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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 325 records · Page 18
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts

Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) training is essential and required for NCS professionals to ensure that fissionable materials outside of nuclear reactors are safely processed, handled, stored, and transported. Furthermore, the requirement of training in NCS is mandated in several international and domestic documents. In this regard, management has an obligation to establish an NCS training program that provides confidence in the continuing proficiency of personnel, and supervisors must ensure that their staff is suitably trained. Training of all personnel in nuclear facilities is required to support the robust performance of operations. There is a continuing need to maintain, enhance, and develop new training courses to support the NCS community. This paper provides an outline of some of the ongoing and future training courses in the United States to support the field of NCS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Conduct of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards

Since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1943, there have been 22 criticality accidents in process facilities worldwide in which fissionable materials were processed by hand for various purposes. Of these 22 process criticality accidents, 16 involved faulty or flawed conduct of operations. Most of these process accidents (17 of 22) occurred before 1970, mostly due to the implementation of formal conduct of operations—such as the use of operating procedures and training—and the use of consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Obviously, the nuclear facilities applied lessons learned from their accident history, and the rate of criticality accidents was significantly reduced as a result. Over the years, it has been emphasized in NCS training courses and other venues in the United States that the consensus standards, such as ASA N6.1-1964, were the key contributors to this reduction in accidents. The formality of operations required to implement and apply the standards at a facility is also a crucial prerequisite that must be sufficiently robust to ensure NCS. This prerequisite is crucial to success fully implement the NCS consensus and other safety standards at a site.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Digital risk analysis in nuclear engineering projects: Designing for safety, performance, reliability, and security

Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are important in promoting the need to identify cybersecurity concerns early in the systems engineering lifecycle so risks from adversarial cyber-attacks can be eliminated or reduced through engineering design practices. In addition to adversarial risk, risk in operational technology systems also includes non-adversarial and unintentional risk from other factors such as human performance errors, environmental conditions, design flaws, and device degradation or failure. This paper introduces a new concept for characterizing digital risk, both adversarial and non-adversarial, and provides the basis for initial research into a novel digital risk analysis approach focused on incorporating attack difficulty into a multi-attribute analysis technique using robust decision-making. This digital risk characterization is also used to frame a discussion on the challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements in an integrated energy system project that incorporates a small modular reactor and industrial facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Brazil in the Global Nuclear Order, 1945-2018

This book is a comprehensive history of Brazil's nuclear activities and diplomacy. The author provides an in-depth explanation of the country's decision to give up the nuclear arms option and to accept nonproliferation norms after decades of opposition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Passive methods for spent fuel characterisation at the Finnish geological repository

Development of the Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) and Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) methods in the context of the Finnish geological repository for spent nuclear fuel has shown that they provide, for BWR fuel assemblies, the comprehensive verification needed to meet the nuclear safeguards objectives of the repository. The principles of the PGET and PNAR methods and the design and operation of the respective instruments are presented. A few results from measurements at the spent fuel storage pools at the Finnish nuclear power plants are discussed. The directions of ongoing and future developments are indicated.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

Reply to “Comment on ‘The Reduced Detection Rate of Signals That Are Hidden by Earthquakes: Case Studies with Spotlight Detectors That Operate at Seismic Arrays,’ by Joshua D. Carmichael, Brent G. Delbridge, and Richard Alfaro-Diaz” by Paul G. Richards

We reply to a comment that Paul G. Richards (Richards, 2026) directed to an article by Carmichael et al. (2025). Richards expressed concern over two issues. The first issue relates to the size of the explosions discussed in the article. The second relates to the probability that earthquakes and explosions sourced near the same location coincide in time, by chance. We do not address the first issue because the original article does not assign significance to the size of the explosions from the point of view of an experimental party. We do respond to Richards’ comment on the second issue and claim that it can be explained through a clarification about conditional versus joint probabilities. Our present discussion, therefore, describes the difference between the conditional probability that a correlator fails, given that an explosion and earthquake coincidently occur in the same place, and the joint probability that a correlator fails while an earthquake and explosion also coincidentally occur in the same place. This latter, joint probability appears to be rare. We clarify that our original article did not treat the joint probability, only the conditional probability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Probabilistic Programming for Transportable Source Characterization and Uncertainty Quantification of the North Korean Nuclear Tests 2006–2017

