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NASA NTRS1991

Facilities maintenance handbook

This handbook is a guide for facilities maintenance managers. Its objective is to set minimum facilities maintenance standards. It also provides recommendations on how to meet the standards to ensure that NASA maintains its facilities in a manner that protects and preserves its investment in the facilities in a cost-effective manner while safely and efficiently performing its mission. This handbook implements NMI 8831.1, which states NASA facilities maintenance policy and assigns organizational responsibilities for the management of facilities maintenance activities on all properties under NASA jurisdiction. It is a reference for facilities maintenance managers, not a step-by-step procedural manual. Because of the differences in NASA Field Installation organizations, this handbook does not assume or recommend a typical facilities maintenance organization. Instead, it uses a systems approach to describe the functions that should be included in any facilities maintenance management system, regardless of its organizational structure. For documents referenced in the handbook, the most recent version of the documents is applicable. This handbook is divided into three parts: Part 1 specifies common definitions and facilities maintenance requirements and amplifies the policy requirements contained in NMI 8831. 1; Part 2 provides guidance on how to meet the requirements of Part 1, containing recommendations only; Part 3 contains general facilities maintenance information. One objective of this handbook is to fix commonality of facilities maintenance definitions among the Centers. This will permit the application of uniform measures of facilities conditions, of the relationship between current replacement value and maintenance resources required, and of the backlog of deferred facilities maintenance. The utilization of facilities maintenance system functions will allow the Centers to quantitatively define maintenance objectives in common terms, prepare work plans, and develop management information in order to statistically identify and analyze variances from those plans. It will also add credibility to the NASA facilities maintenance budgeting process. The key to a successful maintenance program is the understanding and support of the senior Center managers.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2008

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Steady Predictions - Part 1

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. Advanced numerical tools assume greater significance in supporting testing and design of high altitude testing facilities and plume induced testing environments of high thrust engines because of the greater inter-dependence and synergy in the functioning of the different sub-systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Facility designs in this case will require a complex network of diffuser ducts, steam ejector trains, fast operating valves, cooling water systems and flow diverters that need to be characterized for steady state performance. In this paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD analyses s advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in a sub-scale A-3 facility at NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) where extensive testing was performed. Furthermore, the focus in this paper relates to modeling of critical sub-systems and components used in facilities such as the A-3 facility. The work here will address deficiencies in empirical models and current CFD analyses that are used for design of supersonic diffusers/turning vanes/ejectors as well as analyses for confined plumes and venting processes. The primary areas that will be addressed are: (1) supersonic diffuser performance including analyses of thermal loads (2) accurate shock capturing in the diffuser duct; (3) effect of turning duct on the performance of the facility (4) prediction of mass flow rates and performance classification for steam ejectors (5) comparisons with test data from sub-scale diffuser testing and assessment of confidence levels in CFD based flowpath modeling of the facility. The analyses tools used here expand on the multi-element unstructured CFD which has been tailored and validated for impingement dynamics of dry plumes, complex valve/feed systems, and high pressure propellant delivery systems used in engine and component test stands at NASA SSC. The analyses performed in the evaluation of the sub-scale diffuser facility explored several important factors that influence modeling and understanding of facility operation such as (a) importance of modeling the facility with Real Gas approximation, (b) approximating the cluster of steam ejector nozzles as a single annular nozzle, (c) existence of mixed subsonic/supersonic flow downstream of the turning duct, and (d) inadequacy of two-equation turbulence models in predicting the correct pressurization in the turning duct and expansion of the second stage steam ejectors. The procedure used for modeling the facility was as follows: (i) The engine, test cell and first stage ejectors were simulated with an axisymmetric approximation (ii) the turning duct, second stage ejectors and the piping downstream of the second stage ejectors were analyzed with a three-dimensional simulation utilizing a half-plane symmetry approximation. The solution i.e. primitive variables such as pressure, velocity components, temperature and turbulence quantities were passed from the first computational domain and specified as a supersonic boundary condition for the second simulation. (iii) The third domain comprised of the exit diffuser and the region in the vicinity of the facility (primary included to get the correct shock structure at the exit of the facility and entrainment characteristics). The first set of simulations comprising the engine, test cell and first stage ejectors was carried out both as a turbulent real gas calculation as well as a turbulent perfect gas calculation. A comparison for the two cases (Real Turbulent and Perfect gas turbulent) of the Ma Number distribution and temperature distributions are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The Mach Number distribution shows small yet distinct differences between the two cases such as locations of shocks/shock reflections and a slightly different impingement point on the wall of the diffuser from the expansion at the exit of the nozzle. Similarly the temperature distribution indicates different flow recirculation patterns in the test cell. Both cases capture all the essential flow phenomena such as the shock-boundary layer interaction, plume expansion, expansion of the first stage ejectors, mixing between the engine plume and the first stage ejector flow and pressurization due to the first stage ejectors. The final paper will discuss thermal loads on the walls of the diffuser and cooling mechanisms investigated.

