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At least 325 records · Page 18

Fragmentation Prediction for a Brittle Ceramic: a Two-Scale Model Approach

Glass and oxide-ceramic radioactive material forms (e.g., PuO{sub 2}) are susceptible to brittle fracture during handling and transportation. Fracture of these materials may result in the generation of fragments small enough to become airborne, and thus easily dispersed and inhaled. Entrainment and dispersal of particles with dimensions less than 10 μm is generally anticipated under normal aerodynamic conditions. The assessment of the risk to the public and the environment from these materials due to events resulting in their fracture is based on the determination of the source term for environmental release. This source term is typically quantified by an airborne release fraction (ARF) and a respirable fraction (RF) of material generated by a given event. While the recommended empirical bounding values prove satisfactory to comply with the regulatory process for handling and transportation of these materials, they are based on test data for only a few materials subjected to a limited range of loading conditions. Because the final state of fragmentation (in terms of the size and distribution of fragments) is strongly dependent not only on the properties of the material and the energetic loading conditions that lead to breakup, but also on the many intrinsic length scales associated with fragmentation, it is difficult to precisely predict fragmentation characteristics for other brittle solid wastes forms subjected to a wider range of loading conditions based on the test data alone. The purpose of this manuscript is to present a two-scale modeling approach that may be used to simulate the dynamic fragmentation of brittle solid radioactive material forms subjected to general loading and boundary conditions. The method provides the resulting fragment characteristics (average size and size distribution) across the entire fragment range of interest. At the macro-scale, the approach uses a gradient damage elastic continuum mechanics material model within a finite element framework to simulate dynamic fracture under general loading and boundary conditions. Results from the macroscopic calculations are passed to a one-dimensional (1-D) lower length scale model that incorporates the relevant fine scale effects to determine the micro-scale fragmentation. This 1-D micro-scale fragmentation model simulates the internal crack nucleation and opening processes to predict the average fragment size and the fragment size distribution as a function of the material properties, loading conditions, and microscopic characteristic length scale of the material. Results from the lower length scale model are then combined with the macro-scale model fragmentation information to determine the resulting fragment size distribution spanning both length scales. This two-scale model has been exercised on a representative problem drawn from experimental studies, consisting of an impact of a falling weight onto a brittle ceramic. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Historical Perspectives of Very Low-Level Radioactive Waste - 18367

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 61 (10 CFR Part 61), 'Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste', provides licensing procedures, performance objectives, and technical requirements for the issuance of licenses for the land disposal of low-level radioactive waste. Low-level radioactive waste is divided into four categories based on its potential risk and need for isolation. Class A is the lowest category of low-level radioactive waste and poses the least risk. A large percentage of Class A low-level waste contains very low radionuclide concentrations and does not pose a significant health and safety risk. In the current regulatory framework, this waste, referred to as low-activity or very low-level waste, is managed in the same manner as much more hazardous waste. In 1986 and 1990, as a result of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the NRC issued the Below Regulatory Concern (BRC) policy statement. This policy statement established an implementation plan regarding the expeditious handling of rulemaking petitions 'to exempt specific radioactive waste streams from regulation due to the presence of radionuclides in sufficiently low concentrations or quantities as to be below regulatory concern.' The BRC policy statement provided a consistent risk framework when considering regulatory exemption decisions, such as: (1) the release for unrestricted public use of lands and structures containing residual radioactivity; (2) the distribution of consumer products containing small amounts of radioactive material; (3) the disposal of very low-level radioactive waste at other than licensed disposal sites; and (4) the recycling of slightly contaminated equipment and materials. Due to concerns with the BRC policy that were raised by Congress, the States, the public, and others, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which revoked the NRC's 1986 and 1990 BRC policy statements and led to the NRC's formal withdrawal of the BRC policy in 1993. Stakeholders raised concerns on NRC's potential deregulation of radioactive material. Additionally, in March 2005, the NRC staff proposed a rule to amend 10 CFR Part 20, 'Standards for Protection Against Radiation,' to include radiological criteria for controlling the disposition of solid materials with very small amounts of residual radioactivity. The NRC staff also proposed a limited disposition approach for the disposition of solid material, limiting the release of solid material meeting a 0.01 milli-Sievert per year (mSv/yr) [1 milli-rem (mrem/yr)] dose criterion, from licensed control. In June 2005, the Commission disapproved publication of the proposed rule and deferred the rulemaking until a later time, stating that the NRC's existing approach of reviewing specific cases on an individual basis was fully protective of public health and safety. This rulemaking effort was discontinued by the Commission in 2016. Recently, several nuclear power plant licensees have announced early decommissioning of their facilities. Some stakeholders have expressed concerns about the capacity and disposal costs associated with using the four existing low-level waste disposal sites for very low levels of radioactive waste (i.e., waste at the low end of the Class A category). A more risk-informed, performance based approach to waste disposal would allow more flexibility in managing this waste commensurate with its risk and hazard. A new approach would also allow the NRC to align with international standards for this type of waste. The NRC is presently conducting a scoping study to identify the actions the agency should take to strengthen its regulatory framework for very low-level waste disposal. The Very Low-Level Waste (VLLW) scoping study will consider divergent stakeholder comments; lessons learned from the BRC policy statements and the proposed rule on radiological criteria for controlling the disposition of solid materials; and best practices of other countries with respect to VLLW disposal. The NRC will also engage other government agencies to discuss regulatory options for VLLW. This paper offers a historical overview of past NRC initiatives to manage the lower end of Class A waste in a manner that is risk informed and performance based. It examines previous endeavors and discusses the regulatory challenges that arose. It also addresses lessons learned and introduces NRC's current effort regarding very low-level radioactive waste disposal. (authors)

