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At least 343 records · Page 19
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Validation with the FFTF LOFWOS Tests #10-12

The FFTF liquid sodium cooled test reactor was built to assist the development and testing of advanced fuels and material for fast reactors. The goals of the FFTF Passive Safety Testing program included confirming the safety margins of FFTF as a liquid metal reactor, providing data for computer code validation, and demonstrating the inherent and passive safety benefits of its specific design features. The program included thirteen unprotected loss of flow without scram tests. The results of modeling and simulation of LOFWOS Tests #10, #11, and #12 are presented in this report to support validation of Argonne’s SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code. These three tests did not use the primary loop pony motors and thus transitioned to natural circulation flow rates from varying initial power levels. This validation activity leverages modeling and simulation efforts that originated under an International Atomic Energy Agency Coordinated Research Project (CRP) for benchmark analysis of the FFTF LOFWOS Test #13. The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 model originally developed for the CRP has been extended to include LOFWOS Tests #10-12 and modernized to utilize new code features and modeling practices. Predicted results from SAS4A/SASSYS-1 were compared to measured test data and differences were investigated. Overall, it was concluded that, for LOFWOS Tests #10-12, there was good agreement between the flow, power, and temperature predictions and the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Candidacy Renewal Report for ICERR Designation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established a designation for an International Centre based on Research Reactors (ICERR). The intention of this designation is to provide a vehicle for IAEA member states to access international research-reactor and ancillary nuclear research and development infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made a commitment to world leadership in the development of advanced nuclear energy, science, and technology. To this end, DOE has established programs and initiatives to enhance this leadership role. ICERR designation constitutes an important step in achieving the DOE vision. DOE, represented by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), is submitting this application for re-designation as an IAEA ICERR. Both INL and ORNL have a decades-long and storied history that supports nuclear research, development, and deployment both nationally and internationally. Both have a history of safe and efficient nuclear operations and have demonstrated a track record of international collaboration and cooperation. INL and ORNL are home to two primary and two secondary research reactors. The primary reactors are Advanced Test Reactor at INL, and High-Flux Isotope Reactor at ORNL. Secondary reactors include: Neutron Radiography Reactor at INL, Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility at INL, and INL Advanced Test Reactor: Critical Facility (ATRC). ICERR designation will also include numerous ancillary facilities at both laboratories, including the following: Multiple post-irradiation examination facilities at both INL and ORNL, Radiochemistry hot-cell facilities at ORNL, INL nuclear-fuel-fabrication and materials-science facilities, and INL and ORNL radiological and nuclear analytical capabilities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Power Plant Physical Protection Recommendation Document

This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Hardtack II

Armed and ready to fire, Adams remained suspended under a balloon high over the Nevada Test Site throughout the day and night of October 31, 1958. Shortly after midnight, Adams was lowered to the ground and disarmed. With that, Operation Hardtack II ended and a test moratorium, primarily a gentlemen’s agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, took effect. As the possibility of a moratorium became more and more likely in late 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission and its two weapon laboratories sought Presidential approval for an unprecedented number of tests for the coming year, including a proposal by the UCRL for a series of underground and safety tests in an operation called Millrace. Not wanting to jeopardize ongoing international disarmament talks as well as the moratorium, itself, Eisenhower resisted giving approval for Millrace until late August 1958, barely two months before the anticipated start of the moratorium. Millrace, quickly renamed Hardtack II, was expanded to thirty-seven tests beginning with Otero on September 12 th and concluding with Titania on October 30 th . Eighteen devices, including Otero and Titania, were safety tests. Three of these tests explored “safety characteristics for underground detonations” in tunnels. Two of the three such tests vented. In this respect, Hardtack II was a harbinger of the future in that the problem of venting was never fully resolved. Other safety tests, designed to give no yield, were more successful with San Juan, Oberon, and Ganymede having “no measurable yield.”

