Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “atomization energy”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 325 records · Page 18

Case Study: Iran, Islam, the NPT, and the Bomb

The goals of this case study are: (1) To examine the correlation between Iran's nuclear program and clerical statements; (2) To evaluate the importance of these statements; (3) To understand the relationship between policy and fatwas (Islamic decrees); (4) To address the issue of a 'nuclear fatwa'; and (5) To examine how, if at all, Sharia (Islamic law) has influenced Iran's actions or inactions with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran's adherence to its IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol. The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) is one of two theocracies in the world, the second being Vatican City. Iran's government derives its constitutional, moral, and political legitimacy from Islam. As a result of this theocratic culture, rules are set and interpreted with a much different calibrator than that of the Western world. Islam affects all aspects of Iranian life. This is further complicated by the fact that Islam is not a nationalistic faith, in that many people all over the world believe in and adhere to Islamic principles. As a result, a political system that derives much of its fervor from being nationalistic is caught between two worlds, one within the land boundaries of Iran and the other within a faith that transcends boundaries. Thus, any understanding of Islamic law must first be understood within this delicate balance of nationalism and transcendence. Iran has found itself on the international stage concerning its nuclear program. Because Iran is a theocratic state, it is imperative to examine its political moves, speeches, rights, and obligations through the lens of Islam. This study will examine how Islam plays a role in Iran's dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its understanding of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including parties obligations under Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol, and also provide a recommendation on how to move forward in dealings with Iran based in part on an understanding of Islamic principles.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Developments in the Regulatory Framework of Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in Germany - 17374

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license, granted by the competent authority in this field, which has been the Federal Office of Radiation Protection (BfS) until July 2016 and currently is the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE). A first license was granted in 1983 for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified high level waste (HAW) at the interim storage facility in Gorleben. This license was reviewed in 1995. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its current form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since that time at each site of an operational NPP storage facilities were licensed and erected. Thus additionally to the three central storage facilities (Ahaus, Gorleben and Rubenow) there are now 12 storage facilities onsite the NPPs. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic dual purpose casks (DPCs). The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years after closing the transport and storage cask. The first license to expire will be the storage license for the interim storage facility in Gorleben in the year 2034. The German 'Programme for the safe and responsible management of spent fuel and radioactive waste' expects to take the disposal facility into operation in the year 2050. Thus necessary preparations for interim storage till that time have to be taken on the side of the regulator. In the German Atomic Energy Act precautions have already been taken and a consulting of the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory if inevitable events would require an extension of currently licensed interim storage period. In the year 2016, the regulatory body in Germany was given a new structure. The BfS was formerly competent authority in the field of radiation protection since 1989. It had competencies for ionizing and non-ionizing radiation protection (e.g. mobile phone radiation, high voltage power lines and the effects of electric fields), licensing storage of spent nuclear fuel and as the operator of facilities for final disposal. Now there is a new structure with two Federal Offices (BfS and BfE) and a federal company for final disposal (BGE). The BfE is responsible for regulation in the field of nuclear disposal since 30.07.2016. So the package design approval for DPCs and the storage licenses for SNF are now granted by this office. The search for a repository site will be coordinated there as well. The site selection, construction and operation of the repository will be in the responsibility of BGE. The parts of the former BfS dealing with recovery of the waste from Asse (a former salt mine used for disposal research) and the construction of the repository Konrad (for low and medium level radioactive waste) will be transferred into that company. It is planned to incorporate the German company for construction and management of waste disposal facilities (DBE) which is owned by the German utilities as well. The BfS will focus on the scientific foundations and further advancement of radiation protection. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to build confidence in the State System. Viewed from this perspective, the model can be thought of as a quality assurance tool that assists states in ensuring that the outputs of their State System (the tangible 'goods' that are provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the State's agreements) are of high quality. As such, this tool is for the internal use of a State System that wishes to assess and improve its capacity. It is not intended for comparison or outside evaluation. In addition to providing a self-assessment tool, INSEP expects this model to be useful in several other ways: it will inform the approach that INSEP uses in bilateral consultations to identify areas where INSEP outreach and training may be of value, and it will provide a structure for its training curriculum. It will help INSEP to evaluate the effectiveness of its outreach - where there are gaps in the training provided, and whether the training that is provided meets its stated objectives. Finally, it will provide a framework for coordinating with the IAEA and other member states in the 'harmonization' efforts currently underway to align the outreach efforts of states that provide safeguards training. This paper describes the process of evaluation that INSEP is developing. It looks at the expected usefulness of the metrics for conducting self-assessments and joint assessments and enabling partners to identify training needs. The paper begins with a description of various performance requirements that define what must be done at the state and facility level to implement effective and efficient international safeguards. Next, technical performance measures are discussed, that define how well a state and its facilities are fulfilling these requirements. Then a functional analysis is conducted to align the technical requirements with competencies and determine who should carry out the various activities necessary to fulfill the performance requirements. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion about SEP's approach in applying the metrics to its outreach activities intended to help countries to implement high-functioning SSACs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Recommended Nuclear Data for the Production of Selected Therapeutic Radionuclides

