Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Criticality”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 343 records · Page 19

National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) - capabilities and recent measurements

The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is home to four critical assemblies which are used to support of range of missions, including nuclear criticality safety and nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, subcritical systems can also be assembled at NCERC. NCERC is providing critical and subcritical experiments valuable to the nuclear data community and experiments performed at NCERC are often published as benchmarks in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. This manuscript will give a broad overview of recent experiments performed at NCERC, upcoming experiments, and why integral measurements are important and useful to the nuclear data community. The four critical assemblies are GODIVA IV, FLATTOP, COMET, and PLANET. GODIVA IV is a cylindrical metal fast burst reactor, the fourth in the GODIVA series that dates back to the 1950’s. FLATTOP is an highly enriched uranium (HEU) or Pu core reflected by natural uranium. COMET and PLANET are vertical lift assemblies, where one half of the reactor can be lifted to the upper half of the reactor to create a critical system. Some recent experiments include various critical intermediate energy assemblies with lead, and subcritical measurements of plutonium reflected by copper, tungsten, and nickel. Work is also underway to make a better measurement of the critical mass of neptunium, using a neptunium sphere surrounded by nickel shells. Additionally, measurements will be performed next year with HEU shells from Rocky Flats. These HEU shells will be stacked together to make larger systems, allowing for a large range of criticality (from subcritical to delayed critical). Other upcoming measurements include an HEU critical assembly sensitive to intermediate energy neutrons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Critical and Subcritical Experiment NEA Benchmark Possibilities for Measurements at ORCEF and Other USDOE Facilities

This report documents a wide variety of critical and subcritical measurements that could be Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) or International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) benchmarks. The list has omitted some few measurements. The experiments are divided into four classes: critical experiments only, critical and subsequent subcritical experiments, subcritical experiments (all performed in critical experiment facilities, and fourth subcritical measurements performed in Material Balance Areas at the Y-12 National Security Complex (NSC) for Y-12 nuclear criticality safety. This report documents to number of critical facility days utilized used for the measurements. Measurement at critical and subsequently subcritical in critical facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORCEF), Los Alamos National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Babcock and Wilcox at Lynchburg, Va, utilized ~350 operational days of critical facility time, Measurement only at subcritical at ORCEF utilized ~200 operational days in this critical facility, and subcritical measurements in Material Balance Areas of the Y-12 National Security Complex used 350 operational days, many were unattended measurements. In view of the high cost of critical facility time and the limitation of only one facility available for measurements in the United States, it is very cost-effective to mine the existing data to produce benchmarks such as those already in NEA and ICSBEP. For measurements at ORCEF the material descriptions from Y-12 NSC and the accuracy of the configurations should (bases on experience with existing NEA or ICSBEP of ORCEF measurement benchmarks) result in uncertainties in measured k eff values lower than ±0.001 and may be as low as ±0.0002; thus, allowing more accurate comparisons between measurements and calculations and thus more accurate verification of calculations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

HEU Metal Delayed Critical Experiments with 10 to 19 Inch Thick Graphite Reflectors

Approximately 100 graphite-reflected highly enriched uranium (HEU, 93.14 wt % 235 U) metal annular and cylindrical critical experiments were performed in the early 1960s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF). This report presents details from experiment logbooks, experimental data sheets and the author's memory for 44 HEU metal (93.14 wt % 235 U) critical assemblies with graphite reflectors varying from 10 to 19 in. thick, outside diameters varying from 7 to 15 in., inside diameters varying from 7 to 13 in. and critical HEU metal masses varying from 20.4 to 69.0 kg. The data from the 44 experiments described in this report are acceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments for the International Criticality Safety Evaluation Program (ICSBEP) once the uncertainty analysis on the measured k eff is completed. Based on previous ICSBEP benchmarks with this HEU metal at ORCEF, the uncertainties in the measured k eff are expected to be as low as ±0.0004. Preparation of this report is part of an effort at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented series of critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in Critical and Subcritical NEA Benchmark Possibilities for Measurements at ORCEF and Other US DOE Facilities (Mihalzo, ORNL/TM-2019/1188, 2019) and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other US Department of Energy critical experiments facilities. More than 500 operational days of critical facility time were used, not including setup and dismantlement time. This documentation for a part of one series of graphite reflected highly enriched uranium metal critical experiments, that used 50 operational days of ORCEF time, was performed using funding received from the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy’s Nuclear Energy University Programs at the University of Tennessee Nuclear Engineering Department. This documentation was also supported by the Nuclear Criticality, Radiation Transport, and Safety programs at ORNL.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

