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Planetary protection for Mars missions is described, and the approach being taken by the Mars Exploration Rover Project is discussed. Specific topics include alcohol wiping, dry heat microbial reduction, microbiological assays, and the Kennedy Space center's PHSF clean room.
In the search for life on Mars, keeping its surface pristine and free of microbes due to human presence is of utmost importance. Astronauts will use emptied logistics containers during their Martian stay to store waste. These containers will be left on the planet’s surface and are a potential source of microbial contamination. It is desired for these containers to be free from leaks for a minimum of 50 years. If leaks do occur a likely location will be at the port. At this location the mating surfaces will be sealed using a flexible gasket material like a thin metal or a polymer. Eventually these seals will fail. To mitigate these effects, a particulate filter can be employed to equilibrate the pressure between the Martin environment and inside the container. To meet planetary protection requirements, the filter can only allow particulates smaller than 0.2 um diameter to pass. This paper discusses why a particulate filter may be needed and how such a filter would be tested to survive and operate in the harsh Martian environment.
This viewgraph presentation reviews the recommendations and implications for Planetary Protection (PP) as recomended by the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG). This study was formulated in 17 recommendations to NASA in a report Preventing the Forward Contamination of Mars (PREVCOM). Particular attention is paid to the recommendation number 5 that states "Require routine collection of phylogenetic data and require systematic archiving of environmental samples from Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations (ATLO) environments and spacecraft."
Mars exploration motivates the search for extraterrestrial life, the development of space technologies, and the design of human missions and habitations. Here, we seek new insights and pose unresolved questions relating to the natural history of Mars, habitability, robotic and human exploration, planetary protection, and the impacts on human society.
The cleanliness requirements for an organic-detection instrument, like the Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS), on a Planetary Protection Class IVb mission can be extremely stringent. These include surface molecular and particulate, outgassing, and bioburden. The prime contractor for the European Space Agencys ExoMars 2018 project, Thales Alenia Space Italy, provided requirements based on a standard, conservative approach of defining limits which yielded levels that are unverifiable by standard cleanliness verification methods. Additionally, the conservative method for determining contamination surface area uses underestimation while conservative bioburden surface area relies on overestimation, which results in inconsistencies for the normalized reporting. This presentation will provide a survey of the challenge to define requirements that can be reasonably verified and still remain appropriate to the core science of the ExoMars mission.
Prior to potentially sending humans to the surface of Mars, it is fundamentally important to return samples from Mars. Analysis in Earth's extensive scientific laboratories would significantly reduce the risk of human Mars exploration and would also support the science and engineering decisions relating to the Mars human flight architecture. The importance of measurements of any returned Mars samples range from critical to desirable, and in all cases these samples will would enhance our understanding of the Martian environment before potentially sending humans to that alien locale. For example, Mars sample return (MSR) could yield information that would enable human exploration related to 1) enabling forward and back planetary protection, 2) characterizing properties of Martian materials relevant for in situ resource utilization (ISRU), 3) assessing any toxicity of Martian materials with respect to human health and performance, and 4) identifying information related to engineering surface hazards such as the corrosive effect of the Martian environment. In addition, MSR would be engineering 'proof of concept' for a potential round trip human mission to the planet, and a potential model for international Mars exploration.
This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.
