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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Validation Testing for Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment Equipment Removal and Disposal Techniques

The Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE) will be the first reactor featuring a fast-spectrum molten chloride circulating nuclear fuel system in the world. Planning for equipment removal and disposal (ERD) of MCRE has identified several technology gaps due to the unique environment of this nuclear experiment. Some of the gaps arise from the application of existing disassembly and/or sizing methods to novel material forms or in novel configurations. Others arise from unknown material behavior. This paper summarizes proposed test plans for ERD validation experiments to address these complicated or unknown equipment removal procedures. At the Waste Management Symposia in 2024, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) MCRE ERD team presented the challenges associated with hosting multiple nuclear experiments in series with only brief transition periods between systems. Such difficulties include higher dose rates, the presence of radioisotopes infrequently encountered in reactor decommissioning and radioactive waste management, lack of intrinsic remote-operations infrastructure in the test bed, space constraints in the test bed, and contamination minimization requirements. To address these challenges, remote or semi-remote technologies are planned to be implemented in a non-hot cell environment with limited space availability. The team also discussed how a systems engineering approach is being used for conceptual development and design of equipment removal systems to address these challenges. For example, to reduce constraints for the removal of more difficult components, non-activated, noncontaminated elements are planned to be taken out first where possible. Still, there are complexities associated with the remaining components. In this work, the operational framework for MCRE ERD was reviewed for technical gaps and open questions, and test plans were drafted to address these areas. The tests plans were written for the following categories: vision systems, pipe cutting, drill/grout/filler, flush salt, and miscellaneous, with the miscellaneous group consisting of tests like techniques for removing bearings and reflector bricks. The test plans explore material, infrastructure, and staffing requirements needed for test execution. The test plans additionally focus on the evaluation of success. Determining the outcome of a test is imperative - as these explorative actions have the potential to rearrange or re-scope planned ERD activities. Success criteria identified thus far include required tool output, required area(s), debris production and mitigation, and repeatability. Test plans are an essential aspect of the systems engineering approach to MCRE ERD. They are used as the beginning steps in defining use cases for the ERD system. Performance of the validation tests is expected to begin in the summer of 2025 and will take approximately 9 to 12 months to complete. Execution of these plans will be expedited by specifying test needs ahead of time, facilitating efficient interactions with any subcontractors tasked with running the requested tests. Evaluating the outcomes of these tests will inform MCRE ERD procedures and timing and will also identify additional technical constraints for the MCRE ERD System. This upfront process optimization effort will help the project save time and resources at the end of the experiment.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2024

A tri-level optimization model for interdependent infrastructure network resilience against compound hazard events

Resilient operation of interdependent infrastructures against compound hazard events is essential for maintaining societal well-being. To address consequence assessment challenges in this problem space, we propose a novel policy-guided tri-level optimization model applied to a proof-of-concept case study with fuel distribution and transportation networks – encompassing one realistic network; one fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as networks drawn from three synthetic distributions. Mathematically, our approach takes the form of a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model—a multi-agent tri-level optimization, comprised of a defender, attacker, and an operator acting in sequence. Here, in this study, our notional operator may choose proxy actions to operate an interdependent system comprised of fuel terminals and gas stations (functioning as supplies) and a transportation network with traffic flow (functioning as demand) to minimize unmet demand at gas stations. A notional attacker aims to hypothetically disrupt normal operations by reducing supply at the supply terminals, and the notional defender aims to identify best proxy defense policy options which include hardening supply terminals or allowing alternative distribution methods such as trucking reserve supplies. We solve our DAD formulation at a metropolitan scale and present practical defense policy insights against hypothetical compound hazards. We demonstrate the generalizability of our framework by presenting results for a realistic network; a fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as for three networks drawn from synthetic distributions. Additionally, we demonstrate the scalability of the framework by investigating runtime performance as a function of the network size. Steps for future research are also discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Energy Transition: Advanced Nuclear Needed but Address Climate Vulnerabilities Now

