The Roles Of Science In National Security Policymaking: A Case Study Of EMP
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Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent in 2030 and Beyond: Fit for Purpose?
The 13th annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21) workshop brought together a mixture of senior officials from the laboratory, policy, military, and expert communities to promote a high-level focus and well-informed discussion on key deterrence challenges for the U.S. nuclear deterrent over the coming decade and beyond. It brought together interested stakeholders from the national security laboratories, federal government, military, think tank, and academic communities, as well as allied counterparts, to share perspectives in an unclassified setting.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Characterizing the solid hydrolysis product, UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 , generated from neat water reactions with UF 4 at room temperature
Uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ) is an important intermediate in the production of UF 6 and uranium metal. Room temperature hydrolysis of UF 4 was investigated using a combination of Fluorine-19 nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy ( 19 F NMR), Raman and infrared spectroscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, and microscopy measurements. UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 was identified as the primary solid hydrolysis product when anhydrous UF 4 was stirred in deionized water. Static NMR and 19 F magic angle spinning NMR measurements revealed that a small amount of uranyl fluoride can also form when anhydrous UF 4 is left in water, although this species comprises less than 5% of the total sample with the remaining parts being UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 . Since UF 4 is generally considered to be stable under ambient conditions, these findings mark the first time that a room temperature reaction between UF 4 and water has been detected and analyzed without interference from additional chemical reagents. The Raman characterization of UF 4 (H 2 O) 2.5 presented herein is the first on record. Since UF 4 is one of the most used intermediates during chemical conversion of uranium ore to uranium metal for nuclear fuel and weapons, the results presented herein are applicable to numerous nuclear science fields where solid state detection of uranium is of value, including nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, and environmental remediation.
37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
Probing the hydrolytic degradation of UF 4 in humid air
This manuscript describes the chemical transformations that occur during hydrolysis of uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ) due to its storage in humid air (85% and 50% relative humidity) at ambient temperatures. This hydrolysis was previously reported to proceed slowly or not at all (depending on the percent relative humidity); however, previous reports relied primarily on X-ray diffraction methods to probe uranium speciation. Here, we employ a battery of physiochemical probing techniques to explore potential hydrolysis, including Raman spectroscopy, powder X-ray diffraction, 19 F nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, scanning electron microscopy, and focused ion beam microscopy with energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy. Of these, only Raman spectroscopy proved to be particularly useful at observing chemical changes to UF 4 . It was found that anhydrous UF 4 slightly oxidizes over the course of thirteen days to Schoepite-like uranium complexes and possibly UO 3 . In contrast, UF 4 exposed to 50% relative humidity slightly decomposes into UO 2 F 2 , Schoepite-like uranium complexes, and possibly a high order uranium oxide that eluded chemical assignment (U x O y ). Despite the rich chemical speciation observed in our Raman spectroscopy measurements, X-ray diffraction and 19 F NMR measurements on the same material showed no changes. Microscopy measurements suggest that the observed reactions between UF 4 and water occur primarily on the surface of UF 4 particulates via a method that is visually similar to surface corrosion of metals. Therefore, we postulate that NMR spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction, which are well-suited for bulk analysis, are less suited than Raman spectroscopy to observe the surface-based reactions that occur to UF 4 when exposed to humid air. Considering the importance of UF 4 in the production of nuclear fuel and weapons, the results presented herein are widely applicable to numerous nuclear science fields where uranium detection and speciation in humid environments is of value, including nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear forensics.
37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
Nuclear Fundamentals Orientation Module 1: LANL Weapons Program Overview [Slides]
Topics covered include: Our Science; Guiding Principle of Los Alamos; LANL the Design Laboratory; Weapons Mission; Science, Engineering and Computations; Future Weapons Program R&D; NNSA; Aging Weapons; A Final Thought; and, Questions and Answers.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Report on the recovery of legacy 1997-1998 Depth-of-Burial / Tunnel-and-Hole-Closure explosion data from the Kazakhstan former Soviet nuclear test site, Semipalatinsk.