Allgood, Daniel C.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Steady Predictions - Part 1

Allgood, Daniel C.↗

DOE OSTI2016

Results of Modeling and Simulation Support to Specia Nuclear Material Handling Facility Operations - 16053

Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) is the sole designer and provider of nuclear powered aircraft carriers and one of only two companies in the United States to build nuclear powered submarines. As part of the upkeep of aircraft carriers, the ships return to NNS once in their lifetime for a complex overhaul and to be refueled. In support of overhaul operations NNS maintains a state of the art Special Nuclear Material (SNM) handling facility. Due to the complex nature of the operations that occur within this facility, during the design and initial operation of the building NNS developed a facility simulation model to provide decision support during the project planning and operational phases. This tool allows users to experiment with process times, process order, equipment utilization, personnel utilization and spatial utilization. By capturing the planned operations, time distributions for operations, equipment sizes and uses and personnel requirements, the tool accurately reflects the planned use of the facility. This realism allows the user to experiment with any aspect of the facility, in a controlled and cost effective space, and determine how changes or potential delays may impact overall facility operations. Thus the model allows for rapid exploration of multiple scenarios to determine likely outcomes, allowing a user to identify risks well ahead of their realization and explore mitigation strategies in a controlled space, to determine the ideal path forward. The tool was successful during the initial operation of the facility in helping to identify and mitigate risks related to the complex operations occurring during SNM handling. The tool is now in use to support planning for the next series of operations that will occur within the facility. The initial operations the model supported occurred during the deactivation of the USS Enterprise, and future operation will focus on the overhaul of Nimitz class aircraft carriers. The NNS planning team is currently using the tool to assess potential risks and challenges that are identified as potentially impacting the schedule and timelines for these overhaul processes. In addition, the NNS development team is working to add new operational steps to the model, capturing work that is occurring near the facility, but which directly impacts the facilities operational abilities. In conjuncture with the engineering planning division, the NNS development team has run over 20 complex scenarios through the tool. The team has provided output from these scenarios to both NNS personnel and government representatives. To date the model has successfully supported the identification of several feasible paths to incorporate new processes, dictated by the work to support a overhaul vs a deactivation. The model also provides a spatial arrangement component that allows users to experiment with different equipment placement within the facility. Due to the fidelity of the model, arranging equipment with the spatial component allows a user to set up the facility in an experimental layout and run the processes inside the facility to determine if the layout will be feasible, or if it would impact operational capabilities. Additionally, the spatial component allows for visual collaboration between stakeholders to ensure all operational personnel are aware of the current and planned layout, and that they do not locate equipment or work stations in locations that would interfere with facility operations. The spatial component, in combination with the simulation component, has resulted in several documented improvements in process. These include: the identification of additional equipment which could be stored outside the facility, without impacting operations, to increase space; confirmation of the ideal placement of a large water tank; and identification of several risks related to planned equipment storage area, allowing the team to develop new plans and avoid realizing the risk. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Addressing Excess Contaminated Facilities and Mercury Cleanup At the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation - 18408