The term “Energy Transition” is an attempt to capture an elaborate set of activities related to the modernization and decarbonization of energy grids. Performed concurrently and often in an ad hoc manner across local, state, regional and national boundaries, it is bringing chaos to what should arguably be one of the most conservatively managed of all critical infrastructure sectors. What’s more, with climate change producing an increasing tempo of extreme events, confidence in the intended resilient and redundant structure of the electric grids is likely to ebb. Even without these climate induced stressors, the nation’s electric grid was built for an earlier century. In addition to a drive towards greater efficiency via digitization and a continuing price decline in distributed energy resources (DERs), one could argue that climate change concerns are the primary driver of the energy transition. Non-CO2 emitting generation sources like wind and solar have become an important part of the overall generation fleet, albeit ones that cannot be counted upon to provide dispatchable power. Current projections indicate deployment of even larger percentages of DERs in coming years. Until far better storage capabilities arrive, the variability of wind and solar, inconsistent performance of traditional thermal generation plants, and energy delivery failures associated with natural gas pipelines will reinforce mounting reliability concerns. This pertains to both electric transmission and distribution. The recent shuttering of nuclear power plants in Germany, Japan, the US and elsewhere are also putting more downward pressure on dispatchable generation. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has roiled energy markets worldwide and forced some countries to return to coal as a primary fuel. In view circumstances such as these, it is essential that significant changes be made to policies and planning criteria, and to the standards and code on which they are based. Given the accelerating pace of extreme weather events, this needs to occur as soon as possible.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear explosion monitoring network design considerations

Design of an efficient monitoring network requires information on the type and size of releases to be detected, the accuracy and reliability of the measuring equipment, and the desired network performance. This work provides a scientific basis for optimizing or minimizing networks of 133 Xe samplers to achieve a desired performance level for different levels of release. The approach of this work varies the density of sampling locations to find optimal location subsets, and to explore the properties of variations of those subsets – how crucial is a specific subset; are substitutions problematic? The choice of possible station locations is arbitrary but constrained to some extent by the location of islands, land masses, difficult topography (mountains, etc.) and the places where infrastructure exists to run and support a sampler. Performance is evaluated using hypothetical releases and atmospheric transport models that cover an entire year.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Optical follow-up of gravitational wave triggers with DECam during the first two LIGO/VIRGO observing runs

Gravitational wave (GW) events detectable by LIGO and Virgo have several possible progenitors, including black hole mergers, neutron star mergers, black hole–neutron star mergers, supernovae, and cosmic string cusps. A subset of GW events is expected to produce electromagnetic (EM) emission that, once detected, will provide complementary information about their astrophysical context. To that end, the LIGO–Virgo Collaboration (LVC) sends GW candidate alerts to the astronomical community so that searches for their EM counterparts can be pursued. The DESGW group, consisting of members of the Dark Energy Survey (DES), the LVC, and other members of the astronomical community, uses the Dark Energy Camera (DECam) to perform a search and discovery program for optical signatures of LVC GW events. DESGW aims to use a sample of GW events as standard sirens for cosmology. Due to the short decay timescale of the expected EM counterparts and the need to quickly eliminate survey areas with no counterpart candidates, it is critical to complete the initial analysis of each night’s images as quickly as possible. We discuss our search area determination, imaging pipeline, and candidate selection processes. We review results from the DESGW program during the first two LIGO–Virgo observing campaigns and introduce other science applications that our pipeline enables.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Basic Energy Sciences Roundtable: Foundational Science for Carbon-Neutral Hydrogen Technologies

Basic research to identify and understand the fundamental principles governing hydrogen processes is essential for achieving a carbon-neutral, hydrogen-based energy and chemical infrastructure. In August 2021, the Office of Basic Energy Sciences (BES)—in coordination with the US Department of Energy (DOE) technology Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, and Nuclear Energy—held a roundtable titled, “Foundational Science for Carbon-Neutral Hydrogen Technologies,” to discuss the scientific and technical barriers for carbon-neutral hydrogen production, storage, and utilization. Four priority research opportunities (PROs) were identified to address these scientific and technical challenges and accelerate progress toward the realization of energy-efficient, carbon-neutral cycles for hydrogen processes. The PROs are as follows: Discover and Control Materials and Chemical Processes to Revolutionize Electrolysis Systems; Manipulate Hydrogen Interactions to Harness the Full Potential of Hydrogen as a Fuel; Elucidate the Structure, Evolution, and Chemistry of Complex Interfaces for Energy- and Atom-Efficiency; and Understand and Limit Degradation Processes to Enhance the Durability of Hydrogen Systems.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS2002

