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At least 325 records · Page 18
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

A Review of the MLAS Parachute Systems

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is dedicated to Max Faget, the renowned NASA spacecraft designer. The MLAS flight test vehicle consists of boost skirt, coast skirt and the MLAS fairing which houses a full scale boilerplate Orion Crew Module (CM). The objective of the flight test is to prove that the CM can be released from the MLAS fairing during pad abort conditions without detrimental recontact between the CM and fairing, achieving performance similar to the Orion launch abort system. The boost and coast skirts provide the necessary thrust and stability to achieve the flight test conditions and are released prior to the test -- much like the Little Joe booster was used in the Apollo Launch Escape System tests. To achieve the test objective, two parachutes are deployed from the fairing to reorient the CM/fairing to a heatshield first orientation. The parachutes then provide the force necessary to reduce the total angle of attack and body angular rates required for safe release of the CM from the fairing. A secondary test objective after CM release from the fairing is to investigate the removal of the CM forward bay cover (FBC) with CM drogue parachutes for the purpose of attempting to synchronously deploying a set of CM main parachutes. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft D(sub 0) ribbon parachutes, and the remaining four are standard G-12 cargo parachutes. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft D(sub 0) ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after separation from the fairing. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design, previously proven as a spin/stall recovery parachute; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs; a discussion of the rigging techniques used to interface the parachute system to the vehicle; and a brief description of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis. An overview of the Objective system, rationale for the MLAS approach and the future of the program will also be presented. We hope to have flight test results to report at the time of the Conference Presentation.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The NASA MLAS Flight Demonstration - A Review of a Highly Successful Test

NASA has tested the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is not Maximum, but rather dedicated to Max Faget, The renowned NASA Spacecraft designer. In the fall of 2009, the mission was flown, with great success, from the NASA Wallops Flight Facility. The MLAS flight test vehicle prototype consists of a boost ring, coast ring, and the MLAS fairing itself, which houses an Orion Command Module (CM) boilerplate. The objective of the MLAS flight test is to reorient the fairing with the CM, weighing approximately 29,000 lbs and traveling 290 fps, 180 degrees to an orientation suitable for the release of the CM during a pad abort and low altitude abort. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachutes, and the remaining four are standard G-12 cargo parachutes. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast ring separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after separation from the fairing. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design, previously proven as a spin/stall recovery parachute; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs; a discussion of the rigging techniques used to interface the parachute system to the vehicle; a brief description of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis; and a summary of the results of the flight test, including video of the flight test and subsequent summary analysis. . A discussion of the flight test which was highly successful as well as the flight test observations will be a significant portion of the review.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗
NASA NTRS2011

A Review of the NASA MLAS Flight Demonstration

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has tested the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is not Maximum, but rather dedicated to Max Faget, the renowned NASA Spacecraft designer. In July 2009, the mission was flown, with great success, from the NASA Wallops Flight Facility. The MLAS flight test vehicle prototype consists of a boost skirt, coast skirt, and the MLAS fairing itself, which houses an Orion Command Module (CM) boilerplate. The objective of the MLAS flight test is to reorient the fairing with the CM, weighing approximately 29,000 lbs and traveling 290 fps, 180 degrees to an orientation suitable for the release of the CM during a pad abort or low altitude abort. The boost and coast skirts provide the necessary thrust and stability to establish the flight test conditions and are released prior to the reorientation of the fairing. A secondary test objective after successful release of the CM from the fairing is to demonstrate the removal of the CM forward bay cover (FBC) with the CM drogue parachutes, and subsequent deployment of the CM main parachutes attached to the FBC. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachutes already proven as a spin/stall parachute for military aircraft, and the remaining four are G-12 cargo parachutes modified for increased strength and reefing. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as CM drogue parachutes. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs including discussions of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis; a summary of the results of the highly successful flight test, including video of the flight test; and an overview of the subsequent post-test analysis.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Orion MPCV GN and C End-to-End Phasing Tests

