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At least 325 records · Page 18

Use of a Position-Sensitive Multi-Anode Photomultiplier Tube for Finding Gamma-Ray Source Direction

In an urban environment where gamma-ray background counts vary rapidly, it is important to determine the angle (with respect to the detector system) of a discrete gamma-ray–emitting source for localization purposes. We have recently developed a handheld gamma-ray detection system that provides gamma-ray energy spectral data and angular position of the target source. Careful placement and orientation of individual detectors with reference to other detectors in an array can provide improved angular resolution for determining the source position by occlusion mechanism. The objectives of this project were to design and build a prototype, light-weight, hand-held, gamma-ray spectrometer with directional sensitivity. It is important for first responders in a radiological emergency to have an easy-to-use gamma spectrometric detection system that determines the incident gamma-ray energy along with the relative angular position of a point-like radioactive source in a near-field measurement (≤3 meters from the source). The technical challenge of this project, driven by search scenarios for monitoring crowds in a national special security events was to determine the relative angle of a gamma-ray–emitting source (50 μCi strong) at a distance of 3 meters from the detector in 3 minutes. We designed and built small, portable, light-weight directional gamma energy spectrometers using a position-sensitive multi-anode photomultiplier. All of three spectrometers showed remarkable (ΔΘ = ± 2°) sensitivity to relative angular position of the source in near-field laboratory measurements.

position-sensitive photomultiplier tube (PMT), mul↗

An overview of the global threat reduction initiative's physical protection work in Tanzania.

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) mission to reduce and protect nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Internationally, over 80 countries are cooperating with GTRI to enhance security of facilities with these materials. In 2004, a GTRI delegation began working with the Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission, (TAEC). The team conducted site assessments for the physical protection of radiological materials in Tanzania. Today, GTRI and the Government of Tanzania continue cooperative efforts to enhance physical security at several radiological sites, including a central sealed-source storage facility, and sites in the cities of Arusha, Dar Es Salaam, and Tanga. This paper describes the scope of physical protection work, lessons learned, and plans for future cooperation between the GTRI program and the TAEC. Additionally the paper will review the cooperative efforts between TAEC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regards to a remote monitoring system at a storage facility and to the repackaging of radioactive sources.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Priorities for technology development and policy to reduce the risk from radioactive materials.

The Standing Committee on International Security of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials in the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Division conducted its fourth annual workshop in February 2010 on Reducing the Risk from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials. This workshop examined new technologies in real-time tracking of radioactive materials, new risks and policy issues in transportation security, the best practices and challenges found in addressing illicit radioactive materials trafficking, industry leadership in reducing proliferation risk, and verification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article VI. Technology gaps, policy gaps, and prioritization for addressing the identified gaps were discussed. Participants included academia, policy makers, radioactive materials users, physical security and safeguards specialists, and vendors of radioactive sources and transportation services. This paper summarizes the results of this workshop with the recommendations and calls to action for the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) membership community.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

UAVs for Radiological Monitoring: Determining Ideal Operational Parameters From GEANT4 Simulations - 18025

Owing in no small part to the enormous advances in radiation detector technology (size, sensitivity and spectral-resolution), there has been an increased drive and requirement to accurately map both the spatial extent and magnitude of radiological contamination at the greatest possible spatial resolutions. To undertake this, a range of different methods have been devised and include the use of cars and human, but also planes (and more recently) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, critical to the remote sensing using such UAVs in contrast to ground-based sensing, is (i) the selection of the ideal operational parameters to attain the best on-ground resolution in addition to, (ii) understanding the correct normalisation procedures and other influences on results that surveys at these reduced altitudes might present. Resulting from earlier works, through employing combined modelling and experimental data, the optimal height for a UAV survey using the more realistic 'area' radioactive source term (opposed to an infinitely-small 'point-source') is determined to be approximately 5 m - suitably maximizing cross detector counts. At greater altitudes than this, the influence of variations in neighboring topology / topography and nearby structures are observed to be negligible. However, at this and further-reduced altitudes (where optimal count-rates exists), small height-related variations are observed to result, and impact considerably on the complexity of the data normalisation. Whilst not occurring as a tool to entirely replace ground-based surveys, UAV systems are able to perform in challenging or dangerous environments, inadvisable or problematic to send humans. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