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Helium in the topside Venus ionosphere.

The amount of helium in the Venus atmosphere can be estimated from an examination of the measured ionization profiles and from the recent discovery of radioactive materials in the Venus crust. The amount necessary to give agreement between computed and experimental results is approximately 400,000,000 per cu cm at 140 km. When a nominal value of the eddy diffusion coefficient of 1,000,000 sq cm per sec is used, the atmospheric helium mixing ratio is found to be 0.00006, nearly ten times that for the earth. If agreement is required between the helium mixing ratio estimated from an earth-like distribution of crustal radioactive materials and from the measured ionization profile, the required eddy diffusion coefficient would be 5,000,000 sq cm per sec.

Herman, J. R.↗

ADVANCING THE TRANSPORTATION – SECURITY, TRACKING, AND REPORTING (T-STAR) SYSTEM

The Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System was developed by NNSA NA-21 Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for use during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material to provide detection and tracking capability for shipments. While many off the shelf systems provide asset tracking of the conveyance, few offer detection of a breach into the cargo compartment or the removal of cargo from the conveyance. Systems that do offer such capability need to be permanently installed on the conveyance, requiring drilling of holes and running of cables throughout the conveyance itself. This means that dedicated shipping containers or vehicles are required, and this is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building capacity for the security of radioactive materials in use, storage, and in transport. T-STAR is leveraging various ORNL technologies for improved communications capability and reduced power requirements; the multimode communications module developed by the Unmanned Aerial Systems group and the low power and extensible Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) tag developed for the US Department of Energy’s Packaging Certification Program provide a small footprint tracking system which can be installed quickly as needed. T-STAR uses a cellular and an Iridium modem to communicate configuration and alert information to a server used to monitor the shipment and incorporates a Z-wave © wireless security system allowing various intrusion detection sensors to be located in the conveyance. The Z-wave sensors are readily available, inexpensive, and power efficient, making them replaceable and low maintenance. The server software be configured as a standalone system installed on a light duty computer hosted by the competent authority, carrier, or response agency, or hosted as part of an Amazon Cloud Server (AWS) accessible via a secure login. The server has two functions, first is to handle messages to/from the T-STAR field unit, second is to host the user interface which can be accessed using a web browser on desktop or mobile device. The user interface implements roles to determine the level of access to shipment information, define geo-fences, and configure notifications. The user interface also supports multiple languages for display as well as notifications by using a simple lookup file which can be modified by the host country to ensure translations are correct and meaningful to responders receiving notifications and alerts. This paper will detail the overarching T-STAR capabilities, architecture and components, and provide insights on how it is deployed, used, and monitored during transportation of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael↗

Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2013: DOE Operations at The Boeing Company, Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Area IV