Increasing interest in the treatment of human disease by means of targeted radionuclide-based therapies requires an accurate understanding of achievable yields and quantification of realisable degrees of purity. Important studies within a more extensive Coordinated Research Project of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA CRP) have included in-depth assessments and evaluations of all available measured cross-section data for ten nuclear reactions leading to the formation of 131 Cs, 131 Ba, 225 Ac, 225 Ra, 227 Th, 227 Ac, 230 U and 230 Pa for various on-going and proposed therapeutic applications in nuclear medicine. Equivalent studies were also undertaken of possible reactions to produce the 178W /low-spin 178m Ta generator system that has been clinically applied in diagnosis by means of SPECT - these particular cross-section studies and recommendations are included in this paper for completeness. All available measured data have been critically reviewed and assessed to produce statistically consistent datasets. Selected datasets have been fitted by a least-squares method with Padé approximations of variable order to evaluate the production cross sections and corresponding uncertainties. New measurements have been made in some instances, and reported data have been adjusted to accommodate new nuclear decay or monitor reaction data which altered the original reported quantities adversely. Insufficient measured data are available in many cases to permit a reliable evaluation of cross sections, and these instances are discussed. Finally, recommended therapeutic radionuclide production reaction data and their uncertainties are available on the Web page of the IAEA Nuclear Data Section at www-nds.iaea.org/radionuclides/ and also at the IAEA medical portal www-nds.iaea.org/medportal/.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Initial measurements of BN-350 spent fuel in dry storage casks using the dual slab verification detonator