Laser Prevention of Earth Impact Disasters

We now believe that while there are about 2000 earth orbit crossing rocks greater than 1 kilometer in diameter, there may be as many as 100,000 or more objects in the 100m size range. Can anything be done about this fundamental existence question facing us? The answer is a resounding yes! We have the technology to prevent collisions. By using an intelligent combination of Earth and space based sensors coupled with an infrastructure of high-energy laser stations and other secondary mitigation options, we can deflect inbound asteroids, meteoroids, and comets and prevent them from striking the Earth. This can be accomplished by irradiating the surface of an inbound rock with sufficiently intense pulses so that ablation occurs. This ablation acts as a small rocket incrementally changing the shape of the rock's orbit around the Sun. One-kilometer size rocks can be moved sufficiently in a month while smaller rocks may be moved in a shorter time span.We recommend that the World's space objectives be immediately reprioritized to start us moving quickly towards a multiple option defense capability. While lasers should be the primary approach, all mitigation options depend on robust early warning, detection, and tracking resources to find objects sufficiently prior to Earth orbit passage in time to allow mitigation. Infrastructure options should include ground, LEO, GEO, Lunar, and libration point laser and sensor stations for providing early warning, tracking, and deflection. Other options should include space interceptors that will carry both laser and nuclear ablators for close range work. Response options must be developed to deal with the consequences of an impact should we move too slowly.

Campbell, J.↗
NASA NTRS2003

The Impact Imperative: A Space Infrastructure Enabling a Multi-Tiered Earth Defense

Impacting at hypervelocity, an asteroid struck the Earth approximately 65 million years ago in the Yucatan Peninsula a m . This triggered the extinction of almost 70% of the species of life on Earth including the dinosaurs. Other impacts prior to this one have caused even greater extinctions. Preventing collisions with the Earth by hypervelocity asteroids, meteoroids, and comets is the most important immediate space challenge facing human civilization. This is the Impact Imperative. We now believe that while there are about 2000 earth orbit crossing rocks greater than 1 kilometer in diameter, there may be as many as 200,000 or more objects in the 100 m size range. Can anything be done about this fundamental existence question facing our civilization? The answer is a resounding yes! By using an intelligent combination of Earth and space based sensors coupled with an infrastructure of high-energy laser stations and other secondary mitigation options, we can deflect inbound asteroids, meteoroids, and comets and prevent them &om striking the Earth. This can be accomplished by irradiating the surface of an inbound rock with sufficiently intense pulses so that ablation occurs. This ablation acts as a small rocket incrementally changing the shape of the rock's orbit around the Sun. One-kilometer size rocks can be moved sufficiently in about a month while smaller rocks may be moved in a shorter time span. We recommend that space objectives be immediately reprioritized to start us moving quickly towards an infrastructure that will support a multiple option defense capability. Planning and development for a lunar laser facility should be initiated immediately in parallel with other options. All mitigation options are greatly enhanced by robust early warning, detection, and tracking resources to find objects sufficiently prior to Earth orbit passage in time to allow significant intervention. Infrastructure options should include ground, LEO, GEO, Lunar, and libration point laser and sensor stations for providing early warning, tracking, and deflection. Other options should include space interceptors that will carry both laser and nuclear ablators for close range work. Response options must be developed to deal with the consequences of an impact should we move too slowly.

Campbell, Jonathan W.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Sodium Based Heat Pipe Modules for Space Reactor Concepts: Stainless Steel SAFE-100 Core

A heat pipe cooled reactor is one of several candidate reactor cores being considered for advanced space power and propulsion systems to support future space exploration applications. Long life heat pipe modules, with designs verified through a combination of theoretical analysis and experimental lifetime evaluations, would be necessary to establish the viability of any of these candidates, including the heat pipe reactor option. A hardware-based program was initiated to establish the infrastructure necessary to build heat pipe modules. This effort, initiated by Los Alamos National Laboratory and referred to as the Safe Affordable Fission Engine (SAFE) project, set out to fabricate and perform non-nuclear testing on a modular heat pipe reactor prototype that can provide 100 kilowatt from the core to an energy conversion system at 700 C. Prototypic heat pipe hardware was designed, fabricated, filled, closed-out and acceptance tested.