In 1996, negotiations between the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC), the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Administration (DSWA) and the U.S. Department of Energy led to an agreement for a joint series of experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site Semipalatinsk (STS). These experiments had a dual purpose: to close holes and tunnels originally created for the purpose of testing nuclear weapons, and to characterize explosive sources at a former nuclear test site. This report covers the recovery of legacy data from the experiments conduct in 1997 and 1998. Two teams collected data. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in collaboration with the NNC, collected the near-source (local) data out to approximately 20 km. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO), with funding from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL), also in collaboration with NNC, collected regional data, 200 – 1000 km distant, leveraging the KZ regional seismic network that LDEO had recently installed in collaboration with NNC. The two teams also worked together to some extent, regarding instrumentation and planning. This report primarily addresses the near-source data collected by the LANL/NNC team.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Machine Learning Modeling Pipeline for Extracting Nuclear Proliferation Events of Interest from Open Data Sources (U)
In FY2020, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and the Sanghani Center for Artificial Intelligence and Data Analytics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University entered a collaboration funded by Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development. The project’s mission was to take the first steps toward developing a demonstration prototype system that uses multiple machine learning and data analytics methods on largescale open data sources to identify new, developing, and/or undeclared nuclear programs. Given the SRNL team’s on-site perspective of events culminating in the DOE’s decision to pursue the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), the team targeted the identification of events and indicators in retrospective datasets that pointed to the activity of “fissile core fabrication at the Savannah River Site” prior to the official announcement in May of 2018. A preliminary modeling pipeline was developed in FY20 that showed the datasets contained adequate signal for continuation of efforts. In FY21, a modular demonstration prototype modeling pipeline has continued in development for two text-based data sources: a broad internet archive (Webhose Ltd.) and a decahose Twitter database (i.e., a global sampling of one in every ten Tweets). The techniques that have been developed rely on graph theory and anomaly detection to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases at various points in time such that indicators of events of interest could be identified and subsequently, events could be extracted from the corpuses. The foundational concept behind the approaches is that contextual shifts in key words and phrases can act as indicators of events of interest. Both datasets have proven successful in extracting events of interest related to pit production at the Savannah River Site prior to the official announcement. In addition, the pipelines have generated a wide range of events broadly summarized as: the awarding of DOE contracts at major sites, DOE investments in various programs, accidents at DOE national laboratories, speculations about the fate of pit production in the DOE complex, domestic and international shipments and receipts of nuclear materials at DOE sites, termination of non-proliferation agreements with Russia, termination of MOX, new weapons development approvals/testing, nuclear posture reviews, major DOE cleanup/production milestones, political opinions, and nuclear watch groups’ opinions, among many others.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
A Review of Nuclear Forensics: 2016-2020
The study of nuclear forensics harkens back to the Manhattan Project-era, when scientists first started to analyze the debris from the 1945 Trinity test. Political turmoil stemming from the Cold War and the rehabilitation of Germany following WWII has led to new challenges in international security involving nuclear proliferation. Nuclear materials have, on occasion, been lost, misplaced, or stolen from former Soviet countries, and illicit materials have been interdicted all over the world. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) was established in 2006, and has been at the forefront of drive to advance nuclear forensic capabilities in the United States. The ultimate goal of nuclear forensics is to examine nuclear and other radioactive materials using analytical techniques to determine origin and history of the material, particularly in the context of law enforcement investigations. Nuclear forensics can be divided into two parts: predetonation and post-detonation. Pre-detonation forensics, as the name implies, is the investigation of a nuclear material or weapon that has not been detonated or involved in an explosion, whereas postdetonation forensics is the study of activation or fission products in debris or the environment following the use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device (RDD). Both parts require a number of analytical chemical and radiochemical techniques to determine identification of the material. Many advancements in analytical techniques, including rapidity, sample size, and forensic signatures have been made in recent years. The analytical methods that can be used in a nuclear forensic investigation, such as mass spectrometry and gamma spectroscopy, have been described in detail in previous reviews, including Straub et.al, and will not be explained here. This review will discuss recent publications (from 2016 to present) describing advancements of techniques such as radiochronometry, morphology, development of novel reference materials, and inter-laboratory collaborations for both pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics.
