterogeneous distributions may allow the generation of dilatancy-controlled microfractures—an important feature with regard to the advective gas flow in bentonites. However, it can be observed that the heterogeneous distributions in LASGIT are less significant, as technical gaps or differences in material types could have a greater impact.

Environmental Sciences & Ecology↗
DOE OSTI2024

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS1972

Radiological Control Manual

Objectives of the manual are to (1) ensure compliance with requirements of AEC and governmental health agencies, (2) ensure against excessive and unnecessary exposure of personnel to harmful radiation, and (3) prevent contamination of equipment, materials, and environment with radioactive materials.

Noblin, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Radioactive 7Be materials flown on LDEF

Following the discovery of the atmospheric cosmogenic radionuclide Be-7 on the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), we began a search for other known nuclides produced by similar mechanisms. None of the others have the narrow gamma-ray line emission of Be-7 decay which enable its rapid detection and quantification. A search for Be-10 atoms on LDEF clamp plates using accelerator mass spectrometry is described. An unexpected result was obtained.

Gregory, John C.↗
DOE OSTI2015

25 Years Of Environmental Remediation In The General Separations Area Of The Savannah River Site: Lessons Learned About What Worked And What Did Not Work In Soil And Groundwater Cleanup

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is owned and administered by the US Department of Energy (DOE). SRS covers an area of approximately 900 square kilometers. The General Separation Area (GSA) is located roughly in the center of the SRS and includes: radioactive material chemical separations facilities, radioactive waste tank farms, a variety of radioactive seepage basins, and the radioactive waste burial grounds. Radioactive wastes were disposed in the GSA from the mid-1950s through the mid-1990s. Radioactive operations at the F Canyon began in 1954; radioactive operations at H Canyon began in 1955. Waste water disposition to the F and H Seepage Basins began soon after operations started in the canyons. The Old Radioactive Waste Burial Ground (ORWBG) began operations in 1952 to manage solid waste that could be radioactive from all the site operations, and ceased receiving waste in 1972. The Mixed Waste Management Facility (MWMF) and Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility (LLRWDF) received radioactive solid waste from 1969 until 1995. Environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s led to changes in waste management and environmental cleanup practices at SRS. The US Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970, and the Clean Water Act in 1972; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was enacted in 1976; the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted by Congress in 1980; the Federal Facilities Compliance Act (FFCA) was signed into law in 1992. Environmental remediation at the SRS essentially began with a 1987 Settlement Agreement between the SRS and the State of South Carolina (under the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control - SCDHEC), which recognized linkage between many SRS waste management facilities and RCRA. The SRS manages several of the larger groundwater remedial activities under RCRA for facilities recognized early on as environmental problems. All subsequent environmental remediation projects tend to be managed under tri-party agreement (DOE, Environmental Protection Agency, and SCDHEC) through the Federal Facilities Agreement. During 25 years of environmental remediation SRS has stabilized and capped seepage basins, and consolidated and capped waste units and burial grounds in the GSA. Groundwater activities include: pump and treat systems in the groundwater, installation of deep subsurface barrier systems to manage groundwater flow, in situ chemical treatments in the groundwater, and captured contaminated groundwater discharges at the surface for management in a forest irrigation system. Over the last 25 years concentrations of contaminants in the aquifers beneath the GSA and in surface water streams in the GSA have dropped significantly. Closure of 65 waste sites and 4 RCRA facilities has been successfully accomplished. Wastes have been successfully isolated in place beneath a variety of caps and cover systems. Environmental clean-up has progressed to the stage where most of the work involves monitoring, optimization, and maintenance of existing remedial systems. Many lessons have been learned in the process. Geotextile covers outperform low permeability clay caps, especially with respect to the amount of repairs required to upkeep the drainage layers as the caps age. Passive, enhanced natural processes to address groundwater contamination are much more cost effective than pump and treat systems. SRS operated two very large pump and treat systems at the F and H Seepage Basins to attempt to limit the release of tritium to Fourmile Branch, a tributary of the Savannah River. The systems were designed to extract contaminated acidic groundwater, remove all contamination except tritium (not possible to remove the tritium from the water), and inject the tritiated groundwater up-gradient of the source area and the plume. The concept was to increase the travel time of the injected water for radioactive decay of the tritium. The two systems were found to be non-effective and potentially mobilizing more contamination. SRS invested approximately $50 million in construction and approximately $100 million in 6 years of operation. The H Seepage Basin pump and treat system was replaced by a series of subsurface barriers that alters the groundwater velocity; the F Seepage Basin pump and treat system was replaced by subsurface barriers forming a funnel and gate augmented by chemical treatment within the gates. These replacement systems are mostly passive and cost approximately $13 million to construct, and have reduced the tritium flux to Fourmile Branch, in these plumes, by over 70%. SRS manages non-acidic tritiated groundwater releases to Fourmile Branch from the southwest plume of the MWMF with a forest irrigation system. Tritiated water is captured with a sheetpile dam below the springs that caused releases to Fourmile Branch. Water from the irrigation pond is pumped to a filter plant prior to irrigation of approximately 26 hectares of mixed forest and developing pine plantation. SRS has almost achieved a 70% reduction in tritium flux to the Branch from this plume. The system cost approximately $5 million to construct with operation cost of approximately $500K per year. In conclusion, many lessons have been learned in 25 years of relatively aggressive remedial activities in the GSA. Geotextile covers outperform low permeability clay caps, especially with respect to the amount of repairs required to upkeep the drainage layers as the caps age. Passive, enhanced natural processes to address groundwater contamination are much more cost effective than pump and treat systems. In water management situations with non-accumulative contaminants (tritium, VOCs, etc.) irrigation in a forest setting can be very effective.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Recent Developments in the Management of Cameco Corporation's Fuel Services Division Waste - 13144