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Validation with EBR-II Tests Performed During the SHRT Testing Program

The EBR-II sodium-cooled fast reactor supported a wide range of fast reactor research activities. The final fifteen years of operations at EBR-II were used for experiments and tests to demonstrate the importance of passive safety in liquid metal reactors and the capability of such systems to provide strong passive responses during off-normal conditions. The Shutdown Heat Removal Test program at EBR-II provided test data supporting the validation of computer codes for design, licensing, and operation of LMRs, among other objectives. The program included nearly sixty tests, most of which were protected and unprotected loss of flow and loss of heat sink tests run at various initial powers and flow rates. This report documents the results of modeling and simulation of tests from the Shutdown Heat Removal Test program to support validation of Argonne’s SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code. SHRT-17 was a protected loss of flow test where a loss of electrical power to all sodium coolant pumps was simulated to demonstrate the effectiveness of natural circulation cooling characteristics. SHRT-45R was an unprotected loss of flow test where the control rod scram function of the plant protection system was disabled to demonstrate the effectiveness of EBR-II’s passive reactivity feedbacks. BOP-301 and BOP-302R were unprotected loss of heat sink tests that demonstrated how reactivity feedback effects driven by changes to the core inlet temperature can shut down the fission process. This validation activity leverages modeling and simulation efforts that originated under an International Atomic Energy Agency Coordinated Research Project for benchmark analysis of the EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal Tests. The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 models originally developed for the CRP have been modernized to utilize new code features and modeling practices. Differences between the predicted and measured test data were explored and the causes of these differences were identified as being due to modeling approximations, uncertainty in transient component behavior, and instrumentation uncertainties. Overall, it was concluded that for SHRT-17, SHRT-45R, BOP-301, and BOP-302R there was good agreement between the flow, power, and temperature predictions and the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Knowledge Transfer and Training in Safeguards for Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities (Project Final Report for FY2022)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Inspecta Annual Technical Report

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is designing and developing an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled smart digital assistant (SDA), Inspecta (International Nuclear Safeguards Personal Examination and Containment Tracking Assistant). The goal is to provide inspectors an in-field digital assistant that can perform tasks identified as tedious, challenging, or prone to human error. During 2021, we defined the requirements for Inspecta based on reviews of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications and interviews with former IAEA inspectors. We then mapped the requirements to current commercial or open-source technical capabilities to provide a development path for an initial Inspecta prototype while highlighting potential research and development tasks. We selected a highimpact inspection task that could be performed by an early Inspecta prototype and are developing the initial architecture, including hardware platform. This paper describes the methodology for selecting an initial task scenario, the first set of Inspecta skills needed to assist with that task scenario and finally the design and development of Inspecta’s architecture and platform.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Sodium Fire Collaborative Study Progress (CNWG Fiscal Year 2022)

This report discusses the progress on the collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on the sodium fire research in fiscal year (FY) 2022 and is a continuation of the FY 2021 progress report. We only report the changes made to the current sodium pool fire model in MELCOR. We modified and corrected many control functions to enhance the fraction of oxygen consumed that reacts to form monoxide (FO2) parameter in the current model from the FY2021 report. This year's enhancements relate to better agreement of the suspended aerosol measurement from JAEA's F7 series tests. Staff from Sandia and JAEA conducted the validation studies of the sodium pool fire model in MELCOR. To validate this pool fire model with the latest enhancement, JAEA sodium pool fire experiments (F7-1 and F7-2) were used. The results of the calculation, including the code-to-code comparisons are discussed as well as suggestions for further model improvement. Finally, recommendations are made for new MELCOR simulations for FY 2023.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Reduced diffusion and enhanced retention of multiple radionuclides from pore structure characterization of barrier materials for enhanced repository performance