When are aseptic operations necessary? In order to meet certain bioburden requirements, some components must undergo dry heat microbial reduction (DHMR) or other sterilizing procedures. If sensitive surfaces must be re-exposed after DHMR, this could compromise the bioburden levels. Recontaminating sterilized surfaces could be costly both in time by requiring repeated DHMR and risk to the hardware, which may not be compatible with repeated high temperature bakes. In order to prevent recontamination of the sensitive surfaces, an aseptic environment and sterile technique must be employed. Aseptic environments mean working in a space with almost no detectable bioburden in the air or on surfaces. Ideally, DHMR happens as late as possible to avoid requiring aseptic operations, as it can be considered a high-risk operations. Preparing the cleanroom for aseptic operations Establishing an ISO (International Organization for Standardization) class 5 space to minimize airborne particles. Maintain low bioburden in the cleanroom by using biocidal cleaners. Using multiple biocidal techniques decreases the likelihood of selecting for resistant microorganisms. 70% Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA) denatures the proteins in a microorganism (note: 70% IPA is better at killing microorganisms than 100% IPA) 7% hydrogen peroxide: damages DNA and proteins through oxygen radical damage. Ultraviolet-C (UV-C) lamps: causes crosslinking in DNA which prevents replication. Monitor cleanroom regularly for bioburden trending: Standard bioassay: Swab or wipe samples of cleanroom surfaces processed for colony forming unity (viable or spore selected); Rapid bioassay: Adenosine triphosphate (ATP) or Limulus amebocyte lysate (LAL) for a bioburden snapshot. High levels can signal an immediate re-cleaning before standard bioassay samples are taken. Airborne monitoring: Active (pulling air through a filter) or passive (particle fallout) for bioburden. Verify bioburden levels just before aseptic operation. Test hardware and cleanroom surfaces and air 3 days before the planned aseptic operation. Rapid bioburden just before aseptic operation to ensure room was not re-contaminated. Preparing personnel and tools: Personnel training. Everyone in the cleanroom: Standard cleanroom certification Everyone on the team: 1 day Planetary Protection overview. Aseptic operators only: Half-day aseptic operations training. Covers sterile garmenting/gloves, Sterile handling with a focus on contact transfer risk, tool/GSE preparation, and two-operator system for opening sterilized tools/components. Tool sterilization: All tools to be used during an aseptic operation need to be identified. Compatible tools are sterilized by DHMR or Autoclave. Double wrapped so that the exterior bag can be handled by a non-sterile operator, and the sterile. Tools that are not compatible with high heat do not come in contact with sensitive surfaces: either substitutes are found, or tools are isolated by wrapping in sterile foil. During an aseptic operation. Pre-task to make sure everyone understands the operations, who is handling what, and when the most critical surfaces will be exposed. Monitoring during the operation. Bioburden: active and passive airborne bioburden sampling, glove-tip dabs onto a plate after completion of operation (3 days for results). Particles: real time particle counter constantly running, with alarm for exceeding ISO 5 conditions.
Mars-bound rovers such as the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) endure strict planetary protection implementation campaigns to assess bioburden. The objective of this study is to identify cultivable microorganisms isolated by the NASA Standard Assay from spacecraft during pre-launch and evaluate their potential to survive conditions on the Martian surface. Of approximately 350 isolates collected from the MER spacecraft archive, 171 microorganisms were reconstituted for characterization via 16S rRNA fingerprinting. Alignment of 16S sequences revealed high levels of sequence similarity to spore-forming species, overwhelmingly of the genera Bacillus (73.7%) and Paenibacillus (14.0%). Samples underwent phenotype characterization employing multiple carbon sources and ion concentrations in an automated microarray format using the Omnilog system. Working and stock cultures were prepared to address the immediate needs for day-to-day culture utilization and long-term preservation, respectively. Results from this study produced details about the microbes that contaminate surfaces of spacecraft, as well as a preliminary evaluation of a rapid biochemical ID method that also provides a phenotypic assessment of contaminants. The overall outcome of this study will benefit emerging cleaning and sterilization technologies for preventing forward contamination that could negatively impact future life detection or sample return missions.
Planetary Protection (PP) requirements help to ensure the integrity of life-detection science conducted on solar system bodies, particularly those with liquid water. Such requirements are often met by a combination of cleaning and verification steps to reduce microbial contamination (i.e. bioburden) to an acceptable limit. There are only two cleaning methods approved by the National and Space Administration (NASA), vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) and heat microbial reduction (HMR), the latter of which is the most commonly employed. However, HMR can be harsh and produce its own concerns about material integrity, like aging or increasing hardness. When bioburden reduction methods cannot be employed, the project must rely on assumed NASA specification values of bioburden which can cause compliance issues with strict PP bioburden limitations. This work aimed to more accurately define the risk of contamination of a target body by providing empirical data associated with raw materials commonly used in solid rocket motors for lander missions. In this study, we pulverized nonmetallic materials using a cryogenic grinder, then analyzed the resulting substrate for microbial colony forming units (CFU). We found that many nonmetallic materials do not harbor large bioburden when compared with the NASA specification values, though a range existed depending on the material, treatment, and handling. The results from this work provide quantitative data to help reduce concerns of contamination, while also providing a foundation for follow up studies into additional sterilization methods and molecular identification of contaminating microbes.
