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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18

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NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Hydrogen Flow Control Valve Poppet Breakage

The Main Propulsion System (MPS) uses three Flow Control Valves (FCV) to modulate the flow of pressurant hydrogen gas from the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) to the hydrogen External Tank (ET). This maintains pressure in the ullage volume as the liquid level drops, preserving ET structural integrity and assuring the engines receive a sufficient amount of head pressure. On Space Transportation System (STS)-126 (2009), with only a handful of International Space Station (ISS) assembly flights from the end of the Shuttle program, a portion of a single FCV?s poppet head broke off at about a minute and a half after liftoff. The risk of the poppet head failure is that the increased flow area through the FCV could result in excessive gaseous hydrogen flow back to the external tank, which could result in overboard venting of hydrogen ullage pressure. If the hydrogen venting were to occur in first stage (i.e., lower atmosphere), a flammability hazard exists that could lead to catastrophic loss of crew and vehicle. Other failure risks included particle impact damage to MPS downstream hardware. Although the FCV design had been plagued by contamination-related sluggish valve response problems prior to a redesign at STS-80 (1996), contamination was ruled out as the cause of the STS-126 failure. Employing a combination of enhanced hardware inspection and a better understanding of the consequences of a poppet failure, safe flight rationale for subsequent flights (STS-119 and later) was achieved. This paper deals with the technical lessons learned during the investigation and mitigation of this problem at a time when assembly flights were each in the critical path to Space Station success.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗

NASA NTRS2004

A Study to Compare the Failure Rates of Current Space Shuttle Ground Support Equipment with the New Pathfinder Equipment and Investigate the Effect that the Proposed GSE Infrastructure Upgrade Might Have to Reduce GSE Infrastructure Failures

The purposes of this study are to compare the current Space Shuttle Ground Support Equipment (GSE) infrastructure with the proposed GSE infrastructure upgrade modification. The methodology will include analyzing the first prototype installation equipment at Launch PAD B called the "Pathfinder". This study will begin by comparing the failure rate of the current components associated with the "Hardware interface module (HIM)" at the Kennedy Space Center to the failure rate of the neW Pathfinder components. Quantitative data will be gathered specifically on HIM components and the PAD B Hypergolic Fuel facility and Hypergolic Oxidizer facility areas which has the upgraded pathfinder equipment installed. The proposed upgrades include utilizing industrial controlled modules, software, and a fiber optic network. The results of this study provide evidence that there is a significant difference in the failure rates of the two studied infrastructure equipment components. There is also evidence that the support staff for each infrastructure system is not equal. A recommendation to continue with future upgrades is based on a significant reduction of failures in the new' installed ground system components.

Kennedy, Barbara J.↗

NASA NTRS1978

Synopsis of Viking flight data

The temporary failure of the data collection hardware along with the fifty percent degradation on the batteries in lander 1 were discussed.

Britting, A. O.↗

NASA NTRS1978

The effect of normal atmospheric variability on Space Shuttle Orbiter entry performance

The Space Shuttle Orbiter is controlled during entry by a combination of aerodynamic surfaces composed of elevons, a body flap, and a rudder that flares as a speedbrake, and a reaction control system that uses 16 small rocket thrusters. To determine the effects of realistic atmospheric density variations on reentry, a series of Monte Carlo trajectories were generated for each season. The performance parameters analyzed include maximum hinge moments experienced by the aerodynamic control surfaces, the maximum deflections experienced by the aerodynamic control surfaces, a range of angle-of-sideslip values, maximum dynamic pressure, maximum stagnation point heat rate, and state conditions at touchdown. The results of the investigation indicate that the Orbiter guidance and control systems could tolerate atmospheric variability without failures in the control system hardware.

Powell, R. W.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS). Phase 1 report

An integrated avionics system which provides expanded functional capabilities that significantly enhance the utility and safety of general aviation at a cost commensurate with the general aviation market is discussed. Displays and control were designed so that the pilot can use the system after minimum training. Functional and hardware descriptions, operational evaluation and failure modes effects analysis are included.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1981

Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS), Phase 1

Demonstration advanced anionics system (DAAS) function description, hardware description, operational evaluation, and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) are provided. Projected advanced avionics system (PAAS) description, reliability analysis, cost analysis, maintainability analysis, and modularity analysis are discussed.