Here, we introduce a transportable technique to determine the yield and depth of burial (DOB) from seismic source spectra of underground nuclear explosions. We demonstrate this technique on the six declared North Korean nuclear tests. This approach derives source spectra in absolute units from regional phase (Pg) amplitudes by correcting the observations for geometric spreading, attenuation, and site amplification. We couple the source spectra and explosion source models with a probabilistic programming framework that integrates deep learning techniques and Bayesian modeling. This approach permits the exchange of information across various data categories to quantify both the data and model uncertainty. This technique stands out as an innovative use of broad‐area propagation models, making it transportable across various geologic settings. This method proves to be effective in scenarios with diverse and/or limited observational data, even when the source depth is unknown. We present new independent estimates of absolute yield and DOB that are consistent with the prior assessments, underscoring the potential of this method in enhancing transportable nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Raman spectroscopic investigation of selected natural uranyl sulfate minerals

Uranyl sulfates are important constituents of uranium ores and represent a significant fraction of U(VI) minerals discovered in recent years owing to their propensity to form in mine tailings and legacy sites related to uranium exploration. Recently, we surveyed all published Raman spectra for uranium minerals and found significantly less easily accessible data available for uranyl sulfates relative to other groups of uranium minerals (Spano et al. 2023). In that work, we described average spectra for groups of uranyl minerals to understand common vibrational spectroscopic features attributable to similarities in oxyanion chemistry among U(VI) minerals, but only data for three uranyl sulfate minerals were included in the study. The present work reports on Raman spectra collected for 18 additional uranyl sulfate minerals. In conclusion, to better understand underlying structural and chemical features that give rise to spectroscopic observables, we relate differences in structural topology, charge-balancing cations, and locality of origin to features observed in the Raman spectra of selected natural uranyl sulfates.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

ARIES team achieves major milestone in support of nonproliferation

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program is a great example of LANL’s Weapons and Global Security programs working together to achieve important nuclear security mission goals. Executed at PF-4, a facility better known for its pit production mission, the ARIES Program is helping the nation meet its nonproliferation commitments by preparing surplus weapons-grade plutonium for final disposition. ARIES recently met a major milestone of producing 1 metric ton of plutonium oxide from material removed from surplus pits. The milestone was celebrated in an awards ceremony at LANL on January 28.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) Gamma-Ray Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution. Comprehensive Technology Readiness Assessment

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) gamma ray detectors have demonstrated very high energy resolution of 38 eV FWHM for gamma ray energies below 100 keV. This is an order or magnitude better than conventional HPGe detector and can remove most line-overlap problems in NDA by gamma spectroscopy below ~130 keV. Unlike superconducting transition edge sensors (TESs), MMCs have a reproducible and almost perfectly linear response, which greatly simplifies adding spectra from different detector pixels and reduces systematic errors in quantitative assays. The instrument is currently at TRL-5 but could advance to TRL-6 by improving the signal processing software and using the system for the quantitative analysis of a safeguards sample provided by e.g. the IAEA. Making MMC detectors commercially viable and used more widely then depends on making the technology more reliable, specifically by increasing the device uniformity and yield, and by developing commercial software. This situation is often only half-jokingly referred to as the “valley of death” and could be addressed though the SBIR program. Our collaborators at STAR Cryoelectronics LLC are well qualified to further advance MMC development, and XIA LLC is well-positioned to develop the data acquisition system and write the software for MMC readout. In addition, the advance to TRL-6 would be desirable to increase the visibility and showcase the value of MMC spectrometers, e.g. by placing one of them into the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at the IAEA, whose NDA experts have recently started to show interest in cryogenic detector technology. As a result of this LCP, we also now have an instrument at LLNL that we will use for various applications of MMCs in nuclear safeguards and science. We are confident that as the number of high-profile results increases, so will the interest in and commercial viability of this technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) Gamma-Ray Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution. Comprehensive Technology Readiness Assessment