The criticality incident detection system omission cases for the fuel routes at EDF energy power stations - 14280

Criticality safety cases have been produced to justify the omission of criticality alarms from the fuel routes of EDF Energy's UK power stations. This work has addressed the UK regulator's expectations that adequate criticality warning systems should be provided wherever fissile material is present, unless a safety case shows that no criticality excursion could give any individual a whole body dose exceeding the annual whole body dose limit of 20 mSv, or that the predicted frequency of such excursions is acceptably low. In the UK, EDF Energy operates eight nuclear power stations; one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor stations (AGRs). At these stations, the term 'fuel route' is used to encompass all of the ex-reactor arrangements for the handling and storage of both new fuel and discharged irradiated fuel. These fuel routes were all designed in the 1980's (or earlier), using sound deterministic criticality safety principles, from which it was concluded that criticality alarms were not required in any of these areas. Subsequent changes to UK regulations have resulted in the need for the stations' criticality safety cases to be updated to include formal justifications for the omission of criticality alarms from these fuel routes. The EDF Energy Criticality Incident Detection System (CIDS) omission cases have been produced using the principles originally developed for UKAEA in the early 1960's by Aspinall and Daniels. These principles continue to be regarded as a best-practice approach by UK industry. Modern UK regulations also incorporate the ALARP principle, which requires operators to minimize and balance all of the safety risks from power station operations, so that the risks to both the public and to workers are As Low As is Reasonably Practicable. This paper describes how the work undertaken used the so-called Aspinall and Daniels criteria in conjunction with the requirements of the ALARP principle. The fuel storage pond at the Sizewell B PWR was addressed by dose calculations to show that, from the shielding effects of the concrete structure and the pond water, the potential consequences of a criticality accident could not result in a radiation dose in excess of 20 mSv. All of the other fuel route areas were addressed on the basis that, even if all of the active engineered and administrative criticality controls were to fail, a criticality accident would still not be reasonably expected, i.e. the predicted frequencies of all such excursions are acceptably low. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Developing a New Criticality Safety Hands-On Training Utilizing ZPPR Plates

Nuclear criticality safety is an extremely important part of the work at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). As part of the work LANL performs to continue to keep criticality safety a top priority, LANL has developed and regularly teaches nuclear criticality safety training classes for both the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program as well as internal trainings for LANL employees. A portion of the training classes is comprised of hands-on demonstrations, where students get the opportunity to handle special nuclear material at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). One hands-on demonstration uses the “Class foils,” thin HEU foils which are stacked with lucite moderator plates. A hand-stack is performed until the multiplication reaches the “three-quarters rule,” where the demonstration is continued remotely on a vertical lift assembly up until the system is critical. This hands-on demonstration eventually achieves a critical configuration and follows the ANS-1 guidelines on an approach to critical. Another hands-on demonstration involves handling clad plutonium and neptunium spheres, and follows procedures using criticality safety evaluations to ensure that the hands-on demonstrations remain subcritical.This hands-on demonstration also involves the use of polyethylene shells around the plutonium sphere to demonstrate how additional reflector increases the criticality of a system. This paper is focused on developing a new hands-on demonstration using Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates. This new hands-on demonstration will follow the ANS-8 standards as it is not desired to achieve criticality with the ZPPR plates during the hands-on demonstration. A hands-on demonstration using multiple plutonium parts will likely be more applicable to personnel who handle plutonium on a daily basis, such as LANL glovebox operators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Recent activities of the UK working party on criticality - 14334

