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Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report for 2009

The Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report is prepared animally and presents summary environmental data to (1) characterize environmental performance, (2) summarize environmental occurrences reported during the year, (3) confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements, and (4) highlight significant program activities. The report fulfills the requirement contained in DOE Order 231.1 A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting (DOE 2004) that an integrated annual site environmental report be prepared. The results summarized in this report are based on data collected prior to and through 2009. This report is not intended to nor does it present the results of all environmental monitoring associated with the ORR. Data collected for other site and regulatory purposes, such as environmental restoration/remedial investigation reports, waste management characterization sampling data, and environmental permit compliance data, are presented in other documents that have been prepared in accordance with applicable DOE guidance and/or laws and are referenced herein as appropriate. Appendix A to this report identifies corrections to the 2008 report. Appendix B contains a glossary of technical terms that may be useful for understanding the terminology used in this document. Environmental monitoring on the ORR consists primarily of two major activities: effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance. Effluent monitoring involves the collection and analysis of samples or measurements of liquid and gaseous effluents at the points of release to the environment; these measurements allow the quantification and official reporting of contaminant levels, assessment of radiation and chemical exposures to the public, and demonstration of compliance with applicable standards and permit requirements. Environmental surveillance consists of direct measurements and collection and analysis of samples taken from the site and its environs exclusive of effluents; these activities provide information on contaminant concentrations in air, water, groundwater, soil, foods, biota, and other media. Environmental surveillance data support determinations regarding environmental compliance and, when combined with data from effluent monitoring, support chemical and radiation dose and exposure assessments regarding the potential effects of ORR operations, if any, on the local environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Assessment of the 3430 Building Filtered Exhaust Stack Sampling Probe Location

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory performed a demonstration to determine the acceptable location in which to place an air sampling probe for emissions monitoring for radionuclides in the exhaust air discharge from the new 3430 Building Filtered Exhaust Stack. The method was to adopt the results of a previously performed test series for a system of similar configuration, followed by a partial test on the actual system to verify the applicability of previously performed tests. The qualification criteria included 1) a uniform air velocity, 2) an average flow angle that does not deviate from the axis of the duct by more than 20°, 3) a uniform concentration of tracer gases, and 4) a uniform concentration of tracer particles. Section 1 provides background information for the demonstration, and Section 2 describes the test strategy, including the criteria for the applicability of model results and the test matrix. Section 3 describes the flow -angle test and the velocity uniformity test, Section 4 provides the test results, and Section 5 provides the conclusions. Appendix A includes the test data sheets, and Appendix B gives applicable qualification results from the previously tested model stack. The data from the previously tested and similarly designed stack was demonstrated to be applicable to the current design for the 3430 Building Filtered Exhaust Stack. The 3430 stack was tested in both January and May of 2010 to document the results of several changes that were made to the exhaust system after the January tests. The 3430 stack meets the qualification criteria given in the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society N13.1 standard. Changes to the system configuration or operations outside of the bounds of this report (e.g., exhaust velocity increases, relocation of sample probe) will require retesting/reevaluation to determine compliancewith the requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Thermal properties for the thermal-hydraulics analyses of the BR2 maximum nominal heat flux.

This memo describes the assumptions and references used in determining the thermal properties for the various materials used in the BR2 HEU (93% enriched in {sup 235}U) to LEU (19.75% enriched in {sup 235}U) conversion feasibility analysis. More specifically, this memo focuses on the materials contained within the pressure vessel (PV), i.e., the materials that are most relevant to the study of impact of the change of fuel from HEU to LEU. This section is regrouping all of the thermal property tables. Section 2 provides a summary of the thermal properties in form of tables while the following sections present the justification of these values. Section 3 presents a brief background on the approach used to evaluate the thermal properties of the dispersion fuel meat and specific heat capacity. Sections 4 to 7 discuss the material properties for the following materials: (i) aluminum, (ii) dispersion fuel meat (UAlx-Al and U-7Mo-Al), (iii) beryllium, and (iv) stainless steel. Section 8 discusses the impact of irradiation on material properties. Section 9 summarizes the material properties for typical operating temperatures. Appendix A elaborates on how to calculate dispersed phase's volume fraction. Appendix B shows the evolution of the BR2 maximum heat flux with burnup.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Optical Basicity and Nepheline Crystallization in High Alumina Glasses