On the use of a single-fiber multipoint plastic scintillation detector for {sup 192}Ir high-dose-rate brachytherapy

Purpose: The goal of this study was to prove the feasibility of using a single-fiber multipoint plastic scintillation detector (mPSD) as an in vivo verification tool during {sup 192}Ir high-dose-rate brachytherapy treatments.Methods: A three-point detector was built and inserted inside a catheter-positioning template placed in a water phantom. A hyperspectral approach was implemented to discriminate the different optical signals composing the light output at the exit of the single collection optical fiber. The mPSD was tested with different source-to-detector positions, ranging from 1 to 5 cm radially and over 10.5 cm along the longitudinal axis of the detector, and with various integration times. Several strategies for improving the accuracy of the detector were investigated. The device's accuracy in detecting source position was also tested.Results: Good agreement with the expected doses was obtained for all of the scintillating elements, with average relative differences from the expected values of 3.4 {+-} 2.1%, 3.0 {+-} 0.7%, and 4.5 {+-} 1.0% for scintillating elements from the distal to the proximal. A dose threshold of 3 cGy improved the general accuracy of the detector. An integration time of 3 s offered a good trade-off between precision and temporal resolution. Finally, the mPSD measured the radioactive source positioning uncertainty to be no more than 0.32 {+-} 0.06 mm. The accuracy and precision of the detector were improved by a dose-weighted function combining the three measurement points and known details about the geometry of the detector construction.Conclusions: The use of a mPSD for high-dose-rate brachytherapy dosimetry is feasible. This detector shows great promise for development of in vivo applications for real-time verification of treatment delivery.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiation Detection and Dual-Energy X-Ray Imaging for Port Security

Millions of cargo containers are transported across the United States border annually and are inspected for illicit radioactive material and contraband using a combination of passive radiation portal monitors (RPM) and high energy X-ray non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems. As detection performance is expected to vary with the material composition of cargo, characterizing the types of material present in cargo is important to national security. This work analyzes the passive radiation and dual energy radiography signatures from on RPM and two NII system, respectively. First, the cargos were analyzed to determine their ability to attenuate emissions from an embedded radioactive source. Secondly, dual-energy X-ray discrimination was used to determine the material composition and density of the cargos.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Final evaluation of characterizing pipe-over-pack containers using high efficiency neutron counters

Nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of Transuranic (TRU) waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) packed in Pipe-over-Pack Containers (POC) contain a number of complexities. The POC is highly attenuating to both gamma rays and neutrons which presents a difficult waste matrix for correct quantification of material in the container. Currently there are a number ofPOC containers at LANL that require evaluation for shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, NM. Updated data has been evaluated that finalizes the evaluation of characterizing Pipe-Over-Pack Containers. Currently at LANL, a single instrument has been used to explore the appropriateness of both passive neutron and quantitative gamma ray methods for measuring POC's. The passive neutron approach uses the Reals coincidence count rate to establish plutonium mass and other parameters of interest for TRU waste. The quantitative gamma ray method assumes a homogeneous distribution of radioactive source material with the surrounding material throughout the drum volume. Drums are assayed with a calibration based on the known density of the matrix. Both methods are supplemented by a simultaneous isotopic measurement using Multi-Group Analysis (MGA) to determine the plutonium isotopic composition. If MGA fails to provide a viable isotopic result Fixed Energy Response function Analysis with Multiple efficiencies (FRAM) has been used to replace the MGA results. Acceptable Knowledge (AK) may also be used in certain instances. This report will discuss the two methods in detail. Included in the discussion will be descriptions of the setup parameters and calibration techniques for the instrument. A number of test measurements have been performed to compare HENC data with certified historical data. Empty POCs loaded with known sources have also been measured to determine the viability of the technique. A comparison between calorimetry data, historical measurements and HENC data will also be performed. The conclusion will show that the current calibration on the HENC units is viable for analysis of POCs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sandia National Laboratories support of the Iraq Nuclear Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Program.