The Working Party on Criticality (WPC) in the United Kingdom (UK) is the non-executive national committee that focuses on criticality safety issues up to, but not including, experimental and in-core power reactor operations. The current membership includes representatives from all relevant UK Site Licensee Companies and Regulators together with a small number of other key companies with interests in this area. In recent times, the primary focus of the committee has been to provide a forum for the discussion and distribution of information of relevance to criticality safety in the UK, particularly the sharing and development of good practice. However, it also serves as a useful forum to (i) disseminate regulatory issues of relevance to criticality safety and facilitate the development of a UK criticality community view on such matters, (ii) guide, promote, coordinate and encourage cooperation on high priority activities of common interest to the UK criticality community, (iii) promote international collaboration in the field of criticality safety, and (iv) provide opportunities for the professional development of criticality safety personnel. This paper gives a detailed overview of the activities of the WPC in the years since the last International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC), held at Edinburgh in 2011. It undoubtedly continued to be a challenging time for the UK criticality community, not least because of difficulties with the central coordination (and hence funding) of strategic issues in the UK as the nuclear industry has become increasingly fragmented. However, despite these issues, the committee has still been able to fulfil its objectives during that time and successfully supported the UK criticality community. A particular focus of the paper will be the success of the Continued Professional Development workshops and the potential benefits of other countries adopting a similar initiative. (author)

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Methodology for defining intermediate level waste package characteristics that ensure criticality safety in a geological disposal facility - 14599

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. The basis for ensuring criticality safety of intermediate level waste (ILW) packages is to specify controls on the fissile material content of individual packages through the application of deterministic criticality safety assessments (CSAs). The approach is defined and controlled through RWM's Disposability Assessment process, which aims to ensure that: criticality is prevented during waste package transport to a GDF; the risk of criticality is tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) during GDF operations; and the likelihood and consequences of criticality arising from the evolution of waste packages after GDF closure are low. The most restrictive phase determines the package fissile material limit and, until now, in many cases the GDF post-closure phase has provided the most restrictive limit. Currently, the GDF post-closure limits are derived deterministically using highly stylised and conservative assumptions about fissile material accumulations occurring on very long timescales into the future. RWM, waste producers and regulators do not currently consider this approach to be yielding an appropriate balance of risk. Therefore, RWM is modifying the process for setting fissile material limits on ILW packages by making use of the outcomes of its recent research projects to establish the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a GDF and the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events (presented in companion papers). This paper presents the revised methodology, which is based on the requirement that criticality in a GDF can be demonstrated to be of low and tolerable consequences with regard the performance of a GDF. A probabilistic 'low-likelihood package envelope' is proposed that establishes the packaging and disposal facility conditions under which post-closure criticality is considered to be of low likelihood and low consequence. The bounding conditions for establishing the extent of the package envelope have been evaluated through application of the methodologies and models developed in RWM's Likelihood of Criticality research project. It is expected that the vast majority of ILW packages would meet the package envelope requirements. The methodology also allows the use of other options, such as deterministic CSAs, for waste packages that fall outside the low-likelihood package envelope. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Maintaining a critical spectra within Monteburns for a gas-cooled reactor array by way of control rod manipulation

Our burnup study examined the effect of a predicted critical control rod position on the nuclide predictability of several axial and radial locations within a 4×4 graphite moderated gas cooled reactor fuel cluster geometry. To achieve this, a control rod position estimator (CRPE) tool was developed within the framework of the linkage code Monteburns between the transport code MCNP and depletion code CINDER90, and four methodologies were proposed within the tool for maintaining criticality. Two of the proposed methods used an inverse multiplication approach - where the amount of fissile material in a set configuration is slowly altered until criticality is attained - in estimating the critical control rod position. Another method carried out several MCNP criticality calculations at different control rod positions, then used a linear fit to estimate the critical rod position. The final method used a second-order polynomial fit of several MCNP criticality calculations at different control rod positions to guess the critical rod position. The results showed that consistency in prediction of power densities as well as uranium and plutonium isotopics was mutual among methods within the CRPE tool that predicted critical position consistently well. Finally, while the CRPE tool is currently limited to manipulating a single control rod, future work could be geared toward implementing additional criticality search methodologies along with additional features.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Critical Minerals and Materials Matchmaker-CM3

