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Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Disposition Program Final Status Survey Report

As part of the Battelle Facility Restoration Program (Smoter and Biebesheimer 2017), the Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Complex was remediated through demolition and surveyed to show it meets the radiological release criteria for unrestricted use under the clearance process (DOE 2011). The restoration program has directed the implementation of the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) methodology (NRC 2011) to verify the suitability of the site to be released for unrestricted use under the clearance process in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 (Biebesheimer 2018a; DOE 2011). The use of MARSSIM is accepted by federal and state agencies, including DOE. This report documents how the MARSSIM process was used to assure any residual radioactivity is within acceptable levels and as low as reasonably achievable. Past land use for the RTL Complex property included agricultural, residential, and industrial activity. The historical site assessment (HSA) (Lindenmeier et al. 2015; Biebesheimer 2018b) identified use of radionuclides in past RTL Complex research and development activities from commissioning in 1966 until it was vacated in 2017. Based on the information provided in the HSA, the RTL Complex was delineated into six survey units. The 520 building footprint, tank vault and 530 building footprint, other building footprints, and pipeline survey units included excavated areas. The paved areas and open areas survey units were unexcavated areas. Survey units were all determined to be Class 3, with low probability of containing residual radioactivity, after demolition of the structures within the RTL Complex. The Research Technology Laboratory (RTL) Disposition Program: Final Status Survey Plan (Bunn et al. 2018) was designed and conducted to provide quantitative data regarding the residual radioactivity present in each survey unit. Authorized radiological release limits were developed and approved by the DOE Office of Science in December 2016 (DOE 2017). Fourteen random sample locations were identified within each survey unit. Forty-four specific judgmental sample locations were selected across the site based on information in the HSA. The number of sample locations within a survey unit ranged from 15 to 28, for a total of 127 random and judgmental sample locations identified across the RTL Complex. Sampling for the final status survey occurred over 12 days between November 11 and December 7, 2018. Laboratory results were independently validated by Analytical Quality Associates prior to evaluation. All of the over 880 residual radioactivity measurements were less than the release limits and action levels established through the RTL Disposition Program. A sum of fractions calculation for each survey unit resulted in values that were less than unity. Based on the results presented in this report, the restoration program recommends that the RTL Complex be released for unrestricted use.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Process Control Approach to Implement High Waste Loading Glass Formulations for Hanford Low Activity Waste Vitrification - 18435

Acceptable glass formulations for vitrification of Hanford low activity waste (LAW) at The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) must meet a variety of product quality, processability, and waste loading requirements. The glass formulation development work underpinning the WTP baseline LAW glasses was captured in a vitrification process control approach developed by the Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) and Atkins Energy Federal EPC, Inc. that permits the calculation of the glass formulation required for each particular batch of LAW delivered to the LAW vitrification facility. Since that time, we have developed a wide range of glass formulations that achieve considerably higher waste loadings and which therefore are more economically attractive in terms of reduced amounts of glass produced and decreased time for treatment. That work was done in support of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection program that is examining options to optimize the LAW facility and LAW glass waste form. Implementation of these high waste loading formulations at the WTP requires the development of a new LAW vitrification process control algorithm, which is the subject of this paper. Waste loadings in LAW glasses are typically limited by either the alkali loading for LAW with low sulfate content or the SO{sub 3} loading for LAW with high sulfate content. In the former case, waste loadings are limited by refractory corrosion and glass corrosion on the vapor hydration test (VHT) and product consistency test (PCT), all of which tend to increase with higher alkali concentrations. In the latter case, waste loadings are limited by the formation of a molten sulfate phase in the melter, which has deleterious effects. The LAW vitrification process control strategy must mitigate these effects while optimizing waste loadings. Given the composition of any LAW stream, the new LAW vitrification process control algorithm permits the calculation of a suitable high waste loading glass composition and the required glass forming additives such that all processing, waste loading, and product quality requirements are met. This algorithm was developed from data for a large number of glasses that were formulated, and characterized with respect to a variety of properties affecting processability and product quality; many of these formulations were also subjected to melter testing to verify acceptable processing characteristics, processing rates, and the absence of secondary sulfate phase formation. This paper describes the development of the present algorithm, comparisons to the present lower waste loading baseline WTP process control approach, and plans for further development and testing. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sensitive Resources Assessment and Forest Analysis for the Proposed Versatile Test Reactor, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

