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The presentation topics are: Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapons Production (ALDWP) Overview; Plutonium Center and Science; Detonators; and, ALDWP Today.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, or the Lab) is one of the United States’ (U.S.) weapons complex nuclear security laboratories; it is owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Triad National Security, LLC. LANL’s mission is to solve national security challenges through scientific excellence, which includes nuclear deterrence and stockpile stewardship. Such activities generate a variety of radioactive waste types, including transuranic (TRU) waste. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is under a congressional mandate to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 to meet Department of Defense requirements and support the nuclear deterrent. LANL is responsible for producing at least 30 pits per year by 2026, while the Savannah River Site will produce 50 pits per year by 2030. As of August 2018, the NNSA TRU waste inventory at LANL was at 53% capacity. In order to ensure the nuclear material missions are able to continue uninterrupted, the storage of TRU waste needs to remain below 60% of total capacity. As LANL increases production and prepares to meet the 30 pits per year goal, waste generation will increase substantially. Thus, there is a need to rejuvenate current infrastructure and implement TRU waste reduction methods in the coming years.
The rise times computed by the author’s three-dimensional geomagnetic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) code MACSYNC for a high-altitude nuclear burst increase from a fraction of a shake under the burst to tens of shakes at a 1,000 km ground range (one shake equals 10 nanoseconds). Computations for similar geometries with the frequently used one-dimensional spherical EMP codes CHAP and HEMP show similar rise times under the burst, but rise times that are an order-of-magnitude shorter at large ground ranges. This difference is likely due to the inability of these codes to treat the three-dimensional aspect of the slanted EMP incidence on the atmosphere.
The complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could significantly impact nuclear decision-making, particular in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Such conflicts may present governments with a range of nuclear decisions: whether to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis, whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks, and whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. At each decision point, EDTs create potential risks as well as rewards. EDTs are likely to influence the context for nuclear decision-making and the choices between different courses of action. EDTs could impact the context of nuclear decision-making by improving or degrading situational assessment, the ability to deliberate, and the ability to manage one’s nuclear forces. EDTs could influence the choice between nuclear restraint or escalation by affecting the perceived strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action. Even though particular combinations of EDTs could precipitate nuclear use in some scenarios, they could encourage restraint in others. The impact and relevance of the same combinations of EDTs might be different at various nuclear decision points. The availability of specific combinations of EDTs at different stages of a conflict would also vary because of the attrition and one-time-use nature of some capabilities. In later stages of a conflict, the decision maker’s confidence in different combinations of EDTs would depend on their previous experience in using them. While the interactions of EDTs are likely to bring additional complexity to a nuclear decision-making process, EDTs are also not the only source of complexity. Broader strategic, military, operational, legal, moral, and emotional factors are also likely to play an important role. These factors may dominate decision-making in a range of potential cases.
The United States faces an ever-increasingly multi-polar security environment dominated by great power competition with China and a lingering Russian threat as well as from would-be regional hegemons led by ambitions from Iran and North Korea. Our adversaries are pursuing and expanding the strategic means by-which they have an asymmetric offset (e.g., cyber, space, and other modes below the level of armed conflict). To combat and deter against the widening range of hostile actions, the U.S. must have additional capabilities with-which to deter. All of which drives us towards a more thoughtful integrated approach to deterrence, attempting to best align deterrent tools with the adversary actions in order to maximize the credibility of our deterrent. Such an approach complicates our deterrence strategy and demands a methodology to assess whether the U.S. has the deterrent tools necessary to deter the adversarial actions most costly to the U.S. To address this complexity, we create a framework to comprehensively and systematically assess our deterrent tools as qualitatively measured against the adversarial actions we wish to deter. Deterrence is ultimately an operation in the cognitive domain and at the heart of the framework presented here is the fundamental deterrence calculus which we use as the defining measure of whether a tool will credibly deter a given action. We describe the eight levers of the deterrence calculus and distill these levers to four products that are used to qualitatively assess the overall effectiveness of deterrence tools against adversarial actions. Credibility is determined by two principal variables: the technical credibility of the deterrent tool, and the principle of proportionality. Technical credibility of realized deterrence products is assessed through development of key mission requirements and hardware (e.g., components) that will impose costs, deny benefits, or encourage restraint. The principle of proportionality qualitatively asserts that for a deterrent tool to be cognitively credible, the costs imposed against, or benefits denied by, an action are commensurate to the magnitude of costs received from the adversarial action. By basing this framework on these two fundamentals, it is possible to compare deterrent tools in a systematic approach across the broad spectrum of hostile actions.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) J-3 Office Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-620 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-620 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-620 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.
A catalogue of and attributes of the Materials Irradiation and Testing facilities (MIF) and the Basic Neutron Science facilities (BSF) of auxiliary (AUX) facilities of research reactors are compiled. The survey of these facilities is drawn from the set of U.S. university and DOE research reactor facilities and should be considered as a reference point when comparing commonalities in international AUX facilities. The size and shielding capabilities of the facilities, the typical characterization equipment used, and the neutron flux and irradiation capabilities of the facilities are listed. Short descriptions of experimental activities and current practices are detailed for MIFs and BSFs. The attributes are important in consideration of the reconfiguration of the facilities for purposes other than stated mission, i.e., for proliferation of weapons-usable nuclear material (WUNM). An evaluation of the capacity for production rate of WUNM from neutron beams-on-targets or a sample that has been placed in an irradiation position for a period is provided. Further evaluation of reconfiguration of these MIF and BSF are recommended to refine the proliferation risks. Specifically, MIF hot cells and potential configurations, additional modeling of facility throughput and development of methods for determining levels of concern for MIF and BSF have all been identified as steps for refinement of determination of the risks associated with these facilities. Future work will focus on: 1. A model of projected throughput for different MIF and BSF configurations that will be used to provide a window of potential operational misuse for a facility and better understand the capability of production and the rate of processing for WUNM in these facilities. 2. A misuse study for various configurations of MIF hot cell layouts detailing capacity, specifications, shielding constraints for MIF operations, identification of a maximum shielding thickness, and reasonable need associated with each activity performed in a MIF. 3. Development of a rule of thumb rating system utilizing data gathered from previous reports to show levels of concern at a given power level, flux, and experiment set.
