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At least 325 records · Page 18

Burnt Mountain Alaska RTG Extraction, Transport and Disposal Project - 17359

The Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), headquartered at Patrick Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, removed excess nuclear material from one of the center's seismic arrays on Burnt Mountain, Alaska, after nearly 15 years of un-operability, and transferred it to a the low-level waste disposal facility at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Ten radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), were used as a power source by AFTAC at its array 97 kilometers (60 miles) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally placed on Burnt Mountain in 1973, the first RTG was installed to power a single seismometer. Twelve years later, due to the increase in communications equipment and demand for additional power, nine more RTGs were placed at the site. For the next 17 years, the RTGs were operated and maintained by AFTAC's Detachment 460 based at Eielson AFB near Fairbanks, Alaska, and were used because of their high reliability and low maintenance requirements to determine if regional seismic activity was caused by nuclear explosions or naturally-occurring events such as earthquakes, volcanic activity, etc. AFTAC's primary mission is to verify compliance with nuclear test ban treaties. In 1992, a tundra fire encroached on the Burnt Mountain site and damaged some of the data cables. Despite the fact the fire did not impact the generators themselves, it raised public concern among nearby inhabitants about the safety of using radioactive material as a power source at the station. The Air Force, in coordination with multiple agencies and mission partners, made the decision to remove the RTGs and relocate them to NNSS for permanent disposal. (authors)

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EM Communications in Rural Nevada Communities – 24177

The paper and presentation titled, “EM Communications in Rural Nevada Communities,” will detail the unique approaches the EM Nevada team takes to communicate to the rural communities through the Groundwater Open House. The paper and presentation will, in addition, focus on the ways EM Nevada communicates its messaging in other rural communities near the NNSS. This includes holding Nevada Site Specific Advisory Board meetings and Low-Level Waste Stakeholders Forum meetings in rural Nevada cities and towns such as Pahrump and Mesquite. The result is advancing stakeholder engagement and relationships in areas of Nevada that might otherwise not be able to access the important information generated by the EM Nevada scientists at the NNSS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Mule Deer and Pronghorn Antelope on the Nevada National Security Site GPS Radio-Collar Study 2019 – 2022 Radiological Results

A research study involving the capture, global-positioning system (GPS) radio-collaring, and tracking of mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus) and pronghorn antelope (Antilocapra americana) on the NNSS was conducted November 2019 through October 2022. The purpose of this study is to better understand their habitat use, potential overlap with radiological areas on the NNSS, radionuclide concentrations in, and dose to, pronghorn and mule deer, and radiological dose to humans potentially consuming these animals.

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Analysis of 127 Xe tracer measurements using a net counts method

A suite of measurement systems were deployed as part of the Physical Experiment 1 series of experiments, which involved detonating chemical explosives along with radionuclide tracers in an underground cavity, at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the United States. One of the radionuclide tracers, 127 Xe was released from the containment following the explosion and detected on a SAUNA Q B sampler situated approximately 3.5 km away. The system uses a beta-gamma coincidence detector system to measure fission product radioisotopes of xenon relevant to nuclear explosion monitoring. In this work we use the coincidence measurement data to analyse and interpret the results from the SAUNA Q B system, to calculate the measured 127 Xe activity concentration(s).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Neutronics Analysis of Cold Critical KRUSTY Experiments using MCNP and Serpent

Kilowatt Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) is a prototype designed as a proof of concept for NASA’s Kilo power program, which was funded in order to create a small reactor for various space applications such as providing power for a colony on Mars or the moon and eventually as a possible option for powering rockets on deep space missions. KRUSTY was tested at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) from November 2017, through March 2018. The experimental campaign was conducted in four phases: com ponent critical experiments, cold critical experiments, warm critical runs, and high temperature demonstration. The component critical and cold critical experiments were used to determine the worth of the beryllium oxide (BeO) reflector rings and the boron carbide (B4C) control rod disks under different conditions. These conditions were altered by the addition and subtraction of other components in the assembly. The component critical phase was performed at atmospheric pressure and had four solid support rods spanning the center core; whereas the cold critical phase had the center core placed in a vacuum chamber and eight sodium-filled heat pipes spanning the center core region. This summary discusses the static neutronic analysis completed on the cold critical phase of the campaign using MCNP ® and Serpent. These two codes were used to assess any potential differences or biases in the simulation results. Understanding these potential biases is a key step toward the final goal of being able to fully analyze the transient experiments performed during phases 3 and 4 of the campaign.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

2013 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (DOE 1999a, 2000). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for fiscal year (FY) 2013. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2013 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2013 include the following: • Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through. FY 2013 • Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis. • Development of version 4.115 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA model.

