Programmatic Value Determination and Termination of Safeguards Process for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Research and development is underway to improve radiation and nuclear detection capabilities. This research and development in radiation and nuclear detection includes areas such as advanced materials, applied research and engineering for designing and fabricating customized detection equipment, and theoretical modeling and computational support. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has a distinctive set of detector materials fabrication and characterization capabilities and recently created a Center for Radiation Detection Materials and Systems. Applied research and engineering efforts have led to the development of improved detectors for specific applications including safeguards, treaty monitoring, and science experiments. All sizes, types, and capabilities of detector systems have been addressed from miniature to man-portable and from neutrons to gamma radiation. Dedicated test beds, in-house and in the field, have been established to analyze, characterize, and improve detection systems.
Summary of activities from NMDQi/AMMT to be presented to the annual AMMT program integration meeting
No abstract prepared.
Nuclear material deposited in equipment, transfer lines, and ventilation systems of a processing facility is usually referred to as holdup. Operators need to know the location and amount of holdup in their facility for radiation safety and material accountability. In this work, we propose to use an array of detectors co-axial to the inspected pipe to measure the holdup material. This method is implementable into an automated system capable of crawling on surfaces and pipes of various curvatures, which would enable faster, easier, and more accurate holdup safeguards measurements. We first demonstrated that the current holdup assay procedure could lead to a non-negligible bias in the estimate of special nuclear material mass, due to the simplified assumption of deposited geometry introduced by the Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) model. The new approach consists of imaging the inner holdup material by characterizing the detector array’s response and unfolding it from the measured light output. Our experimental proof of principle consists of three NaI(Tl) detectors surrounding an aluminum pipe containing two cesium-137 ( 137 Cs) sources. We derived the source distribution inside the pipe by first calculating the detector response matrix using a method adaptive to the surface geometry of the object containing the measured holdup material. Creating a matrix of the detector array’s measured counts, we then proceed to solve an inverse problem, resulting in an accurately located source position and activity distribution within the response matrix’s spatial resolution. Furthermore, we then developed a simulated model of the envisioned experimental setup, which accurately described both the activity and position of the source in 2D. Finally, we extended our model onto a discretized three-dimensional model of the system, encompassing 36 detectors. The model was simulated to measure the source distribution and activity of multiple sources in pipes of varied geometries, which could then be conveniently translated to a real-time holdup measurement protocol. For the 3D simulation of four different source geometries, the model accurately localized the source position in 3D, while the activity retained a maximum relative error of ±5.32%.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Abstract not provided.
This presentation covers the basics of the nuclear fuel cycle, mining and milling, enrichment technologies and processes, uranium fabrication, plutonium production, and basics of nuclear reactors.
No abstract prepared.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The pebble bed high temperature reactor (PB-HTR) is a promising reactor type with inherent safety features in the next generation nuclear systems Based on the experience of studying and operating test PB-HTR (the HTR-10) for decades, China is constructing the first commercial nuclear power plant of modular PB-HTR in the world, i.e. the HTR-PM, which is expected to commission by the end of 2017. Since the PB-HTRs are quite different from the conventional PWRs in many aspects, including the large amount of fuel pebbles, the continuous refueling, the low heavy metal density in fuels, the safeguards of PB-HTR is important to investigate. Unfortunately, the research on this topic is insufficient by far, especially for the upcoming commercial PB-HTR plants. The PB-HTR has excellent features on proliferation resistance The graphite fuel pebbles with diameter of 6 cm are used as fuel elements, embedded with more than ten thousand TRISO coated fuel particles. This kind of fuel design provides more than one order of magnitude lower heavy metal concentration in fuel than other fuels. For the typical uranium loading of 7 grams in the HTR-PM, more than 10,000 fresh fuel pebbles (about 1.2 tons) are required to provide a significant quantity of indirect-use uranium with enrichment less than 20%. Moreover, the reprocessing of TRISO particle fuels is difficult because of the rigid SiC layer in the coating. Also, the possibility of utilizing materials from PB-HTR's spent fuels to product dirty bombs is quite low just due to the same reason as reprocessing. On the other hand, the large amount of fuel pebbles and the continuous on-line fueling introduce new challenges in nuclear safeguards and material accounting of PB-HTRs. This summary discusses the major considerations on the nuclear material accounting of PB-HTRs.
Through a series of measurements with a high purity germanium detector, we have established that the past presence of neutron emitting material can be detected by the decay of activation products in aluminum containers, tungsten shielding, and concrete floors even several days after last exposure. The time since last exposure can also be estimated by the gamma-ray detection rate. These findings may lead to interesting new CONOPS in the detection of illicit SNM or the verification of the absence (or presence) of SNM containing objects in facilities and/or transit even after the material has been removed.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.