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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2004

NASA Glenn's Single-Stage Axial Compressor Facility Upgraded

NASA Glenn Research Center's Single-Stage Axial Compressor Facility was upgraded in fiscal year 2003 to expand and improve its research capabilities for testing high-speed fans and compressors. The old 3000-hp drive motor and gearbox were removed and replaced with a refurbished 7000-hp drive motor and gearbox, with a maximum output speed of 21,240 rpm. The higher horsepower rating permits testing of fans and compressors with higher pressure ratio or higher flow. A new inline torquemeter was installed to provide an alternate measurement of fan and compressor efficiency, along with the standard pressure and temperature measurements. A refurbished compressor bearing housing was also installed with bidirectional rotation capability, so that a variety of existing hardware could be tested. Four new lubrication modules with backup capability were installed for the motor, gearbox, torquemeter, and compressor bearing housing, so that in case the primary pump fails, the backup will prevent damage to the rotating hardware. The combustion air supply line for the facility inlet air system was activated to provide dry air for repeatable inlet conditions. New flow conditioning hardware was installed in the facility inlet plenum tank, which greatly reduced the inlet turbulence. The new inlet can also be easily modified to accommodate 20- or 22-in.-diameter fans and compressors, so a variety of existing hardware from other facilities (such as Glenn's 9- by 15-Foot Low-Speed Wind Tunnel) can be tested in the Single-Stage Axial Compressor Facility. An exhaust line was also installed to provide bleed capability to remove the inlet boundary layer. To improve the operation and control of the facility, a new programmable logic controller (PLC) was installed to upgrade from hardwired relay logic to software logic. The PLC also enabled the usage of human-machine interface software to allow for easier operation of the facility and easier reconfiguration of the facility controls when necessary. Finally, a new health-monitoring system was installed to measure shaft speed, shaft movement, and machine vibration on all of the rotating equipment. The system also provides automatic alarms and shutdown of the equipment when required. An integrated systems test for checkout of the facility was completed on June 17, 2003. Research testing resumed on June 30 with data obtained in support of the Ultra-Efficient Engine Technology Project's Compressor Casing Treatment Project.

Brokopp, Richard A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Unsteady Analyses and Risk Assessment - Part 2

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Design Support of the feasibility of operating conditions and procedures is critical in such cases due to the possibility of startup/shutdown transients, moving shock structures, unsteady shock-boundary layer interactions and engine and diffuser unstart modes that can result in catastrophic failure. Analyses of such systems is difficult due to resolution requirements needed to accurately capture moving shock structures, shock-boundary layer interactions, two-phase flow regimes and engine unstart modes. In a companion paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD, steady analyses advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in the sub-scale A-3 facility. In this paper we will address transient issues with the operation of the facility especially at startup and shutdown, and assess risks related to afterburning due to the interaction of a fuel rich plume with oxygen that is a by-product of the steam ejectors. The primary areas that will be addressed in this paper are: (1) analyses of unstart modes due to flow transients especially during startup/ignition, (2) engine safety during the shutdown process (3) interaction of steam ejectors with the primary plume i.e. flow transients as well as probability of afterburning. In this abstract we discuss unsteady analyses of the engine shutdown process. However, the final paper will include analyses of a staged startup, drawdown of the engine test cell pressure, and risk assessment of potential afterburning in the facility. Unsteady simulations have been carried out to study the engine shutdown process in the facility and understand the physics behind the interactions between the steam ejectors, the test cell and the supersonic diffuser. As a first approximation, to understand the dominant unsteady mechanisms in the engine test cell and the supersonic diffuser, the turning duct in the facility was removed. As the engine loses power a rarefaction wave travels downstream that disrupts the shock cell structure in the supersonic diffuser. Flow from the test cell is seen to expand into the supersonic diffuser section and re-pressurizes the area around the nozzle along with a upstream traveling compression wave that emanates from near the first stage ejectors. Flow from the first stage ejector expands to the center of the duct and a new shock train is formed between the first and second stage ejectors. Both stage ejectors keep the facility pressurized and prevent any large amplitude pressure fluctuations from affecting the engine nozzle. The resultant pressure loads the nozzle experiences in the shutdown process are small.