Because of past military operations, lack of upkeep and looting there are now enormous radioactive waste problems in Iraq. These waste problems include destroyed nuclear facilities, uncharacterized radioactive wastes, liquid radioactive waste in underground tanks, wastes related to the production of yellow cake, sealed radioactive sources, activated metals and contaminated metals that must be constantly guarded. Iraq currently lacks the trained personnel, regulatory and physical infrastructure to safely and securely manage these facilities and wastes. In 2005 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to organize an international cooperative program to assist Iraq with these issues. Soon after, the Iraq Nuclear Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Program (the NDs Program) was initiated by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to support the IAEA and assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) in eliminating the threats from poorly controlled radioactive materials. The Iraq NDs Program is providing support for the IAEA plus training, consultation and limited equipment to the GOI. The GOI owns the problems and will be responsible for implementation of the Iraq NDs Program. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) is a part of the DOS's team implementing the Iraq NDs Program. This report documents Sandia's support of the Iraq NDs Program, which has developed into three principal work streams: (1) training and technical consultation; (2) introducing Iraqis to modern decommissioning and waste management practices; and (3) supporting the IAEA, as they assist the GOI. Examples of each of these work streams include: (1) presentation of a three-day training workshop on 'Practical Concepts for Safe Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste in Arid Settings;' (2) leading GOI representatives on a tour of two operating low level radioactive waste disposal facilities in the U.S.; and (3) supporting the IAEA's Technical Meeting with the GOI from April 21-25, 2008. As noted in the report, there was significant teaming between the various participants to best help the GOI. On-the-ground progress is the focus of the Iraq NDs Program and much of the work is a transfer of technical and practical skills and knowledge that Sandia uses day-to-day. On-the-ground progress was achieved in July of 2008 when the GOI began the physical cleanup and dismantlement of the Active Metallurgical Testing Laboratory (LAMA) facility at Al Tuwaitha, near Baghdad.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Results with a micro-cavity plasma panel detector

During the three last years, a complete study of a radiation detector based on plasma panel technology (main component of plasma television display) has been completed using source, cosmic ray and beam. This studies showed a fast response (O(5 ns)), high spatial resolution detection of ionizing particle and minimum ionizing particles. It shows very promising results in term of pixel-to-pixel uniformity and time stability of both signal shapes and rates. The prototype has also demonstrated very low background over a wide range of applied high voltages, excellent pixel response isolation, time resolutions of a few nanoseconds, and efficiencies above 95% over a 100-volt range for beta particles emitted by a {sup 106}Ru radioactive source. A full report will be presented (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Orphan Source Recovery Project in the Russian Federation

After 9/11, officials at the United States Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) grew more concerned about radiological materials that were vulnerable to theft and illicit use around the world. The concern was that terrorists could combine stolen radiological materials with explosives to build and detonate a radiological dispersal device (RDD), more commonly known as a “dirty bomb.” In response to this and other terrorist threats, the DOE/NNSA formed what is now known as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to consolidate and accelerate efforts to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Although a cooperative program was already underway in the Russian Federation to secure nuclear materials at a range of different facilities, thousands of sealed radioactive sources remained vulnerable at medical, research, and industrial sites. In response, GTRI began to focus efforts on addressing these materials. GTRI’s Russia Orphan Source Recovery Project, managed at the Nevada National Security Site’s North Las Vegas facility, was initiated in 2002. Throughout the life of the project, Joint Stock Company “Isotope” has served as the primary Russian subcontractor, and the organization has proven to be a successful partner. Since the first orphan source recovery of an industrial cobalt-60 irradiator with 647 curies (Ci) at an abandoned facility in Moscow in 2003, the GTRI Orphan Source Recovery Project in the Russian Federation has accomplished substantial levels of threat reduction. To date, GTRI has recovered and securely disposed of more than 5,100 sources totaling more that 628,000 Ci. This project serves as an extraordinary example of how international cooperation can be implemented by partners with mutual interests to achieve significant goals.