The US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a leading institution in advanced materials, supercomputing, neutrons, and nuclear science. As a research laboratory managed by UT-Battelle, LLC for DOE, ORNL has national priorities in energy, security, and scientific discovery that necessitate facility improvements and expansions. DOE is also committed to environmental stewardship. The laboratory is located on the ~32,000-acre (~13,000-ha) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), much of which is categorized as a National Environmental Research Park (NERP) and a state Wildlife Management Area. DOE works with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), US Department of Agriculture, and other agencies to serve as an effective steward of the ORR. Accordingly, project managers must conform to environmental regulations, agreements, and policies at the federal, state, and institutional levels. Per 40 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 1508.14, potential effects on research and science education also represent potential effects of federal actions on the NERP, and impacts on, e.g., deer harvest, must be considered on the Oak Ridge Wildlife Management Area when other aspects of the human environment are affected. The United States currently has no fast neutron testing capability to support advanced nuclear research and development. The proposed Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) will take advantage of current investments by the US government and private industry in nuclear reactors to expedite the design and construction process, using proven technology to create a world-class scientific infrastructure. The VTR will take advantage of fast neutrons provided by this proven technology, along with a capability to rapidly insert, conduct, and remove state-of-the-art experiments. An advantage of the VTR is that it can support future innovations in experimental capabilities without modifying the facility. The VTR will support progress in a variety of science and technology areas, including testing and qualification of advanced reactor fuels; testing and qualification of innovative structural materials; testing of innovative components and instruments; validation of advanced modeling and simulation tools; and versatility for future technical missions. Through proven technology, the VTR can take advantage of existing reactor designs and operating experience to reduce the risk, cost, and time for design and construction. The top available resources of DOE laboratories, industry, and universities will be used to expedite reactor design and construction toward developing the scientific infrastructure that affords a strong testing capability that can be sustained over many years. This report summarizes current knowledge of natural and cultural resources primarily within the VTR construction area. At the time of this report, the proposed VTR site design includes a construction area of ~150.4 acres (~69.9 ha), which contains an ~51.3-acre (~20.8-ha) operations area, located within forested natural areas of the ORR. The primary goal of the work presented here was to evaluate potential effects on sensitive resources that might result from development and construction activities associated with VTR. In addition to on-the-ground surveys during spring and summer 2020 by the ORNL Natural Resources Management Program and Aquatic Ecology Group staff, this report makes use of historical (pre-1995) and contemporary (1995 to present) data from additional confirmed sources (e.g., TDEC). Likewise, forest conditions were compiled from a 2011 forest inventory and supplemented with limited ground observations in 2020. The individuals who obtained and compiled the data presented here are familiar with and routinely assess sensitive resources on the ORR. Anyone who references this report must consider that the timing of surveys did not permit a complete delineation of the resources that will be affected. If the VTR project proceeds, additional surveys will be required to account for the seasonal patterns of various threatened and endangered species. Data deficiencies and potential resources that likely went undetected are indicated where possible. Accordingly, this report should facilitate more environmentally sound decisions during planning and 2 development of the VTR site, provide a foundation for further assessment of sensitive and cultural resources, and help project managers better address regulatory guidance and DOE policies on sustainable development in compliance with, for example, the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Tennessee Rare Plant Protection and Conservation Act of 1985, Tennessee Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974, several federal and state regulations regarding aquatic resource protection, and site-specific policies as outlined in various ORR management plans developed by ORNL and TWRA for DOE.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 2018 - 19101

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. The evaluations of the shutdown sites contain four components: - A characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory; - A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites; - An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience at the shutdown sites - An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF were the DOE GC-859 and RW-859 spent nuclear fuel inventory databases. This inventory has been augmented with data obtained from the shutdown sites for SNF discharges that occurred after June 2013. The primary sources for information on the conditions of site and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included field observations and information collected during visits to the 14 shutdown sites, information provided by managers and staff at the shutdown sites, and Google Earth imagery. Extensive photographs taken during the shutdown site visits have proven to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at and near the shutdown sites. Tribal and state representatives, State and Regional Group representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in 11 of the shutdown site visits. In addition to visiting the shutdown site, site visits often include activities such as meeting with local railroads to discuss the near-site railroad infrastructure and meeting with community engagement panels. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018 and fuel was removed from the reactor vessel on September 25, 2018. Planning for the Oyster Creek site visit has begun and is conducted in three stages. In the first stage, data and documents that are applicable to Oyster Creek are collected. In the second stage, questions are developed based on the data and documents collected during the first stage. These questions are submitted to the Oyster Creek site approximately one month before the site visit. The third stage involves establishing specific schedules and participants. Participants will likely include tribal and state representatives, the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, and the Federal Railroad Administration. State participation will likely include a representative of the State Rail Safety Participation Program, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering. The site visit is tentatively expected to occur in April or May of 2019. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Packages of Distributed Energy Technologies Demonstrating Demand Flexibility at Community Scale

