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At least 325 records · Page 18

Progression of Safe and Compliant Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 16566

Department of Energy contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is about to begin demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1988, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996 and material processing completed in 2004. The project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL), is in the final stages of preparing to demolish the building by the Tri-Party Agreement Milestone date of September 30, 2016. Since 2008, employees have prepared approximately 85 percent of the building for demolition. All of the 52 pencil-shaped processing tanks and 95 percent of the 238 glove boxes have been removed. Work is progressing on dispositioning remaining glove boxes, filter boxes and ventilation ducts and chemical and drain lines. Demolition is scheduled to start in early 2016. In addition to wrapping up tasks like source term removal (or preparation for removal during pre-demolition) and decontamination, the project is also developing the strategy and process to perform physical open air demolition, including the use of 3D renderings and computer generated illustrations of building infrastructure to safely and compliantly demolish the building. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Electrolytic Oxide Reduction of Plutonium Oxide Surrogates

Our research team has investigated electrolytic oxide reduction (EOR) as an improved metal production process versus the currently employed multiple cycle direct oxide reduction (MCDOR) process for the conversion of plutonium oxide to plutonium metal. Inherent advantages in safety, waste generation, efficiency, and operational ease make EOR an attractive alternative to traditional metal production practices. Phase I of the project consisted of the construction of a prototype electrochemical cell, and proof of concept experiments towards the reduction of SnO 2 and CeO 2 compounds. Phase II of the project was focused on the optimization of the cerium system in preparation for future plutonium EOR experiments. We observed the electrolytic reduction of cerium oxide resulting in mixed degrees of success, and discovered this was a result of parasitic side reactions and partial reduction. We employed cyclic voltammetry (CV) to identify the products of these side reactions and characterize partially reduced species. We also observed that, when metal was successfully produced by EOR, a large amount of passed charge was required. We concluded that this observation was due to several inefficiencies of the process relating to the reduction mechanism (e.g. inefficient use of cathodically produced calcium). We used our CV results to guide our optimization of the EOR of CeO 2 by refining our electrochemical method, cell geometry, and materials of construction. Finally, we developed a next generation cell, worked to establish a new molten salt electrochemical capability in the Plutonium Facility, and completed a strategy for plutonium experiments. Our electrochemical method to produce plutonium metal clearly supports the core mission of the laboratory. Furthermore, this project has allowed for the development of capabilities that will provide valuable data to programs interested in characterization and detection, as well as science of signatures. Additionally, establishing this capability in the plutonium facility will facilitate future safeguard studies that can assist with safeguard development in molten salt reprocessing flowsheets, and molten salt reactor designs.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Preparing for safe and compliant open air demolition at Hanford's plutonium finishing plant - 15100

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), located in the 200 West Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site, began operations in 1949 and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996, and material stabilization completed in 2004. DOE contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL) is tasked with the plant's deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination and demolition, to be completed by September 30, 2016. The project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL), is exploring, evaluating and implementing efficiencies to safely and compliantly prepare the facility for demolition. Since 2008, employees have prepared approximately 75 percent of the complex for demolition. More than 90 percent of the 232 glove boxes have been removed from ventilation and more than 80 percent of pencil tank units have been dispositioned. As decontamination, deactivation and removal nears completion on the remaining glove boxes, pencil tanks and other radiological and chemical processing infrastructure, CH2M HILL and DOE-RL are making preparations to demolish PFP itself, a Hazardous Category II nuclear facility (HazCat II). Conventional techniques used to demolish buildings heavily contaminated with radiological hazards typically involve extensive hands-on work to remove Material at Risk (MAR) and decontaminate the building to low levels before conventional demolition techniques can be used to remove the building. A safe and more cost effective approach is packaging MAR located in hard to access areas of the plant and removing it during demolition. That process, combined with affixing remaining contamination to walls, floors and equipment, performing detailed air dispersion modeling before demolition and air monitoring and dust suppression during demolition, will reduce employee risk and is more efficient in demolishing a HazCat II facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Forensic investigation of plutonium metal: a case study of CRM 126

In our study, a certified plutonium metal reference material (CRM 126) with a known production history is examined using analytical methods that are commonly employed in nuclear forensics for provenancing and attribution. Moreover, the measured plutonium isotopic composition and actinide assay are consistent with values reported on the reference material certificate. Model ages from U/Pu and Am/Pu chronometers agree with the documented production timeline. Finally, these results confirm the utility of these analytical methods and highlight the importance of a holistic approach for forensic study of unknown materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Management of Legacy Enriched Uranium and Transuranic Materials at ORNL