GTRI, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Russian ↗

High-Energy Calibration of a BGO Detector of the GLAST Burst Monitor

The understanding of the instrumental response of the GLAST Burst Monitor BGO detectors at energies above the energy range which is accessible by common laboratory radiation sources (< 4.43 MeV), is important, especially for the later cross-calibration with the LAT response in the overlap region between {approx}20 MeV to 30 MeV. In November 2006 the high-energy calibration of the GBM-BGO spare detector was performed at the small Van-de-Graaff accelerator at SLAC. High-energy gamma-rays from excited {sup 8}Be* (14.6 MeV and 17.5 MeV) and {sup 16}O* (6.1 MeV) were generated through (p, {gamma})-reactions by irradiating a LiF-target. For the calibration at lower energies radioactive sources were used. The results, including spectra, the energy/channel-relation and the dependence of energy resolution are presented.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Use of the Manuela 3D/Radiation Scanning Tool at Nuclear Facilities - 20437

Licensees, facility operators and decommissioning contractors have a need for comprehensive, accurate and precise radiological and topographical data to plan and execute safe and efficient Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) projects. Traditional approaches rely greatly upon labor and administratively intensive data collection methods that require considerable time and effort to glean the relevant data to plan and perform work in a radiological work area. Orano Decommissioning Services has developed and utilized at French nuclear facilities a lightweight portable scanning instrument called MANUELA (Mobile Apparatus for Nuclear Expertise Localization Assistance). Recently Orano conducted demonstrations at two United States nuclear facilities using MANUELA that may prove useful in areas of the fuel cycle including: - ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) planning during facility operations; - Scoping and site characterization during the D and D planning phase; - Remedial action support during active decommissioning work; - Radiation and modeling planning for plant modifications; - Support Final Status Survey and demonstration of 'end state' compliance for license termination. MANUELA is currently being evaluated for use during decommissioning of nuclear facilities and could aide in demonstrating compliance with end state criteria after decommissioning. Of particular interest are decommissioning projects planned for various sites across the United States. Most of these sites present unique challenges and opportunities to safely and efficiently decommission in a regulatory compliant manner. The two demonstration site's current conditions of relatively low radiation levels inside containment proved to be ideal platforms to deploy the MANUELA instrument for evaluation of the complex geometries typically found in a nuclear facility. The MANUELA instrument was able to precisely identify local hot spots of the reactor system's primary equipment and was able to simultaneously overlay the dose information onto the scanned 3D images. Using data like this, a licensee would be able to make informed technical and personnel decisions on methods to remediate, shield or properly dispose of the radioactive source term. MANUELA can be used throughout the decommissioning process to validate progress and continue to refine the work activities to optimize the efforts of the crew which reduces downtime waiting for survey results, whereas traditional survey methodology relies on a physical survey to be performed and the data transcribed onto survey maps that are only two dimensional. The traditional format tends to be inaccurate and difficult to interpret the precise location(s) of hot spots or generalized dose rates. The resultant scan also allows the user to know the exact extent of the survey versus transposing information onto a map with only a portion of the map area scanned. MANUELA also compiles all of the relevant survey data into a downloadable table format which includes the measurement identification number, time stamp, point space location on the XYZ plane, and the dose rate value. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Microbial Biofilm Growth on Irradiated, Spent Nuclear Fuel Cladding