The combination of increased electric load growth across all sectors, deferred electrical infrastructure investment, and other factors resulting in variable electric power supply, has created technical challenges to maintaining a resilient and reliable grid. Many federal, regional, and local efforts are in play to modernize the electric grid, including advancing building technologies and distributed energy resources (DERs) that are utilizing smarter controls to become responsive to both occupant and grid needs. This report reviews ten pilot projects demonstrating how groups of buildings combined with behind-the-meter (BTM) DERs such as electric vehicle (EV) charging, battery storage, flexible HVAC and domestic hot water systems, and photovoltaic systems can reliably and cost effectively provide grid services. Each of the ten pilot projects aim to deliver both energy efficiency and demand flexibility (DF) while supporting load growth. The ten demonstration teams are piloting flexible DER packages across diverse communities of residential and commercial buildings to address a variety of regional grid needs. The outcomes of these pilot projects will be used to inform future scaling through utility program development. This paper characterizes the ten teams, showcasing the decision-making process used by each group to develop their packages (Section 2), the grid services they plan to deliver (Section 3), the types of DER packages selected for deployment within building sectors (Section 4) and trends between building sector, DER types, and grid services In order to achieve community scale benefits, the pilot projects must utilize aggregated control mechanisms for coordinating buildings and DERs together. Several types of coordinated control architectures have evolved amongst the teams, influenced by use type, existing market conditions, and integration type. Three coordinated controls architectures have been characterized, highlighting their use cases, benefits, challenges, and tradeoffs in their design. These insights can aid utilities, control vendors, and developers in scaling community-level energy systems (Paul, 2024). Ultimately, the technology packages selected by the ten teams will be coordinated to provide power system services, also known as grid services. Insights from these demonstrations will be useful for grid operators, regulators, aggregators and other stakeholders as they look to deploy demand flexible resources as grid services in the future. The grid services that each team is targeting for demonstration are described in Section 3 and Section 4. Methods for evaluating the grid services have been described in the paper Metrics for Evaluating Grid Service Provision from Communities of Grid-interactive and Efficient Buildings and other DER (MacDonald, 2023). To identify technology packages for demonstration, Section 2 shows that project teams used a range of analysis approaches, including building energy modeling, AMI data analysis, cost-benefit frameworks, and utility pilot data. Some teams emphasized technical modeling to quantify grid impacts and demand reduction potential, while others prioritized economic evaluations, stakeholder input, or exploratory pilots to inform deployment decisions. This diversity reflects the need to tailor selection methods to project goals, available data, and organizational context. Section 5 discusses trends between the DER technologies deployed and the grid service provisions from each team. Residential buildings (multifamily and single family) lean towards technologies that enhance energy efficiency (e.g. weatherization upgrades, smart thermostats) and onsite power generation integration (e.g. solar PV). Commercial building demonstrations prioritize technologies that ensure operational reliability (e.g. battery storage) and centralized energy management systems and optimization solutions. Teams that are deploying controllable storage-based technologies are more likely to provide grid services that require a near real-time response. Teams incorporating load shifting technologies like smart thermostats with HEMs are likely to include energy markets participation and customer bill management offerings. Campus demonstrations are adopting diverse sets of DERs to emphasize renewable generation, paired with centralized control. This section also describes technologies that were considered during project planning but ultimately excluded from final deployment. These demonstrations reveal that effective DER package design should be tailored to building type, customer segment, and construction vintage. Multifamily buildings benefit from centralized HVAC upgrades and supervisory controls, while single-family homes are well-suited for individualized technologies like solar, storage, and smart home energy monitors. Commercial and campus settings prioritize EMIS integration and load optimization. New construction enables cost-effective integration of DER-ready infrastructure, whereas retrofits require deployments aligned with owner and tenant value streams. For utility program planners, early coordination with developers and building owners, paired with segmented and modular program offerings, can improve adoption, scalability, and grid impact.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Policy, Regulatory, Legal, and Permitting Case Study Subtask 3.2 – Topical Report