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Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1 ROTC-1

This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Frenchman Flat CAU was the site of 10 underground nuclear tests, some of which have impacted groundwater near the tests. This work was performed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from the impacted groundwater

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Test Area Calendar Year 2014 Annual Sampling Analysis Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This report presents the analytical data for the 2014 fiscal year (FY) and calendar year (CY) (October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014), and an evaluation of the data to ensure that the Sampling Plan’s objectives are met. In addition to samples collected and analyzed for the Sampling Plan, some NNSS wells are monitored by NNSA/NFO to demonstrate compliance with State-issued water discharge permits; with protection of groundwater from ongoing radiological waste disposal activities (compliance wells); and to demonstrate that the onsite drinking water supply is below SDWA maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) (public water system [PWS] wells). While not all sampled locations are required by the Sampling Plan, these samples are relevant to its objectives and are therefore presented herein for completeness purposes. Special investigations that took place in 2014 that are relevant to the Sampling Plan are also presented. This is the first annual report released to support Sampling Plan implementation.

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Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2015

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley north east of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area by posting signs 200 to 400 feet (60 to 120 meters) outside of the original fence.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Impact of Delayed Revegetation of Closure Covers at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses the impacts of delayed revegetation of the 92-acre (ac) Low-Level Waste Management Unit (LLWMU) closure covers in the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Area 5 RWMS Performance Assessment (PA) assumes closure with fully functional evapotranspiration (ET) covers. A key safety function of ET covers is to prevent percolation of water through waste by absorbing and storing precipitation in near-surface soil until it is returned to the atmosphere by ET. The closure cover’s ET function relies heavily on native desert vegetation to transpire moisture from dry soils. Final ET closure covers were installed on the 92-ac LLWMU in 2012. Since then attempts to reestablish native vegetation on the closure covers have failed. As of 2018, perennial native vegetation is mostly absent on the covers, but a dense population of invasive weeds (e.g., Salsola paulsenii and Halogeton glomeratus) is present. This UDQE assesses the effect of delayed restoration of native desert vegetation on the hydrologic performance of the Area 5 RWMS ET covers.

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Nevada National Security Site 2017 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2017 environmental data.

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Assessment of Tritium Activities in Bailed versus Pumped Samples from Wells at the Nevada National Security Site

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity uses a variety of methods to collect groundwater samples to identify radionuclide migration from underground nuclear tests. These include depth-discrete bailing, pumping with low-volume rod pumps, and pumping with electrical submersible pumps. The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan specifies that when sampling with a pump, a minimum of three effective well volumes are withdrawn and then samples are collected after water-quality parameters have stabilized. In locations where pumping is not feasible, depth-discrete bailing is used and purging prior to sampling is usually not required. A recent study evaluated three sampling technologies and recommended that historical tritium results be evaluated where both pumped and bailed samples are available to identify preferred sampling protocols for the collection of tritium samples. The tritium ( 3 H) activities were obtained from the UGTA chemistry data base. Wells were identified with known 3 H activities above method detection limits, and then evaluated if both bailed and pumped samples had been collected. Twenty two wells and piezometers with bailed samples, pumped samples, and 3 H activities above background were identified for further consideration. The conclusions from this analysis are: Bailed samples collected for 3 H analysis near the water surface in a well are lower in 3 H activity than bailed samples from within screened intervals and pumped samples. Depth-discrete bailed samples from within the screened intervals are generally in good agreement with pumped samples from developed wells and piezometers. Depth-discrete bailed samples from undeveloped wells and piezometers are in good agreement with the first pumped samples. However, the next pumped samples increased in 3 H activity, resulting in a greater percent difference between the undeveloped bailed samples and later pumped samples. Continuous pumping over extended periods removing large purge volumes from wells can perturbate the surrounding groundwater system for long periods of time. These perturbations can cause large changes in 3 H activities in the aquifer near the well because of the mixing of groundwater with variable 3 H activities. Recommendations include: Bailed samples for 3 H should not be collected near the water surface in the well. Bailed samples should be collected from within the well screen. Logs of temperature, chemistry, and thermal flow should be evaluated to identify optimal depths within the well screen to collect depth-discrete bailer samples. Purging of large volumes of water from the well over extended periods of time should be avoided when collecting 3 H samples. Sufficient time should be allowed after pumping large volumes of water from the well (e.g., after well development) for the surrounding aquifer and 3 H activities to return to ambient conditions