A fundamental criticism regarding the potential for microbial influenced corrosion in spent nuclear fuel cladding or storage containers concerns whether the required microorganisms can, in fact, survive radiation fields inherent in these materials. This study was performed to unequivocally answer this critique by addressing the potential for biofilm formation, the precursor to microbial-influenced corrosion, in radiation fields representative of spent nuclear fuel storage environments. This study involved the formation of a microbial biofilm on irradiated spent nuclear fuel cladding within a hot cell environment. This was accomplished by introducing 22 species of bacteria, in nutrient-rich media, to test vessels containing irradiated cladding sections and that was then surrounded by radioactive source material. The overall dose rate exceeded 2 Gy/h gamma/beta radiation with the total dose received by some of the bacteria reaching 5 × 103 Gy. This study provides evidence for the formation of biofilms on spent-fuel materials, and the implication of microbial influenced corrosion in the storage and permanent deposition of spent nuclear fuel in repository environments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of online pulse-finding algorithms for the Mu2e Stopping Target Monitor and an evaluation of the signal to background ratio for the Mu2e stopped-muon rate determination

This thesis presents a determination of the acceptance of the Mu2e Stopping Target Monitor (STM) detector for both signal and background events. The rate of X-rays of a specific energy in the STM is used to determine the rate of stopped muons in the aluminium stopping target, which is used as the normalisation for all Mu2e measurements, particularly the branching ratio for a charged lepton flavour violating (cLFV) process. The acceptance for the 347\,keV $2p-1s$ aluminium signal X-ray is determined to be $(8.03 \pm 0.05) \times 10^{-10}$\,cm$^{-2}$ and the acceptance for the background photons (at 347\,keV) to be $(3.19 \pm 0.21) \times 10^{-8}$\,cm$^{-2}$. This results in a signal-to-background ratio of approximately two which is significantly higher than had previously been estimated. These signal-to-background rates are used to determine the time required to achieve a statistical uncertainty of 10\% on the number of 347\,keV X-rays as a function of the detector resolution and back ground rate. For a resolution of 2\,keV, and the background rate determined in this thesis, approximately one minute of data is required. The three corrections needed to be applied to the measured 347\,keV rate to determine the rate of stopped muons are also determined and potential sources of bias arising from the background shape, background fit range and energy calibration are investigated and found to be insignificant. The raw energy of the particles in the STM detector comes from a 16-bit ADC digitising at $\sim 300$\,MHz. It is not possible to store all the raw digitisations and online algorithms have been developed to rapidly select pulses in the detector and reconstruct their energy. The performance of these algorithms has been characterised with simulated data as a function of detector rate and resolution and optimum operating points for the algorithms have been defined. The integrity of the algorithms has also been demonstrated and characterised on test-beam data at high r ates and with radioactive sources at low rates.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

High-fidelity photoneutron detection via neutron activation analysis

To interdict illicit radioactive sources and prevent nuclear terror, governments have deployed portal monitor systems at ports of entry. Such portal monitors rely upon the detection of spontaneously-emitted radiation signatures, however, detection scenarios become more challenging for highly enriched uranium, which emits relatively few spontaneous radiation signatures. Photon active interrogation techniques can augment current cargo inspection scenarios and improve detection capabilities for illicit nuclear material. A high-energy photon interrogation source can induce photofission in nuclear material, producing strong radiation signatures for detection. Prompt fission signals are of specific interest because prompt neutrons are greater than 99% of the fission signal. When using detectors capable of spectroscopy, e.g., pulse shape discrimination-capable organic scintillators, the intense interrogating source often will cause pulse pile-up, degrading particle classification. In this work, we demonstrate photoneutron detection via neutron activation of aluminum and iron. The experiments rely upon nuclear reactions that can only be induced by neutrons, and are robust against pile-up, thereby providing high-confidence neutron rates. In this work, we apply neutron activation analysis for the detection of high-energy neutrons produced by high-energy photon irradiation; the depleted uranium sample was irradiated with a 9-MeV bremsstrahlung beam. We find that the irradiated depleted uranium produced an aluminum activation flux of 1.77 × 10 5 n cm –2 s –1 and an iron-56 activation flux of 1.05 × 10 5 n cm –2 s –1 . Furthermore, the ability to detect radioactivity induced by neutrons created in (, n) and photofission reactions demonstrates a new approach for photon active interrogation to identify nuclear materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Aerial Radiological Survey of the Las Vegas Strip and Adjacent Areas