This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for 2013 describes the environmental conditions related to work performed for the Department of Energy (DOE) at Area IV of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL). The Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC), a government-owned, company-operated test facility, was located in Area IV. The operations in Area IV included development, fabrication, operation and disassembly of nuclear reactors, reactor fuel, and other radioactive materials. Other activities in the area involved the operation of large-scale liquid metal facilities that were used for testing non-nuclear liquid metal fast breeder reactor components. All nuclear work was terminated in 1988, and all subsequent radiological work has been directed toward environmental restoration and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the former nuclear facilities and their associated sites. Liquid metal research and development ended in 2002. Since May 2007, the D&D operations in Area IV have been suspended by the DOE, but the environmental monitoring and characterization programs have continued. Results of the radiological monitoring program for the calendar year 2013 continue to indicate that there are no significant releases of radioactive material from Area IV of SSFL. All potential exposure pathways are sampled and/or monitored, including air, soil, surface water, groundwater, direct radiation, transfer of property (land, structures, waste), and recycling. Due to the suspension of D&D activities in Area IV, no effluents were released into the atmosphere during 2013. Therefore, the potential radiation dose to the general public through airborne release was zero. Similarly, the radiation dose to an offsite member of the public (maximally exposed individual) due to direct radiation from SSFL is indistinguishable from background. All radioactive wastes are processed for disposal at DOE disposal sites and/or other licensed sites approved by DOE for radioactive waste disposal. No liquid radioactive wastes were released into the environment in 2013.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Laser ablation spectrometry for studies of uranium plasmas, reactor monitoring, and spent fuel safety

Nuclear security is one of the defining challenges of our time. Nuclear threats range from deliberate dispersal of radioactive material to contaminate the vital infrastructure to diversion and smuggling of special nuclear material for clandestine nuclear programs and nuclear terrorism, respectively. There is an associated need to develop and sustain the nuclear forensics capabilities, which requires the understanding of complex processes that occur in plasmas of nuclear materials. The area of nuclear safety has seen a resurgence of public interest, and there is a concomitant need to safely store used nuclear fuel and detect structural material failure in nuclear power systems, especially in innovative reactor designs envisioned for future adoption. Laser-produced plasmas are complicated extreme environments that can generate intense and rich, highly specific signatures of nuclear and radiological materials, which can then be explored in a wide range of applications. They include interdiction and rapid detection of nuclear materials, including their isotopic composition, detection over long distances, laboratory simulation of weapons effects, monitoring the condition of structural materials in dry cask storage containers, and novel instrumentation for nuclear power systems. We present a compilation of recent representative examples of the application of laser spectroscopy, and laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy in particular, to nuclear safety and security problems. A case is made that spectroscopic techniques based on laser-produced plasmas offer complementary, and sometimes unique, capabilities that motivate the continued exploration of their efficient production and understanding of the signatures they produce

(020.3260) Isotope shifts, (140.3440) Laser-induce↗

2019 Public Debate on the French Waste Plan - 20181

For the first time, a public debate has preceded the preparation of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan (PNGMDR). This debate, which took place over 5 months from 17 April to 25 September, was held by decision of the French National Public Debate Commission (CNDP), an independent administrative authority responsible for public participation in major projects and plans/programmes with environmental impacts. To organise and lead the debate, the CNDP appointed a Special Commission. (authors)

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Annual Site Environmental Report, Department of Energy Operations at the Energy Technology Engineering Center – Area IV, Santa Susana Field Laboratory

This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for 2014 describes the environmental conditions related to work performed for the DOE at Area IV of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL). The ETEC, a government-owned, company-operated test facility, was located in Area IV. The operations in Area IV included development, fabrication, operation and disassembly of nuclear reactors, reactor fuel, and other radioactive materials. Other activities in the area involved the operation of large-scale liquid metal facilities that were used for testing non-nuclear liquid metal fast breeder reactor components. All nuclear work was terminated in 1988, and all subsequent radiological work has been directed toward environmental restoration and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the former nuclear facilities and their associated sites. Liquid metal research and development ended in 2002. Since May 2007, the D&D operations in Area IV have been suspended by the DOE, but the environmental monitoring and characterization programs have continued. Results of the radiological monitoring program continue to indicate that there are no significant releases of radioactive material from Area IV of SSFL. All potential exposure pathways are sampled and/or monitored, including air, soil, surface water, groundwater, direct radiation, transfer of property (land, structures, waste), and recycling.