This is the Critical Minerals and Materials Matchmaker (CM3) survey form. CM3 is an online information resource created to help connect users across the critical minerals and materials supply chain. The survey is designed to allow organizations to self-identify their critical minerals and materials-aligned activities and interests, and an interactive map that displays those on-going activities in a dynamic way. To include your critical minerals management activity or activities in CM3, please open and fill out the Critical Minerals and Materials Survey. If your organization has many ongoing or planned activities that would be onerous to enter in the form, or if your activities are difficult to geolocate (such as a transport network), please email the team at edxspatial@netl.doe.gov. This initiative is aligned with the approach of DOE’s H2 Matchmaker and Carbon Matchmaker. Read more information on H2 Matchmaker and Carbon Matchmaker. Below are some questions to help understand if you should fill out the CM3 survey: Does your company work with elements such as lithium, cobalt, copper, graphite, nickel, rare earth minerals, or platinum group metals? Does your organization have research and development activities related to critical materials or their supply chains? Does your company currently work in the critical minerals or materials supply chain? Do you have prospective work in critical minerals or materials in the next 5 years? Does your company mine, process, refine or distribute critical minerals or materials? Do you want to network with other facilities or organizations working in the same areas? Are you curious about the critical mineral and material activity in your surrounding area? Are you interested in aligning your potential needs across the supply chain to different geographic areas within the U.S? For more information, please see the CM3 website (https://www.energy.gov/fecm/articles/critical-minerals-materials-matchmaker-cm3) or email our team at edxspatial@netl.doe.gov.

CM3↗

Modeling Approach to Critical in the Upcoming CERBERUS Experiment

The planned Critical Experiment Reflected By coppEr to betteR Understand Scattering (CERBERUS) seeks to maximize sensitivity to elastic neutron scattering in the intermediate energy region (0.625 eV to 100 keV). It will be performed near the end of FY 2023 at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Very few International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) benchmarks are sensitive to copper in this region. Creating a benchmark sensitive in this area will make the Zeus benchmark series, an intermediate benchmark evaluation that uses a copper reflector, more useful for code and nuclear data validation. Approaching criticality in a safe manner is of utmost importance to avoid a criticality accident, which would present a safety concern and could cause damage to equipment. The two rules that are followed closely to ensure that a criticality accident does not occur are the 3/4 rule and the 1/2 rule. The 3/4 rule states that no more than 3/4 of a critical mass can be assembled by hand, and the 1/2 rule states that no more than 1/2 of the material expected to reach criticality, or 1/2 the distance needed to reach criticality, can be added before another measurement of the count rate has been taken. This work will discuss the approach to criticality as modeled in MCNP6® 1 particle transport code with the ENDF/B- VIII.0 cross-section library and the .00c data library.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Proposed Plutonium-Nickel Critical Experiment

The Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) and subsequently its descendant, the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located at the Nevada National Security Site, have been performing critical experiments for over 75 years. The work done continues to build upon lessons learned from the past. It also builds upon knowledge gained from past experiments. The LACEF and NCERC experiments “provide nuclear criticality benchmark data for a wide variety of fissile and non-fissile materials in all neutron energy spectra systems”. In 2014, a subcritical benchmark with plutonium surrounded by nickel was issued in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP). Two years later, a new benchmark experiment was performed, commonly known as Subcritical Copper Reflected $\mathcal{a}$-Phase Plutonium SCR$\mathcal{a}$P. The uncertainties in the SCR$\mathcal{a}$P experiment were significantly reduced from the Pu-Ni experiment and the methods were refined. Additionally, a Pu-lead critical experiment was performed in 2017 which followed different methods and with different objectives. Now, an experiment is proposed that builds on both the subcritical nickel experiment and the critical lead experiment. The proposed experiment has interleaved nickel and plutonium, in a thermal arrangement. This particular experiment would support criticality safety at the Hanford Tank Farms, whose tanks contain a significant amount of nickel credited as a neutron absorber in the criticality safety evaluation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Critical and Californium Source-Driven Noise Analysis Subcritical Measurements with an Unreflected Cylindrical Tank of Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Nitrate Solution