The U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) and its prime cleanup contractor, URS | CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) are executing an aggressive program of cleanup and risk reduction in excess contaminated facilities on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Across the complex, DOE has designated more than 2,300 of its facilities 'excess'. Excess means 'nonoperational' and refers to a facility for which DOE no longer has a mission need. Many of these facilities pose high risk to workers and/or the environment. Delayed cleanup increases risk as well as cost. OREM and UCOR initiated a Working Group on Excess Facilities to identify and prioritize activities that are needed to enhance worker safety, minimize further degradation of the facilities, and reduce the environmental risk. Six Excess Contaminated Facilities projects on the ORR were identified as priorities. Three of the projects are located at ORNL - the Building 7500 Homogenous Reactor Experiment, the Building 3026 Radioisotope Development Laboratory and Buildings 3028/3029 Isotope Facilities. At Y-12, priority excess facilities include the Column Exchange Equipment (COLEX), the Alpha-4 Lithium Enrichment Facility and the Biology Complex Research Facilities. Work on these projects is aimed at stabilization of degraded higher risk facilities, characterization of conditions and hazards, removal of hazardous materials and placement of the facility in the lowest risk condition possible pending demolition. At the same time, DOE and UCOR are preparing to undertake a comprehensive program to remediate the presence of mercury in the water stemming from historical operations at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Over decades of operations, mercury migrated into the environment. Deteriorating conditions of large post-operation mercury-use buildings may be contributing to additional releases. Mercury cleanup is a high priority for Y-12 and the Oak Ridge Reservation. UCOR is completing the final design on a new Mercury Treatment Facility with construction expected to begin in late 2017. When constructed the treatment facility will reduce the amount of mercury in local waters, lower environmental contamination levels and serve as a guard against future releases. (author)

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DOE OSTI2019

Development of the Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Idaho National Laboratory Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility - 19143

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been constructed, has received operational approval from the Department of Energy (DOE), and is expected to receive its first waste shipment in FY 2019. The RH LLW Disposal Facility will support the needs of INL and the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF). RH LLW destined for the facility includes waste currently in storage from previous programs and projects conducted at INL; newly generated waste from programs and projects conducted at INL; and waste from NRF spent fuel processing activities. This new facility supports RH LLW disposal needs for the ongoing mission of INL and NRF. Waste to be disposed of at the RH LLW Disposal Facility may exhibit dose rates that range from 0.002 Sv/hr to 600 Sv/hr. Waste types include resins and activated metals as well as surface-contaminated debris generated from existing and new missions. The total number of canisters currently planned for disposal at the RH LLW Disposal Facility is 939 with the possibility of future expansion. The projected waste volume to be disposed of is 3,100 m{sup 3}. The RH LLW Disposal Facility will receive a wide variety of RH LLW and is in preparations to receive its first canisters in FY 2019. Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and the radioactive waste management basis have been developed and implemented in accordance with the applicable DOE Order. In order to ensure that DOE requirements and guidance were appropriately implemented in the RH LLW Disposal Facility WAC, the project worked closely with the DOE Low Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (LFRG) representatives and followed the applicable DOE standard. This paper provides an overview of the development of the WAC, including waste and waste generator certification requirements, for the RH LLW Disposal Facility. The paper illustrates the importance of maintaining strong ties to the development and revision of the RH LLW Disposal Facility Performance Assessment (PA), Documented Safety Analysis, Facility Procedures, Readiness Reviews, DOE Order, and applicable Technical Standards. The paper also provides an overview of the RH LLW Disposal Facility, WAC generator certification requirements, distinctive challenges to acceptance of legacy waste, and the unique approach the RH LLW Disposal Facility has taken to ensure compliance with PA driven limits. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

The use of underground research facilities for the demonstration of safety of geological disposal - 15094

Many countries are progressing towards developing research programmes related to the development of geological disposal facilities and as part of these research programmes many countries have constructed or are planning to construct Underground Research Facilities (URFs). The development of the safety case for geological disposal facilities, which covers both the operational phase and the post-closure phase, is built on the acquisition and integration of all necessary data including data on the natural and engineered barriers, on the facility itself (design), on the operation of the disposal facility, and in the specific case of geological disposal facilities, the conditions at the depth of disposal relevant for both in-situ and waste emplacement states. Taking these conditions into account can make the demonstration of safety more complex and demanding than for near surface disposal facilities. Most if not all of the countries well advanced in the development of geological disposal facilities have also developed underground research facilities to support the decision processes within their disposal facility development programme. Underground Research Facilities play an essential role in the demonstration of safety of geological disposal facilities and a distinction has to be made between data acquired from surface based investigations and boreholes and those data and experiments carried out in-situ. The use of in-situ data contribute to build confidence in the demonstration of safety and contribute to public confidence and acceptance of geological disposal facilities. Further discussion will elaborate on whether to use the URF as part of a future disposal facility or not, with an emphasis on the transposition of data from the experimental site to the disposal site and how this is addressed and validated in the demonstration of safety. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