As proficiency training for the Radiological Mapping mission of the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), a survey team from the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis) conducted an aerial radiological survey of the Las Vegas Strip and adjacent areas on December 29, 2008. This survey was one of the bi-annual surveys carried in support of the city of Las Vegas Police Department (LVPD) before significant events on the Las Vegas Strip: e.g., the annual New Year’s Eve and July Fourth celebrations. The AMS operation and appropriate law enforcement agencies selected this area as an appropriate urban location to exercise AMS capability for mapping environmental radiation and searching for man-made radioactive sources. The surveys covered approximately 11 square miles. Each survey required a 2.5-hour-long flight, performed at an altitude of 300 ft above ground level (AGL) at a line spacing of 600 ft. Water line and test line flights are conducted over the Lake Mead and Government Wash areas to determine the non-terrestrial background contributed by aircraft, radon, and cosmic activity, and to determine the altitude-dependent air mass correction. The data were collected by the AMS data acquisition system (REDAR V) using an array of twelve 2" x 4" x 16" sodium iodide (NaI) detectors flown on-board a twin-engine Bell 412 helicopter. Gamma energy spectral data were collected second-by-second over the survey area. This spectral data allows the system to distinguish between natural terrestrial background contributions and man-made radioisotope contributions. Spectral data can also be used to identify specific man-made radioactive isotopes. Data geo-locations were determined with a Real-Time Differential Global Positioning System (RDGPS).

aerial radiological survey, Las Vegas Strip↗

Anisotropy Characterization of I-125 Seed with Attached Encapsulated Cobalt Chloride Complex Contrast Agent Markers for MRI-Based Prostate Brachytherapy

We have developed a novel MRI marker for prostate brachytherapy. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the changes in anisotropy when cobalt chloride complex contrast agent encapsulated contrast agent markers (C4-ECAM) were placed adjacent to an iodine-125 (I-125) titanium seed, and to verify that the C4-ECAMs were visible on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) after radiation exposure. Two C4-ECAMs were verified to be MRI visible in a phantom before radiation exposure. The C4-ECAMs were then attached to each end of a 12.7-U (10-mCi) I-125 titanium seed in a polymer tube. Anisotropy was measured and analyzed with the seed alone and with attached C4-ECAMs by suspending thermoluminescent dosimeters in a water phantom in 2 circles surrounding the radioactive source with radius of 1 or 2 cm. A T1-weighted MRI evaluation of C4-ECAMs was then performed after exposure to the amount of radiation typically delivered during 1 month of prostate brachytherapy. Measured values of the anisotropy function F(r, {theta}) for the I-125 seed with and without the C4-ECAMs were mutually statistically indistinguishable (standard error of the mean <4.2%) and agreed well with published TG-43 values for the bare seed. As expected, the anisotropy function {phi}{sub an}(r) for the 2 datasets (with and without C4-ECAMs) derived from the measured F(r, {theta}) did not exhibit statistically measurable difference. Both datasets showed agreement with the published TG-43 {phi}{sub an}(r) for the bare seed. The C4-ECAMs were well visualized by MRI after 1 month of radiation exposure. There were no changes in anisotropy when the C4-ECAMs were placed next to an I-125 radioactive seed, and the C4-ECAMs were visualized after radiation exposure.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