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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

The need for standardization of nuclear cardiology reporting and data system (NCAD-RADS): Learning from coronary artery disease (CAD), breast imaging (BI), liver imaging (LI), and prostate imaging (PI) RADS

Newer structured reporting manners, the reporting and data system (RADS), have made vast steps in improving standardized and structured reporting, allowing better communication between radiologists and referring providers. This has been implemented in several fields: breast (BI-RADS), lung (Lung-RADS), liver (LI-RADS), thyroid (TI-RADS), prostate (PI-RADS), and in cardiovascular radiology (CAD-RADS). The field of nuclear cardiology began its efforts of standardization years ago; however, a widespread standardized reporting structure has not yet been adopted. Such an approach in nuclear cardiology, the nuclear cardiology reporting and data system (NCAD-RADS), will assist radiologists and treating clinicians in conveying and understanding reports and determining the appropriate next steps in management. By linking explicit findings to defined recommendations, patients will receive more consistent and appropriate care.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2016

Nevada National Security Site Underground Radionuclide Inventory, 1951-1992: Accounting for Radionuclide Decay through September 30, 2012

This report is an update of report LA-13859-MS (Bowen et al., 2001). In that original report, the underground radionuclide inventory at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was decay corrected to September 23, 1992, the date of the last underground nuclear test at the NNSS. In this report, the inventory is updated to account for the decay of radionuclides over two additional decades (1992-2012) and revised tritium, fission product and actinide inventory figures and tables are presented. The maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides were also updated to Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) (CFR, 2013). Also, a number of minor errata found in the original publication were corrected. An inventory of radionuclides produced by 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NNSS by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 includes tritium, fission products, actinides, and activation products. The inventory presented in this report provides an estimate of radioactivity remaining underground at the NNSS after nuclear testing. The original test inventory is decayed to September 30, 2012, and predictions of inventory decay over the subsequent 1000 years are presented. For the purposes of summary and publication, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory authors of this report subdivided the inventory into five areas corresponding to the principal geographic test centers at the NNSS. The five areas roughly correspond to Underground Test Area “Corrective Action Units” (CAUs) for remediation of groundwater. In addition, the inventory is further subdivided for the Yucca Flat region by tests where the working point depth is more than 328 feet (100 meters) above the water table and tests that were detonated below that level. Water levels used were those from the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997), now called the Nevada Field Office. Curie activities and atoms are reported as of September 30, 2012. This inventory is strictly a compilation of the residual radiologic inventory remaining from the underground nuclear tests conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 and does not include radioactivity from other types of nuclear testing (e.g., atmospheric, reactors, rocket engines). A companion classified report (Miller et al., 2002) contains test-specific data for each test performed at the NNSS. This work has been sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office.

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DOE OSTI2016

Corrosion of Metal Inclusions In Bulk Vitrification Waste Packages. Erratum

This report refers to or contains K g values for glasses LAWA44, LAWB45 and LAWC22 affected by calculations errors as identified by Papathanassiu et al. (2011). The corrected K g values are reported in an erratum included in the revised version of the original report. The revised report can be referenced as follows: Pierce E. M. et al. (2004) Waste Form Release Data Package for the 2005 Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment. PNNL-14805 Rev. 0 Erratum. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USA.

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DOE OSTI2012

Nevada National Security Site 2011 Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This report is a compilation of the groundwater sampling results from the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The data have been collected since 1993 and include calendar year 2011 results. During 2011, groundwater samples were collected and static water levels were measured at the three pilot wells surrounding the Area 5 RWMS. Samples were collected at UE5PW-1 on March 8, August 2, August 24, and October 19, 2011; at UE5PW-2 on March 8, August 2, August 23, and October 19, 2011; and at UE5PW-3 on March 8, August 2, August 23, and October 19, 2011. Static water levels were measured at each of the three pilot wells on March 1, June 7, August 1, and October 17, 2011. Groundwater samples were analyzed for the following indicators of contamination: pH, specific conductance, total organic carbon, total organic halides, and tritium. Indicators of general water chemistry (cations and anions) were also measured. Initial total organic carbon and total organic halides results for samples collected in August 2011 were above previous measurements and, in some cases, above the established investigation limits. However, after field sample pumps and tubing were disinfected with Clorox solution, the results returned to normal levels. Final results from samples collected in 2011 were within the limits established by agreement with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for each analyte. These data indicate that there has been no measurable impact to the uppermost aquifer from the Area 5 RWMS. There were no significant changes in measured groundwater parameters compared to previous years. The report contains an updated cumulative chronology for the Area 5 RWMS Groundwater Monitoring Program and a brief description of the site hydrogeology.