Transitioning from Construction to Startup for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's Low-Activity Waste Facility - 17284

The original design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) required all waste be processed through the Pretreatment (PT) Facility in order to separate the low-activity waste and high-level waste streams. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) has developed a sequenced approach to completing the WTP Project, beginning with delivering some liquid waste directly to the Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility, bypassing the PT Facility. This operating configuration is referred to as direct-feed LAW (DFLAW). The primary driver for the DFLAW approach is to enable startup and commissioning of the LAW Facility for low-activity waste processing prior to the completion and availability of the PT and High-Level Waste facilities. In March 2016, a federal judge amended the Consent Decree between DOE and the State of Washington to require completion of hot commissioning for the LAW Facility no later than December 31, 2023. During the next few years ORP and the WTP contractor will transition the project from completion of construction to the startup and commissioning phase for the LAW Facility and the associated support facilities. The WTP contractor has developed an integrated management process to successfully conduct facility startup testing for the WTP facilities required to support DFLAW. The WTP contractor will also develop a commissioning plan and facility transition plan. These plans will describe the strategy; schedule; and requirements for safe, efficient, and sequential startup, commissioning, and transfer of the WTP facilities to an operations contractor. The WTP contractor has also established a strategy to achieve operational readiness for the facilities required to support DFLAW consistent with DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities and DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. ORP has established a strategy for oversight of the WTP contractor's startup, commissioning, and readiness activities. The strategy also encompasses ORP's own activities to achieve readiness. (authors)

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NASA NTRS2003

Designing Facilities for Collaborative Operations

A methodology for designing operational facilities for collaboration by multiple experts has begun to take shape as an outgrowth of a project to design such facilities for scientific operations of the planned 2003 Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission. The methodology could also be applicable to the design of military "situation rooms" and other facilities for terrestrial missions. It was recognized in this project that modern mission operations depend heavily upon the collaborative use of computers. It was further recognized that tests have shown that layout of a facility exerts a dramatic effect on the efficiency and endurance of the operations staff. The facility designs (for example, see figure) and the methodology developed during the project reflect this recognition. One element of the methodology is a metric, called effective capacity, that was created for use in evaluating proposed MER operational facilities and may also be useful for evaluating other collaboration spaces, including meeting rooms and military situation rooms. The effective capacity of a facility is defined as the number of people in the facility who can be meaningfully engaged in its operations. A person is considered to be meaningfully engaged if the person can (1) see, hear, and communicate with everyone else present; (2) see the material under discussion (typically data on a piece of paper, computer monitor, or projection screen); and (3) provide input to the product under development by the group. The effective capacity of a facility is less than the number of people that can physically fit in the facility. For example, a typical office that contains a desktop computer has an effective capacity of .4, while a small conference room that contains a projection screen has an effective capacity of around 10. Little or no benefit would be derived from allowing the number of persons in an operational facility to exceed its effective capacity: At best, the operations staff would be underutilized; at worst, operational performance would deteriorate. Elements of this methodology were applied to the design of three operations facilities for a series of rover field tests. These tests were observed by human-factors researchers and their conclusions are being used to refine and extend the methodology to be used in the final design of the MER operations facility. Further work is underway to evaluate the use of personal digital assistant (PDA) units as portable input interfaces and communication devices in future mission operations facilities. A PDA equipped for wireless communication and Ethernet, Bluetooth, or another networking technology would cost less than a complete computer system, and would enable a collaborator to communicate electronically with computers and with other collaborators while moving freely within the virtual environment created by a shared immersive graphical display.