The ExoMars 2020 Rover is a life detection mission, and is classified as Planetary Protection (PP) Mission Category IVb, the first IVb mission since the Viking missions. Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS) is a life detection instrument for the rover. To meet the stringent bioburden requirement of 0.03 spore/m2, the MS is subjected to Dry Heat Microbial Reduction (DHMR) to decrease the bioburden from a measured 88 spores/m2 to 0.009 spores/m2. After DHMR, exposure of the sample path must be kept to an absolute minimum and requires aseptic operations. Aseptic operations include determining the safe exposure time based on the surface area of exposure and particle fallout expected in the aseptic ISO class 5 workspace, preparing an aseptic ISO class 5 workspace, and using sterile garments and tools. During the exposure activity the environment is monitored with active and passive fallout for bioburden and real time airborne particle counts. Sterile tools are handled by a two person team so the operator touches only the tool and not the exterior surfaces of the sterilization pouch, and a sterile operating field is established as a safe place to organize tools or parts during the aseptic operations. In cases where aseptic operations are not feasible, localized DHMR is used after exposure. Any breach in the PP cleanliness can necessitate repeating instrument level DHMR, which not only has significant cost and schedule implications, but also is a risk to hardware that is not rated for repeated long exposures to high temperatures.
NASA's Mars Sample Return (MSR) project will bring Mars surface and atmosphere samples back to Earth for detailed examination. Langley Research Center's MSR Earth Entry Vehicle (EEV) is a core part of the mission, protecting the sample container during atmospheric entry, descent, and landing. Planetary protection requirements demand a higher reliability from the EEV than for any previous planetary entry vehicle. An overview of the EEV design and preliminary analysis is presented, with a follow-on discussion of recommended future design trade studies to be performed over the next several years in support of an MSR launch in 2018 or 2020. Planned topics include vehicle size for impact protection of a range of sample container sizes, outer mold line changes to achieve surface sterilization during re-entry, micrometeoroid protection, aerodynamic stability, thermal protection, and structural materials selection.
Extraterrestrial sample return is a growing component of solar system exploration. Currently, four missions, Stardust, 1 Muses-C, 2 Genesis, and Mars Sample Return, are under development that employ sample return as a prime component of the mission architecture. Respectively, these missions will return samples from the tail of a comet, an asteroid, the solar wind, and, Mars. An important component of these missions and the focus of this paper is the design of the sample return capsule (SRC). The purpose of the SRC is to safely return to Earth any gathered samples for terrestrial analysis. The two major design constraints for any SRC are as follows: 1) it must be able to survive a high-speed Earth entry (11 km/s to as a high as 15 km/s), 2) the mass of the SRC must be as small as possible. Because the SRC mass is carried from Earth to the sample sight and back, the SRC mass is a strong driver in the mission mass budget. Further, for the Mars Sample Return Capsule, planetary protection is another constraint. For this capsule, the probability of planetary contamination at Earth due to an SRC failure at entry must be minimal. For an SRC, a possible failure mechanism is severe local heating as a result of cavities and or protuberances in the SRC forebody heatshield. For example, the Apollo Command Module had a number of cavities and protuberances as part of the baseline designs Wind-tunnel tests of models containing small cavities and protuberances showed severe local heating augmentations in the vicinity of these surface discontinuities.4-5 As another example, the Genesis SRC forebody heat-shield contains penetrations (cavities) to mount the vehicle to the carrier bus. It is expected that these penetrations will also experience a severe local heating environment. A concern is that the large thermal gradients may produce sufficient thermal stress to cause local mechanical failure of the heatshield. Penetrations to the forebody heat-shield can also result from damage at vehicle integration, during launch, or during transportation of the sample return capsule from earth to the sample site and back. For example, the Starting SRC was damaged near the shoulder during the heatshield integration process producing a local surface discontinuity. Also, the Starting SRC traverses through the tail of a comet and is in space for 7 years. Thus, damage to the heatshield as a result of micrometeroid impact is a concern. Finally, it is difficult to characterize the effects of these potential heatshield singularities with ground-test facilities. Either detailed simulation or a dedicated flight test is required.
NASA's current plans for solar system exploration are summarized, focusing on the robotic missions planned for the next decade. The areas in which these mission engage the legal community as regards planetary protection, launch and use in space of nuclear materials, and possession of planetary resources by telepresence are considered.