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DOE OSTI2021

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Finding, Organizing, and Preserving Legacy Nuclear Test Monitoring Data—Examples from the Livermore Nevada Network

A challenge for geophysical research is the relatively short time for which continuous digital data have been available. There are many events of research interest where much of the data were collected by analog or temporary digital means. These legacy data require special efforts to find, organize, and preserve for future research. Here, we focus on one type of legacy data, nuclear explosions, and associated events (e.g., collapses, aftershocks) of high interest for nuclear monitoring research and development. For nuclear tests conducted in Nevada, the Lawrence Livermore Nevada Network recorded valuable data on a variety of formats. In this article, we briefly review this network, and describe one set of data that previously was available via CD-ROM by request, and since 2018 has become available through Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology as assembled dataset 18-001.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Environmental Remediation Using EPA's Model Evaluation Guidance to Move to Closure - 15588

The National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) has adapted the Environmental Protection Agency's guidance on environmental model evaluation as a framework for evaluating corrective action investigation models. Model evaluation is an important confidence building activity, which is needed to support closure of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Corrective Action Units (CAUs) associated with underground nuclear testing. Through this process, site-investigation models of groundwater flow and contaminant transport are reviewed and compared to new site-specific data to determine if the results can be used to support regulatory decisions required for closure and to achieve NNSA/NFO site management objectives. The regulatory decisions include identifying and establishing CAU regulatory boundaries; identifying institutional controls, including use-restriction boundaries; and developing a long-term closure monitoring program. A successful case study from Frenchman Flat, Nevada is used to illustrate the model evaluation process. Groundwater flow and transport from two of the 10 underground nuclear tests in Frenchman Flat had the largest potential for contaminating groundwater, and were selected for evaluation. Wells were drilled, logged, hydraulically tested, sampled, and analyzed for radionuclides and the data was evaluated with respect to previous site conceptualization and numerical model results. The approach and results of this process as applied to the PIN STRIPE test and how it helped build confidence to close the Frenchman Flat CAU is described in this case study. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Developing a New Model to Estimate the Costs to Decommission DOE's Active Facilities - 16368

The Active Facilities Data Collection System (AFDCS) is a major means the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department) uses to estimate its out-year environmental liability for the active and surplus facilities across the Department. The previous AFDCS cost model was based on cost assumptions that date back to the mid-1990s. The model is being replaced with a model that reflects more recent facility disposition experience and costs. DOE's Office of Environmental Management's (DOE-EM) historical cost collection database provides the basis for the new AFDCS cost model. This paper describes the process that was used to update the AFDCS facility data inputs, analyze this data, and formulate historical costs and parameters. This process created a robust and reliable cost model that will provide DOE with a valid estimate of the facilities' disposition costs. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Submittal of SWMU Assessment Report for Building 9960 Surface Discharge

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-purpose engineering and science laboratory owned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration and managed and operated by Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. This Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) Assessment Report (SAR) for the Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM), Coyote Test Field, Building 9960 Surface Discharge, has been prepared in accordance with Section V of the Compliance Order on Consent (the Consent Order) between the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), DOE, and Sandia (NMED April 2004). The DOE and Sandia formally notified the NMED of this newly identified or suspected SWMU or Area of Concern (AOC) by letter dated December 9, 2014. This SAR is being submitted in accordance with the NMED Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB) letter dated February 16, 2015 letter (Kieling February 2015). This SAR presents the available information for the Building 9960 Surface Discharge, including location, designation of type and function, a general description, the operational dates, waste characteristics, and a summary of existing analytical wastewater and soil data

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DOE OSTI2016

Data Validation Package May 2016 Groundwater Sampling at the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site, September 2016

Groundwater samples were collected from monitoring wells at the Bluewater, New Mexico, Disposal Site to monitor groundwater contaminants as specified in the 1997 Long-Term Surveillance Plan for the DOE Bluewater (UMTRCA Title II) Disposal Site Near Grants, New Mexico (LTSP). Sampling and analyses were conducted as specified in the Sampling and Analysis Plan for U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management Sites (LMS/PRO/S04351, continually updated). A duplicate sample was collected from location 16(SG).