The purpose of this study was to find compositions that increase waste loading of high-alumina wastes beyond what is currently acceptable while avoiding crystallization of nepheline (NaAlSiO4) on slow cooling. Nepheline crystallization has been shown to have a large impact on the chemical durability of high-level waste glasses. It was hypothesized that there would be some composition regions where high-alumina would not result in nepheline crystal production, compositions not currently allowed by the nepheline discriminator. Optical basicity (OB) and the nepheline discriminator (ND) are two ways of describing a given complex glass composition. This report presents the theoretical and experimental basis for these models. They are being studied together in a quadrant system as metrics to explore nepheline crystallization and chemical durability as a function of waste glass composition. These metrics were calculated for glasses with existing data and also for theoretical glasses to explore nepheline formation in Quadrant IV (passes OB metric but fails ND metric), where glasses are presumed to have good chemical durability. Several of these compositions were chosen, and glasses were made to fill poorly represented regions in Quadrant IV. To evaluate nepheline formation and chemical durability of these glasses, quantitative X-ray diffraction (XRD) analysis and the Product Consistency Test were conducted. A large amount of quantitative XRD data is collected here, both from new glasses and from glasses of previous studies that had not previously performed quantitative XRD on the phase assemblage. Appendix A critically discusses a large dataset to be considered for future quantitative studies on nepheline formation in glass. Appendix B provides a theoretical justification for choice of the oxide coefficients used to compute the OB criterion for nepheline formation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 367 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 10-09-03, Mud Pit • 10-45-01, U-10h Crater (Sedan) • 10-45-02, Ess Crater Site • 10-45-03, Uncle Crater Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation of the corrective actions and site closure activities implemented at CAU 367. A corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions was completed at each of the three crater CASs (10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03); corrective actions were not required at CAS 10-09-03. In addition, a limited soil removal corrective action was conducted at the location of a potential source material release. Based on completion of these correction actions, no additional corrective action is required at CAU 367, and site closure is considered complete. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from February 2010 through March 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of non-test or other releases (e.g., migration in washes and potential source material). Based on the proximity of the Uncle, Ess, and Sedan craters, the impact of the Sedan test on the fallout deposited from the two earlier tests, and aerial radiological surveys, the CAU 367 investigation was designed to study the releases from the three crater CASs as one combined release (primary release). Corrective Action Site 10-09-03, Mud Pit, consists of two mud pits identified at CAU 367. The mud pits are considered non-test releases or other releases and were investigated independent of the three crater CASs. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 367 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. For the primary release, radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface or shallow subsurface soil outside the default contamination boundary. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within each of the three craters (Sedan, Ess, and Uncle) due to prompt injection of radionuclides from the tests. Based on the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each crater CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. With regard to other releases, no contaminants of concern were identified at the mud pits or any of the other release locations, with one exception. Potential source material in the form of lead was found at one location. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at this location, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 367. • Corrective Action Unit 367 should be promoted from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-99-20, EMAD Compound, located within Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 566 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 566 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From October 2010 through May 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 566. Assessment of the data from collected soil samples, and from radiological and visual surveys of the site, indicates the FALs were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and radioactivity. Corrective actions were implemented to remove the following: • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL at two locations • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL with lead shot • PCB-contaminated soil • Radiologically contaminated filters and equipment • Fuels, lubricants, engine coolants, and oils • Lead debris • Electrical and lighting components assumed to be potential source materials, including - fluorescent light bulbs - mercury switches (thermostats) - circuit boards - PCB-containing ballasts Closure of CAU 566 was achieved through a combination of removal activities and closure in place. Corrective actions to remove COCs, and known and assumed potential source materials, were implemented as was practical. The PCBs remaining at the site are bounded laterally, but not vertically, within CAS 25-99-20 based upon step-out sampling; the sources (e.g., PCB transformer oils, diesel fuel from locomotive reservoirs) have been removed; the practice of the application of PCB-containing oils for soil stabilization has ceased; and the COCs are not readily mobile in the environment. Closure in place is necessary, and future land use of the site will be restricted from intrusive activities. This will effectively eliminate inadvertent contact by humans with the contaminated media. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CAS 25-99-20. • Closure in place of CAS 25-99-20. • A use restriction is required at CAU 566. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 566. • Corrective Action Unit 566 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1 and 2, Revision 0 with ROTCs 1,2, and 3

Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises five corrective action sites (CASs): • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 374 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at CASs 18-23-01 and 20-45-03, and a corrective action of removing potential source material (PSM) was conducted at CAS 20-45-03. The other CASs require no further action; however, best management practices of removing PSM and drums at CAS 18-22-06, and removing drums at CAS 18-22-08 were performed. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from May 4 through October 6, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigating the primary release of radionuclides and investigating other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 374 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were found to be present in the surface soil that was sampled. It is assumed that radionuclide levels present in subsurface media within the craters and ejecta fields (default contamination boundaries) at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites exceed the FAL. It is also assumed that PSM in the form of lead-acid batteries at Schooner exceeds the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of removing PSM, where present, and implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 374. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 374. • Corrective Action Unit 374 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 561: Waste Disposal Areas, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

CAU 561 comprises 10 CASs: (1) 01-19-01, Waste Dump; (2) 02-08-02, Waste Dump and Burn Area; (3) 03-19-02, Debris Pile; (4) 05-62-01, Radioactive Gravel Pile; (5) 12-23-09, Radioactive Waste Dump; (6) 22-19-06, Buried Waste Disposal Site; (7) 23-21-04, Waste Disposal Trenches ; (8) 25-08-02, Waste Dump; (9) 25-23-21, Radioactive Waste Dump; and (10) 25-25-19, Hydrocarbon Stains and Trench. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 561 with no further corrective action. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the DQO process: (1) Determine whether COCs are present; (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent; and (3) Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The following contaminants were determined to be present at concentrations exceeding their corresponding FALs: (1) No contamination exceeding FALs was identified at CASs 01-19-01, 03-19-02, 05-62-01, 12-23-09, and 22-19-06. (2) The surface and subsurface soil within the burn area at CAS 02-08-02 contains arsenic and lead above the FALs of 23 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) and 800 mg/kg, respectively. The surface and subsurface soil within the burn area also contains melted lead slag (potential source material [PSM]). The soil within the waste piles contains polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) above the FALs. The contamination within the burn area is spread throughout the area, as it was not feasible to remove all the PSM (melted lead), while at the waste piles, the contamination is confined to the piles. (3) The surface and subsurface soils within Trenches 3 and 5 at CAS 23-21-04 contain arsenic and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) above the FALs of 23 mg/kg and 0.74 mg/kg, respectively. The soil was removed from both trenches, and the soil that remains at this CAS does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Lead bricks and counterweights were also removed, and the soil below these items does not contain contamination that exceeds the FAL for lead. (4) The concrete-like material at CAS 25-08-02 contains arsenic above the FAL of 23 mg/kg. This concrete-like material was removed, and the soil that remains at this CAS does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Lead-acid batteries were also removed, and the soil below the batteries does not contain contamination that exceeds the FAL for lead. (5) The surface soils within the main waste dump at the posted southern radioactive material area (RMA) at CAS 25-23-21 contain cesium (Cs)-137 and PCBs above the FALs of 72.9 picocuries per gram (pCi/g) and 0.74 mg/kg, respectively. The soil was removed from the RMA, and the soil that remains at this CAS does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. (6) The surface and subsurface soils at CAS 25-25-19 do not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. In addition, lead bricks were removed, and the soil below these items does not contain contamination that exceeds the FAL for lead. The following best management practices were implemented: (1) Housekeeping debris at CASs 02-08-02, 23-21-04, 25-08-02, 25-23-21, and 25-25-19 was removed and disposed of; (2) The open trenches at CAS 23-21-04 were backfilled; (3) The waste piles at CAS 25-08-02 were removed and the area leveled to ground surface; and (4) The remaining waste piles at the main waste dump at CAS 25-23-21 were leveled to ground surface. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further action for CASs 01-19-01, 03-19-02, 05-62-01, 12-23-09, and 22-19-06; (2) Closure in place with an FFACO use restriction (UR) at CAS 02-08-02 for the remaining PAH-, arsenic-, and lead-contaminated soil, and the melted lead PSM. The UR form and map have been filed in the NNSA/NSO Facility Information Management System, the FFACO database, and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files; (3) No further corrective action at CAS 23-21-04, as the lead bricks and counterweights (PSM) have been removed, and the COCs of arsenic and PCBs in soil have been removed; (4) No further corrective action at CAS 25-08-02, as the COC of arsenic in soil has been removed, and the lead-acid batteries have been removed; (5) No further corrective action at CAS 25-23-21, as the COCs of Cs-137 and PCBs in soil have been removed, and the cast-iron pipes have been removed and disposed of; (6) No further corrective action at CAS 25-25-19, as the lead bricks (PSM) been removed; (7) A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 561; and (8) Corrective Action Unit 561 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 375 comprises three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 25-23-22, Contaminated Soils Site; (2) 25-34-06, Test Cell A Bunker; and (3) 30-45-01, U-30a, b, c, d, e Craters. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 375 based on the implementation of corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls at CAS 25-23-22, no further action at CAS 25-34-06, and closure in place with administrative controls and removal of potential source material (PSM) at CAS 30-45-01. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 28, 2010, through April 4, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 375 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were assumed to be present within the default contamination boundaries at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. No contaminants were identified at CAS 25-34-06, and no corrective action is necessary. Potential source material in the form of lead plate, lead-acid batteries, and oil within an abandoned transformer were identified at CAS 30-45-01, and corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of removing the PSM. Use restrictions and warning signs were implemented for the remaining radiological contamination at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 375; (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 375; and (3) Move CAU 375 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 106: Area 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond; (2) 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able; (3) 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area; (4) 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 106 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of clean closure was implemented at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05, while no corrective action was necessary at CASs 05-20-02 and 05-23-05. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 20, 2010, through June 1, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (mechanical displacement and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 106 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Industrial Area exposure scenario (2,250 hours of annual exposure). The only radiological dose exceeding the FAL was at CAS 05-45-05 and was associated with potential source material (PSM). It is also assumed that additional PSM in the form of depleted uranium (DU) and DU-contaminated debris at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05 exceed the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken at these CASs that consisted of removing PSM and collecting verification samples. Results of verification samples show that remaining soil does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 106. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 106. (3) Corrective Action Unit 106 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 With ROTC-1