The reported experiments were performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at the Battelle Northwest Laboratory’s (now Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) critical experiments facility at Hanford, Washington in 1981 and used 16 days of critical facility time, not including 10 days for setup and removal of ORNL equipment. These measurements were to assess the capability of the Cf source-driven noise analysis (CSDNA) method to measure the subcriticality (keff) of mixed U-Pu nitrate solutions. In addition to the CSNDA measurements, measurements were also performed near delayed criticality where CSDNA measurements cannot be performed. This report documents the experiments that were not reported at that time by presenting the ORNL experimental results and any online analysis performed during and shortly after the measurements. The mixed nitrate solution had a U concentration at 188 grams per liter (g/L), a Pu concentration of 280 g/L, free acid normality of 2.80, H ion molarity of 5.9 and a specific gravity of 1.754 g/cm 3 , a 240 Pu isotopic content of 7.981 wt. %, and a 235 U isotopic content of 0.724 wt. %. The stainless-steel tank for the solution had an inside diameter of 35.38 cm, an outside diameter of 35.53 cm, a height of 56.72 cm, and bottom thickness of 0.9525 cm. A Zircaloy pipe with a 3.1496 cm outside diameter, a 2.7788 cm inside diameter, and bottom thickness of 0.635 cm was available for insertion of the Cf source in the center of the fissile solution. The Cf source was also located at the outside surface of the tank (solution height varied from 10 to 53 cm) and in the center of the solution (solution height varied from 10 to 60.7 cm). The CSDNA measurements were not analyzed online to determine the subcritical neutron multiplication factors. At all subcritical states, the break frequency noise analysis data was fitted to obtain the prompt neutron decay constant. The neutron multiplication factors were determined for the two configurations of the measurements near delayed criticality. The subcritical neutron multiplication factors from the CNSDA measurements can be obtained with further analysis. However, the near delayed critical configuration, the prompt neutron decay constants, the count rates, and the measured cross and auto power spectral densities can be calculated directly for benchmarking. Much of data presented in this report are from ORNL notes—not in the ORNL logbooks. For the final benchmark analysis, the data from the Battelle Northwest Laboratory (which operated the critical facility in 1981) critical facility logbook should be consulted and be incorporated where appropriate. The purpose of this report is to document the experimental information for the measurements performed so that at a later date researchers could perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) or Nuclear Energy Agency benchmark. The data from these measurements are available from the ORNL Records Management Services Department, and the logbook is available from ICSBEP at Idaho National Laboratory. Preparation of the present report is part of a larger cooperative effort between Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other USDOE critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of criticality risk evaluation method for fuel debris in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS - 14373

After the accident of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, there has been still damaged nuclear fuel in the reactor buildings, which is called 'fuel debris' and contains an amount of fissile materials show that it is currently subcritical, which must be kept until finishing retrieval work. In the latest plan, retrieving fuel debris is to start in 2025. The International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning, IRID, has been developing the technology for decontamination in reactor building. A developed method will be reviewed and granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Japan, NRA, before the start of the retrieving. Criticality risk information will be needed for decision making on following two subcriticality issues, -Criticality control of fuel debris to keep is subcritical until the end of retrieval work. -Safe operation for retrieving fuel debris to keep it subcritical. Because fuel debris has been out of criticality control and the key condition for its current subcriticality is unknown, it is important to obtain criticality risk information as soon as possible. Applying conventional Probabilistic Safety Assessment, PSA, to fuel debris is difficult, because it is based on the probability of becoming out of criticality control due to troubles such as equipment failure, operation mistake and so on. A new method, which has been developed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency to technically support the NRA, is designed to estimate criticality risk based on a probability distribution of k{sub eff} due to uncertainty of composition and geometry of fuel debris, which method will provide risk information for the two subcriticality issues as well as for the tolerance level of criticality risk if it is unavoidable. Developed method contains four steps: two steps of analysis of criticality risk and two steps of quantification of the risk. A procedure of risk quantification has been defined, in which systematic analysis of criticality risk can be done by making 'status matrix'. A trial analysis by using the procedure shows that some events which can initiate criticality are able to be supposed to happen during maintenance period until the beginning of retrieving fuel debris, and that analysis also indicates countermeasures should be considered as soon as possible in order to reduce criticality risk for public and workers. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Importance of Plutonium Turnings in Criticality Safety