Frazee, Brad↗

Lessons Learned from Hanford's Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project - 20509

In 2019, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) completed structurally stabilizing the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant (Purex) waste storage Tunnel 2 with engineered grout. This action significantly reduced risk to Hanford workers, the surrounding community and environment by preventing future collapse of the tunnel and possible release of radioactive materials. Decades of plutonium production at the Purex facility required construction of two large underground tunnels for storage of highly contaminated plutonium processing equipment that had failed during the operation of Purex and other facilities across the Hanford Site. Following the partial collapse of Purex Tunnel 1 on May 9, 2017, DOE and CHPRC took immediate action to safely stabilize the collapsed section of the tunnel. The hole in the tunnel was filled the next day as a temporary stabilization measure, and no contamination was detected as a result of the partial collapse of the tunnel. Workers then stabilized Tunnel 1 in its entirety by filling with engineered grout, which also encapsulated the radioactive equipment and railcars within the tunnel. Grouting eliminated the risk of further collapse and stabilized the tunnel contents, all while not precluding future remedial actions or final closure decisions. While conducting an integrity analysis of Tunnel 1 by using construction drawings, photos and other historical documents, project teams also analyzed the much larger Purex Tunnel 2. The analysis found Tunnel 2 did not meet current codes for structural integrity, and it may not be able to bear the weight of the soil above the tunnel. Therefore, it was determined that Tunnel 2 was also at risk of collapse. DoE's independent panel of experts determined grouting to be the best choice for stabilizing Tunnel 2 because it provides the highest level of stability and protection, and does not preclude future remedial actions. DOE authorized CHPRC to commence work and the Purex Tunnel 2 Structural Stabilization Project was launched in December of 2017. The paper will discuss the process of recognizing the following critical aspects and risks associated with stabilizing Tunnel 2, and the actions taken by the project team to mitigate these risks, including: - Tunnel investigation and data collection to assist with future remediation; - On-site batching and mock-ups to provide the large quantity of grout required for stabilizing the tunnel; - Workforce involvement and innovative actions that mitigated the project's most significant potential hazards, including traffic control; - Project team high level of execution translated into successful project execution. Sharing lessons learned from this critical risk-reduction effort can enhance the safety and efficiency of other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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Mapping the scattered family tree of fission neutrons

A statistically predicted tendency for neutrons produced inside fission reactors to form in clusters can cause asymmetrical energy production that is counterbalanced, at least in part, by the spontaneous fission of radioactive material in the reactor. This neutron-clustering effect theory has been demonstrated in a nuclear reactor for the first time and was described in an article published by Los Alamos National Laboratory. The findings of a study supported by the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, funded through the National Nuclear Security Administration, and carried out in collaboration with two French nuclear agencies—the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA)—could improve reactor safety and lead to more accurate simulations, according to LANL. The team found that a complete die-off was avoided in the small reactor because spontaneous fission—nuclear splitting of radioactive material inside reactors that is not caused by direct impact from a fission neutron—creates more neutrons. The balance of fission chain reactions and spontaneous fission lessens the impact of energy bursts created by clustering neutrons.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Site Environmental Report For Calendar Year 2012. DOE Operations at The Boeing Company Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Area IV

This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for 2012 describes the environmental conditions related to work performed for the Department of Energy (DOE) at Area IV of Boeing’s Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL). The Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC), a government-owned, company-operated test facility, was located in Area IV. The operations in Area IV included development, fabrication, operation and disassembly of nuclear reactors, reactor fuel, and other radioactive materials. Other activities in the area involved the operation of large-scale liquid metal facilities that were used for testing non-nuclear liquid metal fast breeder reactor components. All nuclear work was terminated in 1988, and all subsequent radiological work has been directed toward environmental restoration and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the former nuclear facilities and their associated sites. Liquid metal research and development ended in 2002. Since May 2007, the D&D operations in Area IV have been suspended by the DOE, but the environmental monitoring and characterization programs have continued. Results of the radiological monitoring program for the calendar year 2012 continue to indicate that there are no significant releases of radioactive material from Area IV of SSFL. All potential exposure pathways are sampled and/or monitored, including air, soil, surface water, groundwater, direct radiation, transfer of property (land, structures, waste), and recycling.

Liu, Ning↗

Applicability of Developed Calculation Models to Predict Long-term Behavior of Metal Seals - Necessary Scope of Tests - 19311

The long-term sealing behavior of metal seals, assembled in the lid system of casks for transportation and storage of radioactive materials, has been investigated. For that purpose, phenomenological models describing the time- and temperature dependent behavior have been introduced by BAM since 2016, e.g. by using the time-temperature superposition principle. Results have shown that these models describe the relaxation behavior adequately and are suitable for extrapolations. In this work, the applicability of these models is checked by analyzing the necessary scope of tests, which must be carried out to get sufficient information about the long-term behavior of metal seals based on short-term tests. (authors)

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Enhancing Risk Analysis of Accidental Release Using CFD Modeling and Machine Learning