Corrective Action Unit 365 comprises one corrective action site (CAS), CAS 08-23-02, U-8d Contamination Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 365 based on the implementation of the corrective action of closure in place with a use restriction (UR). Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 18, 2011, through August 2, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 365 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in supporting the DQO decisions. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were found to be present to the southwest of the Baneberry crater. It was also assumed that radionuclide levels present within the crater and fissure exceed the FAL. Corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of establishing a UR and posting warning signs for the crater, fissure, and the area located to the southwest of the crater where soil concentrations exceeded the FAL. These URs were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions beyond what are described in this document are necessary for CAU 365. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 365. (3) Corrective Action Unit 365 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TANK 5 FLOOR SAMPLE RESULTS

Sampling has been completed for the characterization of the residual material on the floor of Tank 5 in the F-Area Tank Farm at the Savannah River Site (SRS), near Aiken, SC. The sampling was performed by Savannah River Remediation (SRR) LLC using a stratified random sampling plan with volume-proportional compositing. The plan consisted of partitioning the residual material on the floor of Tank 5 into three non-overlapping strata: two strata enclosed accumulations, and a third stratum consisted of a thin layer of material outside the regions of the two accumulations. Each of three composite samples was constructed from five primary sample locations of residual material on the floor of Tank 5. Three of the primary samples were obtained from the stratum containing the thin layer of material, and one primary sample was obtained from each of the two strata containing an accumulation. This report documents the statistical analyses of the analytical results for the composite samples. The objective of the analysis is to determine the mean concentrations and upper 95% confidence (UCL95) bounds for the mean concentrations for a set of analytes in the tank residuals. The statistical procedures employed in the analyses were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) technical guidance by Singh and others [2010]. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) measured the sample bulk density, nonvolatile beta, gross alpha, radionuclide, inorganic, and anion concentrations three times for each of the composite samples. The analyte concentration data were partitioned into three separate groups for further analysis: analytes with every measurement above their minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs), analytes with no measurements above their MDCs, and analytes with a mixture of some measurement results above and below their MDCs. The means, standard deviations, and UCL95s were computed for the analytes in the two groups that had at least some measurements above their MDCs. The identification of distributions and the selection of UCL95 procedures generally followed the protocol in Singh, Armbya, and Singh [2010]. When all of an analyte's measurements lie below their MDCs, only a summary of the MDCs can be provided. The measurement results reported by SRNL are listed in Appendix A, and the results of this analysis are reported in Appendix B. The data were generally found to follow a normal distribution, and to be homogeneous across composite samples.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Understanding and Predicting Metallic Whisker Growth and its Effects on Reliability (LDRD Final Report)