Fluid flow and chemical transport in porous media are the macroscopic consequences of pore structure, which integrates geometry (e.g., pore size and surface area, pore-size distribution) and topology (e.g., pore connectivity). Low-permeability geological media whose pores are poorly interconnected will exhibit the characteristics of anomalous diffusion and sample size-dependent effective porosity, which will strongly impact long-term net diffusion and retention of radionuclides in geological repository settings involving different host rocks and barrier materials. A suite of innovative and complementary experimental approaches is utilized to study the microscopic pore structure and macroscopic fluid flow & chemical transport for a range of host rocks and barrier materials, in addition to standard clay minerals and reference rocks. With a particular focus on quantifying the presence and magnitude of “isolated” pores for a reduced effective porosity in low-permeability geomedia, the integrated methodologies for basic properties and pore structure characterization of these geomedia include X-ray diffraction, thin section petrography, grain size distribution, water immersion porosimetry after vacuum-pulling for full saturation, mercury intrusion porosimetry, nitrogen physisorption, scanning electron microscopy, X-ray computed tomography, and (ultra-)small angle neutron (X-ray) scattering. In addition, custom-designed gas diffusion, tracer recipe involving a range of anionic and cationic chemicals with subsequent analyses by laser ablation and inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry, along with batch sorption, column transport, and imbibition tests were conducted for coupled effects of pore structure and chemical retention/transport. From the perspectives of pore structure in conjunction with multiple and complementary approaches to examining a range of sample sizes under different observational scales, we find that the poor pore connectivity is prevalent in low-permeability media (mudstone and crystalline rock) that is related to geological processes (e.g., compaction, diagenesis and thermal maturation). For example, the deep and organic matter-rich mudstones have a much smaller effective porosity than the total porosity (as a result of poor pore connectivity) and associated diffusion coefficient, and the effective porosity & diffusion coefficients are also dependent upon the sample sizes used in the measurement. Similarly, most of the pore space in the shallow mudstone is also controlled by pore-throat diameters in the 5-50 nm range of intergranular pore types from its fine-grained nature, but with an overall good pore connectivity. However, the nm-sized pore space (physically pore-network architecture) and strong sorption capacities (chemical retention from clay minerals) of both shallow and deep mudstones lead to the synergistic retention of cationic radionuclides and their utilities as effective host rocks and barrier materials. Our unique approaches of studying how the micro-scale pore structure affect macro-scale fluid flow, diffusion & retention, and chemical transport produce improved mechanistic understanding, and realistic quantification, of diffusion and retention of typical radionuclides in a range of generic host rocks and barrier materials (clay/shale, salt, crystalline rock, and tuff), with the overall results leading to scientifically-based understanding of enhanced isolation (from both diffusion and retention) of radionuclides and improved confidence on the long-term performance of geological repository to store high-level radioactive wastes. In addition to the training of 25 undergraduates, graduates, and postdocs of UTA, the scientists (organizations) involved in performing this work (e.g., discussion, sample sharing, and operation of SANS and SAXS instruments) include Ed Matteo, Yifeng Wang, and Kristopher Kuhlman (Sandia National Laboratories), Jens Birkholzer, Liange Zheng, Tim Kneafsey, and Sharon Borglin (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory), Mavrik Zavarin (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Yukio Tachi and Yuta Fukatsu (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), Mieke de Craen (Euridice, Belgium), Markus Bleuel (NIST), Wei-Ren Chen, Gergely Nagy, Changwoo Do, William Heller, Larry Anovitz, and Kenneth Littrell (ORNL), as well as Jan Illvsky, Ivan Kuzmenko, Ju-Sang Park and Jon Almers (ANL). Key deliverables include a total of 13 peer-reviewed journal articles (nine published and three under review), 23 presentations at scientific conferences (AAPG, AAPG Southwest Section, AGU, Asian Clay Conference, GSA, GSA South-Central Section, IHLRWM, InterPore, International Conference on Chemistry and Migration Behavior of Actinides and Fission Products in the Geosphere, International Conference on Coupled Processes in Fractured Geological Media: Observation, Modeling and Application), and academic institutions (UTA, New Mexico State University; University of Poitiers, France; University of Helsinki, Finland; Uppsala University, Sweden; Istanbul Technical University, Turkey) and other organizations (Andra, France; Posiva Oy, Finland).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Characterization of Safeguards Implementation Schedules for Advanced Reactors

Advanced reactor designs differ from the traditional light-water reactor designs and operational requirements in nearly every facet, including the heat transfer fluids, operating temperatures and pressures, and fuel cycle requirements. To account for these differences, significant effort will be required to ensure appropriate safeguards implementation for US-based reactors intended for global deployment. This is the second in a series of three reports that examine facets of this issue. The first paper (ORNL/TM-2021/2142) examines potential construction schedules for advanced reactors to create a baseline understanding of the timeframes involved. This second report characterizes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards implementation schedules for potential advanced reactors. Finally, the third report (ORNL/TM-2021/2208) examines existing gaps for safeguards implementation at advanced reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: "Republic of Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Feasibility Report"