Norris, Jeffrey↗

DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Baseline Monitoring Data for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory

The purpose of this document is to summarize environmental monitoring data collected at the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility during the first four years of facility operations (FY 2019 through FY 2022). This summary provides a “baseline” condition for the facility, which can be used to distinguish contaminant releases from the RHLLW Disposal Facility from pre existing contamination as well as potential future releases from other sources (i.e., upgradient aquifer sources), as specified in the facility monitoring plan. Sufficient data has been collected over the first four years of operation of the RHLLW Disposal Facility to establish baseline conditions for future compliance monitoring of aquifer wells and performance monitoring of vadose zone lysimeters. Except for seven elevated tritium measurements from lysimeter HFEF-South believed to have been impacted by waste disposals, all data was deemed appropriate for establishing baseline concentrations. Monitoring of the aquifer detected indicator analytes gross alpha and gross beta and target analytes tritium and C-14. There were a few C-14 detections prior to an increase in the required detection level (RDL) after the first round of sampling. I-129 and Tc-99 were not detected above RDLs in aquifer samples. Lysimeter samples detected indicator analytes gross alpha and gross beta and target analyte tritium. Target analytes C-14, I-129, and Tc-99 were not detected above RDLs in lysimeter samples. Except for tritium, baseline concentrations of indicator and target analytes measured during the first four years of RHLLW facility operations are expected to represent conditions through the expected 20 year operating period of the facility. Elevated tritium in the aquifer, a result of past discharges of tritium at upgradient facilities, showed a decline over the first four years of operations, and levels are expected to continue to decline with time as a result of dilution and decay. Current tritium levels in lysimeter samples may be elevated due to tritium in the water applied during construction and infiltration testing of the facility. As a result, tritium concentrations in lysimeters may decline with time as a result of dilution and decay. Statistical measures (i.e., mean, standard deviation, and 99% upper confidence level [UCL]) were calculated for all detected analytes using the four years of concentration data. These measures will be used to evaluate future monitoring results and to demonstrate the facility is performing, or not performing, as established in the facility performance assessment (PA). Future monitoring results will also be combined with the baseline data in this report to further establish temporal trends and natural variability in the measurements. Based on the data collected during the baseline period, it is recommended the gross alpha action level for performance monitoring increase from 10 to 20 pCi/L due to several baseline measurements exceeding the preliminary action level of 10. An action level of 20 pCi/L is slightly greater than the 99% UCL, is protective of the aquifer, and would reduce unnecessary sampling. It is also recommended that tritium be added to the lysimeter analyte list for post-baseline period monitoring. Tritium, while not a dose concern, is a good tracer that can provide valuable information on water flow in and around the RHLLW Disposal Facility. Recommendations for a tritium action level are provided if considered necessary.

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DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Facility Informatics with GeoVisipedia (Final Report)

Characterization and understanding of nuclear fuel cycle facilities is of considerable interest to DNN R&D and the nonproliferation community due to their importance in nuclear weapons manufacture. Satellite imagery is a key source of information about these facilities, particularly in denied areas. Such imagery can be useful in its own right but annotations applied to the imagery vastly expand the value of the imagery and its usefulness by providing object descriptions, context and potentially linkages to other relevant information. GeoVisipedia (Geospatial Visual Wikipedia) is a new and novel approach to collecting, organizing, sharing and preserving knowledge about nuclear facilities to support nonproliferation efforts. Our approach is unique in that it emphasizes geospatial visual information about nuclear facilities rather than focusing exclusively on textual information. GeoVisipedia users, such as all-source analysts and decision makers, have access to richly annotated nuclear facility imagery with hyperlinks to visual and textual information that provides users with details and context about the facility. A major accomplishment of this project was to develop technology that allows annotations from one satellite image of a facility to be propagated to other satellite imagery of the facility. New satellite imagery of the facility is automatically populated with all previous annotations of the facility. This technology breakthrough provides users with the annotations, and hence knowledge and insight, from all the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who have previously annotated imagery of the facility. This capability was demonstrated in a GeoVisipedia prototype, awarded a patent and is described in several publications. In the latter part of the project an informal collaboration was established with the DNN R&D Multi Informatics for Nuclear Operations Scenarios (MINOS) venture. A second prototype of GeoVisipedia was developed that directly supports the MINOS venture. This prototype is called the Nuclear Facility Information Explorer (NFIX) and is tailored to the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) facility, a testbed for the MINOS venture. NFIX downloads sensor metadata and operator logs, parses and displays this information. NFIX has been licensed and deployed to several laboratories participating in the MINOS venture.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Survey of U.S. Research Reactor Auxiliary Facilities Used for Material Testing and Basic Neutron Science