End-to-end integration tests are critical risk reduction efforts for any complex vehicle. Phasing tests are an end-to-end integrated test that validates system directional phasing (polarity) from sensor measurement through software algorithms to end effector response. Phasing tests are typically performed on a fully integrated and assembled flight vehicle where sensors are stimulated by moving the vehicle and the effectors are observed for proper polarity. Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) Phasing Test was conducted from inertial measurement to Launch Abort System (LAS). Orion Exploration Flight Test 1 (EFT-1) has two end-to-end phasing tests planned. The first test from inertial measurement to Crew Module (CM) reaction control system thrusters uses navigation and flight control system software algorithms to process commands. The second test from inertial measurement to CM S-Band Phased Array Antenna (PAA) uses navigation and communication system software algorithms to process commands. Future Orion flights include Ascent Abort Flight Test 2 (AA-2) and Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1). These flights will include additional or updated sensors, software algorithms and effectors. This paper will explore the implementation of end-to-end phasing tests on a flight vehicle which has many constraints, trade-offs and compromises. Orion PA-1 Phasing Test was conducted at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) from March 4-6, 2010. This test decreased the risk of mission failure by demonstrating proper flight control system polarity. Demonstration was achieved by stimulating the primary navigation sensor, processing sensor data to commands and viewing propulsion response. PA-1 primary navigation sensor was a Space Integrated Inertial Navigation System (INS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) (SIGI) which has onboard processing, INS (3 accelerometers and 3 rate gyros) and no GPS receiver. SIGI data was processed by GN&C software into thrust magnitude and direction commands. The processing changes through three phases of powered flight: pitchover, downrange and reorientation. The primary inputs to GN&C are attitude position, attitude rates, angle of attack (AOA) and angle of sideslip (AOS). Pitch and yaw attitude and attitude rate responses were verified by using a flight spare SIGI mounted to a 2-axis rate table. AOA and AOS responses were verified by using a data recorded from SIGI movements on a robotic arm located at NASA Johnson Space Center. The data was consolidated and used in an open-loop data input to the SIGI. Propulsion was the Launch Abort System (LAS) Attitude Control Motor (ACM) which consisted of a solid motor with 8 nozzles. Each nozzle has active thrust control by varying throat area with a pintle. LAS ACM pintles are observable through optically transparent nozzle covers. SIGI movements on robot arm, SIGI rate table movements and LAS ACM pintle responses were video recorded as test artifacts for analysis and evaluation. The PA-1 Phasing Test design was determined based on test performance requirements, operational restrictions and EGSE capabilities. This development progressed during different stages. For convenience these development stages are initial, working group, tiger team, Engineering Review Team (ERT) and final.

Neumann, Brian C.↗
NASA NTRS2010

TPSAS-NF1676L-11132-DND

The Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight Test occurred on May 6th, 2010 at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The test was the first for the Orion vehicle and was primarily a test of the Orion Launch Abort System’s ability to execute an abort from the launch pad. The test was successful, and, in most cases, results were well within predicted outcomes. For this test, the thermal control subsystem was an inherent part of the flight operations team. The thermal team provided pre-launch predictions of component temperatures, set component temperature limits, and monitored those limits during the flight operations process as part of the primary flight operations team. The thermal team was also responsible for day-of-flight predictions of the main abort motor’s propellant mean bulk temperature, a key launch constraint for the test. After the test, thermal data was collected, reviewed, and compared against pre-launch predictions showing very good agreement in most areas. Based on the pre-test and flight operations experience, a detailed list of lessons learned has been developed and will be reviewed prior to potential future Orion or other such flight tests.

Joseph F Gasbarre↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TPSAS-NF1676L-11021-DND

The Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight Test occurred on May 6th, 2010 at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The test was the first for the Orion vehicle and was primarily a test of the Orion Launch Abort System’s ability to execute an abort from the launch pad. The test was successful and in most cases results were well within predicted outcomes. For this test, the thermal control subsystem was an inherent part of the flight operations team. The thermal team provided pre-launch predictions of component temperatures, set component temperature limits, and monitored those limits during the flight operations process as part of the primary flight operations team. The thermal team was also responsible for day-of-flight predictions of the main abort motor’s propellant mean bulk temperature, a key launch constraint for the test. After the test, thermal data was collected, reviewed, and compared against pre-launch predictions showing very good agreement in most areas. Based on the pre-test and flight operations experience, a detailed list of lessons learned has been developed and will be reviewed prior to potential future Orion or other such flight tests.