This project report presents the results from the AU31 project that is entitled “Enhancing Risk Analysis of Accidental Release Using CFD Modeling and Machine Learning” performed between FY2021 and FY2022. The technical objective of this project is to enhance risk analysis of accidental release of radioactive materials and provide novel risk forecasting and capabilities for assessing unplanned hazardous chemical releases for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The approach includes a cross-platform finite element analysis of airborne chemical release, machine learning (ML) for simulation and forecasting, and a big data approach to data management, transformation and analysis capable of handling petabyte-scale unstructured and structured data. The outcome of these findings were assembled and accessible as a final output via an intuitive web hosted geospatial-based user interface for demonstration and general dissemination. These new results also provide a mechanism of combining this knowledge in a risk analysis framework tool. The geospatial analysis and output can utilize 5 years of qualified meteorological data to illustrate projected plume footprints that are generated from computational aspects of this study. Specifically, we show the development of a geospatial risk analysis capabilities to respond to and plan for accidental release of radioactive materials and to provide a risk forecasting tool for assessing hazardous chemical releases for the DOE. The focus of this effort is germane to common practices in risk analysis; and it is highly relevant to the timely and transparent release of information related to materials at risk including hazardous materials and chemical vapors and rapid assessment of the potential impacts on the workforce at active sites across the DOE complex.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Explicit Dynamic Impact Analysis of the Building 3525 Packages

The safe transport and handling of radioactive material containers is critical to ensure the protection of personnel, facilities, and the environment. Accidental drops during handling pose a significant hazard, necessitating robust design and analysis to mitigate potential consequences. This study presents an explicit dynamic impact analysis of two container designs, the Baby Sugarman and the Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF) Tall Boy, used in Building 3525 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The analysis employed nonlinear finite element modeling in LS-DYNA to simulate free-fall impacts from a height of 16.5 ft across eight critical orientations. The study evaluated deformation, strain failure, and shielding integrity under these extreme conditions. Results demonstrated that both designs maintain structural integrity, with no breaches or loss of shielding under specified administrative controls. Notably, a maximum shielding loss of 10 lbs was observed during a top-corner drop, highlighting the need to limit drop heights to less than 1 ft for certain orientations. These findings underscore the effectiveness of engineering controls and design measures in preventing containment breaches and ensuring compliance with safety requirements. This work provides a comprehensive methodology for impact analysis, contributing valuable insights to the field of radioactive materials packaging and transportation safety.

Martinez, Oscar [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000181814046)↗

Development of a military-specific mesh-type computational phantom library and its application to internal dosimetry and in-field radiological triage screening

Estimates of organ-absorbed and committed doses to individuals exposed to radioactive materials via acute inhalation often rely on internal dose coefficients and detector responses from reference human computational models. To achieve more accurate dose assessments to United States Armed Forces service members exposed in-field, computational models with varying morphometric parameters representative of this population are necessary. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 145 provides detailed mesh reference computational phantoms (MRCPs) for adult males and females, with morphometric parameters matched to the 50th percentile. Previously, these phantoms were 2D and 3D scaled to match desired height, mass, and secondary anthropomorphic parameters in the creation of the University of Florida / Memorial Sloan Kettering (UF/MSK) computational phantom library. To achieve body fat percentage targets required for accession into the US Armed Forces, muscle and fat volumes were adjusted accordingly, thus, creating the UF/Department of Defence computational phantom library presented in this study. A comprehensive library of mesh-type computational human phantoms was created, including 57 adult males and 49 adult females with morphometric parameters aligned with United States Armed Forces service members. Phantoms were restricted to a body mass index between 19 and 27.5, with body fat percentages below 26% for males and 36% for females. Specific absorbed fractions were computed for selected source and target combinations, demonstrating how variations in height and body mass influence energy absorption in target regions relative to the ICRP MRCPs. Radiation detector responses were also computed, revealing that higher body masses resulted in decreased registered counts in the detection volume. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating morphometric variability in computational phantoms to achieve more accurate dose assessments and radiation detection responses for United States Armed Forces service members who inhale radioactive materials in-field.

computational phantoms↗

Fall Protection Procedures for Sealing Bulk Waste Shipments by Rail Cars at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites - 13509

Rail-cars loaded with radioactive materials must be closed and fastened to comply with United States Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements before they shipped. Securing waste shipments in a manner that meets these regulations typically results in the use of a sealable rail-car liner. Workers accessing the tops of the 2.74 m high rail-cars to seal and inspect liners for compliance prior to shipment may be exposed to a fall hazard. Relatively recent revisions to the Fall Protection requirements in the Safety and Health Requirements Manual (EM385-1-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) have necessitated modifications to the fall protection systems previously employed for rail-car loading at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In response these projects have developed site-specific procedures to protect workers and maintain compliance with the improved fall protection regulations. (authors)