The DOE manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960s through the 1980s. These materials were made by irradiating targets in production reactors to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. ORNL uses these materials in DOE’s center for production, storage, and distribution of transuranium isotopes (plutonium through californium) for the heavy-element research program and has used them as feedstock in the Calutron Electromagnetic Isotope Enrichment Facility, one of only two facilities in the world with capabilities to enrich radioisotopes in multigram quantities. Both the production reactors and enrichment facilities have been shut down, and many of these unique materials will not be produced again in the foreseeable future [1, 2]. As a result, ORNL has an inventory of radioisotopes that are being held for reuse because their potential intrinsic value to DOE, but many of these materials have no currently defined use. ORNL is undertaking an initiative to more actively manage these materials by reviewing the existing inventory to determine if the contents have programmatic use. Steps are being taken to process, repackage, and stage the materials for distribution to programmatic users or for waste disposal, primarily at WIPP. This paper describes the approach that ORNL has taken to determine whether the inventory of materials should be kept or disposed and the processes that are being used to manage or disposition the materials.

Patton, Bradley↗

Determination of the Sensitivity of the Antineutrino Probe for Reactor Core Monitoring

This paper presents a feasibility study of the use of the detection of reactor-antineutrinos (ν{sup ¯}{sub e}) for non proliferation purpose. To proceed, we have started to study different reactor designs with our simulation tools. We use a package called MCNP Utility for Reactor Evolution (MURE), initially developed by CNRS/IN2P3 labs to study Generation IV reactors. The MURE package has been coupled to fission product beta decay nuclear databases for studying reactor antineutrino emission. This method is the only one able to predict the antineutrino emission from future reactor cores, which don't use the thermal fission of {sup 235}U, {sup 239}Pu and {sup 241}Pu. It is also the only way to include off-equilibrium effects, due to neutron captures and time evolution of the fission product concentrations during a reactor cycle. We will present here the first predictions of antineutrino energy spectra from innovative reactor designs (Generation IV reactors). We will then discuss a summary of our results of non-proliferation scenarios involving the latter reactor designs, taking into account reactor physics constraints.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Aqueous Chloride Operations Overview: Plutonium and Americium Purification/Recovery

Acqueous Chloride mission is to recover plutonium and americium from pyrochemical residues (undesirable form for utilization and storage) and generate plutonium oxide and americium oxide. Plutonium oxide is recycled into Pu metal production flowsheet. It is suitable for storage. Americium oxide is a valuable product, sold through the DOE-OS isotope sales program.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Is xenon eldest?

It is well known that the solubility of noble gases in magmas decreases with increasing atomic weight. Xenon, the weightiest of the stable noble gases, is the least soluble atmospheric gas in magma. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the noble gases should have degassed from (or equilibrated with) a bubbling mantle in order of increasing solubility, such that xenon was the most rapidly degassed and helium the least. The apparent relative ages of the famous radiogenic noble gas isotopes agrees, at least qualitatively, with this premise. When atmospheric loss processes are assigned their proper place, several long-standing xenonological puzzles become added evidence for xenon's relative antiquity. Xenon being the afore-mentioned sense the oldest atmospheric gas, will have been most greatly subject to escape, be it impact-driven or EUV-driven. Nonradiogenic xenon's pronounced isotopic fractionation has already been attributed to escape; why it should be more fractionated than krypton would be assigned to xenon's greater atmospheric age. The small atmospheric inventory of xenon relative to the other nonradiogenic noblegases, known as the 'missing xenon' problem, could easily be explained by differential escape. The relatively tiny atmospheric inventories of the radiogenic daughter products of 129 Iodine and 244 Plutonium, both much smaller than would be expected from the inferred abundances of the parents in meteorites, offer a third and fourth data to support the hypothesis that Earth has lost most of its xenon.