In criticality safety, turnings are a concern due to the fact that they leave interstitial space in which a moderator can ingress and reduce the critical mass for a fissile material. As turnings are produced when a Plutonium (Pu) items are machined, they are commonly encountered in facilities that process Pu. The intent of this paper is to establish minimum subcritical mass data points for Pu turnings based on the minimum density achievable as measured in a turnings experiment performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Further discussion will cover the implications of these results with concern to criticality safety during normal operations and during a glovebox fire scenario. The results of the study show that a bare homogeneous Pu turnings (at 0.252 kg/L) and water mixture has a spherical critical mass of 3.80 kg, while the fully water reflected spherical critical mass of the same Pu turnings and water mixture has a critical mass of 1.65 kg. When mixed with an idealized hydrocarbon oil rather than water, the spherical critical mass is reduced. In this case, the bare critical mass of the homogeneous Pu turnings and oil mixture is 2.57 kg while the fully water reflected spherical critical mass of the Pu turnings and oil mixture is 1.17 kg. The results of this study show that up to approximately 1000 g of Pu turnings even if mixed with an ideal hydrocarbon and flooded would not be a criticality concern during fire fighting activities. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Incorporating realistic conservatism into criticality alarm placement and emergency response: a regulatory perspective - 14425

Review of historical process plant criticality accidents shows that their consequences vary widely and are extremely difficult to predict accurately. Because of the wide variability and inherent uncertainty in estimating consequences, criticality detector placement analysis and consequence estimation for emergency response typically utilize very conservative assumptions with regard to the total fissions, time-dependent fission rate, and intervening shielding. For detector placement, a 'minimum accident of concern' is typically defined, whereas emergency consequence evaluations typically define a maximum fission source term. These require different mindsets because what is conservative for one type of analysis may be non-conservative for the other. While some conservatism is commonly practiced in both cases, excessive conservatism can result in a net increase in risk, such as resulting from inadvertent alarm activations, that can be costly to operations and counterproductive to safety. Conversely, reliance on very detailed calculational models to reduce conservatism could increase the number and complexity of controls, such as shielding for dose mitigation. Deterministic regulatory criteria have also been applied for determining where criticality detectors are to be deployed and what areas must be evacuated in the event of an accident. This paper explores several issues associated with criticality alarm placement and emergency response from a regulatory perspective. This paper will discuss insights gained from historical fuel facility accidents and significant events regarding the inherent risk of criticality, the most likely locations for criticality to occur, and the most probable characteristics of a critical excursion. This will include discussion of the previously disputed relevance of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (USNRC's) longstanding model for a critical excursion. While USNRC regulations deterministically require dual alarm coverage in all areas having greater than a 'critical mass' of fissionable material, a process is provided to grant exemptions when a risk-informed argument is technically justified. Similar risk-informed considerations have been used to justify compensatory measures allowing limited operation during periods of alarm system outage due to component failure or maintenance. This paper will explore the application of risk information and performance history to address requirements for criticality alarm system coverage, granting exemptions from deterministic criteria, allowing compensatory measures during system outages, determining evacuation areas and routes, and assessing the significance associated with alarm system issues. Finally, the impact of shielding on the USNRC's regulatory risk basis and approved subcritical margin will be reviewed. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Godiva Experiments for the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)

Godiva IV is a fast burst critical assembly constructed of approximately 65 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel alloyed with 1.5 percent molybdenum for strength. Godiva is one of the last such critical assemblies in the United States, and can be used for studies of super-prompt critical behavior as well as irradiations and demonstrations. A demonstration of a Godiva burst is usually performed as a highlight of the hands-on portion of the Criticality Safety Training Classes taught at the National Criticality Experiment Research Center (NCERC). The Godiva burst is used to demonstrate the concept of super-prompt critical and the time-scale of a criticality accident. In addition, several NCSP projects have been conducted on Godiva IV over the past two years. One experiment focused on collecting data to support multiphysics simulations using Photo-Doppler Velocimetry (PDV) to measure surface movement and gamma detectors to measure the burst output as the burst develops from background to peak over ten orders of magnitude. Another experiment was performed to demonstrate the functionality of the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) system developed for installation in the Y-12 Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The system must not only respond to a criticality event and alarm, but must also be shown to operate in a high dose environment.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Performance of supercritical CO{sub 2} Brayton cycle with additive gases at varying critical points for SFR application