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Approaches for Communicating Technical Information - 16012

Projects within the nuclear industry are generally complex and associated with high hazards. To achieve success there is often a necessity to apply innovation or adopt longer term strategies and solutions. Because of these long timescales and the fact that some approaches revolve around allowing natural radioactive decay to take place prior to visible action, the industry is sometimes perceived to be technically unable to make progress with its environmental and waste management obligations. Work within the industry additionally takes on a high profile and invariably creates greater levels of anxiety and mistrust in the eyes of stakeholders than comparable projects from non-nuclear related industries. Many aspects of the industry are still seen as secretive, environmentally detrimental and 'risky' and all components of the nuclear life-cycle are therefore open to external scrutiny. Although communication and engagement has increased greatly over the years, especially in developed countries, there is still room for improvement in this field. Such improvement might relate to the frequency and level of engagement, the subject matter or the actual process itself. Communication with stakeholders is required throughout the various phases of the nuclear lifecycle whether the activity relates to mining/milling of uranium, fuel production, operational plant activities, decommissioning, remediation or waste management. The concerns and aspirations of stakeholders during these different activities will vary but need to be adequately addressed. Some organisations now have a basic engagement program and convince themselves that they are carrying out true engagement. But just ticking a box to say that an engagement program is in place does not provide evidence of its appropriateness or success as on many occasions' organisations might still not understand how to adequately engage and communicate technical information. It is not always the information we choose to communicate but that which might be withheld that is often perceived to be most relevant to the stakeholder community. Communicating technical information isn't as straightforward as it sounds, but still has to be undertaken, otherwise trust, understanding and acceptance of chosen options will not be achieved. I utilise what I call the 'ten principles of engagement' which I believe can help when communicating technical Information in relation to nuclear and radiological matters. These are; 1. Develop Trust. 2. Educating people and providing information in a transparent manner. 3. Develop an engagement process that is truly a two way process. 4. Openly discuss risk perception and risk communication. 5. Never try to trivialise risk. 6. Where possible, simplify the language you use. 7. Put background and naturally occurring radioactivity into context. 8. Explain how radioactive materials are often used in everyday life. 9. Try to demonstrate that you too are a member of the public. 10.Walk the talk - Try to undertake what you wish others to undertake. Further research is being undertaken to determine if Mental Models might assist with the communication of nuclear and radiological information. A mental model is an explanation of someone's thought process about how something works in the real world. The mental model approach aims to investigate the judgment and decision-making processes of both expert and lay groups, thus allowing a comparison and visualisation of the different views to be made. It is undoubtedly worthwhile keeping a watching brief on the outcome of such research as we strive to improve our communication with the general public. The aim of this paper is to highlight some simple principles and approaches that can assist with the communication of technical information. (authors)

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SU-E-T-388: Estimating the Radioactivity Inventory of a Cyclotron Based Pencil Beam Proton Therapy Facility

Purpose: Parts of the cyclotron and energy degrader are incidentally activated by protons lost during the acceleration and transport of protons for radiation therapy. An understanding of the radioactive material inventory is needed when regulatory requirements are assessed. Methods: First, the tumor dose and volume is used to determine the required energy deposition. For spot scanning, the tumor length along the beam path determines the number of required energy layers. For each energy layer the energy deposition per proton can be calculated from the residual proton range within the tumor. Assuming a typical layer weighting, an effective energy deposition per proton can then be calculated. The total number of required protons and the number of protons per energy layer can then be calculated. For each energy layer, proton losses in the energy degrader are calculated separately since its transmission efficiency, and hence the amount of protons lost, is energy dependent. The degrader efficiency also determines the number of protons requested from the cyclotron. The cyclotron extraction efficiency allows a calculation of the proton losses within the cyclotron. The saturation activity induced in the cyclotron and the degrader is equal to the production rate R for isotopes whose half-life is shorter that the projected cyclotron life time. R can be calculated from the proton loss rate and published production cross sections. Results: About 1/3 of the saturation activity is produced in the cyclotron and 2/3 in the energy degrader. For a projected case mix and a patient load of 1100 fractions per week at 1.8 Gy per fraction a combined activity of 180 mCi was estimated at saturation. Conclusion: Calculations were used to support to application of a radioactive materials license for the possession of 200 mCi of activity for isotopes with atomic numbers ranging from 1-83.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