Zahnle, K.↗

Elucidating the Radiation-Induced Redox Chemistry of Plutonium Under Used Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Conditions

Plutonium plays a critical role in the development of sustainable nuclear fuel cycles, and yet, our fundamental understanding of this element’s inherent radiation-induced redox chemistry and associated impacts on nuclear fuel cycle technologies is limited. Unanticipated changes in oxidation state distribution can influence the speciation and transport of plutonium in a given process. Control of these parameters is especially important for used nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies, wherein the separation and recovery of plutonium is typically achieved by the selective formation, maintenance, and complexation of specific oxidation states. Furthermore, plutonium’s inherent radiation-induced redox chemistry has the capacity to influence the radiolytic behavior of its complexes, the longevity of which are critical in the design of efficient and cost-effective advanced reprocessing technologies. These radiation-induced processes are unavoidable under fuel cycle conditions owing to the inherency of ionizing radiation fields to the decay of plutonium’s isotopes and to the various other radioisotopes generated by nuclear fission and neutron-capture process and the subsequent radioactive decay of their products. As such, mechanistically understanding the response of plutonium’s multiple oxidation states to multi-component ionizing radiation fields is essential for predicting the behavior of this critical element under used nuclear fuel reprocessing conditions. Here, through a combination of time-resolved (electron pulse) and steady-state (alpha and gamma) irradiation experiments complemented by quantitative, multiscale modeling calculations, we present advances in our understanding of radiation-induced plutonium redox chemistry!

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Low temperature dissolution flowsheet for plutonium metal

The H-Canyon flowsheet used to dissolve Pu metal for PuO 2 production utilizes boiling HNO 3 . SRNL was requested to develop a complementary dissolution flowsheet at two reduced temperature ranges. The dissolution and H 2 generation rates of Pu metal were investigated using a dissolving solution at ambient temperature (20-30 °C) and for an intermediate temperature of 50-60 °C. Additionally, the testing included an investigation of the dissolution rates and characterization of the off-gas generated from the ambient temperature dissolution of carbon steel cans and the nylon bags that contain the Pu metal when charged to the dissolver.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Verification of Plutonium Content in PuBe Sources Using MCNP® 6.2.0 Beta with TENDL 2012 Libraries

Although the production of PuBe neutron sources has discontinued, hundreds of sources with unknown or inaccurately declared plutonium content are in existence around the world. Institutions have undertaken the task of assaying these sources, measuring, and calculating the isotopic composition, plutonium content, and neutron yield. The nominal plutonium content, based off the neutron yield per gram of pure 239 Pu, has shown to be highly inaccurate. New methods of measuring the plutonium content allow a more accurate estimate of the true Pu content, but these measurements need verification. Using the TENDL 2012 nuclear data libraries, MCNP6 has the capability to simulate the (α, n) interactions in a PuBe source. Theoretically, if the source is modeled according to the plutonium content, isotopic composition, and other source characteristics, the calculated neutron yield in MCNP can be compared to the experimental yield, offering an indication of the accuracy of the declared plutonium content. In this study, three sets of PuBe sources from various backgrounds were modeled in MCNP6 1.2 Beta, according to the source specifications dictated by the individuals who assayed the source. Verification of the source parameters with MCNP6 also serves as a means to test the alpha transport capabilities of MCNP6 1.2 Beta with TENDL 2012 alpha transport libraries. Finally, good agreement in the comparison would indicate the accuracy of the source parameters in addition to demonstrating MCNP's capabilities in simulating (α, n) interactions.

(α,n)↗

Processing and Disposition of Special Actinide Target Materials - 13138

The Department of Energy (DOE) manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960's through the 1980's by irradiating targets in high-flux reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Among the products were californium-252, heavy curium (including Cm-246 through Cm-248), and plutonium-242 and -244. Many of the isotopes are still in demand today, and they can be recovered from the remaining targets previously irradiated at SRS or produced from the recovered isotopes. Should the existing target materials be discarded, the plutonium (Pu) and curium (Cm) isotopes cannot be replaced readily with existing production sources. Some of these targets are stored at SRS, while other target material is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at several stages of processing. The materials cannot be stored in their present form indefinitely. Their long-term management involves processing items for beneficial use and/or for disposition, using storage and process facilities at SRS and ORNL. Evaluations are under way for disposition options for these materials, and demonstrations of improved flow sheets to process the materials are being conducted at ORNL and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The disposition options and a management evaluation process have been developed. Processing demonstrations and evaluations for these unique materials are under way. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The effect of the composition of plutonium loaded on the reactivity change and the isotopic composition of fuel produced in a fast reactor

This paper presents the results of a numerical investigation into burnup and breeding of nuclides in metallic fuel consisting of a mixture of plutonium and depleted uranium in a fast reactor with sodium coolant. The feasibility of using plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel from domestic thermal reactors and weapons-grade plutonium is discussed. It is shown that the largest production of secondary fuel and the least change in the reactivity over the reactor lifetime can be achieved when employing plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel from a reactor of the RBMK-1000 type.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Neutron Measurements from Boron Carbide Addition to a Plutonium Waste Form

The Department of Energy (DOE) has identified the Dilute and Dispose approach as the preferred method for the disposition of surplus plutonium materials. Dilute and Dispose requires surplus plutonium to be converted to an oxide product and then dry blended with a multi-component adulterant mixture to reduce the Safeguards and Security attractiveness level of the materials. The resulting product will be discarded in a geologic repository at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MCNPX Monte Carlo burnup simulations of the isotope correlation experiments in the NPP obrigheim.