Ahuja, Vineet↗
NASA NTRS2013

An Overview of the Microgravity Science Glovebox (MSG) Facility and the Research Performed in the MSG on the International Space Station (ISS)

The Microgravity Science Glovebox (MSG) is a rack facility aboard the International Space Station (ISS) designed for investigation handling. The MSG was built by the European Space Agency (ESA) which also provides sustaining engineering support for the facility. The MSG has been operating on the ISS since July 2002 and is currently located in the US Laboratory Module. The unique design of the facility allows it to accommodate science and technology investigations in a "workbench" type environment. The facility has an enclosed working volume that is held at a negative pressure with respect to the crew living area. This allows the facility to provide two levels of containment for small parts, particulates, fluids, and gases. This containment approach protects the crew from possible hazardous operations that take place inside the MSG work volume. Research investigations operating inside the MSG are provided a large 255 liter enclosed work space, 1000 watts of dc power via a versatile supply interface (120, 28, +/- 12, and 5 Vdc), 1000 watts of cooling capability, video and data recording and real time downlink, ground commanding capabilities, access to ISS Vacuum Exhaust and Vacuum Resource Systems, and gaseous nitrogen supply. These capabilities make the MSG one of the most utilized facilities on ISS. The MSG has been used for over 14500 hours of scientific payload operations. MSG investigations involve research in cryogenic fluid management, fluid physics, spacecraft fire safety, materials science, combustion, plant growth, and life support technology. The MSG facility is operated by the Payloads Operations Integration Center at Marshall Space flight Center. Payloads may also operate remotely from different telescience centers located in the United States and Europe. The investigative Payload Integration Manager (iPIM) is the focal to assist organizations that have payloads operating in the MSG facility. NASA provides an MSG engineering unit for payload developers to verify that their hardware is operating properly before actual operation on the ISS. This paper will provide an overview of the MSG facility, a synopsis of the research that has already been accomplished in the MSG, and an overview of video and biological upgrades.

Jordan, Lee P.↗
NASA NTRS2016

X-ray Cryogenic Facility (XRCF) Handbook

The X-ray & Cryogenic Facility (XRCF) Handbook is a guide for planning operations at the facility. A summary of the capabilities, policies, and procedures is provided to enhance project coordination between the facility user and XRCF personnel. This handbook includes basic information that will enable the XRCF to effectively plan and support test activities. In addition, this handbook describes the facilities and systems available at the XRCF for supporting test operations. 1.2 General Facility Description The XRCF was built in 1989 to meet the stringent requirements associated with calibration of X-ray optics, instruments, and telescopes and was subsequently modified in 1999 & 2005 to perform the challenging cryogenic verification of Ultraviolet, Optical, and Infrared mirrors. These unique and premier specialty capabilities, coupled with its ability to meet multiple generic thermal vacuum test requirements for large payloads, make the XRCF the most versatile and adaptable space environmental test facility in the Agency. XRCF is also recognized as the newest, most cost effective, most highly utilized facility in the portfolio and as one of only five NASA facilities having unique capabilities. The XRCF is capable of supporting and has supported missions during all phases from technology development to flight verification. Programs/projects that have benefited from XRCF include Chandra, Solar X-ray Imager, Hinode, and James Webb Space Telescope. All test programs have been completed on-schedule and within budget and have experienced no delays due to facility readiness or failures. XRCF is currently supporting Strategic Astrophysics Technology Development for Cosmic Origins. Throughout the years, XRCF has partnered with and continues to maintain positive working relationships with organizations such as ATK, Ball Aerospace, Northrop Grumman Aerospace, Excelis (formerly Kodak/ITT), Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Goddard Space Flight Center, University of Alabama Huntsville, and more.

