Results for “quantitative risk assessment” — Page 18

NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗

NASA NTRS1980

Health and safety: Preliminary comparative assessment of the Satellite Power System (SPS) and other energy alternatives

Data readily available from the literature were used to make an initial comparison of the health and safety risks of a fission power system with fuel reprocessing; a combined-cycle coal power system with a low-Btu gasifier and open-cycle gas turbine; a central-station, terrestrial, solar photovoltaic power system; the satellite power system; and a first-generation fusion system. The assessment approach consists of the identification of health and safety issues in each phase of the energy cycle from raw material extraction through electrical generation, waste disposal, and system deactivation; quantitative or qualitative evaluation of impact severity; and the rating of each issue with regard to known or potential impact level and level of uncertainty.

Habegger, L. J.↗

NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure and guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. The theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be 4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.

Launch Vehicle↗

NASA NTRS2019

Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure or guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. Although the theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be in reasonable agreement (4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively) the underlying sub-root cause scoring had significant disparities attributable to significant organizational changes and acquisitions. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.

Craig H Williams↗

DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS1995

Fractal mechanisms and heart rate dynamics. Long-range correlations and their breakdown with disease

Under healthy conditions, the normal cardiac (sinus) interbeat interval fluctuates in a complex manner. Quantitative analysis using techniques adapted from statistical physics reveals the presence of long-range power-law correlations extending over thousands of heartbeats. This scale-invariant (fractal) behavior suggests that the regulatory system generating these fluctuations is operating far from equilibrium. In contrast, it is found that for subjects at high risk of sudden death (e.g., congestive heart failure patients), these long-range correlations break down. Application of fractal scaling analysis and related techniques provides new approaches to assessing cardiac risk and forecasting sudden cardiac death, as well as motivating development of novel physiologic models of systems that appear to be heterodynamic rather than homeostatic.

NASA Discipline Cardiopulmonary↗

DOE OSTI2026

Overview of the physics basis for the ARC fusion power plant

Commonwealth Fusion Systems plans to build ARC as the first fusion power plant at a site in Chesterfield County, Virginia, USA by the early 2030s. We present an overview of analysis comprising the physics basis of the ARC V3A design, a high-magnetic-field tokamak with 𝐵 0 =11.4 T, 𝐼 𝑝 =12.0 MA, 𝑅 0 =4.62 m, 𝑎 =1.18 m. ARC V3A is designed to produce 𝑃 𝑓⁡𝑢⁢𝑠 ≈1.13 GW DT fusion power and deliver ⩾400 MW net electric power to the grid. This overview includes quantitative analysis of fundamental issues for design of and operational plasma scenarios for a tokamak power plant, and lays out the design targets and strategic choices for ARC, including empirical fusion performance projections, assessment of H-mode access, ion cyclotron resonance heating simulations, alpha particle physics and time-dependent full-pulse simulations. This is complemented by topical papers on fusion performance and transport, disruption physics, boundary physics and magnetohydrodynamic stability. Critically, these studies identify key model uncertainties and physics risks to be retired through SPARC operation. Due to the modular nature of ARC, early results from SPARC can be incorporated into the design of the first ARC as well as subsequent replacements of the ARC vacuum vessel.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

NASA NTRS2016

A Survey of Cost Estimating Methodologies for Distributed Spacecraft Missions

Satellite constellations and Distributed Spacecraft Mission (DSM) architectures offer unique benefits to Earth observation scientists and unique challenges to cost estimators. The Cost and Risk (CR) module of the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) being developed by NASA Goddard seeks to address some of these challenges by providing a new approach to cost modeling, which aggregates existing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) from respected sources, cost estimating best practices, and data from existing and proposed satellite designs. Cost estimation through this tool is approached from two perspectives: parametric cost estimating relationships and analogous cost estimation techniques. The dual approach utilized within the TAT-C CR module is intended to address prevailing concerns regarding early design stage cost estimates, and offer increased transparency and fidelity by offering two preliminary perspectives on mission cost. This work outlines the existing cost model, details assumptions built into the model, and explains what measures have been taken to address the particular challenges of constellation cost estimating. The risk estimation portion of the TAT-C CR module is still in development and will be presented in future work. The cost estimate produced by the CR module is not intended to be an exact mission valuation, but rather a comparative tool to assist in the exploration of the constellation design tradespace. Previous work has noted that estimating the cost of satellite constellations is difficult given that no comprehensive model for constellation cost estimation has yet been developed, and as such, quantitative assessment of multiple spacecraft missions has many remaining areas of uncertainty. By incorporating well-established CERs with preliminary approaches to approaching these uncertainties, the CR module offers more complete approach to constellation costing than has previously been available to mission architects or Earth scientists seeking to leverage the capabilities of multiple spacecraft working in support of a common goal.