[This is part of a hypothetical, scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] This report serves as official record of the coordinated process completed by competent authorities and other organizations with nuclear security responsibilities in the Republic of Centralia to determine the feasibility of establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). The report summarizes all sustainability needs and available resources identified during the feasibility determination process, including consideration of possible NSSC institutional models, in line with the systematic approach recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, has prepared this report in collaboration with members of the Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report has been presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), for final review and decision-making as to whether Centralia should proceed with establishing an NSSC.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Workshop on Establishing and Operating a National Nuclear Security Support Centre Hypothetical Scenario: “Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre Strategy Implementation Plan”

[This is part of a hypothetical scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] In prior years, as a part of efforts to strengthen and better sustain nuclear security within the State, Centralia requested through the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) framework that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conduct an expert mission on establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). After the IAEA conducted the NSSC expert mission, members of the Centralia Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) agreed to initiate the feasibility determination phase of establishing an NSSC, in line with the systematic process recommended by the IAEA. Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, prepared a Feasibility Report in collaboration with members of the CNS and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report was presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), who reviewed and approved the proposal for Centralia to proceed with establishing an NSSC. After Centralia moved into the planning phase for the Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre (CNSSC), per REF, the primary stakeholders of the centre jointly developed this strategy implementation plan, which provides an outline of the organizational structure, needs analysis, programme objectives, financial and project management, risk management, and other key aspects of the centre. This document will be reviewed and updated as necessary on a semi-annual basis during the project implementation period of establishing CNSSC.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Zeus: Fast-Spectrum Critical Assemblies with a Pb-HEU Core Surrounded by a Copper Reflector

The Zeus experiments with lead (Pb) were a series of measurements performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in collaboration with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). Personnel from the JAEA who assisted with the experiment were Masahiro Fukushima and Akito Oizumi. The measurements were performed by Joetta Goda, Geordie McKenzie, John Bounds, Jessie Walker, Travis Grove, Theresa Cutler, Rene Sanchez, and Jesson Hutchinson from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The purpose of these experiments was to validate Pb nuclear cross sections and Pb void reactivity worth using the Comet critical assembly machine. Plates of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pb were arranged in a cylindrical configuration with full copper (Cu) reflection. To study the Pb void reactivity worth, a varying number of cylindrical aluminum (Al) spacers with voids replaced Pb plates in different configurations. Four configurations, which used zero to eight Al spacers, were evaluated as benchmarks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Validation with EBR-II Tests Performed During the SHRT Testing Program (Rev. 2)

The EBR-II sodium-cooled fast reactor supported a wide range of fast reactor research activities. The final fifteen years of operations at EBR-II were used for experiments and tests to demonstrate the importance of passive safety in liquid metal reactors and the capability of such systems to provide strong passive responses during off-normal conditions. The Shutdown Heat Removal Test program at EBR-II provided test data supporting the validation of computer codes for design, licensing, and operation of LMRs, among other objectives. The program included nearly sixty tests, most of which were protected and unprotected loss of flow and loss of heat sink tests run at various initial powers and flow rates. This report documents the results of modeling and simulation of tests from the Shutdown Heat Removal Test program to support validation of Argonne’s SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code. SHRT-17 and SHRT-6 were protected loss of flow tests where a loss of electrical power to all sodium coolant pumps was simulated to demonstrate the effectiveness of natural circulation cooling characteristics. SHRT-45R, SHRT-39, and SHRT-43R were unprotected loss of flow tests where the control rod scram function of the plant protection system was disabled to demonstrate the effectiveness of EBR-II’s passive reactivity feedbacks. BOP-301 and BOP-302R were unprotected loss of heat sink tests that demonstrated how reactivity feedback effects driven by changes to the core inlet temperature can shut down the fission process. PICT-5/6 demonstrated how core power could be increased and decreased via changes in the intermediate sodium and feedwater flow rates. This validation activity leverages modeling and simulation efforts that originated under an International Atomic Energy Agency Coordinated Research Project for benchmark analysis of the EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal Tests. The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 models originally developed for the CRP have been modernized to utilize new code features and modeling practices. Differences between the predicted and measured test data were explored and the causes of these differences were identified as being due to modeling approximations, uncertainty in transient component behavior, and instrumentation uncertainties. Overall, it was concluded that for all tests simulated there was good agreement between the flow, power, and temperature predictions and the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Dissolution of a Can Carrier Pin in Concentrated Nitric Acid