XRCF↗
NASA NTRS2016

Overview of the Microgravity Science Glovebox (MSG) Facility and the Research Performed in the MSG

The Microgravity Science Glovebox (MSG) is a rack facility aboard the International Space Station (ISS) designed for investigation handling. The MSG was built by the European Space Agency (ESA) which also provides sustaining engineering support for the facility. The MSG has been operating on the ISS since July 2002 and is currently located in the US Laboratory Module. The unique design of the facility allows it to accommodate science and technology investigations in a "workbench" type environment. The facility has an enclosed working volume that is held at a negative pressure with respect to the crew living area. This allows the facility to provide two levels of containment for small parts, particulates, fluids, and gases. This containment approach protects the crew from possible hazardous operations that take place inside the MSG work volume. Research investigations operating inside the MSG are provided a large 255 liter enclosed work space, 1000 watts of direct current power via a versatile supply interface (120, 28, plus or minus 12, and 5 volts direct current), 1000 watts of cooling capability, video and data recording and real time downlink, ground commanding capabilities, access to ISS Vacuum Exhaust and Vacuum Resource Systems, and gaseous nitrogen supply. These capabilities make the MSG one of the most utilized facilities on ISS. The MSG has been used for over 27,000 hours of scientific payload operations. MSG investigations involve research in cryogenic fluid management, fluid physics, spacecraft fire safety, materials science, combustion, plant growth, biological studies and life support technology. The MSG facility is operated by the Payloads Operations Integration Center at Marshall Space Flight Center. Payloads may also operate remotely from different telescience centers located in the United States and Europe. The Investigative Payload Integration Manager (IPIM) is the focal to assist organizations that have payloads operating in the MSG facility. NASA provides an MSG engineering unit for payload developers to verify that their hardware is operating properly before actual operation on the ISS. This poster will provide an overview of the MSG facility, a synopsis of the research that has already been accomplished in the MSG, and an overview of video and biological upgrades. The author would like to acknowledge Teledyne Brown Engineering and the entire MSG Team for their inputs into this poster.

Jordan, Lee↗
DOE OSTI2022

Towards an HPC Complementary Computing Facility

This Letter considers the design for computing facilities that are complementary to the leadership class High Performance Computing (HPC) facilities. This design envisions a future where funding agencies are allocating greater resources for leadership class facilities and these facilities will provide a significant part of the total compute cycles for HEP Experiments. While a leadership class facility (LCF) may provide cycles and advanced architectures, the facility does not necessarily provide all of the services needed to help HEP users make the best use of the HPC facility, as well as the services needed to provide computing for workflows that are not a good fit for the HPC facilities. This Letter outlines some of the necessary components of a facility designed to provide those services and capabilities.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Methodology on cyber security evaluation in nuclear facilities considering I and C architecture - 224

Cyber security has become a major issue in nuclear facilities recently due to obsolescence of existing analog system and increasing the use of digital system for instrumentation and control (I and C) system. There are several cases which are similar to cyber-attacks in nuclear facilities such as Davis-Besse NPP, Browns Ferry NPP, Hatch NPP, Natanz Nuclear Facility, and Monju NPP. Since the cyber-attack called 'Stuxnet' occurred to a Natanz Nuclear Facility at 2010, the regulatory agencies have developed regulatory guidance for cyber security of nuclear facilities. In this paper, we will propose a methodology on cyber security evaluation in nuclear facilities considering I and C architecture. We will introduce the cyber security evaluation model for I and C system with Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The cyber security evaluation model for nuclear facilities consists of I and C architecture, cyber threat such as malicious activity of attacker, and mitigation measure against malicious activity. In order to make benchmark model with I and C architecture, cyber threat, and mitigation measure, the likelihood and consequence concepts are used as prior information to the model. Bayesian update can be used to evaluate the cyber security for nuclear facility by calculating posterior information and comparing between prior information and posterior information with the model. Moreover, we will propose the methodology on application of the cyber security to existing PSA by using the cyber security evaluation model with BBN. It presents quantitative information for cyber security against cyber-attack and it is helpful to communicate between licensee and regulator on nuclear facilities. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Integral and Separate Effects Test Facilities To Support Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors: A Review