A catalogue of and attributes of the Materials Irradiation and Testing facilities (MIF) and the Basic Neutron Science facilities (BSF) of auxiliary (AUX) facilities of research reactors are compiled. The survey of these facilities is drawn from the set of U.S. university and DOE research reactor facilities and should be considered as a reference point when comparing commonalities in international AUX facilities. The size and shielding capabilities of the facilities, the typical characterization equipment used, and the neutron flux and irradiation capabilities of the facilities are listed. Short descriptions of experimental activities and current practices are detailed for MIFs and BSFs. The attributes are important in consideration of the reconfiguration of the facilities for purposes other than stated mission, i.e., for proliferation of weapons-usable nuclear material (WUNM). An evaluation of the capacity for production rate of WUNM from neutron beams-on-targets or a sample that has been placed in an irradiation position for a period is provided. Further evaluation of reconfiguration of these MIF and BSF are recommended to refine the proliferation risks. Specifically, MIF hot cells and potential configurations, additional modeling of facility throughput and development of methods for determining levels of concern for MIF and BSF have all been identified as steps for refinement of determination of the risks associated with these facilities. Future work will focus on: 1. A model of projected throughput for different MIF and BSF configurations that will be used to provide a window of potential operational misuse for a facility and better understand the capability of production and the rate of processing for WUNM in these facilities. 2. A misuse study for various configurations of MIF hot cell layouts detailing capacity, specifications, shielding constraints for MIF operations, identification of a maximum shielding thickness, and reasonable need associated with each activity performed in a MIF. 3. Development of a rule of thumb rating system utilizing data gathered from previous reports to show levels of concern at a given power level, flux, and experiment set.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS1993

Research and test facilities

A description is given of each of the following Langley research and test facilities: 0.3-Meter Transonic Cryogenic Tunnel, 7-by 10-Foot High Speed Tunnel, 8-Foot Transonic Pressure Tunnel, 13-Inch Magnetic Suspension & Balance System, 14-by 22-Foot Subsonic Tunnel, 16-Foot Transonic Tunnel, 16-by 24-Inch Water Tunnel, 20-Foot Vertical Spin Tunnel, 30-by 60-Foot Wind Tunnel, Advanced Civil Transport Simulator (ACTS), Advanced Technology Research Laboratory, Aerospace Controls Research Laboratory (ACRL), Aerothermal Loads Complex, Aircraft Landing Dynamics Facility (ALDF), Avionics Integration Research Laboratory, Basic Aerodynamics Research Tunnel (BART), Compact Range Test Facility, Differential Maneuvering Simulator (DMS), Enhanced/Synthetic Vision & Spatial Displays Laboratory, Experimental Test Range (ETR) Flight Research Facility, General Aviation Simulator (GAS), High Intensity Radiated Fields Facility, Human Engineering Methods Laboratory, Hypersonic Facilities Complex, Impact Dynamics Research Facility, Jet Noise Laboratory & Anechoic Jet Facility, Light Alloy Laboratory, Low Frequency Antenna Test Facility, Low Turbulence Pressure Tunnel, Mechanics of Metals Laboratory, National Transonic Facility (NTF), NDE Research Laboratory, Polymers & Composites Laboratory, Pyrotechnic Test Facility, Quiet Flow Facility, Robotics Facilities, Scientific Visualization System, Scramjet Test Complex, Space Materials Research Laboratory, Space Simulation & Environmental Test Complex, Structural Dynamics Research Laboratory, Structural Dynamics Test Beds, Structures & Materials Research Laboratory, Supersonic Low Disturbance Pilot Tunnel, Thermal Acoustic Fatigue Apparatus (TAFA), Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT), Transport Systems Research Vehicle, Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel, and the Visual Motion Simulator (VMS).