37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
Dose Coefficient Calculation for Use in Dosimetry Assessment of a Fission-Based Weapon
In the event of a fission-based weapon or improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation, dose coefficients can be harnessed to provide dose assessments for defense, emergency preparedness, and consequence management, as well as to prospectively inform the assessment of radiation biomarkers and development of medical prophylaxis countermeasures for defense and homeland security stakeholders and decision-makers. Although dose coefficients have previously been calculated for this group, they would apply specifically to the studied population, the 1945 Japanese cohort, after which their anthropomorphic computational phantoms were modeled. For this reason, applications to other populations may be limited, and instead, an assessment of a more standardized population is desired. We employed a series of computational human phantoms representing international reference individuals: UF/NCI voxel phantom series containing newborn, 1-, 5-, 10-, 15-, and 35-year-old males and females. Irradiation of the phantoms was simulated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code to determine organ dose coefficients under four idealized irradiation geometries at three distances from the detonation hypocenter at Hiroshima and Nagasaki using DS02 free-in-air prompt neutron and photon fluence spectra. Through these simulations, age-specific dose coefficients were determined for individual organs. Various articulated PIMAL stylized phantoms were simulated as well to estimate the effect of body posture on dose coefficients and determine the effect of posture on dosimetric estimation and reconstruction. Results additionally demonstrate that 137 Cs and the Watt fission spectra are not ideal general surrogate sources for fission weapons, which may be considered for experimental testing of medical countermeasures. Supplementary data provided tabulates the compilation of organ dose-rate coefficients in this study.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Army Reactor Program Regulatory Bases: Supporting Army Regulation 50–7
This report describes the regulatory bases for the 2025 revision of Army Regulation (AR) 50–7 - Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Army Reactor Program and the new associated Department of the Army pamphlet (DA PAM) Army Reactor Program Procedures.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy
The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) identifies DARHT as a weapons mission critical facility along with the need to modernize DARHT to support weapons modernization efforts. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75 th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the nuclear weapons infrastructure has suffered the effects of age and underfunding with no margin for further delay in recapitalizing the physical infrastructure. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Prioritizing Countries by Concern Regarding Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction Materials
This article presents a global prioritization methodology that evaluates the relative risks of non-state actor acquisition of materials that could be used in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) from the country’s relevant infrastructure. Prioritization is based on three domains: 1. Assessing relative scale of materials in each country, 2. The country’s corresponding security posture, and 3. The presence of threat actors. The output is a list of countries prioritized from greatest risk to least. Rather than providing an overall 1 to N ranking, however, the results are placed into tiers based upon their natural groupings within the three domains. The countries in the highest tiers are flagged as potential US national security concern; those scoring in the middle and at the bottom are flagged as posing lower US national security concern. A systematic approach assesses each country by leveraging many disciplines, such as risk and decision analysis, as well as expert judgement. A quantitative value model based on Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT) organizes the objectives scoring criteria into a value tree using lessons learned from previous studies, published literature, and expert judgement. The article presents the prioritization categories and corresponding value model scoring criteria to include measurement type, weight, range, and value preference. Country names and data are notional in order to share the details on the underlying methodology and model without identification of actual security risks. A deliberative process addresses factors external to the model and scrutinizes inputs, methodology, model, and results.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Proven Technologies for the Solidification of Complex Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW): Global Case Studies of Applications and Disposal Options - 20424
Legacy radioactive waste streams from the Cold War still exist and newly generated waste streams from nuclear power plants and research institutes go untreated and expose environmental hazards at many nuclear sites. The nature of the waste is diverse, depending upon the source or the process from which it originated. The most problematic waste streams include complex liquids such as organic (tri-butyl-phosphate TBP) solutions contaminated with Pu and U isotopes, mixed sludge types, high acid radioactive waste, H-3 contaminated organic and aqueous streams, etc. Technological, environmental and economic challenges exist for the treatment and disposal of such waste streams. A proven technology that has been applied to LRW on a global basis provides one option as a low-cost solution to legacy streams and small volume, highly complex LRW frequently found during decommissioning at nuclear power plants and weapons sites. The engineered polymer technology from Nochar, USA, is capable of solidifying standard and highly complex LLW and ILW waste streams for interim or final storage, or for incineration. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Mesocarnivore Surveys on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site 300 Alameda and San Joaquin Counties, California