This study reviews previous experimental facilities and test programs relevant to water-cooled reactor system design and analysis to meet regulatory compliances. This study aims to find the best solution for designing the required experiments, obtaining necessary test data, and verifying the developed computer code/models to support the new reactor design and development while minimizing cost and time while leveraging experiences from previous facilities to minimize. Nuclear reactor licensing requires supportive design, analysis, and experimental results to ensure the safety of the full-scale prototype reactor in regular operation, as well as during postulated accident scenarios. These reactor design analyses are generally performed using system codes and other associated simulation tools that require assessment, verification and validation using an appropriate experimental dataset. Experimental facilities used for reactor system safety analysis and system code assessments are categorized into integral effects test (IET) and separate effects test (SET) facilities. Further, these IET and SET experiments and studies use geometrically scaled systems to reproduce the prototype system behavior at a reasonable cost, albeit with some scaling-related distortions. The design challenge of these model facilities is to identify and minimize scaling distortions while reproducing the most important operational phenomena in steady-state operation and in postulated accident scenarios. Lessons learned from previous experimental facilities, models, and correlations can support the development of new multipurpose, scaled, hybrid, integrated, and modular experimental facilities for advanced light water-cooled small modular reactors (SMRs). Successful operation of these facilities can significantly reduce upfront reactor development and demonstration costs and time to deployment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Annual Summary Report for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility—FY 2025

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requires the performance assessment (PA) (Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office [DOE-ID] 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE-ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b) for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site shall be maintained to evaluate changes that could affect the performance, design, and operating basis for the facility (DOE Manual 435.1-1 Change 3, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Section IV.P. [4]). The RHLLW Disposal Facility became operational in September 2018 after the completion of operational readiness activities required by DOE Order 425.1D, “Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities,” and the issuance of the startup authorization by the Startup Approval Authority (Boston 2018). The first waste disposals at the RHLLW Disposal Facility began in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. This FY 2025 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the PA, CA, operating disposal authorization statement (ODAS) (ODAS 2018), ODAS technical-basis documents, and the radioactive waste management basis (RWMB) (INL 2024a) to meet DOE Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” performance objectives for the RHLLW Disposal Facility. Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA at the RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 435.1.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Monitoring Plan for the Idaho National Laboratory Remote Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility

This monitoring plan for Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low Level Waste Disposal Facility was developed to meet the requirements for monitoring low-level waste disposal facilities according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” and the guidance provided in the associated technical standard “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation” (DOE-STD-5002-2017). The purpose of this monitoring plan is to document a monitoring strategy that includes (1) compliance monitoring activities to demonstrate compliance with regulatory standards/limits and (2) performance monitoring to build confidence the facility is performing as demonstrated in the facility performance assessment (PA) (DOE-ID 2018a), composite analysis (CA) (DOE ID 2012), and CA addendum (DOE-ID 2018b). The de minimus impact to the aquifer predicted by the PA suggests that aquifer compliance monitoring should be augmented with performance monitoring of the drainage course materials and sedimentary interbeds in the vadose zone beneath the facility to provide a more effective means of identifying performance deviations. The monitoring approach delineated in this document was informed by the systems evaluation of natural and engineered facility features presented in the PA, an assessment of aquifer baseline conditions (INL 2017d), the dose analysis conducted in support of the PA and CA, and monitoring data collected during the first four years of facility operations (baseline monitoring phase) (INL 2023b). This plan provides monitoring locations, sampling frequencies, and sampling methods; recommendations for data evaluation; and a description of the monitoring plan implementation. Collected data will be used to demonstrate facility compliance and to identify conditions that are not consistent with the key assumptions made by the PA and CA.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗
DOE OSTI2018

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Stabilization and Ventilation Project-18121