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DOE OSTI2025

Harvesting Reactor Pressure Vessel Beltline Material from the Decommissioned Zion Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1

The decommissioning of the Zion Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) provided a unique opportunity to harvest and study service-aged reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline materials. This work, conducted through the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, aims to improve the understanding of radiation-induced embrittlement to support extended nuclear plant operations. Material segments containing the Linde 80 flux, wire heat 72105 (WF-70) beltline weld and the A533B Heat B7835-1 base metal, obtained from the intermediate shell region with a peak fluence of 0.7 × 10 19 n/cm 2 (E > 1.0 MeV), were extracted, cut into blocks, and machined into test specimens for mechanical and microstructural characterization. The segmentation process involved oxy-propane torch-cutting, followed by precision machining using wire saws and electrical discharge machining (EDM). A chemical composition analysis confirmed the expected variations in alloying elements, with copper levels being notably higher in the weld metal. The harvested specimens enable a detailed evaluation of through-wall embrittlement gradients, a comparison with the existing surveillance data, and the validation of predictive embrittlement models. This study provides critical data for assessing long-term reactor vessel integrity, informing aging-management strategies, and supporting regulatory decisions to extend the life of nuclear plants. This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled, “Current Status of the Characterization of RPV Materials Harvested from the Decommissioned Zion Unit 1 Nuclear Power Plant”, PVP2017-65090, which was accepted and presented at the ASME 2017 Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, Waikoloa, HI, USA, 16–20 July 2017.

harvesting beltline material↗
DOE OSTI2012

Akuna - Integrated Toolsets Supporting Advanced Subsurface Flow and Transport Simulations for Environmental Management

A next generation open source subsurface simulator and user environment for environmental management is being developed through a collaborative effort across Department of Energy National Laboratories. The flow and transport simulator, Amanzi, will be capable of modeling complex subsurface environments and processes using both unstructured and adaptive meshes at very fine spatial resolutions that require supercomputing-scale resources. The user environment, Akuna, provides users with a range of tools to manage environmental and simulator data sets, create models, manage and share simulation data, and visualize results. Underlying the user interface are core toolsets that provide algorithms for sensitivity analysis, parameter estimation, and uncertainty quantification. Akuna is open-source, cross platform software that is initially being demonstrated on the Hanford BC Cribs remediation site. In this paper, we describe the emerging capabilities of Akuna and illustrate how these are being applied to the BC Cribs site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Implementation and evaluation of a radiological field investigation for real property interests associated with the FUSRAP Maywood Site - 15611

Public streets, easements, and rights-of-way, collectively referred to as Real Property Interests (RPI), pose challenging and complex problems for the FUSRAP Maywood Project Team. RPIs are components of a multi-faceted objective to evaluate all remaining sources of contamination for which the Government is responsible under the Maywood Record of Decision. USACE designed and implemented a MARSSIM-based radiological investigation within sixteen potentially impacted RPIs. These RPIs were not completely addressed on their own or in conjunction with nearby property investigations or remediations. However, these RPIs were investigated based on the potential for or known impact of FMSS contamination as determined through both a historic data review of the transport mechanism (downstream waste deposition) and process knowledge obtained during Final Status Survey of proximal properties. The primary objectives of this investigation were to confirm the presence or absence of FUSRAP contamination within a given RPI, provide sufficient data to release an RPI if contamination was not encountered, and provide sufficient data for either design of an appropriate remedial solution or implementation of Land Use Controls when contamination was encountered. Of additional value, knowledge gained during the RPI investigations will allow the team to share useful radiological data with local officials and utility service providers. This information will support better, more informed decisions by all parties involved in situations such as emergency subsurface utility repairs, roadway improvement planning, or even natural disaster response. Finally, certain unexpected outcomes learned during the final data analysis may lead to refinement of the conceptual site model. Logistical lessons learned and challenges encountered during the Maywood investigation may also be helpful to stakeholders, planners, and managers of similar projects wishing to identify their own potential liability within public streets, easements, rights-of-way, and other types of RPIs. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

An experimental program to characterize confined explosions of hydrogen/oxygen mixtures in the context of radioactive material transport between CEA nuclear facilities - 15125

CEA, the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission, carries out a variety of nuclear research programs in many research reactors and nuclear facilities, decommissioning and dismantling operations that require multiple transports of different type of radioactive material such as radioactive waste or experimental fuel rods using a wide range of transportation packages. Packages are designed, constructed and operated to meet safety and regulatory requirements and must be approved by the French Safety Authority. Application for package approval (e.g. type B package) requires a complete and thorough safety demonstration in which flammable gas generation like radiolysis has become a major issue in the last few years. To face these challenges, the CEA unit in charge of transport package construction and transport operations (CEA/STMR, Cadarache Center, France), has developed a many-sided approach based on one hand on a better knowledge of both hydrogen gas generation and oxygen consumption in waste materials, and on the other hand, on design of transport packages or waste containers capable of withstanding dynamic pressure loads due to an inner hydrogen/air mixture explosion. This paper describes the experimental program that CEA/STMR has decided to implement in order to better characterize confined space explosions of hydrogen/oxygen mixtures. It presents how pressure profiles were experimentally measured in various pressure and temperature conditions which are representative of normal and accident transport conditions. It describes how different experimental set-ups were designed and improved progressively so as to obtain reliable and reproducible detonation conditions, investigate the influence of water vapor and characterize pressure profiles (peak pressure, residual pressure, peak duration). This experimental data will be used to qualify computational models and tools that are used to calculate the structural response of waste containers or fuel canisters, and finally demonstrate the safety of transport packages following an inner hydrogen explosion. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2022