The supercritical carbon dioxide Brayton cycle (S-CO{sub 2} cycle) has received attention as alternative to the energy conversion system for a Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR). The high cycle efficiency of S-CO{sub 2} cycle is attributed to significantly reduced compressor work. This is because the compressor operates like a pump in the vicinity of CO{sub 2} critical point. To make use of this feature, the minimum cycle operating range of S-CO{sub 2} cycle, which is the main compressor inlet condition, should be located close to the critical point of CO{sub 2}. This translated into that the critical point of CO{sub 2} is the limitation of the lowest cycle condition of S-CO{sub 2} cycles. To increase the flexibility and broaden the applicability of the cycle, changing the critical point of CO{sub 2} by mixing additive gases could be adopted. An increase in the efficiency of the S-CO{sub 2} cycle could be achieved by decreasing critical point of CO{sub 2}. In addition, increasing critical point of CO{sub 2} could be utilized to obtain improved cycle performances at ascending heat sink temperature of hot arid areas. Due to the rapid fluctuations of thermo-physical properties of gas mixtures near the critical point, an in-house cycle analysis code coupled to NIST property database was developed. Several gases were selected as potential additives through the screening process for thermal stability and chemical interaction with sodium. By using the developed cycle code, optimized cycles of each gas mixture were compared with the reference case of S-CO{sub 2} cycle. For decreased critical temperatures, CO{sub 2}-Xe and CO{sub 2}-Kr showed an increase in the total cycle efficiency. At increasing critical temperatures, the performance of CO{sub 2}-H{sub 2}S and CO{sub 2}-cyclohexane is superior to S-CO{sub 2}cycle when the compressor inlet temperature is above the critical temperature of CO{sub 2}. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Criticality Safety Aspects of Higher Fissile Gram Equivalent at the AMWTF - 19296

Operating since 2003, the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility (AMWTF) has used high-tech characterization equipment, robotics, and automated treatment processes to accomplish its mission. The facility was designed to treat contact handled waste up to 325 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE). As the lower fissile mass drums and boxes were treated and shipped for disposal, other high fissile mass containers needed to be treated and shipped. The facility's mission evolved to include treating containers with up to 3,000 FGE. The nuclear criticality safety group has worked diligently with operations to increase AMWTF's fissile mass limits. As operations change across the Department of Energy facility, the nuclear criticality safety groups must work with operations to meet the mission. How Fluor Idaho LLC is accomplishing this task with respect to criticality safety is the subject of this paper. The signature piece of equipment at AMWTF is the Supercompactor, a giant hydraulic ram capable of exerting 4 million pounds of force that can reduce a 55-gal drum to a 5-inch puck. By compacting waste, the Department of Energy can put more waste into the limited storage space of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Compaction also reduces the number of trips required to transport waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. There are two box-lines with hydraulic manipulators, nondestructive assay systems for drums and boxes, along with real-time-radiography. The plant's operations are highly automated. As time passed, AMWTF was tasked to treat drums that were not treatable with current operations. Based on analysis and experience of the nuclear criticality safety personnel, we have changed the fissile limits while maintaining a critically safe environment for the facility. Credit was taken for form, geometry, and lack of moderation in the material being treated. As the need arose to process higher FGE containers, more controls were identified for the treatment process. Criticality safety evaluations were expanded to 1,000 FGE for operational flexibility. Those evaluations included the box-line, the hot maintenance cell, and conveyors. Later, criticality safety evaluations were written to allow tanks to be processed in a box-line, as well as the use of a port in the box-line. Criticality safety evaluations for the box-line, hot maintenance cell, and conveyor were expanded to 3,000 FGE. The criticality safety officer is onsite and actively involved in operations. By expanding the nuclear criticality safety operating parameters, the AMWTF will meet the 2008 Record of Decision in which the Department of Energy directed 8,700 cubic meters of waste to be treated at the facility. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