Department of Energy contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is responsible for the safe and compliant operation of the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF), a nuclear materials storage facility at Hanford containing 1,936 highly radioactive capsules containing cesium and strontium. The capsules are currently stored under approximately 4 m (13 ft) of water. The water shields workers from radiation and helps cool the capsules. WESF is a large, concrete structure nominally 48 m (160 ft) long, 30 m (98 ft) wide and 12 m (40 ft) high with the pool cells being approximately 4 m (13 ft) below grade level. It is a robust facility with walls ranging from 0.3 m to 1 m (1 ft to 3 ft) thick. While the capsules are currently in a safe configuration, WESF is an aging facility, and DOE and CH2M are modifying the facility to ensure continued safe and compliant operations and to support the eventual transfer of capsules to dry storage. Dry storage would eliminate the possibility of a release of radioactive material in the unlikely event of a major earthquake that might result in loss of pool storage water and overheating and breach of one or more capsules. The project was divided into two major deliverables: 1) Ventilation: replacement of the existing ventilation system which included a below-grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter pit with an above grade HEPA filter skid and new fans and ducting. 2) Stabilization: grouting deactivated facility hot cells and other void spaces to the maximum extent practical to reduce material at risk from legacy contamination. The aging ventilation system relied on HEPA filters that exceeded their operational life. Due to the high levels of radionuclide contamination, replacing the filters was impractical and highly hazardous. CH2M installed a new ventilation system to provide safe and compliant ventilation for future operations. The project used an existing, unused ventilation skid that was designed for another project. Repurposing the unused skid presented additional technical challenges to modify the system for the project specific requirements. The new system is above ground, easier to maintain and is built to current standards. New connections inside the facility were installed to allow the new ventilation to operate effectively. The stabilization project is unique in that core drilling and grouting was performed in an operating Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility, which brought forth safety basis and environmental regulatory challenges. The hot cells were isolated from all existing support utilities including electrical, process chemicals, manipulator ports, instrument air, etc. to seal the hot cells and prevent highly contaminated supernate or grout from leaking into adjacent galleries. A high flow grout was used to maximize the distance between injection ports. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Opportunities for Automated Demand Response in California Wastewater Treatment Facilities

Previous research over a period of six years has identified wastewater treatment facilities as good candidates for demand response (DR), automated demand response (Auto-­DR), and Energy Efficiency (EE) measures. This report summarizes that work, including the characteristics of wastewater treatment facilities, the nature of the wastewater stream, energy used and demand, as well as details of the wastewater treatment process. It also discusses control systems and automated demand response opportunities. Furthermore, this report summarizes the DR potential of three wastewater treatment facilities. In particular, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) has collected data at these facilities from control systems, submetered process equipment, utility electricity demand records, and governmental weather stations. The collected data were then used to generate a summary of wastewater power demand, factors affecting that demand, and demand response capabilities. These case studies show that facilities that have implemented energy efficiency measures and that have centralized control systems are well suited to shed or shift electrical loads in response to financial incentives, utility bill savings, and/or opportunities to enhance reliability of service. In summary, municipal wastewater treatment energy demand in California is large, and energy-­intensive equipment offers significant potential for automated demand response. In particular, large load reductions were achieved by targeting effluent pumps and centrifuges. One of the limiting factors to implementing demand response is the reaction of effluent turbidity to reduced aeration at an earlier stage of the process. Another limiting factor is that cogeneration capabilities of municipal facilities, including existing power purchase agreements and utility receptiveness to purchasing electricity from cogeneration facilities, limit a facility’s potential to participate in other DR activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Plant model of KIPT neutron source facility simulator