Joseph F Gasbarre↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Logistics and Supportability Challenges of Sustained Human Lunar Exploration

NASA’s Artemis program plans to establish a sustained human presence on the lunar surface. The International Space Station other space station programs have demonstrated long-duration human spaceflight operations that reuse infrastructure in Low Earth Orbit, sometimes including long uncrewed “dormant” periods. In contrast, human lunar exploration to date has consisted solely of relatively short sortie missions, rather than a sustained presence. A sustained human outpost on the Moon that can support month-long crewed exploration missions and be reused by multiple crews will be more challenging than past operations, particularly from the perspective of logistics, supportability, and risk. This paper examines the integrated logistics and supportability challenges of sustained human lunar exploration and provides a review of historical spaceflight experience in terms of crewed mission endurance, uncrewed duration, transportation overhead, and access to abort. Planned Artemis Base Camp crewed mission endurance is approximately 2.5 times longer than past lunar surface crewed mission endurance, but similar to average time between resupply for the International Space Station. Sustained human spacecraft have only twice experienced uncrewed durations longer than the planned interval between Artemis Base Camp missions, and Artemis surface assets will face long uncrewed periods more regularly than any past sustained human spacecraft. Transportation of crew and cargo to and from the Moon will be more difficult and time-consuming than transportation to and from Low Earth Orbit, and crew access to abort will be more limited. The implications of Artemis lunar operations for crewed Mars mission planning are also discussed. Historical approaches to risk management—including logistics, supportability, and abort strategies—should be reexamined and re-optimized for this new mission context. Sustained lunar operations will provide a valuable proving ground for testing new approaches to crewed space exploration.

logistics↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Logistics and Supportability Challenges of Sustained Human Lunar Exploration

NASA’s Artemis program plans to establish a sustained human presence on the lunar surface. The International Space Station and other space station programs have demonstrated long-duration human spaceflight operations that reuse infrastructure in Low Earth Orbit, sometimes including long uncrewed “dormant” periods. In contrast, all human exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit to date has consisted solely of relatively short sortie missions, rather than a sustained presence. A sustained human outpost on the Moon that can support month-long crewed exploration missions and be reused by multiple crews will be more challenging than past operations, particularly from the perspective of logistics, supportability, and risk. This paper examines the integrated logistics and supportability challenges of sustained human lunar exploration and provides a review of historical spaceflight experience in terms of crewed mission endurance, uncrewed duration, transportation overhead, and access to abort. Planned Artemis Base Camp crewed mission endurance is approximately 2.5 times longer than past lunar surface crewed mission endurance, but similar to the average time between resupply for the International Space Station. Sustained human spacecraft have only twice experienced uncrewed durations longer than the planned interval between Artemis Base Camp missions, and Artemis surface assets will face long uncrewed periods more regularly than any past sustained human spacecraft. Transportation of crew and cargo to and from the Moon will be more difficult and time-consuming than transportation to and from Low Earth Orbit, and crew access to abort will be more limited. The implications of Artemis lunar operations for crewed Mars mission planning are also discussed. Historical approaches to risk management—including logistics, supportability, and abort strategies—should be reexamined and re-optimized for this new mission context. Sustained lunar operations will provide a valuable proving ground for testing new approaches to crewed space exploration.

logistics↗
DOE OSTI2024

Identification of equine mares as reservoir hosts for pathogenic species of Leptospira