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Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2017

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil attaches preferentially to smaller particles (Tamura, 1985; Friesen, 1992; Murarik et al., 1992; and Misra et al., 1993). Therefore, redistribution of soil particles by wind (dust) and water are the mechanisms most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 CA. Monitoring was implemented in 2011 by Desert Research Institute (DRI) to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and to characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Initially, two monitoring stations consisting of radiological, meteorological, and dust sampling equipment were installed near the southeast and northeast corners of the CA. In January 2015, the original monitoring stations were dismantled and moved farther to the west along the CA boundary. This move was made to place the monitoring stations downwind of ground zero and the High Contamination Area (HCA) during the dominant northerly and southerly winds. Samples of particles suspended in the air are collected every two weeks and submitted for laboratory assessments of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity, and for determinations of gamma-emitting radionuclides. In calendar year (CY) 2017, the mean gross alpha concentration at monitoring station P57-4 was approximately 4.25 times the value at monitoring station P57-3. In CY2015 and CY2016, the difference in mean gross alpha concentration at the two stations was approximately 1.5. The mean gross alpha concentrations at P57-3 and P57-4 were approximately 1.9 and 7.9 times, respectively, the mean gross alpha concentrations at the surrounding Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations. The minimum gross alpha concentrations reported for the Project 57 stations are in the range of the minimum values observed at the CEMP stations. However, maximum gross alpha concentrations are greater than the maximum concentrations observed at the surrounding CEMP stations. Gamma spectroscopy analyses resulted in the detection of seven radionuclides. Except for americium-241 (Am-241), all reported radionuclides occur naturally in the environment. The Am-241 detection by gamma spectroscopy was confirmed by alpha spectroscopy. During each quarter of CY2017, four suspended particulate matter samples were selected for alpha spectroscopy analysis. Two were selected each quarter from the regular biweekly samples collected at each of the two monitoring stations. Of the eight samples from P57-3, one was reported to have plutonium-238 (Pu-238) above the minimum detectable activity (MDA) and five were reported to have plutonium 239/240 (Pu-239/240) above the MDA. Of the eight samples from P57-4, three were reported to have Pu-238 above the MDA and six were reported to have Pu-239/240 above the MDA. Soil material is also transported by saltation, which is a wind driven phenomena that bounces sand-sized soil particles across the land surface because they are too heavy to be suspended in the air. Samples of particles transported by saltation were collected downwind and upwind of the CA at both monitoring stations in May 2017 after a 190-day deployment and again in September 2017 after a 114-day deployment. Mass of the saltation samples was determined after oven drying. The September sample had greater mass than the May sample. The same relationship was observed for the suspended particulate matter samples during periods of saltation sample collection. The difference in the collected mass appears to be because of the amount of soil moisture. Higher soil moisture exerts additional isotopic bonds between soil particles and water molecules, and between water molecules that envelop soil particles, making it more difficult for wind to raise the particles as dust. In general, samples collected from saltation traps facing south contained more material than samples collected from traps facing north. This suggests that although saltation material may have been moving back and forth in conjunction with the two dominant wind directions, there was a net trend for saltation material to be transported toward the north. Radiological analyses of the saltation samples show that the smaller particle size faction (<63 μm) generally produced the highest activity levels of Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239/240. In general, the isotope activity levels decreased as the particle size increased. These results are consistent with the expectation that the greatest potential for transport of radiological contamination is with the smaller particles. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual external radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is slightly higher than the dose determined at the surrounding CEMP stations, but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public from exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 CA. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph (24 km/hr) begin to generate dust movement by saltation or suspension, as determined by the monitoring instruments. Saltated particles, PM10 (i.e., inhalable dust), and PM2.5 (i.e., fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occurred for winds exceeding 20 mph (32 km/hr). When the wind/dust analysis was performed for winds separated into the dominant northerly and southerly wind directions, it was evident that the northerly winds generated the higher PM10 concentrations and had the dominate influence on the PM10 concentration determined for all wind speeds when all wind directions were evaluated together. During the year, winds in excess of 20 mph (32 km/hr) occurred approximately one percent of the time. Although winds sufficient to generate dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. A preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation in response to specific wind conditions is highly variable. Wind speeds that would be expected to generate noticeable dust may not do so in every instance. Additionally, saltation transport in response to wind conditions was less common than expected. These variations were likely because of the influence of meteorological and environmental parameters other than wind.