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine are collaborating on constructing a neutron source facility at KIPT, Kharkov, Ukraine. The facility has 100-kW electron beam driving a subcritical assembly (SCA). The electron beam interacts with a natural uranium target or a tungsten target to generate neutrons, and deposits its power in the target zone. The total fission power generated in SCA is about 300 kW. Two primary cooling loops are designed to remove 100-kW and 300-kW from the target zone and the SCA, respectively. A secondary cooling system is coupled with the primary cooling system to dispose of the generated heat outside the facility buildings to the atmosphere. In addition, the electron accelerator has a low efficiency for generating the electron beam, which uses another secondary cooling loop to remove the generated heat from the accelerator primary cooling loop. One of the main functions the KIPT neutron source facility is to train young nuclear specialists; therefore, ANL has developed the KIPT Neutron Source Facility Simulator for this function. In this simulator, a Plant Control System and a Plant Protection System were developed to perform proper control and to provide automatic protection against unsafe and improper operation of the facility during the steady-state and the transient states using a facility plant model. This report focuses on describing the physics of the plant model and provides several test cases to demonstrate its capabilities. The plant facility model uses the PYTHON script language. It is consistent with the computer language of the plant control system. It is easy to integrate with the simulator without an additional interface, and it is able to simulate the transients of the cooling systems with system control variables changing on real-time.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle Maintenance Facility Modification Handbook

To ensure the safety of personnel and facilities, vehicle maintenance facilities are required by law and by guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Fire Code (IFC) to exhibit certain design features. They are also required to be fitted with certain fire protection equipment and devices because of the potential for fire or explosion in the event of fuel leakage or spills. All fuels have an explosion or fire potential if specific conditions are present. The hazard presented by liquid fuels, such as gasoline and diesel, results from the spillage of these liquids and subsequent ignition of vapors, causing a fire or explosion. Facilities that maintain liquid-fueled vehicles and implement appropriate safety measures are protected with ventilation systems designed to capture liquid fuel vapors at or near floor level. To minimize the potential for ignition in the event of a spill, receptacles, electrical fixtures, and hot-work operations, such as welding, are located outside of these areas. Compressed natural gas (CNG) is composed of methane with slight amounts of heavier simple hydrocarbons. Maintenance facilities that maintain CNG vehicles indoors must be protected against fire and explosion. However, the means of ensuring safety are different from those employed for liquid fuels because of the gaseous nature of methane and the fact that it is lighter than air. Because CNG is lighter than air, a release will rise to the ceiling of the maintenance facility and quickly dissipate rather than remaining at or near floor level like liquid fuel vapors. Although some of the means of protection for CNG vehicle maintenance facilities are similar to those used for liquid-fueled vehicles (ventilation and elimination of ignition sources), the types and placement of the protection equipment are different because of the behavior of the different fuels. The nature of gaseous methane may also require additional safeguards, such as combustible gas detectors and control systems, or specialized space heating, which are not needed in facilities servicing liquid-fuel vehicles. This handbook covers maintenance facilities that service CNG-fueled vehicles. Although similar requirements are mandated for liquefied natural gas (LNG) or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fueled vehicles, LNG and LPG are not covered in this handbook.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Saltstone Waste Characterization Analysis - Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Waste Stream (Q4 CY2020)

The Saltstone Production and Disposal Facility is designed and permitted by the state of South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) to treat and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Low-level waste (LEW) aqueous streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP) and decontaminated solutions from the Tank Closure Cesium Removal Unit (TCCR) and the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) are stored in Tank 50 until the LEW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. In the past, decontaminated solution from the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) was stored in Tank 50 until the LEW could be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. MCU is currently in a suspended operations state. LEW that meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) can be transferred, stored, and treated in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) for subsequent disposal as saltstone grout in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Sampling will be conducted as new waste streams are identified for treatment and disposal at the Saltstone Industrial Wastewater Treatment Facility (IWTF) and Z-Area Industrial Solid Waste Landfill (ISWLF), Facility ID# 025500-1603, General Condition B.9 or every six years in accordance with South Carolina (SC) Regulation 61-107.19 Parti C, “Solid Waste Management: Solid Waste Landfills and Structural Fill - General Requirements.”