Bailey, A. J.↗

NASA NTRS1984

F-15 digital electronic engine control system description

A digital electronic engine control (DEEC) was developed for use on the F100-PW-100 turbofan engine. This control system has full authority control, capable of moving all the controlled variables over their full ranges. The digital computational electronics and fault detection and accomodation logic maintains safe engine operation. A hydromechanical backup control (BUC) is an integral part of the fuel metering unit and provides gas generator control at a reduced performance level in the event of an electronics failure. The DEEC's features, hardware, and major logic diagrams are described.

Myers, L. P.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Compiler-Assisted Multiple Instruction Rollback Recovery Using a Read Buffer

Multiple instruction rollback (MIR) is a technique to provide rapid recovery from transient processor failures and was implemented in hardware by researchers and slow in mainframe computers. Hardware-based MIR designs eliminate rollback data hazards by providing data redundancy implemented in hardware. Compiler-based MIR designs were also developed which remove rollback data hazards directly with data flow manipulations, thus eliminating the need for most data redundancy hardware. Compiler-assisted techniques to achieve multiple instruction rollback recovery are addressed. It is observed that data some hazards resulting from instruction rollback can be resolved more efficiently by providing hardware redundancy while others are resolved more efficiently with compiler transformations. A compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback scheme is developed which combines hardware-implemented data redundancy with compiler-driven hazard removal transformations. Experimental performance evaluations were conducted which indicate improved efficiency over previous hardware-based and compiler-based schemes. Various enhancements to the compiler transformations and to the data redundancy hardware developed for the compiler-assisted MIR scheme are described and evaluated. The final topic deals with the application of compiler-assisted MIR techniques to aid in exception repair and branch repair in a speculative execution architecture.

Alewine, Neal Jon↗

NASA NTRS1993

Overview of the Systems Special Investigation Group investigation

The Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) carried a remarkable variety of electrical, mechanical, thermal, and optical systems, subsystems, and components. Nineteen of the fifty-seven experiments flown on LDEF contained functional systems that were active on-orbit. Almost all of the other experiments possessed at least a few specific components of interest to the Systems Special Investigation Group (Systems SIG), such as adhesives, seals, fasteners, optical components, and thermal blankets. Almost all top level functional testing of the active LDEF and experiment systems has been completed. Failure analysis of both LDEF hardware and individual experiments that failed to perform as designed has also been completed. Testing of system components and experimenter hardware of interest to the Systems SIG is ongoing. All available testing and analysis results were collected and integrated by the Systems SIG. An overview of our findings is provided. An LDEF Optical Experiment Database containing information for all 29 optical related experiments is also discussed.

Mason, James B.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Potential Damage to Flight Hardware from MIL-STD-462 CS02 Setup

The MIL-STD-462 CS02 conducted susceptibility test setup, performed during electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing, consists of an audio transformer with the secondary used as an inductor and a large capacitor. Together, these two components form an L-type low-pass filter to minimize the injected test signal input into the power source. Some flight hardware power input configurations are not compatible with this setup and break into oscillation when powered up. This can damage flight hardware and caused a catastrophic failure to an item tested in the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Large EMC Test Facility.

Harris, Patrick K.↗

NASA NTRS1997

SCARLET Photovoltaic Concentrator Array Selected for Flight Under NASA's New Millennium Program

The NASA Lewis Research Center continues to demonstrate its expertise in the development and implementation of advanced space power systems. For example, during the past year, the NASA New Millennium Program selected the Solar Concentrator Array with Refractive Linear Element Technology (SCARLET) photovoltaic array as the power system for its Deep Space-1 (DS-1) mission. This Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) managed DS-1 mission, which represents the first operational flight of a photovoltaic concentrator array, will provide a baseline for the use of this technology in a variety of future government and commercial applications. SCARLET is a joint NASA Lewis/Ballistic Missile Defense Organization program to develop advanced photovoltaic array technology that uses a unique refractive concentrator design to focus sunlight onto a line of photovoltaic cells located below the optical element. The general concept is based on previous work conducted at Lewis under a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contract with AEC-Able Engineering, Inc., for the Multiple Experiments to Earth Orbit and Return (METEOR) spacecraft. The SCARLET II design selected by the New Millennium Program is a direct adaptation of the smaller SCARLET I array built for METEOR. Even though SCARLET I was lost during a launch failure in October 1995, the hardware (designed, built, and flight qualified within 6 months) provided invaluable information and experience that led to the selection of this technology as the primary power source for DS-1.