Equine leptospirosis can result in abortion, stillbirth, neonatal death, placentitis, and uveitis. Horses can also act as subclinical reservoir hosts of infection, which are characterized as asymptomatic carriers that persistently excrete leptospires and transmit disease. In this study, PCR and culture were used to assess urinary shedding of pathogenic Leptospira from 37 asymptomatic mares. Three asymptomatic mares, designated as H2, H8, and H9, were PCR-positive for lipL32, a gene specific for pathogenic species of Leptospira. One asymptomatic mare, H9, was culture-positive, and the recovered isolate was classified as L. kirschneri serogroup Australis serovar Rushan. DNA capture and enrichment of Leptospira genomic DNA from PCR-positive, culture-negative samples determined that asymptomatic mare H8 was also shedding L. kirschneri serogroup Australis, whereas asymptomatic mare H2 was shedding L. interrogans serogroup Icterohaemorrhagiae. Sera from all asymptomatic mares were tested by the microscopic agglutination test (MAT) and 35 of 37 (94.6%) were seropositive with titers ranging from 1:100 to 1:3200. In contrast to asymptomatic mares, mare H44 presented with acute spontaneous abortion and a serum MAT titer of 1:102,400 to L. interrogans serogroup Pomona serovar Pomona. Comparison of L. kirschneri serogroup Australis strain H9 with that of L. interrogans serogroup Pomona strain H44 in the hamster model of leptospirosis corroborated differences in virulence of strains. Since lipopolysaccharide (LPS) is a protective antigen in bacterin vaccines, the LPS of strain H9 (associated with subclinical carriage) was compared with strain H44 (associated with spontaneous abortion). This revealed different LPS profiles and immunoreactivity with reference antisera. It is essential to know what species and serovars of Leptospira are circulating in equine populations to design efficacious vaccines and diagnostic tests. Our results demonstrate that horses in the US can act as reservoir hosts of leptospirosis and shed diverse pathogenic Leptospira species via urine. This report also details the detection of L. kirschneri serogroup Australis serovar Rushan, a species and serotype of Leptospira, not previously reported in the US.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1972

Booster recovery following premature space shuttle stage separation

Abort criteria necessary to satisfy space shuttle program requirements to include intact vehicle abort capability are discussed. Intact abort implies the ability of the booster and orbiter to separate and both continue flight to a safe landing, with a full payload aboard the orbiter. Obviously, the requirement to separate early along the ascent trajectory presupposes critical operational problems that are probably booster problems and may preclude booster recovery. On the other hand, some critical problems while mated can become manageable when separated and should result in full booster recovery. All critical orbiter problems fall into this category; since stage separation without orbiter thrust is a capability of some separation system concepts, booster stage recovery following separation is a requirement.

Hurley, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS1973

DOD/NASA system impact analysis (study 2.1). Volume 2: Study results

Results of the tug turnaround cost study and the space transportation system (STS) abort modes and effects study are presented for DOD/NASA system impact analysis. Cost estimates are given for tug turnabout; and vehicle description, abort assessment, and abort performance capability are given for the STS.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1975

Fail-safe system for activity cooled supersonic and hypersonic aircraft

A fail-safe-system concept was studied as an alternative to a redundant active cooling system for supersonic and hypersonic aircraft which use the heat sink of liquid-hydrogen fuel for cooling the aircraft structure. This concept consists of an abort maneuver by the aircraft and a passive thermal protection system (TPS) for the aircraft skin. The abort manuever provides a low-heat-load descent from normal cruise speed to a lower speed at which cooling is unnecessary, and the passive TPS allows the aircraft skin to absorb the abort heat load without exceeding critical skin temperature. On the basis of results obtained, it appears that this fail-safe-system concept warrants further consideration, inasmuch as a fail-safe system could possibly replace a redundant active cooling system with no increase in weight and would offer other potential advantages.

Jones, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Space Shuttle guidance for multiple main engine failures during first stage

This paper presents contingency abort guidance schemes recently developed for multiple Space Shuttle main engine failures during the first two minutes of flight (first stage). The ascent and entry guidance schemes greatly improve the possibility of the crew and/or the Orbiter surviving a first stage contingency abort. Both guidance schemes were required to meet certain structural and controllability constraints. In addition, the systems were designed with the flexibility to allow for seasonal variations in the atmosphere and wind. The ascent scheme guides the vehicle to a desirable, lofted state at solid rocket booster burnout while reducing the structural loads on the vehicle. After Orbiter separation from the solid rockets and the external tank, the entry scheme guides the Orbiter through one of two possible entries. If the proper altitude/range/velocity conditions have been met, a return-to-launch-site 'Split-S' maneuver may be attempted. Otherwise, a down-range abort to an equilibrium glide and subsequent crew bailout is performed.

Sponaugle, Steven J.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Twin-page storage management for rapid transaction-undo recovery

This paper presents and evaluates a new twin-page disk-storage management scheme for rapid database transaction-undo recovery. In contrast to previous twin-page schemes, the present approach uses static page mapping and allows dirty pages in the main memory to be written, at any instant, onto disk without the requirement of undo logging. No explicit undo is required when a transaction is aborted. Transaction undo is implicitly performed by not subsequently fetching from disk the invalid pages updated by the aborted transaction. Performance in terms of disk I/O and CPU overhead for transaction-undo recovery is analyzed and compared with a previous approach TWIST. It is shown that the scheme achieves rapid transaction-undo recovery without degrading average system performance for various workloads, and that the scheme is well suited for applications with a large number of updates and frequent transaction aborts.

