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Report on July 2015 Additional Protocol Coordinators Best Practices Workshop

After 10 years of implementation experience, the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) within the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) conducted the Additional Protocol (AP) Coordinators Best Practices Workshop at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from July 29-30, 2015. The goal of this workshop was to identify implementation best practices, lessons learned, and compliance challenges from the various Additional Protocol Coordinators (APCs) at each laboratory in the DOE/NNSA complex and associated sites. The workshop provided the opportunity for participants to share their insights and establish networks that APCs can utilize to continue to discuss challenges (new and old), identify best practices, and enhance communication and coordination for reporting multi-lab research projects during review activities. Workshop participants included DOE/NNSA HQ, laboratory and site APCs, seasoned experts, members of the original implementation outreach team, and Field Element and site security representatives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gary Laughlin IHNS Intro to 2015 HPC Annual Report

The International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security (IHNS) Program Management Unit (PMU) oversees a broad portfolio of Sandia’s programs in areas ranging from global nuclear security to critical asset protection. We use science and technology, innovative research, and global engagement to counter threats, reduce dangers, and respond to disasters. The PMU draws on the skills of scientists and engineers from across Sandia. Our programs focus on protecting US government installations, safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials, facilitating nonproliferation activities, securing infrastructures, countering chemical and biological dangers, and reducing the risk of terrorist threats. We conduct research in risk and threat analysis, monitoring and detection, decontamination and recovery, and situational awareness. We develop technologies for verifying arms control agreements, neutralizing dangerous materials, detecting intruders, and strengthening resiliency. Our programs use Sandia’s High-Performance Computing resources for predictive modeling and simulation of interdependent systems, for modeling dynamic threats and forecasting adaptive behavior, and for enabling decision support and processing large cyber data streams. In this report, we highlight four advanced computation projects that illustrate the breadth of the IHNS mission space.

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Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy for Safeguards Applications

The delayed gamma-ray assay technique utilizes an external neutron source (D-D, D-T, or electron accelerator-driven), and high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers to perform characterization of SNM materials behind shielding and in complex configurations such as a nuclear fuel assembly. High-energy delayed gamma-rays (2.5 MeV and above) observed following the active interrogation, provide a signature for identification of specific fissionable isotopes in a mixed sample, and determine their relative content. Potential safeguards applications of this method are: 1) characterization of fresh and spent nuclear fuel assemblies in wet or dry storage; 2) analysis of uranium enrichment in shielded or non-characterized containers or in the presence of a strong radioactive background and plutonium contamination; 3) characterization of bulk and waste and product streams at SNM processing plants. Extended applications can include warhead confirmation and warhead dismantlement confirmation in the arms control area, as well as SNM diagnostics for the emergency response needs. In FY16 and prior years, the project has demonstrated the delayed gamma-ray measurement technique as a robust SNM assay concept. A series of empirical and modeling studies were conducted to characterize its response sensitivity, develop analysis methodologies, and analyze applications. Extensive experimental tests involving weapons-grade Pu, HEU and depleted uranium samples were completed at the Idaho Accelerator Center and LLNL Dome facilities for various interrogation time regimes and effects of the neutron source parameters. A dedicated delayed gamma-ray response modeling technique was developed and its elements were benchmarked in representative experimental studies, including highresolution gamma-ray measurements of spent fuel at the CLAB facility in Sweden. The objective of the R&D effort in FY17 is to experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of the delayed gamma-ray interrogation of shielded SNM samples with portable neutron sources suitable for field applications.

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Rethinking Approaches to Strategic Stability in the 21st Century

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a two-day conference on rethinking approaches to strategic stability in the 21st century on October 20-21, 2016 in Livermore, CA. The conference was jointly convened by Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories, and was held in partnership with the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. The conference took place at LLNL’s Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) and included a range of representatives from U.S. government, academic, and private institutions, as well as representatives from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.The following summary covers topics and discussions from each of the panels. It is not intended to capture every point in detail, but seeks to outline the range of views on these complex and inter-related issues while providing a general overview of the panel topics and discussions that took place. The conference was held under the Chatham House rule and does not attribute any remarks to any specific individual or institution. The views reflected in this report do not represent the United States Government, Department of State, or the national laboratories.

