Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Physical Protection”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Characterization of Uranium Foil Irradiations at the WSU TRIGA Reactor Using a New Reactor Model in SCALE [Slides]

A depleted uranium foil and a highly enriched uranium foil that were irradiated at the Washington State University TRIGA reactor were used to measure the relative production of 237 U and 239 U, two key isotopes of interest in nuclear forensics, as well as their decay daughters 237 Np and 239 Pu. Total fissions in the two foils were also estimated using 99 Mo measurement. A reactor model of the TRIGA was built in the SCALE neutron transport code using dimensions obtained from an existing MCNP geometry. The model was successfully used to simulate foil fissions and the reaction rate ratios in 238 U, using the laboratory-measured isotope ratios as a benchmark. The flux distribution in the foils was determined. Finally, using the continuous energy Tsunami-3d module of SCALE, a sensitivity/uncertainty analysis was performed to determine the effects on the reaction ratio caused by other reactions in the reactor and by uncertainties in the known cross-sections.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Mass Attribute System (UMAS) Study: Evaluation of Options against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria

In this FY19 study, a range of possible measurement systems for confirming a U-235 mass attribute were identified. The systems were reviewed for their applicability in a potential future arms control agreement, and a subset of the eight most plausible systems were selected for further evaluation against the Arms Control Evaluation Criteria (ACEC). The evaluation results were then used to identify a primary and secondary recommended measurement system for confirming a U-235 mass attribute on warheads, nuclear components of warheads, and/or materials as part of a hypothetical arms control agreement.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards Hour [Sides]

This presentation provides an overview of nonproliferation and safeguards, introduces neutron coincidence counting, reviews spent fuel characterization for power reactors and research reactors, and outlines safeguards at Los Alamos.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapons Deterrence Concepts

Deterrence is the action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences. Our security hedge in an uncertain world discourages our adversaries & reassures our allies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Ready, Set, Getting to Go: America's Nuclear Test Readiness Posture

In a geopolitical environment once again dominated by Great Power competition, the stakes of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent also returned to the forefront of national security. Yet, as nearly thirty years have passed without the United States conducting a nuclear test, there exists considerable uncertainty on how quickly, or even if, the United States could resume nuclear testing—a key component of a credible deterrent. However, there remains a legal requirement, with origins in hard-earned Cold War lessons, for the nation to return to underground nuclear testing if called upon to do so. This paper provides an overview of nuclear testing, the nation’s current state of preparedness, and offers recommendations on how to improve its test readiness posture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

NNSA GenScen 2.1 Methodology

Nuclear weapons stockpile planning is a complex process. The Non-Proliferation Treaty,' New START Treaty,2 DOE/NNSA, STRATCOM, Navy, Air Force, and Executive-Branch all have objectives that drive requirements for the types and quantities of nuclear weapons, which in turn drive how nuclear weapons are designed, manufactured, tested, maintained, deployed, transported, stored, retired, and ultimately dismantled. An estimated 200 distinct individuals contribute to the development, completion, and approval of this plan. And once that plan is completed, herein called the N NSA Program of Record (POR), ensuring that the plan is feasible — that the stockpile work can get done — ensures that the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) can deliver the intended nuclear force posture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its Role in Trust Building

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its role in Trust Building [Slides]

Technical cooperation is a low-cost way to initiate movement in the arms control sphere and offers an operational path forward for the reestablishment of working relationships built on trust not freely given, but gained through experience, and a shared vision of the future; Political will alone, though necessary for cooperation to take place, is insufficient in the face of structural obstacles. For effective cooperation to have a future, countries must have both political will and complementary and conducive institutional structures; Cooperation at the intergovernmental level seems unlikely at this time. However, if relationships with international partners continue to be strained as development of new offensive technologies continues, it is very possible that future movement in technical arms control cooperation could again be initiated in the nongovernmental sphere; As the stewards of the majority of the world’s nuclear stockpile, the United States and the Russian Federation have a unique role to play in shaping global norms on arms control verification and cooperation; it is in their mutual interest now to begin to find technical solutions to the question of verification as other countries ramp up production.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Applying Waveform Correlation to Mining Blasts Using a Global Sparse Network

Agencies that monitor for underground nuclear tests are interested in techniques that automatically characterize mining blasts to reduce the human analyst effort required to produce high-quality event bulletins. Waveform correlation is effective in finding similar waveforms from repeating seismic events, including mining blasts. We report the results of an experiment that uses waveform templates recorded by multiple International Monitoring System stations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for up to 10 years prior to detect and identify mining blasts that occur during single weeks of study. We discuss approaches for template selection, threshold setting, and event detection that are specialized for mining blasts and a sparse, global network. We apply the approaches to two different weeks of study for each of two geographic regions, Wyoming and Scandinavia, to evaluate the potential for establishing a set of standards for waveform correlation processing of mining blasts that can be effective for operational monitoring systems with a sparse network. We compare candidate events detected with our processing methods to the Reviewed Event Bulletin of the International Data Centre to develop an intuition about potential reduction in analyst workload.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Treaties and Arms Control [Slides]

This presentations provides an overview of arms control including aims and methods of arms control, the treaty process, treaties, new START inspections, and future treaty considerations: strategic vs. nonstrategic.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Annual Assessment Reporting Process

On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States intended to enter negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To address concerns that the cessation of nuclear testing would introduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he also announced the concurrent establishment of six Safeguards as conditions of entry. Safeguard A prescribed “. . . a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile.” Safeguard B required “The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure . . . human scientific resources.” These two Safeguards led to the establishment of the physical and intellectual capabilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Major Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk Reduction: Perspectives From Russia, China, and the United States

Since its founding in 1992, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) has had an abiding interest in nuclear threat reduction. In the 1990s it did some of the leading thinking about cooperative threat reduction with post-Soviet entities. In the early 2000s it focused increasingly on strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Since 2015 one of its primary interests has been exploring the future of cooperative strategies to reduce nuclear/strategic dangers. That future faces many challenges, both technical and geopolitical. By 2020, a rising sense of urgency of nuclear danger had clearly taken shape in the United States and internationally, driven in significant measure by the renewal of major power rivalry and potential military flashpoints among those powers. And that urgency has driven a rising national and international exploration of what can be done to reduce nuclear dangers.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapon Culture

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Culture; Nuclear Weapon Culture; Manhattan Project Secrecy & Intelligence; Pre-Hiroshima & Nagasaki; Surety; Propaganda; Living in the Nuclear Age

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles; Deterrence Basics; Key Elements of Nuclear Deterrence; Nuclear Deterrence Theories; Nuclear Deterrence Cold War; Nuclear Deterrence Today; New Deterrence Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective

Presentation Overview: Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective; DOD and DOE Nuclear Security Policy Standards; Weapon Secure Storage Methods; Modes of Transportation: DOD and DOE; Security Breeches; Basic Security Classification Practices

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