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), operated under cooperative agreement between the University of California and the U. S. Department of Energy, administers and operates an approximately 11 mi2 (2$ km2) test site in the remote hills at the northern end of the South Coast Ranges of Central California. Known as Site 300, this expanse of rolling hills and canyons supports a diverse array of grassland communities typical of lowland central California. The facility serves a variety of functions related to testing non-nuclear explosives, lasers, and weapons subsystems. The primary purpose of this project was to determine the presence of any mesocamivores on Site 300 that use the property for foraging, denning, and other related activities. The surveys occurred from mid-September to mid-October, 2002.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Watch former Lab Director and Manhattan Project Veteran Harold Agnew’s 1985 speech
From the first nuclear reactor to the weapon development to the bomb delivery in war, Harold Agnew was there. The only two atomic bombs to ever be used in combat – Little Boy, a uranium gun-type weapon, and Fat Man, a plutonium implosion weapon – were released above Japan 75 years ago on Aug. 6 and Aug. 9, respectively. World War II ended not long after. And, according to The New York Times, Agnew was the only person to witness the whole undertaking, from reactor to Hiroshima: Years earlier, on a frigid December day in 1942 in Chicago, a 21-year-old Agnew was one of a few dozen gathered to see atoms split in two. Not long after, Agnew came to Los Alamos as a graduate student to work on the development the atomic bomb. Then, on Aug. 6, 1945, Agnew was a part of the delivery of Little Boy; he flew as a scientific member on the mission to Hiroshima to film the mushroom cloud and measure the shockwave. It is the only existing footage of the Hiroshima bombing from the air; other footage was taken, but was most likely not handled properly and was unusable, according to Agnew.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Physics Flash Fall 2020
The Fall 2020 edition of Physics Flash includes article briefs on: Patrick Younk, Fusing concepts, technology to past performance of nuclear explosives; LANL inertial confinement fusion programs aims to develop burning plasma for weapons science; Lab's high energy nuclear physics explored at international conference; and, Novel study reveals new details on the impact of thermal interfaces in dynamic compression experiments.
70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
Weapons Radiochemistry: Trinity and Beyond
On July 16, 1945, the Trinity nuclear test exploded in the desert near Alamogordo, New Mexico. A variety of new diagnostic experiments were fielded in an effort to understand the detailed performance of the nuclear device. This paper describes a series of radiochemical experiments that were designed to measure the efficiency and neutron fluence of the test. These experiments, and the scientists who led them, laid the foundation of weapons radiochemistry for decades to come.
38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
An Autonomous Critical Data Extrapolator for the AGN-201m
Nuclear nonproliferation serves as a key goal, being undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To recognize proliferation there are two pathways that states, who intend to use nuclear material for malicious purposes can take, diversion can misuse. Diversion is when fissile nuclear material is declared to the IAEA for non-weapon purposes, but then covertly removed. If the source of nuclear material, that is not declared and not fissionable, is placed inside the reactor core to create fissile material used to create weapons then the state is using the second pathway of proliferation, misuse. With the emerging development in areas of simulation and machine learning the creation of virtual models of reactor systems, digital twins, serve as a potential method to identify proliferation through detecting anomalous behavior in the reactor. A digital twin for a physical nuclear reactor has never been developed, as digital twins serve as an emerging technology. To investigate the process for development and use of a digital twin for a nuclear reactor Idaho State University’s AGN-201m serves as the nuclear reactor used for development of this digital twin. A data acquisition system has been installed to the reactor system allowing for the transfer of collected data from a reactor operation to Idaho National Laboratory’s Deeplynx data warehouse. When utilizing data to train reactor physics and machine learning models, a significant challenge encountered is the initial state of the data. Nuclear proliferation will have the capacity to be detected when the reactor immediately starts up, nor will it occur after the reactor shuts down. Generally, it will be detected when the reactor is operating at some desired power over a sufficient period for that specific reactor design. For the AGN-201m this will be when the reactor is critical (generally 1 mW or above) for a timespan that is within or less than the range of a regular business day. Datasets sent to Deeplynx have had to be manually cut to when the reactor is critical based on plots of power levels. This method is inefficient and laborious, especially when using multiple datasets at once to train a model. To provide a more streamlined approach an automated critical data extrapolator is developed, with capabilities of recognizing when the reactor operation first reaches criticality, and when the reactor undergoes a SCRAM and is shutdown.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