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FPGA Authentication Methods.

One of the greatest challenges facing designers of equipment to be used in a nuclear arms control treaty is how to convince the other party in the treaty to trust its results and functionality. Whether the host provides equipment meant to prove treaty obligations and the inspector needs to gain that trust (commonly referred to as authentication), or the inspector provides this equipment and the host needs to gain this trust (commonly considered to be included in certification), one party generally has higher confidence in the equipment at the start of a treaty regime and the other party needs to gain that confidence prior to use. While we focus on authentication in this document—that is, the inspector gaining confidence in host-provided equipment—our conclusions will likely apply to host certification of inspector-provided equipment.

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Consortium for Verification Technology Fellowship Report.

As one recipient of the Consortium for Verification Technology (CVT) Fellowship, I spent eight days as a visiting scientist at the University of Michigan, Department of Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences (NERS). During this time, I participated in multiple department and research group meetings and presentations, met with individual faculty and students, toured multiple laboratories, and taught one-half of a one-unit class on Risk Analysis in Nuclear Arms control (six 1.5 hour lectures). The following report describes some of the interactions that I had during my time as well as a brief discussion of the impact of this fellowship on members of the consortium and on me/my laboratory’s technical knowledge and network.

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Impact of Technology Developments on Cost and Embodied Energy of Advanced Polymer Composite Components

Within Manufacturing USA, The Institute for Advanced Composites Manufacturing Innovation, IACMI, is a partnership of industry, private and state universities, as well as federal, state, and local governments that are working together to benefit the nation’s energy and economic security. This diverse public/private partnership validates manufacturing technologies that respond to private industry’s need for faster and more cost-, material-, and energy-efficient composites manufacturing, including recycling at the end of product life. IACMI has set specific quantitative goals towards advancing the state-of-the-art in materials and manufacturing technologies for carbon fiber reinforced polymer matrix (CFRP) composites. The goals were set with respect to three targeted application areas, namely: automobiles, wind turbine blades and compressed gas storage tanks. The specific goals set for IACMI at the end of the first five years were to: (1) reduce the cost of productionized composite parts by 25%, (2) reduce the embodied energy in the production of these parts by 50%, and (3) increase recyclability of CFRP parts into useful products to 80% of the part being recycled. A baseline set of metrics representing the state-of-the-art at the start of IACMI (June 2015) were required to estimate the potential impact of the various technology development efforts towards these goals. Further, the actual impact on the baseline metrics as each project is completed needs to be quantified, considering the technology advances accomplished. These baseline cost and energy metrics are available on the IACMI website at https://iacmi.org/baseline-cost-energy. A special embodied energy estimator tool, developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), is available to the public online at http://www.energytoolestimator.com/, and has been used to develop the baselines as well as evaluate impacts from completed IACMI projects. This report describes the impact of two recently completed IACMI sponsored technology projects on the baseline metrics. In the first project, titled “Thermoplastic Composites Parts Manufacturing Enabling High Volumes, Low Cost, Reduced Weight with Design Flexibility”, a highly drapable, easily recyclable thermoplastic coated, near net-shape carbon fiber fabric was developed. The thermoplastic coated tow (CT) fabric was manufactured using a rapid fabric formation (RFF) process developed for textile manufacturing. The DuPont, Fibrtec, and Purdue University team that accomplished the development of this low scrap rate carbon fiber product form selected an automobile control arm to be built in a follow-on phase of the project as a demonstrator of the benefits of this technology.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Examining Efficacy of Strategic Stability in South Asia: An Analysis

This paper highlights how, in the backdrop of prevalent tensions between India and Pakistan, deterrence stability is endangered even when overall strategic stability prevails. Unresolved legacy issues including an outstanding boundary dispute, conflict over Kashmir, and terrorism mar India-Pakistan relations. Variables undermining the prospects for long term peace, among others, include growing mutual mistrust, the proxy war that India believes is state perpetrated, increasing conventional asymmetry, rapid advancement in weapon technologies, growing size of nuclear arsenals, doctrinal mismatch and above all, bilateral gridlock in confidence building measures and arms control measures.