Magnetic Microcalorimeter (MMC) gamma ray detectors have demonstrated very high energy resolution of 38 eV FWHM for gamma ray energies below 100 keV. This is an order or magnitude better than conventional HPGe detector and can remove most line-overlap problems in NDA by gamma spectroscopy below ~130 keV. Unlike superconducting transition edge sensors (TESs), MMCs have a reproducible and almost perfectly linear response, which greatly simplifies adding spectra from different detector pixels and reduces systematic errors in quantitative assays. The instrument is currently at TRL-5 but could advance to TRL-6 by improving the signal processing software and using the system for the quantitative analysis of a safeguards sample provided by e.g. the IAEA. Making MMC detectors commercially viable and used more widely then depends on making the technology more reliable, specifically by increasing the device uniformity and yield, and by developing commercial software. This situation is often only half-jokingly referred to as the “valley of death” and could be addressed though the SBIR program. Our collaborators at STAR Cryoelectronics LLC are well qualified to further advance MMC development, and XIA LLC is well-positioned to develop the data acquisition system and write the software for MMC readout. In addition, the advance to TRL-6 would be desirable to increase the visibility and showcase the value of MMC spectrometers, e.g. by placing one of them into the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at the IAEA, whose NDA experts have recently started to show interest in cryogenic detector technology. As a result of this LCP, we also now have an instrument at LLNL that we will use for various applications of MMCs in nuclear safeguards and science. We are confident that as the number of high-profile results increases, so will the interest in and commercial viability of this technology.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

AMS / BARC Joint Survey (Summary Report)

Report describes a series of joint aerial radiation survey flights at various locations in Southern Nevada and Colorado performed by AMS and BARC (U.S. and India). The flights were conducted over areas of well-characterized natural background in Nevada, at the Large-Area Calibration Pads at Grand Junction, CO, and over real ground contamination at the Nevada National Security Site. The intention of the joint surveys was to compare the responses, processes, and procedures of each country’s aerial radiation detection system. These systems can detect and map ground contamination that may result from a nuclear or radiological accident or incident, and play a significant role in the national radiological emergency response capabilities of both countries.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

2019 Hyperion 5313A and 5119A Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated two variations of a new model of infrasound sensor, the Hyperion 5313A and 5119A. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in static pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to vertical acceleration. The Hyperion infrasound sensors are being evaluated for potential use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of Dry Cask Risk Tools

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has repeatedly expressed a desire to increase the use of risk in its decision-making. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Policy Statement published in 1995 formalized the Commission’s commitment to risk-informed regulation through the expanded use of PRA. While a great deal of work has been done to incorporate risk insights into the regulatory framework for at-power nuclear reactors. Far less progress has been made to risk inform the dry-casks and nuclear waste transportation areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. INL was tasked with incorporating the information from the two completed dry cask PRAs as well as any additional available information into a tool that helps the NRC use those insights to identify levels of risk at various stages in the nuclear waste cycle. The first task was to address the License Amendment Request (LAR) Process for Dry Cask storage, the second task is for the incorporate transportation into the tool, and the third and final task will be incorporate any additional regulatory applications for dry cask storage. This report covers the first task of the tool and will eventually incorporate the remaining two tasks may be completed in the future and built off the model described here. Task 1 specifically asked to incorporate the risk insights into the process for determining and prioritizing review of license amendment changes related to storage applications by outlining a resource allocation strategy and defining recommendations of for the depth and breadth of the LAR review. It was requested that the tool be similar in design to the SDP notebooks/worksheets and contain quantitative, qualitative, or semi-quantitative approaches to assessing the risk of the change. The final tool that was selected by INL to be developed was a flowchart and associated rationale document that allows the reviewer to quickly assess potential LAR changes and their associated risks as well as the rationale behind the risk categorization. This risk categorization will lead to specific actionable recommendations to expect from a change of that specific category. This allows for a more consistent review process as well as improving the overall efficiency of the review itself.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

2019 LDRD Annual Report

The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program Annual Report for Savannah River National Laboratory for FY2019 focuses on the following project areas: legacy waste cleanup, nuclear materials threat reduction; nuclear deterrent, and secure energy & manufacturing.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