The Dual Slab Verification Detector (DSVD) has been developed, built, and characterized by Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as part of the dry storage safeguards system for the spent fuel from the BN-350 fast reactor. The detector consists of two rows of 3He tubes embedded in a slab of polyethylene which has been designed to be placed on the outer surface of the dry storage cask. By performing DSVD measurements at several different locations around the outer surface of the DUC, a signature 'fingerprint' can be established for each DUC based on the neutron flux emanating from inside the dry storage cask. The neutron fingerprint for each individual DUC will be dependent upon the spatial distribution of nuclear material within the cask, thus making it sensitive to the removal of a certain amount of material from the cask. An initial set of DSVD measurements have been performed on the first set of dry storage casks that have been loaded with canisters of spent fuel and moved onto the dry storage pad to both establish an initial fingerprint for these casks as well as to quantify systematic uncertainties associated with these measurements. The results from these measurements will be presented and compared with the expected results that were determined based on MCNPX simulations of the dry storage facility. The ability to safeguard spent nuclear fuel is strongly dependent on the technical capabilities of establishing and maintaining continuity of knowledge (COK) of the spent fuel as it is released from the reactor core and either reprocessed or packaged and stored at a storage facility. While the maintenance of COK is often done using continuous containment and surveillance (C/S) on the spent fuel, it is important that the measurement capabilities exist to re-establish the COK in the event of a significant gap in the continuous CIS by performing measurements that independently confirm the presence and content of Plutonium (Pu) in the spent fuel. The types of non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements that can be performed on the spent fuel are strongly dependent on the type of spent fuel that is being safeguarded as well as the location in which the spent fuel is being stored. The BN-350 Spent Fuel Disposition Project was initiated to improve the safeguards and security of the spent nuclear fuel from the BN-350 fast-breeder reactor and was developed cooperatively to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the terms of the 1993 CTR and MPC&A Implementing Agreements. The unique characteristics of fuel from the BN-350 fast-breeder reactor have allowed for the development of an integrated safeguards measurement program to inventory, monitor, and if necessary, re-verify Pu content of the spent fuel throughout the lifetime of the project. This approach includes the development of a safeguards measurement program to establish and maintain the COK on the spent fuel during the repackaging and eventual relocation of the spent-fuel assemblies to a long-term storage site. As part of the safeguards measurement program, the Pu content of every spent-fuel assembly from the BN-350 reactor was directly measured and characterized while the spent-fuel assemblies were being stored in the spent-fuel pond at the BN-350 facility using the Spent Fuel Coincidence Counter (SFCC). Upon completion of the initial inventory of the Pu content of the individual spent-fuel assemblies, the assemblies were repackaged into welded steel canisters that were filled with inert argon gas and held either four or six individual spent-fuel assemblies depending on the type of assembly that was being packaged. This repackaging of the spent-fuel assemblies was performed in order to improve the stability of the spent-fuel assemblies for long-term storage and increase the proliferation resistance of the spent fuel. To maintain the capability of verifying the presence of the spent-fuel assemblies inside the welded steel canisters, measurements were performed on the canisters using the Spent Fuel Attribute Monitor (SPAM), which was a neutron coincidence counter very similar in design to the SFCC, but with a larger operational volume to accommodate the canisters. The analysis of the neutron coincidence data from the measurements of the welded steel canisters using SP AM yielded a Canister Attribute (CA) that was shown to be proportional to the total amount of Pu mass that was present inside the canister and comparable to the CA values that were calculated based on the previous SFCC measurements. The next step in securing the spent fuel from the BN-350 reactor is the packaging of the steel canisters into Dual-Use Casks (DUCs) and the transportation of the DUCs to a remote dry storage site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Seismic Fragility Analysis of a Degraded Condensate Storage Tank

The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Brookhaven National Laboratory are conducting a collaborative research project to develop seismic capability evaluation technology for degraded structures and components in nuclear power plants (NPPs). One of the goals of this collaboration endeavor is to develop seismic fragility analysis methods that consider the potential effects of age-related degradation of structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The essential part of this collaboration is aimed at achieving a better understanding of the effects of aging on the performance of SSCs and ultimately on the safety of NPPs. A recent search of the degradation occurrences of structures and passive components (SPCs) showed that the rate of aging related degradation in NPPs was not significantly large but increasing, as the plants get older. The slow but increasing rate of degradation of SPCs can potentially affect the safety of the older plants and become an important factor in decision making in the current trend of extending the operating license period of the plants (e.g., in the U.S. from 40 years to 60 years, and even potentially to 80 years). The condition and performance of major aged NPP structures such as the containment contributes to the life span of a plant. A frequent misconception of such low degradation rate of SPCs is that such degradation may not pose significant risk to plant safety. However, under low probability high consequence initiating events, such as large earthquakes, SPCs that have slowly degraded over many years could potentially affect plant safety and these effects need to be better understood. As part of the KAERI-BNL collaboration, a condensate storage tank (CST) was analyzed to estimate its seismic fragility capacities under various postulated degradation scenarios. CSTs were shown to have a significant impact on the seismic core damage frequency of a nuclear power plant. The seismic fragility capacity of the CST was developed for five cases: (1) a baseline analysis where the design condition (undegraded) is assumed, (2) a scenario with degraded stainless steel tank shell, (3) a scenario with degraded anchor bolts, (4) a scenario with anchorage concrete cracking, and (5) a perfect correlation of the above three degradation scenarios. This paper will present the methodology for the time-dependent fragility calculation and discuss the insights drawn from this study. To achieve a better understanding of the effects of aging on the performance of structures and passive components (SPCs) in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) are collaborating to develop seismic fragility analysis methods that consider age-related degradation of SPCs. The rate of age-related degradation of SPCs was not found to be significantly large, but increasing as the plants get older. The slow but increasing rate of degradation of SPCs can potentially affect the safety of the older plants and become an important factor in decision making in the current trend of extending the operating license period of the plants (e.g., in the U.S. from 40 years to 60 years, and even potentially to 80 years). In this paper, a condensate storage tank (CST) was analyzed to estimate its seismic fragility capacities under various postulated degradation scenarios. This paper will present the methodology for the time-dependent fragility calculation and discuss the insights drawn from this study.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Bimetallic Cobalt-Based Phosphide Zeolitic Imidazolate Framework: CoP x Phase-Dependent Electrical Conductivity and Hydrogen Atom Adsorption Energy for Efficient Overall Water Splitting