Martin, James J.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for Advanced Reactors (Conference Presentation)

The next generation of Advanced Reactors include planned capabilities for both Autonomous (operating without human interaction for a set period-of-time) and Remote (operating with human interaction from a separate physical location) Operations. Existing Nuclear Reactor architectures include a set of safety and security constraints tightly coupled with personnel policies and procedures. As Advanced Reactors are fielded with these new Autonomous and Remote operational capabilities, the architectures and associated infrastructure services and components will perceivably expand the overall attack surface and risk calculations with regards to safe and secure operations. This paper is part of an FY21 work program focused on ensuring Advanced Reactor designs are informed with threat-based guidance on design and operation of Secure Architectures with a specific focus on the deployment of Autonomous Systems in support of Advanced Reactor Operations. The next phase of this research program is to complement produce a methodology for assessment of the cyber threat against these architectures as well as a catalogue of Use Cases to support the Advanced Reactor community in their implementation of Autonomous and Remote Operations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Neutron irradiation and electrical characterisation of the first 8” silicon pad sensor prototypes for the CMS calorimeter endcap upgrade

As part of its HL-LHC upgrade program, the CMS collaboration is replacing its existing endcap calorimeters with a high-granularity calorimeter (CE). The new calorimeter is a sampling calorimeter with unprecedented transverse and longitudinal readout for both electromagnetic and hadronic compartments. Due to its compactness, intrinsic time resolution, and radiation hardness, silicon has been chosen as active material for the regions exposed to higher radiation levels. The silicon sensors are fabricated as 20 cm (8”) wide hexagonal wafers and are segmented into several hundred pads which are read out individually. As part of the sensor qualification strategy, 8” sensor irradiation with neutrons has been conducted at the Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center (RINSC) and followed by their electrical characterisation in 2020-21. The completion of this important milestone in the CE's R&D program is documented in this paper and it provides detailed account of the associated infrastructure and procedures.The results on the electrical properties of the irradiated CE silicon sensors are presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluating software defined networking solutions to reduce the digital attack surface of nuclear security systems

Most nuclear security systems used today were not designed for today’s threat environment. Systems that were intended to be stand alone are now interconnected. Devices that have a single purpose are built on multi-purpose platforms and communication protocols that, while effective, have no ability to authenticate authorized versus unauthorized commands. These attributes provide an attacker significant ability to affect the system, pivot throughout the interconnected networks, and remain undetected if he/she is able to compromise a single node. Software defined networking (SDN) has been used for years by information technology (IT) cloud service providers to quickly provision or remove servers or other systems to meet changing demand. The same concept has recently been applied to operational technology (OT) systems to enable very fast failover on critical systems that have stringent and deterministic (<5ms) transmit/receive times. By carefully engineering the communication flows through a network using preplanned routes and specific pathways it is possible to achieve deterministic and extremely reliable message delivery even when components fail. This engineering approach to network design has added security benefits including securing the networking control plane, eliminating network scanning and mapping, inhibiting ARP spoofing and host masquerading, eliminating unauthorized network pivoting and enabling greater situational awareness on the network. SDN in OT environments is new but early testing in electrical power and other critical infrastructure has shown it to be a very powerful tool for building reliable networks and reducing the digital attack surface of the network. The authors tested a software defined network switch on a simple physical protection system with components commonly found in nuclear security systems and found improved mitigations to denial of service attacks, lateral movement and network reconnaissance. The paper details the tests and their results.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, software defined↗
NASA NTRS2003

The Case of Nuclear Propulsion

Fission technology can enable rapid, affordable access to any point in the solar system. If fission propulsion systems are to be developed to their full potential; however, near-term customers must be identified and initial fission systems successfully developed, launched, and utilized. Successful utilization will simultaneously develop the infrastructure and experience necessary for developing even higher power and performance systems. To be successful, development programs must devise strategies for rapidly converting paper reactor concepts into actual flight hardware. One approach to accomplishing this is to design highly testable systems, and to structure the program to contain frequent, significant hardware milestones. This paper discusses ongoing efforts in Russia and the United States aimed at enabling near-term utilization of space fission systems.

Koroteev, Anatoly S.↗
DOE OSTI2021

A.I. for nuclear physics

Nuclear science is concerned with the understanding of the nature of matter, its basic constituents and their interaction to form the elements and the properties we observe. This includes the forms of matter we see around us and also exotic forms such as those that existed in the first moments after the Big Bang and that exist today inside neutron stars. The techniques, tools, and expertise needed for nuclear physics (NP) research are therefore diverse in nature. State-of-the art accelerators are being developed to illuminate the dynamical basis of the core of the atom in terms of the fundamental constituents called quarks and gluons and to increase the number of isotopes with known properties. This scientific infrastructure is reaching scales and complexities that require computational methods for tasks such as anomaly detection in operational data. New methodologies are needed to detect anomalies and to optimize operating parameters, predict failures as well as to discover new optimization algorithms.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