Piszczor, Michael F., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

NASA NTRS2019

Novel concept for detection of a fluid flow fault in a pumped fluid heat rejection system

A pumped fluid heat rejection system (HRS) requires continuous flow of the working fluid to ensure that the components controlled by the HRS stay within their allowable temperature limits. An interruption of flow could result in violations of hardware qualification limits and mission failure. Some of these violations can happen within a few hours. Hence, quick detection of a flow fault to invoke mitigation measures is very critical. In typical pumped fluid HRS, dual or triple pumps are employed to switch the backup units in case the primary unit were to fail. The key metric for the selection of a fault detection system is that it should detect the fault much before the fault’s impact on the thermal health of the HRS controlled components is realized. A trade study was conducted to select such a system for the Europa Clipper Mission to Europa, a moon of Jupiter that is planned for a launch in 2023. Out of the several concepts studied, the most attractive one was a novel and simple concept that uses a low power film heater attached to a section of the HRS tubing. While the fluid flows at its nominal rate, the high thermal coupling of the flowing fluid leads to the tube being close to the fluid’s temperature. However, when the flow stops, the heater warms the small thermal mass of the tubing to a high temperature in a short span of time (~15 minutes). This large temperature rise would then imply that the flow must have stopped. This paper will describe the various concepts considered, the chosen concept, its implementation, and the results of developments tests to validate its performance.

Schmidt, Tyler↗

NASA NTRS1982

The implementation and use of Ada on distributed systems with high reliability requirements

The use and implementation of Ada in distributed environments in which the hardware components are assumed to be unreliable is investigated. The possibility that a distributed system can be programmed entirely in Ada so that the individual tasks of the system are unconcerned with which processor they are executing on, and that failures can occur in the underlying hardware is considered. The reduced cost of computer hardware and the advantages of distributed processing (for example, increased reliability through redundancy and greater flexibility) indicate that many aerospace computer systems can be distributed. The use of Ada and distributed systems is a good combination for aerospace embedded systems.

Knight, J. C.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Turbofan engine demonstration of sensor failure detection

In the paper, the results of a full-scale engine demonstration of a sensor failure detection algorithm are presented. The algorithm detects, isolates, and accommodates sensor failures using analytical redundancy. The experimental hardware, including the F100 engine, is described. Demonstration results were obtained over a large portion of a typical flight envelope for the F100 engine. They include both subsonic and supersonic conditions at both medium and full, nonafter burning, power. Estimated accuracy, minimum detectable levels of sensor failures, and failure accommodation performance for an F100 turbofan engine control system are discussed.

Merrill, Walter C.↗

NASA NTRS1987

An innovative design for autonomous backup attitude control of the Gamma Ray Observatory

The Gamma Ray Observatory is a NASA funded three-axis stabilized spacecraft which will carry four scientific instruments to observe gamma ray phenomena. The requirement to protect the scientific mission from system failures led to the attitude control and determination system design described in this paper. The design employs nine control modes with error detection, hardware substitution, and autonomous mode switching. The system architecture evolved to eliminate cross-dependence between the primary on-board computer (OBC) and the backup control processor electronics. Cross strapping of sensors and actuators and separation of the input/output electronics ensure that a reliable set of sensors and actuators will be available for backup mode operation. The OBC software includes failure detection, hardware reconfiguration, and mode switching logic which provide the ability to autonomously transfer, upon anomaly, to a reliable backup mode. Verification of this mode transition design is done in four test programs: at the unit level, by analytical simulation, by a hybrid breadboard electronics-simulation setup, and by a flight hardware-simulation test.

Tai, F.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Failure

Good Evening, my name is Greg Jerman and for nearly a quarter century I have been performing failure analysis on NASA's aerospace hardware. During that time I had the distinct privilege of keeping the Space Shuttle flying for two thirds of its history. I have analyzed a wide variety of failed hardware from simple electrical cables to cryogenic fuel tanks to high temperature turbine blades. During this time I have found that for all the time we spend intelligently designing things, we need to be equally intelligent about understanding why things fail. The NASA Flight Director for Apollo 13, Gene Kranz, is best known for the expression "Failure is not an option." However, NASA history is filled with failures both large and small, so it might be more accurate to say failure is inevitable. It is how we react and learn from our failures that makes the difference.

Jerman, Gregory↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