INL Site ARG-US Implementation – FY22 Activities and FY23 Plans

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US provides necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance, and has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in INL’s Nuclear Science and Technology (NS&T) directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend INL site processes or facilities in which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversight representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management personnel to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified the following high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. As a result, INL suggests three program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “Tank Farm,” and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions for completing the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

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NASA NTRS2012

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

probabilistic risk↗
DOE OSTI2017

Integrated Modeling and Monitoring Technologies for Environmental Resiliency in Nuclear Energy

Environmental concerns pose the biggest challenge for the development of the nuclear energy industry, often preventing or limiting the construction of new plants and radioactive waste disposal facilities. There are currently numerous sites in the world at which surface and groundwater are contaminated by nuclear weapon production and testing, as well as due to nuclear power plant accidents. Many of those sites remain unused or inhabited primarily due to public concern. Improving scientific and technical capabilities to develop environmental resiliency is critical not only to address existing contamination, but also to build public confidence and support for nuclear energy. One of the obstacles in remediation is to tackle a large volume of contaminated soil and groundwater with relatively low concentrations. Although many contaminant removal technologies have developed (e.g., pump-and-treat systems), they are often expensive and not cost-effective for low-concentration radionuclide contamination. Although soil removal is often the most effective, it produces a large amount of waste that has to be stored securely for a long period of time or treated at the special treatment facilities. Transporting a large amount of waste may also produce greenhouse gases and disrupt local communities. Recently, the concept of 'sustainable remediation' has been proposed to improve a remediation system as a whole, including the consideration of cost effectiveness, reduction of greenhouse emission, waste production and energy usage. Rather than just focusing on removing contaminants, the sustainable remediation highlights the use of passive remediation technologies to immobilize radionuclides along with the application of monitored natural attenuation and longer institutional control. However, such passive technologies and monitored natural attenuation require the increased burden of proof to ensure that those immobilized contaminants would not compromise the long-term public health. Although contaminant transport modeling and risk assessments are always performed, they sometimes fail due to the lack of understanding the contaminant transport proposes at the time of the risk assessment or due to some unexpected processes. Monitoring technologies are critical to ensure the long-term stability of such remediated sites, and also to address the public concerns. Recent advances in in situ sensor technologies and spatially-extensive mapping technologies (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne mapping, geophysics) have improved monitoring of contamination over space and time. In addition to new sensing devices, data management and data analytics technologies have been expanded to manage and process large spatial and temporal datasets. Such technologies can be used to reduce monitoring cost significantly, and to facilitate long-term monitoring. In this study, we demonstrate our data analytics technologies for two nuclear-related contaminated sites: (1) air dose rate monitoring in Fukushima prefecture, and (2) groundwater monitoring at the Savannah River Site F-Area. We are developing the spatial and temporal data integration methodologies to integrate various spatially extensive data and time-series data for improving long-term monitoring. Such monitoring technologies and experiences at the existing contaminated sites can be transferred to build a better monitoring system for nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storages.

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DOE OSTI2016

Remote Geophysical Logging at the Hanford Single-Shell Tank Farms: Maintaining Efficiency and Reducing Personnel Hazards - 16190

Vadose zone characterization around groups of underground waste storage tanks (known as tank farms) at the US DOE Hanford Site in Washington State is conducted to assess the presence and extent of manmade gamma-ray emitting radionuclides. Boreholes around the tanks are characterized using a high-resolution spectral gamma logging system (SGLS). In the past, logging operations required workers to remain inside the tank farm boundary during data acquisition. This approach was effective; however, personnel were at risk of exposure to potential radiological hazards, chemical hazards, and/or vapor releases that can be associated with the tank farm environment. Limitations associated with this work environment necessitated a new approach in order to decrease the amount of time personnel spent in the farm without affecting work productivity and efficiency. In order to accomplish this, a new remote logging cable support (RLCS) was developed and implemented which effectively removed workers from the hazards associated with the tank farm environment. (authors)

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