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The Significance of Strategic Foresight in Verification Technologies: A Case Study of the INF Treaty

Verification technologies can serve as important tools of statecraft in arms control efforts beyond providing monitoring capabilities and deterring noncompliance. The INF Treaty provides an insightful case study of the strategic side of verification technologies, illuminating how these capabilities can be used to shape negotiation positions and treaty content, provide domestic and international assurance, and manage tensions in the treaty implementation process. Operationalizing verification technologies in this way expands the tools available at the diplomatic and policy levels, but it requires foresight and preparedness to identify and develop the relevant technical capabilities. The most important finding of this case study is that technical preparedness had an important impact, but only after a period of latency. The verification approaches used in the INF Treaty were developed before the topic was raised in the negotiations, and thus the capabilities were available when certain political shifts had occurred

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The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) Science Plan (Version 2.4c)

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) series is a long-term NNSA research and development effort designed to improve U.S. arms control and nuclear nonproliferation verification and monitoring capabilities. The findings from the SPE will advance the United States’ nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities, particularly with respect to detection, discrimination and determination of yields associated with small nuclear explosions that can be lost amid the noisy seismo-acoustic background from other sources. The data generated from the SPE, a series of well-designed and recorded chemical explosions, will contribute to the development and validation of first-principles explosive source generated seismo-acoustic modeling codes. These codes will then facilitate the update of semi-empirical methods, currently based on historic test site data, such that key explosion observables can be reproduced, thus improving confidence in nuclear test monitoring in new areas and/or under novel emplacement conditions. The overall SPE project is comprised of both the development of the new explosion simulation codes and the chemical explosion test series. The chemical explosion test series will generate the empirical data required to both develop and validate the new simulation codes.

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Minimally Intrusive Verification of Deep Nuclear Warhead Reductions: A Fresh Look at the Buddy-Tag Concept

Future nuclear arms - control agreements may place numerical limits on the total number of warheads in the nuclear arsenals of states. Verifying these limits may require inspectors to account for individual warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. This task could be accomplished with unique identifiers, but standard tagging techniques may be unacceptable in this case due to host concerns about safety and intrusiveness. To resolve this dilemma, we revisit the so - called Buddy Tag concept first proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the early 1990s. The conceptual innovation in the Buddy Tag was to by separate the tag from the treaty limited item itself. Verification of the pairings between tags and limited items would take place during a short-notice inspection, where the host would be required to produce one buddy tag for each item. Sensors on the Buddy Tag would show that it had not been moved to the inspected site after the inspection was declared (e.g., within the last 24-48 hours). If the inspector counted more (or fewer) treaty limited items than Buddy Tags at the inspected site, a treaty violation could be asserted. Using a number of single-site inspections, an inspecting party can hold the host at risk for discovery of violating the treaty at an enterprise level by possessing more treaty limited items than the treaty allows. In this project, we developed a buddy-tag prototype for demonstration and evaluation purposes. This paper summarizes the performance requirements for an advanced Buddy Tag, the proposed conduct of operations, the design choices and functionalities of the different subsystems, and initial testing results. The report also summarizes peer review feedback obtained throughout the project.