Source record↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)

NASA, in partnership with the European Space Agency (ESA), is seeking to return Martian geological and atmospheric samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Due to the possibility that the samples could contain extraterrestrial life, Mars Sample Return (MSR) is classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return mission by the NASA Planetary Protection Office. As a result of this classification, a MSR Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) must not only provide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence) to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized. The nominal utilization period for a SRF is anticipated to be 2-5 years and is intended to enable curation activities, biohazard assessment, select early science activities, and the rapid release of samples to the scientific community. However, to account for possible delays in schedule or the identification of extant life, this anticipated period of time must be flexible to accommodate schedule extensions and contingency plans. Due to requirements for high-level biological containment and cleanliness, a traditional receiving/curation facility cannot be utilized for MSR. Therefore, beginning in 2022, NASA Johnson Space Center is performing a MSR SRF Assessment Study (MSAS) to investigate the most optimal facility modality for a MSR SRF, as well as start to define programmatic early estimate of costs and schedules before the initial design phase begins. NASA is partnering with industry contractors (architectural and engineering firms with BSL-4 and cleanroom technology experience, as well as other contracted infrastructure and construction specialists) along with selected experts from NASA, ESA, existing U.S. BSL-4 facilities, and other U.S. government agencies, to carry out the assessment study. The MSAS should also aid in the future refinement of the science requirements (e.g., contamination control, equipment accommodations) before site-specific design would commence. As part of the MSAS, NASA is planning to assess an array of possibilities for a MSR SRF. One of the main considerations is the facility modality and whether an existing BSL-4 facility can be utilized (for some or all functions); or, if new constructure would be required, would a traditional fixed facility or a modular facility the best choice. MSAS will also investigate the ability of the modalities to accommodate two different facility capability endmembers: 1) a minimal facility focusing on biohazard assessment and curation tasks with a small footprint, and 2) an enhanced facility with additional capabilities to enable expedited processing and the completion of time-sensitive and (some) sterilization-sensitive science. The assessment is intended to generate information that will inform the selection of facility modalities for high-level conceptual design development. While the assessment study will focus on SRF requirements for accommodating curation, science, and sample safety assessment infrastructure, it will also consider an array of other factors, such as ease of access for international users, decommissioning, repurposing, future sale or lease following MSR’s use of the facility, and uncontained preparatory laboratory spaces. Upon completion of the study, the preferred modality and refined requirements would be utilized for site-specific design but will not be finalized until NASA’s completion of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

A.D. Harrington↗

DOE OSTI2017

Optically-based Sensor System for Critical Nuclear Facilities Post-Event Seismic Structural Assessment

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has ownership and operational responsibility for a large enterprise of nuclear facilities that provide essential functions to DOE missions ranging from national security to discovery science and energy research. These facilities support a number of DOE programs and offices including the National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Science, and Office of Environmental Management. With many unique and “one of a kind” functions, these facilities represent a tremendous national investment, and assuring their safety and integrity is fundamental to the success of a breadth of DOE programs. Many DOE critical facilities are located in regions with significant natural phenomenon hazards including major earthquakes and DOE has been a leader in developing standards for the seismic analysis of nuclear facilities. Attaining and sustaining excellence in nuclear facility design and management must be a core competency of the DOE. An important part of nuclear facility management is the ability to monitor facilities and rapidly assess the response and integrity of the facilities after any major upset event. Experience in the western U.S. has shown that understanding facility integrity after a major earthquake is a significant challenge which, lacking key data, can require extensive effort and significant time. In the work described in the attached report, a transformational approach to earthquake monitoring of facilities is described and demonstrated. An entirely new type of optically-based sensor that can directly and accurately measure the earthquake-induced deformations of a critical facility has been developed and tested. This report summarizes large-scale shake table testing of the sensor concept on a representative steel frame building structure, and provides quantitative data on the accuracy of the sensor measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2019

Natural and Engineered Features Supporting Environmental Performance of Idaho National Laboratory’s Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

The Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated at the INL site in support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. The facility has been designed to receive legacy RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW to be received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated debris; ion exchange resins used to purify cooling and canal water; activated metals generated during reactor core change outs and Naval spent fuel management; and nuclear Research & Development. Disposal of INL's RH LLW poses unique disposal challenges due to high radiation levels (contact rates up to 600 Sv/hr [60,000 Rem/hr]) that require remote handling and adequate shielding for transportation and disposal. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 [1], including the all-pathways dose, air pathway dose, inadvertent intruder doses, and radon emissions limits. This paper presents an overview of natural and engineered design features that support the safety case and enhance the environmental performance of the facility. These include location selection, use of reinforced pre-cast concrete vaults; a robust hydraulic drainage system; use of steel waste canisters for waste disposal; the facility monitoring system; facility layout; and crediting waste forms. The facility performance assessment (PA) [2] developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 “Radioactive Waste Management” credits each of these protective features. Releases from waste forms disposed of at this facility are limited by corrosion of the steel waste canisters which will ultimately allow contact with infiltrating water followed by transport of radionuclides from the vault system. The steel waste canisters were credited for their ability to limit water contact with the waste based on the demonstrated ability of the reinforced pre-caste concrete vaults to provide long-term structural protection of the steel waste canisters. Verification of hydraulic and concrete performance was conducted through laboratory data, field infiltration tests supported by a robust monitoring system, and numerical modeling. Releases into the vault system from activated metals are based on site-specific corrosion data. Radionuclide transport from the vault system from all waste forms is based on site-specific climatological, hydrologic, and stratigraphic data. At INL, the groundwater pathway historically and appropriately has received the most attention. By crediting aspects of the natural system, the engineered vault system, and the waste, estimated radiologic doses via the groundwater pathway are minimal. Air pathway doses were reduced by differentially crediting corrosion of aluminum and stainless steel activated metals resulting in the pathway being screened out of the PA. Groundwater and inadvertent intruder doses were reduced through selective facility layout. This paper provides an overview of the system-wide protective features incorporated into the facility design along with an extensive reference list to supporting technical papers and analyses that provide data and interpretation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Natural and Engineered Features Supporting Environmental Performance of Idaho National Laboratory's Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility - 19436

The Idaho National Laboratory's (INL's) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated at the INL site in support of the US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. The facility has been designed to receive legacy RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW to be received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated materials; ion exchange resins used to purify cooling and canal water; and activated metal components generated during reactor core change outs and Naval spent fuel management; and nuclear R and D. Disposal of INL's RH LLW poses unique disposal challenges due to high radiation levels (contact rates up to 600 Sv/hr [60,000 Rem/hr]) that require remote handling and adequate shielding for transportation and disposal. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, including the all-pathways dose, air pathway dose, inadvertent intruder doses, and radon emissions limits. This paper presents an overview of natural and engineered design features that support the safety case and enhance the environmental performance of the facility. These features include location selection, use of reinforced pre-cast concrete vaults; a robust hydraulic drainage system; use of steel waste canisters for waste disposal; the facility monitoring system; facility layout; and crediting waste forms. The facility performance assessment (PA) developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, credits each of these protective features. Releases from waste forms disposed of at this facility are limited by corrosion of the steel waste canisters which will ultimately allow contact with infiltrating water followed by transport of radionuclides from the vault system. The steel waste canisters were credited for their ability to limit water contact with the waste based on the demonstrated ability of the reinforced pre-caste concrete vaults to provide long-term structural protection of the steel waste canisters. Verification of hydraulic and concrete performance was conducted through laboratory data, field infiltration tests supported by a robust monitoring system, and numerical modeling. Releases into the vault system from activated metals are based on site-specific corrosion data. Radionuclide transport from the vault system from all waste forms is based on site-specific climatological, hydrologic, and stratigraphic data. At INL, the groundwater pathway historically and appropriately has received the most attention. By crediting aspects of the natural system, the engineered vault system, and the waste, estimated radiologic doses via the groundwater pathway are minimal. Air pathway doses were reduced by differentially crediting corrosion of aluminum and stainless steel activated metals resulting in the pathway being screened out of the PA. Groundwater and inadvertent intruder doses were reduced through selective facility layout. This paper provides an overview of the system-wide protective features incorporated into the facility design along with an extensive reference list to supporting technical papers and analyses that provide data and interpretation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