Cameco Corporation is a world leader in uranium production. Headquartered in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan our operations provide 16% of the world uranium mine production and we have approximately 435 million pounds of proven and probable uranium reserves. Cameco mining operations are located in Saskatchewan, Wyoming, Nebraska and Kazakhstan. Cameco is also a major supplier of uranium processing services required to produce fuel for the generation of clean energy. These operations are based in Blind River, Cobourg and Port Hope, Ontario and are collectively referred to as the Fuel Services Division. The Fuel Services Division produces uranium trioxide from uranium ore concentrate at the Blind River Refinery. Cameco produces uranium hexafluoride and uranium dioxide at the Port Hope Conversion Facility. Cameco operates a fuel manufacturing facility in Port Hope, Ontario and a metal fabrication facility located in Cobourg, Ontario. The company manufactures fuel bundles utilized in the Candu reactors. Cameco's Fuel Services Division produces several types of low-level radioactively contaminated wastes. Internal processing capabilities at both the Blind River Refinery and Port Hope Conversion Facility are extensive and allow for the recycling of several types of waste. Notwithstanding these capabilities there are certain wastes that are not amenable to the internal processing capabilities and must be disposed of appropriately. Disposal options for low-level radioactively contaminated wastes in Canada are limited primarily due to cost considerations. In recent years, Cameco has started to ship marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) to the United States for disposal in an appropriate landfill. The landfill is owned by US Ecology Incorporated and is located near Grand View, Idaho 70 miles southeast of Boise in the Owyhee Desert. The facility treats and disposes hazardous waste, non-hazardous industrial waste and low-activity radioactive material. The site's arid climate, deep groundwater and favourable geology help ensure permanent waste isolation. Combined with a state of the art multi-layer landfill liner system, the Grand View facility represents an ideal choice to minimize environmental liability. Marginally contaminated wastes from operations within the Fuel Services Division are typically loaded into PacTec IP-2 rated Intermediary Bulk Containers and then transported by road to a nearby rail siding. The Intermediary Bulk Containers are then loaded in US Ecology owned gondola rail-cars. The gondolas are then transported via Canadian Pacific and Union Pacific railroads to the US Ecology Rail Transfer facility located in Mayfield, Idaho. The Intermediary Bulk Containers are unloaded into trucks for transport to the disposal facility located approximately 32 miles away. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

25 years of environmental remediation in the general separations area of the Savannah river site: lessons learned about what worked and what did not work in soil and groundwater cleanup - 15270

The Savannah River Site, which is owned and administered by the US Department of Energy, covers approximately 900 square kilometers. The General Separation Area is located in the center of the site and includes: radioactive material chemical separations facilities, radioactive waste tank farms, radioactive seepage basins, and the radioactive waste burial grounds. Radioactive wastes were disposed in the General Separation Area from the mid-1950's through the mid-1990's. Operations at the F Canyon began in 1954 and at H Canyon began in 1955. Waste water disposition to the F and H Seepage Basins began soon after operations started in the canyons. The Old Radioactive Waste Burial Ground began operations in 1952 to manage solid waste that could be radioactive from all the site operations, and ceased receiving waste in 1972. The Mixed Waste Management Facility and Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility received radioactive solid waste from 1969 until 1995. Environmental legislation enacted in the 1970's through 1990's led to changes in waste management and environmental cleanup practices. The US Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the Clean Water Act in 1972; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was enacted in 1976; the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act was enacted by Congress in 1980; and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act was signed into law in 1992. Environmental remediation at the Savannah River Site essentially began with a 1987 Settlement Agreement between the Savannah River Site and the State of South Carolina. The site manages several of the larger groundwater remedial activities under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for facilities recognized early on as environmental problems. All subsequent remediation projects are managed under a tri-party agreement (Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) through the Federal Facilities Agreement. Environmental remediation activities during the past 25 years have stabilized and capped seepage basins as well as consolidated and capped waste units and burial grounds in the General Separation Area. Groundwater activities include: pump and treat systems in the groundwater, installation of deep subsurface barrier systems to manage groundwater flow, in situ chemical treatments in the groundwater, and captured contaminated groundwater discharges at the surface for management in a forest irrigation system. Concentrations of contaminants in the aquifers beneath the General Separation Area and in surface water streams in the General Separation Area have decreased over the past 25 years. Closure of 65 waste sites and 4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act facilities has been successfully accomplished. Environmental clean-up has progressed to the stage where most of the work involves monitoring, optimization, and maintenance of existing remedial systems. Many lessons have been learned in the process of remediating the General Separations Area. Geo-textile covers outperform low permeability clay caps, especially with respect to the amount of repairs required to upkeep the drainage layers as the caps age. Passive and enhanced natural processes to address contamination are much more cost effective than pump and treat systems. Forest irrigation can be very effective in water management situations with non-accumulative contaminants such as tritium and volatile organic contaminants. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