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The Historic Water, Sewer, and Steam/HTHW Systems in Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Report and Appendix A.)

This report provides documentation intended to satisfy the mitigation requirements for a substantial portion of the above- and belowground utilities in Mercury on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) outlined in the associated Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) manages the property and anticipates conducting activities in the future that will affect these resources. These structures are entirely within the Mercury Historic District, which is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places. The district is considered eligible under Criteria A and C for the theme of nuclear testing, with a period of significance from 1951 through 1992. The utilities addressed here include the systems related to potable water and steam/high temperature hot water distribution, as well as the sewage system. More specifically, this documentation covers these underground utilities that were installed in Mercury from 1951 through 1977 and aboveground components installed from 1951 through 1992. (See also Appendix B listed separately in OSTI.)

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The Historic Water, Sewer, and Steam/HTHW Systems in Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Appendix B - Resource Forms)

This report provides documentation intended to satisfy the mitigation requirements for a substantial portion of the above- and belowground utilities in Mercury on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) outlined in the associated Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) manages the property and anticipates conducting activities in the future that will affect these resources. These structures are entirely within the Mercury Historic District, which is eligible to the National Register of Historic Places. The district is considered eligible under Criteria A and C for the theme of nuclear testing, with a period of significance from 1951 through 1992. The utilities addressed here include the systems related to potable water and steam/high temperature hot water distribution, as well as the sewage system. More specifically, this documentation covers these underground utilities that were installed in Mercury from 1951 through 1977 and above-ground components installed from 1951 through 1992. Introduction The information in this report is intended to meet the requirements of the Memorandum of Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Water and Sewer Upgrades at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (MOA) signed on January 30, 2018. The purpose of the MOA is to mitigate the adverse effects of proposed activities on utilities in the Mercury Historic District. The MOA covers the potable water, sewage, and steam/high temperature hot water (HTHW) systems in Mercury. A historic context related to the district as a whole is documented in Reno et al. The State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) has concurred with NNSA/NFO’s determination that the district is eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C at the national level, with a period of significance of 1951 to 1992, which encompasses the period of nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site. The utility systems are not considered individually eligible for the National Register, but are contributing components to the eligibility of the district. This report combines information from an unpublished preliminary historic context on the underground utilities written prior to the initiation of recording activities and included as an attachment to the MOA and new data acquired during the course of meeting the MOA requirements. In addition to documenting the underground utility components exposed during excavation of discovery holes to verify pipe locations, Desert Research Institute (DRI) also recorded numerous above-ground elements and equipment in accessible vaults to develop a more complete representation of the historic utilities in Mercury. The information below is organized in the order it is discussed in the MOA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Development of Upscaling Techniques and Construction of Calibrated Models for Fractured Rocks Using Discrete Fracture Network Approaches

The Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Unit on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) contains several fractured aquifers that can potentially provide high-permeability pathways for radionuclides to migrate away from underground nuclear testing locations. Although the geometric properties of fractures, such as length and orientation, can be found using geophysical methods and borehole image analyses, the hydraulic property of fractures (which are primarily influenced by apertures) are often unknown or have a high degree of uncertainty attached to their values. The aperture values have a profound impact on groundwater velocity and are critical to understanding transport scales at Pahute Mesa. Fracture aperture values and their distributions also have dominant control over radionuclide transport with potential for long-range correlations or scale-invariant dynamics. Understanding of the small-scale transport variability in fractures could lead to identification of distinct characteristics on larger scales. Furthermore, upscaling techniques need to be developed to adequately predict transport behavior at field scales by capturing the transport trends of smaller scale networks. This report explores these vital modeling needs to understand the role of fractures in Pahute Mesa. Discrete fracture network (DFN) models are the basis for constructing a well-calibrated model to ascertain aperture values of fractures in lava-flow aquifers. These models are also used to develop and compare the usefulness of several random-walk-based models to perform transport upscaling.

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Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2019

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was performed to (1) assess a technique for estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation, (2) develop biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments, (3) evaluate methods of surface decontamination, and (4) evaluate instruments and field procedures for the prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) in 2007 by posting signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