This paper describes the simulation work of the Isotope Correlation Experiment (ICE) using the MCNPX Monte Carlo computer code package. The Monte Carlo simulation results are compared with the ICE-Experimental measurements for burnup up to 30 GWD/t. The comparison shows the good capabilities of the MCNPX computer code package for predicting the depletion of the uranium fuel and the buildup of the plutonium isotopes in a PWR thermal reactor. The Monte Carlo simulation results show also good agreements with the experimental data for calculating several long-lived and stable fission products. However, for the americium and curium actinides, it is difficult to judge the predication capabilities for these actinides due to the large uncertainties in the ICE-Experimental data. In the MCNPX numerical simulations, a pin cell model is utilized to simulate the fuel lattice of the nuclear power reactor. Temperature dependent libraries based on JEFF3.1 nuclear data files are utilized for the calculations. In addition, temperature dependent libraries based ENDF/B-VII nuclear data files are utilized and the obtained results are very close to the JEFF3.1 results, except for {approx}10% differences in the prediction of the minor actinide isotopes buildup.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The Need for Minor Actinide Production

The US Department of Energy (DOE) manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960s through the 1980s by irradiating targets in production reactors to produce special heavy isotopes for DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) used many of these materials as feedstock in the calutron Electromagnetic Isotope Enrichment Facility (EIEF), one of only two facilities in the world with capabilities to enrich radioisotopes in multigram quantities. Both the production reactors and enrichment facilities have been shut down, and many of these unique materials will never be produced again. ORNL maintains a major portion of the United States’ inventory of these materials and uses them in DOE’s center for production, storage, and distribution of transuranium isotopes (plutonium through californium) to the user community. The US inventory of enriched actinides is being depleted, and attempts for over a decade to obtain critical supplies from foreign sources have been unsuccessful. Significant strides have been made recently in the development of new and improved enrichment technologies to replace the previous electromagnetic separations techniques. This paper summarizes the US’s need for production of high-purity enriched actinides by national security, nuclear nonproliferation, and basic research programs.

Robinson, Sharon↗

Mark-18A Cold Runs

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is tasked by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to recover highly valued isotopes from irradiated Mark-18A (Mk-18A) targets. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has sixty-five Mk-18A targets available for the recovery of the high valued materials. The sixty-five Mk-18A targets are currently stored in the L-Area Basin and will be removed one at a time and individually transported to SRNL. Upon receipt at SRNL, the Mk-18A target material will be removed from the confinement, dissolved, chemically separated, and calcined to a stable oxide. The flowsheet is designed to recover the plutonium as well as the trivalent actinides. The remaining unrecovered material will be discarded to the high activity drain (HAD) system in SRNL. A specially designed cask was procured for transport of the targets from L-Area to SRNL. Once received at SRNL, the targets will be loaded into the back of Cell 7 and resized as they enter the cell. The resized targets (1/4 lengths) will then be processed one at a time through the following processes: caustic dissolution and filtration; acidic dissolution and filtration, Reillex anion exchange, diglycolamide (DGA) cation exchange; and DGA calcination. This processing will result in two product streams. The first is an aqueous plutonium solution which will be removed from the shielded cells and taken to a glovebox for further purification and conversion to an oxide. The second is a calcined oxide containing the Am and Cm as well as other lanthanide fission products which will be removed from the shielded cells using a bagless transfer system. Both materials will be packaged for shipment to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). All equipment to carry out this process was designed, procured or fabricated, and installed in a mock-up facility (716-4A) at SRS to allow for simulation testing in a non-radioactive area. This equipment was then dismantled and transferred from 716-4A to 773-A and installed in the SRNL Shielded Cells. After installation in the shielded cells facility testing was performed using water followed by surrogates and cold chemicals. Issues were identified during these evaluations, including equipment issues as well as technical challenges. Many of the issues were rectified during performance of the cold runs, and the remaining have a resolution identified. Table ES-1 provides a summary of all issues identified during the cold run operations, as well as the status and identified resolutions to outstanding issues.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