Wu, Kun-Lung↗
NASA NTRS1993

Future space transportation system architecture avionics requirements

NASA began a multi-center study in January 1993 to examine options for providing the most cost effective space transportation system in the future. The key advanced avionics requirements for these vehicle concepts are envisioned to provide significantly improved operational efficiency and effectiveness. It is very desirable to have adaptive guidance, navigation, and control approaches that will allow launch and return in almost any weather condition. The vehicles must be able to accommodate atmospheric density variations and winds without software changes. The flight operations must become much more autonomous in all flight regimes like an aircraft, and preflight checkout should make use of the onboard systems. When the vehicle returns to the launch site, subsystem health must be known and maintenance tasks scheduled accordingly. Ground testing of most subsystems must be eliminated. Also, the health monitoring system must be designed to enhance the ability to abort the mission significantly and save the crew and the vehicle. The displays and controls must be much less complex than current systems and must significantly reduce pilot work load. It is important to have low power, light weight displays and controls. Rendezvous and docking and all flight phases must have autopilot capability to reduce pilot work load for routine operations and in abort situations. The vehicles must have the demonstrated ability to return to the launch site. Abort from all mission phases can put additional demands on the communications system.

Stone, Howard↗
NASA NTRS1994

Flight test of takeoff performance monitoring system

The Takeoff Performance Monitoring System (TOPMS) is a computer software and hardware graphics system that visually displays current runway position, acceleration performance, engine status, and other situation advisory information to aid pilots in their decision to continue or to abort a takeoff. The system was developed at the Langley Research Center using the fixed-base Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) simulator. (The TSRV is a highly modified Boeing 737-100 research airplane.) Several versions of the TOPMS displays were evaluated on the TSRV B-737 simulator by more than 40 research, United States Air Force, airline and industry and pilots who rated the system satisfactory and recommended further development and testing. In this study, the TOPMS was flight tested on the TSRV. A total of 55 takeoff and 30 abort situations were investigated at 5 airfields. TOPMS displays were observed on the navigation display screen in the TSRV research flight deck during various nominal and off-nominal situations, including normal takeoffs; reduced-throttle takeoffs; induced-acceleration deficiencies; simulated-engine failures; and several gross-weight, runway-geometry, runway-surface, and ambient conditions. All tests were performed on dry runways. The TOPMS software executed accurately during the flight tests and the displays correctly depicted the various test conditions. Evaluation pilots found the displays easy to monitor and understand. The algorithm provides pretakeoff predictions of the nominal distances that are needed to accelerate the airplane to takeoff speed and to brake it to a stop; these predictions agreed reasonably well with corresponding values measured during several fully executed and aborted takeoffs. The TOPMS is operational and has been retained on the TSRV for general use and demonstration.

Middleton, David B.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Human Mars Missions: Cost Driven Architecture Assessments

This report investigates various methods of reducing the cost in space transportation systems for human Mars missions. The reference mission for this task is a mission currently under study at NASA. called the Mars Design Reference Mission, characterized by In-Situ propellant production at Mars. This study mainly consists of comparative evaluations to the reference mission with a view to selecting strategies that would reduce the cost of the Mars program as a whole. One of the objectives is to understand the implications of certain Mars architectures, mission modes, vehicle configurations, and potentials for vehicle reusability. The evaluations start with year 2011-2014 conjunction missions which were characterized by their abort-to-the-surface mission abort philosophy. Variations within this mission architecture, as well as outside the set to other architectures (not predicated on an abort to surface philosophy) were evaluated. Specific emphasis has been placed on identifying and assessing overall mission risk. Impacts that Mars mission vehicles might place upon the Space Station, if it were to be used as an assembly or operations base, were also discussed. Because of the short duration of this study only on a few propulsion elements were addressed (nuclear thermal, cryogenic oxygen-hydrogen, cryogenic oxygen-methane, and aerocapture). Primary ground rules and assumptions were taken from NASA material used in Marshall Space Flight Center's own assessment done in 1997.

Interplanetary Mission↗