0↗

NASA NTRS2016

A Survey of Cost Estimating Methodologies for Distributed Spacecraft Missions

Satellite constellations and Distributed Spacecraft Mission (DSM) architectures offer unique benefits to Earth observation scientists and unique challenges to cost estimators. The Cost and Risk (CR) module of the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) being developed by NASA Goddard seeks to address some of these challenges by providing a new approach to cost modeling, which aggregates existing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) from respected sources, cost estimating best practices, and data from existing and proposed satellite designs. Cost estimation through this tool is approached from two perspectives: parametric cost estimating relationships and analogous cost estimation techniques. The dual approach utilized within the TAT-C CR module is intended to address prevailing concerns regarding early design stage cost estimates, and offer increased transparency and fidelity by offering two preliminary perspectives on mission cost. This work outlines the existing cost model, details assumptions built into the model, and explains what measures have been taken to address the particular challenges of constellation cost estimating. The risk estimation portion of the TAT-C CR module is still in development and will be presented in future work. The cost estimate produced by the CR module is not intended to be an exact mission valuation, but rather a comparative tool to assist in the exploration of the constellation design tradespace. Previous work has noted that estimating the cost of satellite constellations is difficult given that no comprehensive model for constellation cost estimation has yet been developed, and as such, quantitative assessment of multiple spacecraft missions has many remaining areas of uncertainty. By incorporating well-established CERs with preliminary approaches to approaching these uncertainties, the CR module offers more complete approach to constellation costing than has previously been available to mission architects or Earth scientists seeking to leverage the capabilities of multiple spacecraft working in support of a common goal.

Foreman, Veronica L.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Streamlining the Design Tradespace for Earth Imaging Constellations

Satellite constellations and Distributed Spacecraft Mission (DSM) architectures offer unique benefits to Earth observation scientists and unique challenges to cost estimators. The Cost and Risk (CR) module of the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) being developed by NASA Goddard seeks to address some of these challenges by providing a new approach to cost modeling, which aggregates existing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) from respected sources, cost estimating best practices, and data from existing and proposed satellite designs. Cost estimation through this tool is approached from two perspectives: parametric cost estimating relationships and analogous cost estimation techniques. The dual approach utilized within the TAT-C CR module is intended to address prevailing concerns regarding early design stage cost estimates, and offer increased transparency and fidelity by offering two preliminary perspectives on mission cost. This work outlines the existing cost model, details assumptions built into the model, and explains what measures have been taken to address the particular challenges of constellation cost estimating. The risk estimation portion of the TAT-C CR module is still in development and will be presented in future work. The cost estimate produced by the CR module is not intended to be an exact mission valuation, but rather a comparative tool to assist in the exploration of the constellation design tradespace. Previous work has noted that estimating the cost of satellite constellations is difficult given that no comprehensive model for constellation cost estimation has yet been developed, and as such, quantitative assessment of multiple spacecraft missions has many remaining areas of uncertainty. By incorporating well-established CERs with preliminary approaches to approaching these uncertainties, the CR module offers more complete approach to constellation costing than has previously been available to mission architects or Earth scientists seeking to leverage the capabilities of multiple spacecraft working in support of a common goal.

Science Data Processing↗

NASA NTRS2016

Satellite Constellation Cost Modeling: An Aggregate Model

Satellite constellations and Distributed Spacecraft Mission (DSM) architectures offer unique benefits to Earth observation scientists and unique challenges to cost estimators. The Cost and Risk (CR) module of the Tradespace Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C) being developed by NASA Goddard seeks to address some of these challenges by providing a new approach to cost modeling, which aggregates existing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) from respected sources, cost estimating best practices, and data from existing and proposed satellite designs. Cost estimation through this tool is approached from two perspectives: parametric cost estimating relationships and analogous cost estimation techniques. The dual approach utilized within the TAT-C CR module is intended to address prevailing concerns regarding early design stage cost estimates, and offer increased transparency and fidelity by offering two preliminary perspectives on mission cost. This work outlines the existing cost model, details assumptions built into the model, and explains what measures have been taken to address the particular challenges of constellation cost estimating. The risk estimation portion of the TAT-C CR module is still in development and will be presented in future work. The cost estimate produced by the CR module is not intended to be an exact mission valuation, but rather a comparative tool to assist in the exploration of the constellation design tradespace. Previous work has noted that estimating the cost of satellite constellations is difficult given that no comprehensive model for constellation cost estimation has yet been developed, and as such, quantitative assessment of multiple spacecraft missions has many remaining areas of uncertainty. By incorporating well-established CERs with preliminary approaches to approaching these uncertainties, the CR module offers more complete approach to constellation costing than has previously been available to mission architects or Earth scientists seeking to leverage the capabilities of multiple spacecraft working in support of a common goal.