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

April 2025 Semiannual Composite Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) Results

The aqueous waste from the Salt Waste Processing Facility is sampled semiannually for transfers to the Saltstone Production Facility. Salt solution is treated at the Saltstone Production Facility and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility. Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00027, Revision 0, one Saltstone Disposal Facility waste form was prepared at Savannah River National Laboratory using the Salt Waste Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution and Z-area premix material for the April 2025 semiannual Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure sample. The sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash (referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”). Results from the technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request prepared by Savannah River Mission Completion. At 43 days cured, the Saltstone sample was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure. The April 2025 semiannual Cement-Free grout sample met the South Carolina Code of Regulations for Hazardous Waste Management Regulations 61-79.261.24 and 61-79.268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents, and met the Saltstone Production Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria that was in effect at the time of the sample collection at the Salt Waste Processing Facility.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Authorization to proceed with production engineering for the waste treatment and immobilization plant's high-level waste facility - 15595

The U.S. Department of Energy restricted certain engineering, procurement, and construction work on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's (WTP) Pretreatment Facility, and to a lesser degree the High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility in 2012 and early 2013 because of the impact of unresolved technical issues on the facility design, and a misalignment between the facility design and nuclear safety basis. The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection (ORP) needed a way to minimize project management risk, while continuing limited critical path construction work for the HLW Facility and resolving the technical and safety basis issues. ORP developed a process to systematically address and resolve the technical, management, and quality issues that led DOE to restrict HLW Facility production activities in 2012 and 2013. This process provided for a phased resumption of HLW engineering, procurement, and construction activities on an incremental basis and a final decision for release to full production. In August 2014, ORP provided authorization for the WTP contractor to resume all engineering work necessary to finalize the HLW Facility design. The decision to proceed with production engineering in the HLW Facility, representing the first of two decision points, was based on significant progress in resolving HLW technical issues and improving work processes to align the HLW design and safety basis. Full release for HLW equipment procurements and construction is forthcoming based on conditions that must be fully satisfied and demonstrated during a transition period expected to continue for the next few years. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Introduction on Recently Revised Regulatory Framework Related to Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities in Korea - 16488

There are 24 units of nuclear power reactors in operation and 4 units of nuclear power reactors under construction in Korea as of November 2015. However, there is no permanently shutdown nuclear power reactor and decommissioned or under decommissioning nuclear power reactor. There are only 2 research reactors being decommissioned since 1997. It is realized that improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of IAEA's safety standards. IAEA published the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities on July 2014; its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to follow up action on the result of IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea was revised through comparing to IAEA safety standards. It was identified that items should be revised to improve the regulatory framework for decommissioning. Those are as follows: absence of legal definition of decommissioning, incomplete procedure for safety regulation after permanent shutdown, un-detailed acceptance criteria for decommissioning plan, incomplete requirements for early preparing and periodic update of decommissioning plan, un-detailed requirements on standard format and contents for decommissioning plan, and incomplete radiological criteria on site and building reuse after completion of decommissioning. Nuclear Safety Act related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities was revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. As the lower statute of Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act and Enforcement Regulation of the Nuclear Safety Act were also revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. In this paper, related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactor, research or training reactor, and nuclear fuel cycle facility, it was introduced the main changes of the amended and promulgated Nuclear Safety Act on July 2015. It was also mentioned about the current issue in accordance with its implementation. Main contents of revised Nuclear Safety Act are that decommissioning plan should be submitted for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated, and this plan should be updated periodically. In addition, 3 years of grace period was set to submit preliminary decommissioning plan for the facility which has already been approved prior to July 2018. Preliminary decommissioning plan should be updated every 10 years, and regulatory body should review this document. According to the revised Nuclear Safety Act, in the case of a nuclear power reactor after the approval of the change on operating license for permanent shutdown, should submit final decommissioning plan within 5 years, and be approved by the regulatory body. On July 2015, Kori Unit 1 was determined not to apply its 2nd continued operation, and will expire in 2017. Kori Unit 1 will be the first case for the submission of final decommissioning plan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