H=Canyon will be dissolving Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The FCA fuel will be dissolved in the electrolytic dissolver in a solution that is a 50 wt.% nitric acid (HNO 3 ), 0.5 g/l gadolinium (Gd), and 0.05 M potassium fluoride (KF). The nitric acid concentration is expected to decrease during the batch process from 10.3 to 7 M. The temperature of the nitric acid solution may be as low as 15 °C. The fuel can will be placed in the dissolver basket insert utilizing a reusable charging device. The charging device is a coated stainless-steel rod with a clevis design. The charging device employs a linchpin to secure the FCA fuel can as it is being charged into the H-canyon dissolver. Prior to beginning the electrolytic dissolution process, the pin will be dissolved, the fuel can will remain in the dissolver basket insert and the charging device will be removed. Currently the time necessary for complete dissolution of the pin is unknown and thus the timing of the removal of the charging device cannot be planned. This process is to be performed remotely and therefore complete dissolution of the pin will not be able to be visually determined. The pin will be made of a material that dissolves in the concentrated nitric acid solution in the dissolver. The facility desired to know the time that the pin would be dissolved so that the charging device for the FCA can could be removed from the dissolver. In particular, the pin dissolution time as a function of the nitric acid concentration and the temperature was desired. The facility would like to ensure that the solution environment was such that the charging device could be removed within an operational shift (8-12 hours).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Plan for Development and Application of Risk Assessment Approach for Transportation Package Approval of an MNPP for Domestic Highway Shipment

For nuclear reactors, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been conducted since the 1970s [e.g., see WASH-1400 (NRC 1975), NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990), and NUREG-1935 (Chang et al. 2012)]. PRA has also been used to assess a dry cask storage system at a nuclear power plant [see NUREG-1864 (NRC 2007)]. PRA techniques have also been applied to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, most notably in NUREG/CR-4829 (Fischer et al. 1987), NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung et al. 2000), and NUREG-2125 (NRC 2014). Additional guidance is provided in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA-TECDOC-1346 (2003). Transportation PRA was also used in the evaluations of transportation impacts in reports such as the Repository Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2002) and the Repository Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2008).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Performance Evaluation of the Starfire nGen-350 DD Neutron Generator for use with the Fast Neutron Coincidence Collar

The Starfire Industries nGen-350 DD neutron generator has been developed for use with the Fast Neutron Coincidence Collar (FNCL). The generator was adapted from the nGen-310 model generator by Starfire to accommodate an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) request to incorporate a neutron yield stabilization mechanism. An nGen-350 generator was obtained by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for evaluation as a potential neutron interrogation source replacement for Am(Li) in the FNCL. This report provides a summary of the performance of the nGen-350.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

What Crime? Legal Jurisdiction over Civilians in the Pacific Proving Ground

In late 1948 the Atomic Energy Commission “designated Enewetak Atoll as a permanent proving ground.” Subsequently renamed, the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG), six nuclear tests, including Mike, were conducted on the atoll. When Mike vaporized an entire island, it became clear that Enewetak’s small islands were insufficient and Bikini Atoll, abandoned after Operation Crossroads, was made part of the PPG. Authority to create the PPG resided in a “Trusteeship” agreement between the United States and the United Nations. Following the first World War, the Marshall Islands became a “Mandate” of the League of Nations. After World War II, the League’s successor, the United Nations, converted the Marshall Islands to a “Strategic Trusteeship” with the United States as its administrator. The Strategic Trust designation gave the U.S. nearly unfettered control over the islands, including the right to establish the PPG.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