Science Data Processing↗

NASA NTRS2023

The Hazard Components of Representative Key Risks. The Physical Climate Perspective

The framework of Representative Key Risks (RKRs) has been adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II (WGII) to categorize, assess and communicate a wide range of regional and sectoral key risks from climate change. These are risks expected to become severe due to the potentially detrimental convergence of changing climate conditions with the exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems. Other papers in this special issue treat each of eight RKRs holistically by assessing their current status and future evolution as a result of this convergence. However, in these papers, such assessment cannot always be organized according to a systematic gradation of climatic changes. Often the big-picture evolution of risk has to be extrapolated from either qualitative effects of “low”, “medium” and “high” warming, or limited/focused analysis of the consequences of particular mitigation choices (e.g., benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2C), together with consideration of the socio-economic context and possible adaptation choices. In this study we offer a representation – as systematic as possible given current literature and assessments – of the future evolution of the hazard components of RKRs. We identify the relevant hazards for each RKR, based upon the WGII authors’ assessment, and we report on their current state and expected future changes in magnitude, intensity and/or frequency, linking these changes to Global Warming Levels (GWLs) to the extent possible. We draw on the assessment of changes in climatic impact-drivers relevant to RKRs described in the 6th Assessment Report by Working Group I supplemented when needed by more recent literature. For some of these quantities - like regional trends in oceanic and atmospheric temperature and precipitation, some heat and precipitation extremes, permafrost thaw and Northern Hemisphere snow cover - a strong and quantitative relationship with increasing GWLs has been identified. For others - like frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones and extra-tropical storms, and fire weather - that link can only be described qualitatively. For some processes - like the behavior of ice sheets, or changes in circulation dynamics - large uncertainties about the effects of different GWLs remain, and for a few others - like ocean pH and air pollution - the composition of the scenario of anthropogenic emissions is most relevant, rather than the warming reached. In almost all cases, however, the basic message remains that every small increment in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and associated warming will bring changes in climate phenomena that will contribute to increasing risk of impacts on human and natural systems, in the absence of compensating changes in these systems’ exposure and vulnerability, and in the absence of effective adaptation. Our picture of the evolution of RKR-relevant climatic impact-drivers complements and enriches the treatment of RKRs in the other papers in at least two ways: by filling in their often only cursory or limited representation of the physical climate aspects driving impacts, and by providing a fuller representation of their future potential evolution, an important component – if never the only one – of the future evolution of risk severity.

Representative Key Risks↗

NASA NTRS2021

Orbital Debris Mitigation and CubeSats

The 2019 update to the U. S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) included CubeSats as a special class of space operations for the first time. This is the first governmental-level policy document that calls for CubeSats to follow quantitative recommendations for orbital debris mitigation. While CubeSats were never exempt from such recommendations, mission designers often “under assess” CubeSats due to their small size and historically low level of stored energy. Qualitative assessments of debris potential are less applicable as miniaturized energy systems (propulsive and electrical) become more available and as the “CubeSat” label is applied to larger payloads. Of particular interest to the long-term evolution of the debris environment is the likelihood of accidental explosion or collision; we must also consider the risk to the human population from reentering spacecraft. We discuss the on-orbit history of CubeSats and present guidance to assist in designing for future compliance with the new standard practices.

Chris L. Ostrom↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Orbital Debris Mitigation and CubeSats

The 2019 Update to the United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) included CubeSats for the first time as a special class of space operations. This is the first governmental-level policy document that calls for CubeSats to follow quantitative recommendations for orbital debris mitigation. While CubeSats were never exempt from such recommendations, mission designers often under assess CubeSats due to their small size and historically low level of stored energy. Qualitative assessments of debris potential are less applicable as miniaturized energy systems (propulsive and electrical) become more available and as the “CubeSat” label is applied to larger payloads. Of particular interest to the long-term evolution of the debris environment is the likelihood of accidental explosion or collision; we must also consider the risk to the human population from reentering spacecraft. We discuss the on-orbit history of CubeSats and present guidance to assist in designing for future compliance with the new standard practices.

Chris L Ostrom↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Assessment of a Machine Learning-Based Aircraft Emergency Braking System: A Case Study

Machine Learning (ML) is revolutionizing many technological fields, but its use in aviation remains restricted due to stringent certification requirements. Efforts by the aviation community to establish standards for certifying ML-based systems are progressing, yet challenges persist, particularly with safety assessment methods for ML-based systems. This research addresses these challenges through a case study of an autonomous emergency braking system utilizing a computer vision deep neural network (DNN). We demonstrate a safety assessment process tailored to ML-specific concerns, such as low integrity and performance variability in quantitative safety analysis. This study can serve as an illustrative example to facilitate the discussion and convergence on certification aspects for ML-based systems within the aviation community.