Tin (Sn) whiskers are conductive Sn filaments that grow from Sn-plated surfaces, such as surface finishes on electronic packages. The phenomenon of Sn whiskering has become a concern in recent years due to requirements for lead (Pb)-free soldering and surface finishes in commercial electronics. Pure Sn finishes are more prone to whisker growth than their Sn-Pb counterparts and high profile failures due to whisker formation (causing short circuits) in space applications have been documented. At Sandia, Sn whiskers are of interest due to increased use of Pb-free commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts and possible future requirements for Pb-free solders and surface finishes in high-reliability microelectronics. Lead-free solders and surface finishes are currently being used or considered for several Sandia applications. Despite the long history of Sn whisker research and the recently renewed interest in this topic, a comprehensive understanding of whisker growth remains elusive. This report describes recent research on characterization of Sn whiskers with the aim of understanding the underlying whisker growth mechanism(s). The report is divided into four sections and an Appendix. In Section 1, the Sn plating process is summarized. Specifically, the Sn plating parameters that were successful in producing samples with whiskers will be reviewed. In Section 2, the scanning electron microscopy (SEM) of Sn whiskers and time-lapse SEM studies of whisker growth will be discussed. This discussion includes the characterization of straight as well as kinked whiskers. In Section 3, a detailed discussion is given of SEM/EBSD (electron backscatter diffraction) techniques developed to determine the crystallography of Sn whiskers. In Section 4, these SEM/EBSD methods are employed to determine the crystallography of Sn whiskers, with a statistically significant number of whiskers analyzed. This is the largest study of Sn whisker crystallography ever reported. This section includes a review of previous literature on Sn whisker crystallography. The overall texture of the Sn films was also analyzed by EBSD. Finally, a short Appendix is included at the end of this report, in which the X-Ray diffraction (XRD) results are discussed and compared to the EBSD analyses of the overall textures of the Sn films. Sections 2, 3, and 4 have been or will be submitted as stand-alone papers in peer-reviewed technical journals. A bibliography of recent Sandia Sn whisker publications and presentations is included at the end of the report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

2011 Performance Assessment Community of Practice Technical Exchange – Summary

The Performance Assessment Community of Practice (PA CoP) was developed in 2008 to improve consistency and quality in the preparation of performance assessments (PAs) and risk assessments across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The term, PA, is used to represent all of these modeling applications in this report. The PA CoP goals are to foster the exchange of information among PA practitioners and to share lessons learned from PAs conducted for DOE, commercial disposal facilities, and international entities. Technical exchanges and workshops are a cornerstone of PA CoP activities. Previous technical exchanges have addressed Engineered Barriers (2009 - http://www.cresp.org/education/workshops/pacop/), the Advanced Simulation Capability for Environmental Management and the Cementitious Barriers Partnership (2010 - http://srnl.doe.gov/copexchange/links.htm). Each technical exchange also includes summary presentations regarding activities at DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other organizations (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) as well as a number of presentations from selected sites to provide insight and perspective from on-going modeling activities. Through the deployment of PA Assistance Teams, the PA CoP has also been engaged in the development of new PAs across the DOE Complex. As a way of improving consistency in the preparation of new PAs, the teams provide technical advice and share experiences, noteworthy practices, and lessons learned from previous Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (LFRG) reviews. Teams have provided support for PAs at Hanford, Idaho, Paducah and Portsmouth. The third annual PA CoP Technical Exchange was held on May 25-26, 2011 in Atlanta, GA. The PA CoP Steering Committee Meeting held its first meeting on May 24 prior to the Technical Exchange. Decision making using models and software quality assurance were the topical emphasis for the exchange. A new feature at the 2011 technical exchange was the use of panel discussions to solicit feedback from regulators and practitioners. This report summarizes discussions and recommendations from the steering committee meeting and presentations and feedback obtained at the technical exchange. Appendix I includes the steering committee meeting agenda and Appendix II includes the agenda for the technical exchange and a screenshot of the presentations and video files that are available online.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Calibration of the Accuscan II In Vivo System for I-125 Thyroid Counting