Abstract not provided.
Postdoctoral research offers value to Lawrence Livermore’s scientific and technological efforts. Uplifting early-career researchers as the next generation of scientists benefits their futures and the Laboratory’s. Taking inspiration from the University of California Grad Slam, which challenges participants to explain their theses in three minutes, the Research SLAM at Livermore provides postdoctoral researchers an opportunity to share their research while honing their communication skills and preparing them for a career in collaborative science. The first spinoff of the Livermore SLAM extended the competition to all Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories in the San Francisco Bay Area. A competition among DOE national laboratories across the country has followed, spurring a nationwide appreciation for budding scientists and the art of connecting high-level science with the nonexpert.
The debris produced by a nuclear explosion forms a hazard to response, can serve as a record used to interpret the event, and may persist in the environment necessitating long term management. Hence, understanding the radiochemical inventory of nuclear debris remains an important area of study, particularly the behavior and resulting distribution of actinides and fission products. Despite formation in a high energy environment, it has been recognized for decades that the chemical and isotopic composition of debris rarely, if ever, captures a homogenized blend of the bomb products. Instead, during cooling and debris formation, a variety of chemical processes cause separation of the different constituents. This process of chemical fractionation creates debris with a variety of different radionuclide inventories. Here we provide an overdue re-examination of our historic basis for understanding chemical fractionation in nuclear explosions through the context of new characterization of a large set of historical nuclear test data. Finally, we then discuss the implications of our findings for advancing models of radionuclide distribution and postdetonation chemical fractionation.
Abstract not provided.
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There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.
The 13th annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21) workshop brought together a mixture of senior officials from the laboratory, policy, military, and expert communities to promote a high-level focus and well-informed discussion on key deterrence challenges for the U.S. nuclear deterrent over the coming decade and beyond. It brought together interested stakeholders from the national security laboratories, federal government, military, think tank, and academic communities, as well as allied counterparts, to share perspectives in an unclassified setting.
Uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ) is an important intermediate in the production of UF 6 and uranium metal. Room temperature hydrolysis of UF 4 was investigated using a combination of Fluorine-19 nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy ( 19 F NMR), Raman and infrared spectroscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, and microscopy measurements. UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 was identified as the primary solid hydrolysis product when anhydrous UF 4 was stirred in deionized water. Static NMR and 19 F magic angle spinning NMR measurements revealed that a small amount of uranyl fluoride can also form when anhydrous UF 4 is left in water, although this species comprises less than 5% of the total sample with the remaining parts being UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 . Since UF 4 is generally considered to be stable under ambient conditions, these findings mark the first time that a room temperature reaction between UF 4 and water has been detected and analyzed without interference from additional chemical reagents. The Raman characterization of UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 presented herein is the first on record. Since UF 4 is one of the most used intermediates during chemical conversion of uranium ore to uranium metal for nuclear fuel and weapons, the results presented herein are applicable to numerous nuclear science fields where solid state detection of uranium is of value, including nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, and environmental remediation.
This manuscript describes the chemical transformations that occur during hydrolysis of uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ) due to its storage in humid air (85% and 50% relative humidity) at ambient temperatures. This hydrolysis was previously reported to proceed slowly or not at all (depending on the percent relative humidity); however, previous reports relied primarily on X-ray diffraction methods to probe uranium speciation. Here, we employ a battery of physiochemical probing techniques to explore potential hydrolysis, including Raman spectroscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, 19 F nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, scanning electron microscopy, and focused ion beam microscopy with energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy. Of these, only Raman spectroscopy proved to be particularly useful at observing chemical changes to UF 4 . It was found that anhydrous UF 4 slightly oxidizes over the course of thirteen days to Schoepite-like uranium complexes and possibly UO 3 . In contrast, UF 4 exposed to 50% relative humidity slightly decomposes into UO 2 F 2 , Schoepite-like uranium complexes, and possibly a high order uranium oxide that eluded chemical assignment (U x O y ). Despite the rich chemical speciation observed in our Raman spectroscopy measurements, X-ray diffraction and 19 F NMR measurements on the same material showed no changes. Microscopy measurements suggest that the observed reactions between UF 4 and water occur primarily on the surface of UF 4 particulates via a method that is visually similar to surface corrosion of metals. Therefore, we postulate that NMR spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction, which are well-suited for bulk analysis, are less suited than Raman spectroscopy to observe the surface-based reactions that occur to UF 4 when exposed to humid air. Considering the importance of UF 4 in the production of nuclear fuel and weapons, the results presented herein are widely applicable to numerous nuclear science fields where uranium detection and speciation in humid environments is of value, including nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear forensics.