Cobalt-based bimetallic phosphide encapsulated in carbonized zeolitic imadazolate frameworks has been successfully synthesized and showed excellent activities toward both hydrogen evolution reaction (HER) and oxygen evolution reaction (OER). Density functional theory calculation and electrochemical measurements reveal that the electrical conductivity and electrochemical activity are closely associated with the Co2P/CoP mixed phase behaviors upon Cu metal doping. This relationship is found to be the decisive factor for enhanced electrocatalytic performance. Moreover, the precise control of Cu content in Co-host lattice effectively alters the Gibbs free energy for H* adsorption, which is favorable for facilitating reaction kinetics. Impressively, an optimized performance has been achieved with mild Cu doping in Cu0.3Co2.7P/nitrogen-doped carbon (NC) which exhibits an ultralow overpotential of 0.19 V at 10 mA cm–2 and satisfying stability for OER. Cu0.3Co2.7P/NC also shows excellent HER activity, affording a current density of 10 mA cm–2 at a low overpotential of 0.22 V. In addition, a homemade electrolyzer with Cu0.3Co2.7P/NC paired electrodes shows 60% larger current density than Pt/ RuO2 couple at 1.74 V, along with negligible catalytic deactivation after 50 h operation. The manipulation of electronic structure by controlled incorporation of second metal sheds light on understanding and synthesizing bimetallic transition metal phosphides for electrolysis-based energy conversion.

Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory↗

Response of a uniformly accelerated detector to massless Rarita–Schwinger fields in vacuum

We study the response of a uniformly accelerated detector modeled by a two-level atom nonlinearly coupled to vacuum massless Rarita–Schwinger fields. We first generalize the formalism developed by Dalibard, Dupont-Roc, and Cohen-Tannoudji in the linear coupling case, and we then calculate the mean rate of change of the atomic energy of the accelerated atom. Our result shows that a uniformly accelerated atom in its ground state interacting with vacuum Rarita–Schwinger field fluctuations would spontaneously transition to an excited state and the unique feature in contrast to the case of the atom coupled to the scalar, electromagnetic and Dirac fields is the appearance of terms in the excitation rate which are proportional to the sixth and eighth powers of acceleration. - Highlights: • We study the response of an accelerated detector to Rarita–Schwinger fields. • Detector spontaneously transitions to an excited state in vacuum. • Excitation rate contains terms of the sixth and eighth powers of acceleration.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

An analysis of the influence of impurities on fast particle attenuation and on fast ion spectral shape in LHD

Neutral particle fluxes measured by neutral particle analyzers can provide information about the ion temperature as well as the non-Maxwellian anisotropic ion distribution tails from neutral beam injection and ion cyclotron radio frequency heating. In the case of multidirectional diagnostics employing high resolution atomic energy spectrometers, the neutral atomic flux source is not localized in contrast to pellet charge exchange or diagnostic neutral beam methods. The correct interpretation of such measurements from plasma in a complex toroidally asymmetric geometry, like that of LHD, requires careful numerical modeling of the neutral flux formation. Previously a measured neutral flux calculation scheme was developed and was used for the LHD geometry and a suitable analytic expression for ionization cross sections {sigma}{sub s}{sup (z)}(E,n{sub e},T{sub e},Z{sub eff}) of impurities was formulated by Janev et al. [Nucl. Fusion 29, 2125 (1989)]. In this paper, the attenuation of fast particles by impurities is incorporated into the neutral flux calculation scheme and the influence of impurities on the calculated neutral flux spectra is shown. Finally, the behavior of the calculated and experimental suprathermal particle distributions is compared for pure hydrogen and for argon impurity seeded plasmas.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Long plasma duration operation analyses with an international multi-machine (tokamaks and stellarators) database