This report describes the March 2011 calibration of the Accuscan II HpGe In Vivo system for I-125 thyroid counting. The source used for the calibration was a DOE manufactured Am-241/Eu-152 source contained in a 22 ml vial BEA Am-241/Eu-152 RMC II-1 with energies from 26 keV to 344 keV. The center of the detector housing was positioned 64 inches from the vault floor. This position places the approximate center line of the detector housing at the center line of the source in the phantom thyroid tube. The energy and efficiency calibration were performed using an RMC II phantom (Appendix J). Performance testing was conducted using source BEA Am-241/Eu-152 RMC II-1 and Validation testing was performed using an I-125 source in a 30 ml vial (I-125 BEA Thyroid 002) and an ANSI N44.3 phantom (Appendix I). This report includes an overview introduction and records for the energy/FWHM and efficiency calibration including performance verification and validation counting. The Accuscan II system was successfully calibrated for counting the thyroid for I-125 and verified in accordance with ANSI/HPS N13.30-1996 criteria.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Calibration of the Accuscan II In Vivo System for I-131 Thyroid Counting

This report describes the March 2011 calibration of the Accuscan II HpGe In Vivo system for I-131 thyroid counting. The source used for the calibration was an Analytics mixed gamma source 82834-121 distributed in an epoxy matrix in a Wheaton Liquid Scintillation Vial with energies from 88.0 keV to 1836.1 keV. The center of the detectors was position 64-feet from the vault floor. This position places the approximate center line of the detectors at the center line of the source in the thyroid tube. The calibration was performed using an RMC II phantom (Appendix J). Validation testing was performed using a Ba-133 source and an ANSI N44.3 Phantom (Appendix I). This report includes an overview introduction and records for the energy/FWHM and efficiency calibrations including verification counting. The Accuscan II system was successfully calibrated for counting the thyroid for I-131 and verified in accordance with ANSI/HPS N13.30-1996 criteria.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Calculation Package: Derivation of Facility-Specific Derived Air Concentration (DAC) Values in Support of Spallation Neutron Source Operations

Derived air concentration (DAC) values for 175 radionuclides* produced at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Spallation Neutron Source (SNS), but not listed in Appendix A of 10 CFR 835 (01/01/2009 version), are presented. The proposed DAC values, ranging between 1 E-07 μCi/mL and 2 E-03 {micro}Ci/mL, were calculated in accordance with the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and are intended to support an exemption request seeking regulatory relief from the 10 CFR 835, Appendix A, requirement to apply restrictive DACs of 2E-13 μCi/mL and 4E-11 {micro}Ci/mL and for non-listed alpha and non-alpha-emitting radionuclides, respectively.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report for 2010

The Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report is prepared annually and presents summary environmental data to (1) characterize environmental performance, (2) summarize environmental occurrences reported during the year, (3) confirm compliance with environmental standards and requirements, and (4) highlight significant program activities. The report fulfills the requirement contained in DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting (DOE 2004) that an integrated annual site environmental report be prepared. The results summarized in this report are based on data collected prior to and through 2010. This report is not intended to nor does it present the results of all environmental monitoring associated with the ORR. Data collected for other site and regulatory purposes, such as environmental restoration/remedial investigation reports, waste management characterization sampling data, and environmental permit compliance data, are presented in other documents that have been prepared in accordance with applicable DOE guidance and/or laws and are referenced herein as appropriate. Appendix A to this report identifies corrections to the 2009 report. Appendix B contains a glossary of technical terms that may be useful for understanding the terminology used in this document. Environmental monitoring on the ORR consists primarily of two major activities: effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance. Effluent monitoring involves the collection and analysis of samples or measurements of liquid and gaseous effluents at the points of release to the environment; these measurements allow the quantification and official reporting of contaminant levels, assessment of radiation and chemical exposures to the public, and demonstration of compliance with applicable standards and permit requirements. Environmental surveillance consists of direct measurements and collection and analysis of samples taken from the site and its environs exclusive of effluents; these activities provide information on contaminant concentrations in air, water, groundwater, soil, foods, biota, and other media. Environmental surveillance data support determinations regarding environmental compliance and, when combined with data from effluent monitoring, support chemical and radiation dose and exposure assessments of the potential effects of ORR operations, if any, on the local environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