Safety certification↗

DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS2015

Critical Team Composition Issues for Long-Distance and Long-Duration Space Exploration: A Literature Review, an Operational Assessment, and Recommendations for Practice and Research

Prevailing team effectiveness models suggest that teams are best positioned for success when certain enabling conditions are in place (Hackman, 1987; Hackman, 2012; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008; Wageman, Hackman, & Lehman, 2005). Team composition, or the configuration of member attributes, is an enabling structure key to fostering competent teamwork (Hackman, 2002; Wageman et al., 2005). A vast body of research supports the importance of team composition in team design (Bell, 2007). For example, team composition is empirically linked to outcomes such as cooperation (Eby & Dobbins, 1997), social integration (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002), shared cognition (Fisher, Bell, Dierdorff, & Belohlav, 2012), information sharing (Randall, Resick, & DeChurch, 2011), adaptability (LePine, 2005), and team performance (e.g., Bell, 2007). As such, NASA has identified team composition as a potentially powerful means for mitigating the risk of performance decrements due to inadequate crew cooperation, coordination, communication, and psychosocial adaptation in future space exploration missions. Much of what is known about effective team composition is drawn from research conducted in conventional workplaces (e.g., corporate offices, production plants). Quantitative reviews of the team composition literature (e.g., Bell, 2007; Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau, & Briggs, 2011) are based primarily on traditional teams. Less is known about how composition affects teams operating in extreme environments such as those that will be experienced by crews of future space exploration missions. For example, long-distance and long-duration space exploration (LDSE) crews are expected to live and work in isolated and confined environments (ICEs) for up to 30 months. Crews will also experience communication time delays from mission control, which will require crews to work more autonomously (see Appendix A for more detailed information regarding the LDSE context). Given the unique context within which LDSE crews will operate, NASA identified both a gap in knowledge related to the effective composition of autonomous, LDSE crews, and the need to identify psychological and psychosocial factors, measures, and combinations thereof that can be used to compose highly effective crews (Team Gap 8). As an initial step to address Team Gap 8, we conducted a focused literature review and operational assessment related to team composition issues for LDSE. The objectives of our research were to: (1) identify critical team composition issues and their effects on team functioning in LDSE-analogous environments with a focus on key composition factors that will most likely have the strongest influence on team performance and well-being, and 1 Astronaut diary entry in regards to group interaction aboard the ISS (p.22; Stuster, 2010) 2 (2) identify and evaluate methods used to compose teams with a focus on methods used in analogous environments. The remainder of the report includes the following components: (a) literature review methodology, (b) review of team composition theory and research, (c) methods for composing teams, (d) operational assessment results, and (e) recommendations.

Bell, Suzanne T.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Building a predictive model for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon dosimetry in organotypically cultured human bronchial epithelial cells using benzo[ a ]pyrene

The airway epithelium is a primary route of exposure for inhaled toxicants, and organotypic culture models represent an important advancement for toxicity testing compared to simple in vitro models that may lack metabolic capability and multicellular structure/communication associated with the bronchial epithelium in vivo. A quantitative understanding of chemical dosimetry is key for interpreting and extrapolating study results; however, dosimetry is understudied in organotypic models limiting ability to predict toxicity. We developed a dosimetry model for primary human bronchial epithelial cells (HBECs) cultured at the air-liquid interface (ALI) using benzo[a]pyrene (BAP), a representative polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon. Dose and time course evaluation of metabolite formation and enzyme activity and expression were utilized to parameterize a cellular dosimetry model to improve the utility of ALI-HBECs for assessing chemical risk. Dosimetry analysis demonstrated absorption of BAP into cells and an increase in Phase 1 and 2 metabolites over time that correlated with regulation of metabolizing enzymes. BAP was cleared from cells by 48 h after exposure, and the primary metabolites generated in ALI-HBECs were BAP-3-phenol, BAP-4,5-dihydrodiol, BAP-7,8-dihydrodiol, BAP-9,10-dihydrodiol, BAP-7,8,9,10-tetrol, BAP-3-phenol-glucuronide, BAP-4,5-dihydrodiol-glucuronide, and BAP-9,10-dihydrodiol-glucuronide. The resulting dosimetry model described BAP and 7,8-dihydrodiol toxicokinetics in ALI-HBECs and suggested active excretion of 7,8-dihydrodiol. Overall, this study demonstrates metabolic competency of ALI-HBECs for BAP metabolism, demonstrates the usefulness of complex in vitro systems for human-relevant toxicity data, and exhibits how in silico models can be utilized for understanding the dosimetry of test compounds to aid in in vitro to human extrapolation of toxicity data for risk assessments.

Benzo[a]pyrene↗