The Electron Microscopy Abrasion Analysis of Candidate Fabrics for Planetary Space Suit Protective Overgarment Application is in support of the Abrasion Resistance Materials Screening Test. The fundamental assumption made for the SEM abrasion analysis was that woven fabrics to be used as the outermost layer of the protective overgarment in the design of the future, planetary space suits perform best when new. It is the goal of this study to determine which of the candidate fabrics was abraded the least in the tumble test. The sample that was abraded the least will be identified at the end of the report as the primary candidate fabric for further investigation. In addition, this analysis will determine if the abrasion seen by the laboratory tumbled samples is representative of actual EVA Apollo abrasion.
Sample return missions seek to collect samples from planets, moons, asteroids, and other planetary bodies and return them to earth for in-depth analysis. Backward planetary protection requirements are often in place for such missions to prevent the introduction of any extra-terrestrial material into the Earth’s biosphere, which could occur if a meteoroid or space debris particle were to damage a critical part of the returning spacecraft. The ability of a shielding system used to mitigate this damage risk is typically characterized by a ballistic limit equation (BLE), which predicts whether or not a protected system or structural element will sustain a critical failure due to a high-speed impact. In this paper, we develop a particle-impact-based BLE for the thermal protection system (TPS) of a sample return spacecraft that is protected by a multi-shock shield. The predictions of the BLE we develop for TPS failure are shown to be consistent with the predictions of hydrocode simulations.
Dry heat microbial reduction is the only NASA approved sterilization method to reduce the microbial bioburden on space-flight hardware prior to launch. Reduction of the microbial bioburden on spacecraft is necessary to meet planetary protection requirements specific for the mission. Microbial bioburden reduction also occurs if a spacecraft enters a planetary atmosphere (e.g., Mars) and is heated due to frictional forces. Temperatures reached during atmospheric entry events (>200 C) are sufficient to damage or destroy flight hardware and also kill microbial spores that reside on the in-bound spacecraft. The goal of this research is to determine the survival rates of bacterial spores when they are subjected to conditions similar to those the spacecraft would encounter (i.e., temperature, pressure, etc.). B. subtilis var. niger spore coupons were exposed to a range of temperatures from 125 C to 200 C in a vacuum oven (at <1 Torr). After the exposures, the spores were removed by sonication, dilutions were made, and the spores were plated using the pour plate method with tryptic soy agar. After 3 days incubation at 32 C, the number of colony-forming units was counted. Lethality rate constants and D-values were calculated at each temperature. The calculated D-values were: 27 minutes (at 125 C), 13 minutes (at 135 C), and <0.1 minutes (at 150 C). The 125 C and 135 C survivor curves appeared as concavedownward curves. The 150 C survivor curve appeared as a straight-line. Due to the prolonged ramp-up time to the exposure conditions, spore killing during the ramp-up resulted in insufficient data to draw curves for exposures at 160 C, 175 C, and 200 C. Exploratory experiments using novel techniques, with short ramp times, for performing high temperature exposures were also examined. Several of these techniques, such as vacuum furnaces, thermal spore exposure vessels, and laser heating of the coupons, will be discussed.
In accordance with NASA Planetary Protection (PP) policy requirements, flight project hardware may be required to undergo microbial reduction processes to prevent the forward contamination of target planetary bodies with Earth organisms. Heat microbial reduction (HMR) is the most commonly employed modality used at JPL for reducing the microbial bioburden on flight hardware. In 2013, longstanding HMR specifications were abandoned, and revised specifications were developed which integrated the latest findings on bacterial spore heat resistivity. Revised decimal reduction values (D-values) for time-temperature lethality curves (110 °C to 200 °C) were developed to account for “hardy” bacterial spores that exhibit greater heat resistance than previously understood. Presented here is a comparative analysis of the revised NASA HMR specifications against empirical data compiled from recent JPL studies, and peer-reviewed, published literature. Bacillus sp. strain ATCC 29669 displayed high heat resistance, and this strain’s 4-log heat lethality curve was comparable to the revised 4-log specification. Spores of Bacillus atrophaeus ATCC 9372 displayed less heat resistance, and exhibited D-values which were less than the revised 3-log microbial reduction specifications. Extrapolations indicate that the current 6-log reduction credit applied to 350 °C for 1 hr. and 500 °C for 0.5 sec. is highly conservative. Projections indicate that a 10- to 18-log reduction of both hardy and non-hardy spores may be achievable at bakeouts of 350 °C for 1 hr. The findings reported here indicate the revised NASA HMR specifications from 110 °C to 200 °C are appropriate for achieving 4-log and 6-log reductions with hardy spore populations; however, for non-hardy spore populations, or for temperatures above 200 °C, the specifications are exceedingly conservative.