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The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, NATO's Brussels Summit and Beyond

The NATO allies must react to the nuclear policy and posture choices of the Trump administration. In some respects, there are good reasons why the Alliance should move closer to the Trump Administration. In other cases, Allies should seek agreement on slightly different policies. While it is unrealistic to expect that the NATO allies will be able to resolve all the questions posed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review at the Summit in Brussels, there are several things that they should be able to agree upon. This includes more specific language about the Russia nuclear challenges, general recognition of U.S. efforts to bolster NATO nuclear deterrence posture, a clear language on the value of nuclear sharing arrangements, and reaffirmation of some of NATO’s statements on arms control and disarmament. Yet, a signal in Brussels of NATO’s efforts to build a new nuclear consensus would be stronger if heads of state and government initiated a broader process aimed at developing a comprehensive deterrence and defense strategy that would treat nuclear deterrence as an integral part of a multi-domain approach.

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Epithermal Neutron Resonance Analysis Using a Compact D-T Generator

Nuclear material identification and isotopic composition analysis are important capabilities for safeguards and the verification of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation treaties. Epithermal neutron resonance imaging has been proposed for spent fuel assay measurements, and the development of a mobile neutron imaging system could provide such a tool for on-site applications. This technique is highly sensitive to isotopes of interest for safeguards applications (e.g. 235,238 U, 238,239,240 Pu) and yields unique transmission spectra for a target containing actinides and some mid- and high-Z elements. Paired with a position-sensitive neutron detector, such a system could provide spatial information of the target isotopic composition. Recent progress in the development of high intensity neutron sources could make mobile epithermal neutron imaging designs increasingly feasible to serve as a tool for nuclear inspectors. In this work, Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were performed to further optimize a previous design for an epithermal neutron resonance-based analysis apparatus using a D-T portable neutron generator. Additionally, experimental work is being performed to test the feasibility of this method. The MC simulations of moderation time distributions for different moderator compositions and thicknesses were measured to provide a multi-group correction for neutron time-of-flight energy reconstruction.

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Warhead verification concepts and technologies [Slides]

Weapons verification concepts and technologies are discussed related to Arms Control instrumentation, which is a three-part problem: measurement; certification, and authentication.

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The future of the NPT: REVCON and beyond

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Open Radiation Monitoring: Histogram Builder Module Design

The Open Radiation Monitoring Project seeks to develop and demonstrate a modular radiation detection architecture designed specifically for use in arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications that will facilitate rapid development of trusted systems to meet the needs of potential future treaties. A modular architecture can be used to reduce more complex systems to a series of single purpose building blocks, thereby facilitating equipment inspection and in turn building trust in the equipment by all treaty parties. Furthermore, a modular architecture can be used to control data flow within the measurement system, reducing the risk of "hidden switches" and constraining the amount of sensitive information that could potentially be inadvertently leaked. This report details the first revision of a prototype circuit that will convert analog pulses directly into a histogrammed data set for further processing. The circuit was designed with both spectroscopy and multiplicity analysis in mind but can, in principle, be used to reduce any raw data stream into a histogram. The number of output channels is limited, and the histogram bin ranges are user configurable to allow for non-uniform and discontinuous bins, which makes it possible to restrict the information being passed down stream if desired. Pulse processing relies entirely on analog circuitry and non- programmable logic, which enables operation without the need for a central processor or other programmable control unit. The circuit remains untested under the Open Radiation Monitoring project due to the closure of the sponsoring program. However, further development and testing is scheduled to take place in support of a purpose-built trusted verification system development effort known as COGNIZANT, which demonstrates the potential benefit of developing a suite of modular trusted system components.

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Non-RF Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) Development Report

The Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) developed by Sandia National Laboratories is one of the most mature and well-studied active seals for use in containment applications for arms control treaty verification and international nuclear safeguards. However, its typical design includes wireless communications provided by a radio frequency (RF) transmitter and receiver. While this provides flexibility of movement for many applications, it is unnecessary and undesired for some treaty verification applications. This report details the design and construction of two variants of the CoCIM that remove the RF transmission capability in favor of directly connected wired and short-range infrared communications, as well as a new coordinator that is used to interface the CoCIM to a computer, and new interface software that is simplified for a likely inspection use case.

42 ENGINEERING↗