Combined high-fusion performance and long-pulse operation is one of the key integration challenges for fusion energy development in magnetic devices. Addressing these challenges requires an integrated vision of physics and engineering aspects with the purpose of simultaneously increasing time duration and fusion performance. Significant progress has been made in tokamaks and stellarators, including very recent achievement in duration and/or performance. This progress is reviewed by analyzing the experimental data (109 plasma pulses with a total of 3200 data points, i.e. on average 29 data per pulse) provided by ten tokamaks (in alphabetical order: Axially Symmetric Divertor Experiment Upgrade, DIII-D, Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak, Joint European Torus, JT-60 Upgrade, Korea Superconducting Tokamak Advanced Research, tokamak à configuration variable, Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor, Tore Supra, W Environment in Steady-State Tokamak) and two stellarators (Large Helical Device and Wendelstein 7-X) expanding the pioneering work of Kikuchi (Kikuchi M. and Azumi M. 2015 Frontiers in Fusion Research II: Introduction to Modern Tokamak Physics (Springer)). Data have been gathered up to January 2022 and coordination has been provided by the recently created International Energy Agency-International Atomic Energy Agency international Coordination on International Challenges on Long duration OPeration group. By exploiting the multi-machine international database, recent progress in terms of injected energies (e.g. 1730 MJ in L-mode, 425 MJ in H-mode), durations (1056 s in L-mode, 101 s in H-mode), injected powers, and sustained performance will be reviewed. Progress has been made to sustain long-pulse operation in tokamaks and stellarators with superconducting coils, actively cooled components, and/or with metallic walls. The graph of the fusion triple products as a function of duration shows a dramatic reduction of, at least two orders of magnitude when increasing the plasma duration from less than 1 s to 100 s. Indeed, long-pulse operation is usually reached in dominant electron-heating modes at reduced density (current drive optimization) but with low ion temperatures ranging from 1 to 3 keV for discharges above 100 s. Difficulties in extending the duration may arise from coupling high heating powers over long durations and the evolving plasma-wall interaction towards an unstable operational domain. Possible causes limiting the duration and critical issues to be addressed prior to ITER operation and DEMO design are reported and analyzed.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Identifying different stacking sequences in few-layer CVD-grown Mo S 2 by low-energy atomic-resolution scanning transmission electron microscopy

We present that atomically thin MoS 2 grown by chemical vapor deposition (CVD) is a promising candidate for next-generation electronics due to inherent CVD scalability and controllability. However, it is well known that the stacking sequence in few-layer MoS 2 can significantly impact electrical and optical properties. Herein we report different intrinsic stacking sequences in CVD-grown few-layer MoS 2 obtained by atomic-resolution annular-dark-field imaging in an aberration-corrected scanning transmission electron microscope operated at 50 keV. Trilayer MoS 2 displays a new stacking sequence distinct from the commonly observed 2H and 3R phases of MoS 2 . Finally, density functional theory is used to examine the stability of different stacking sequences, and the findings are consistent with our experimental observations.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

2012 Radiological Monitoring Results Associated with the Advanced Test Reactor Complex Cold Waste Pond

This report summarizes radiological monitoring performed of the Idaho National Laboratory Site’s Advanced Test Reactor Complex Cold Waste wastewater prior to discharge into the Cold Waste Pond and of specific groundwater monitoring wells associated with the Industrial Wastewater Reuse Permit (#LA-000161-01, Modification B). All radiological monitoring is performed to fulfill Department of Energy requirements under the Atomic Energy Act.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