This report summarizes the policy, regulatory, legal, and permitting requirements to-date for the siting of a CO 2 injection and storage project in the CarbonSAFE Illinois East Sub-Basin pre-feasibility study area. Where applicable, the East Sub-Basin case study focuses on a proposed carbon capture and storage (CCS) site location in West Terre Haute, Indiana. Indiana has established the legal mechanisms to obtain rights to the subsurface mineral estate with the expectation to apply to reservoir pore space for CO 2 storage in an analogous manner to storage of natural gas, which is a common practice in Indiana. There is, however, no precedent in Indiana to take liability for stored CO 2 . There are currently no Indiana State incentives for CCS, but at the Federal level, tax credits for carbon capture and storage under 26. U.S. Code § 45Q constitute the greatest incentive targeted at CCS projects. The amendment to these credits put forth in the Bipartisan Budget Act (the FUTURE Act) of 2018 substantially increases the per-ton incentive for CCS—from $22.66 per ton in tax year 2017 up to $50 per ton in tax year 2027, for CO 2 not used as an injectant (i.e. saline storage). Additional economic opportunities may exist for the provision of CO 2 for potential EOR in the Illinois Basin. Policies that may support the development of CO 2 pipelines and/or CCS projects in Indiana include: 1) Title 41 of the FAST Act (2015), which created a new governance structure, procedures, and funding authorities in order to improve and expedite Federal review and authorization of covered infrastructure projects, including pipelines, and 2) the Eminent Domain for Transportation of Carbon Dioxide by Pipeline (IC 14-39, Indiana State, 2011), which declares pipeline transportation of CO 2 exclusively to a carbon management application, including sequestration, enhanced oil recovery, and deep saline injection as a benefit to the welfare of Indiana and the people. The US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI rule and permit requirements address all components pertaining to CO 2 injection and monitoring for long-term storage, and outline the minimum technical criteria to protect underground sources of drinking water at, and surrounding, injection well sites. The Class VI requirements also address financial responsibility for corrective action, post-injection site care, and site closure. In addition, UIC Program public notice requirements include that the EPA issue notice of the draft permit preparation to key stakeholders, and open a public comment period of not less than 30 days. A public hearing about the permit would also be held, if specifically requested by the public. A potential Class VI CO 2 injection well permit for the East Sub-Basin case study site would be obtained through the US EPA Region 5, because the State of Indiana does not have UIC Class VI primacy. Although no CO 2 injection wells have been permitted in Indiana, the US EPA Region 5 (which covers Illinois and Indiana) and the East Sub-Basin CarbonSAFE team (via the Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium [MGSC]) have Class VI permitting experience from several projects located in Illinois. Based on our experience, applying for a Class VI permit can be an intensive and iterative process requiring clear communication and numerous interactions with EPA staff. In addition to gathering and preparing the data/models and documentation necessary for a permit application’s initial submittal, the subsequent public comments, EPA response and review, and answering of any follow-up questions/requests by the EPA could significantly increase the timeframe of draft permit issuance. The US EPA offers guidance documents regarding the specific Class VI permit requirements, and shows a general permitting timeline example from the FutureGen Alliance 2.0 covering one-and-a-half years from permit submittal to issuance. However, the overall permitting process to-date has a high degree of variability, and in MGSC’s project experience we observed a more extended timeline to receive Class VI permits for each of two CO 2 injection wells.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of Building 23-702, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory H-8 Foil Handling Building, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-702, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) H-8 Foil Handling Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15278) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. As part of the modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement Between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-702 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-702 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-702 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-109, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-109, the Mercury Fire Station/Maintenance/Housing Office (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15235) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-109 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-109 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-109 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains some aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Building 23-620, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory J-3 Office, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) J-3 Office Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-620 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-620 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-620 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for the Main Gate (23-GS100), Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to replace the existing guard shack at the Main Gate (23-GS100, Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. S1758) to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The purpose of the project is to improve security. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. The Main Gate is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria, prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. Thus, the purpose of this report is to evaluate the Main Gate as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that the Main Gate is individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under SOI Significance Criterion A at the national level of significance for its direct, important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1965 (the date the current Main Gate was constructed) through 1992 (when critical nuclear testing on the NNSS ceased).

23-GS100↗

Report Series: Evaluation, Finding Of Effect, And Mitigation Documentation For Building 23-113, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-113 in Mercury (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15236), which is on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Demolition of Building 23-113 is part of the long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury on the NNSS for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (the Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-113 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. Therefore, the purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-113 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that although Building 23-113 is significant at the local level for its important role as a recreational facility on the NNSS, the building lacks sufficient integrity to convey its significance. It is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP at any level. The building remains eligible as a contributing element to the MHD.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Potential State Regulatory Pathways to Facilitate Low-Carbon Fuels

States and the federal government are increasingly engaged in the challenges around decarbonizing the electric grid. In particular, regulators, consumers, stakeholders, and utilities recognize the need to carefully consider the role natural gas will play in a decarbonized future. A variety of technology and policy options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with natural gas use are available, including energy efficiency programs, demand reduction tools, strategic electrification, and strategies to reduce emissions from natural gas production, transportation, and consumption. Low-carbon fuels – mainly renewable natural gas (RNG) and clean hydrogen – are being considered an important component of decarbonization goals. RNG and hydrogen may be able to meaningfully reduce emissions from processes independent of geologic natural gas, displacing emissions of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas. Although RNG and hydrogen are not cost-competitive today with geologic natural gas and are smaller in scale and potential than other decarbonization options, they can be explored as potential critical tools to decarbonize sectors that are difficult to electrify or shift off of natural gas entirely, such as air travel, industrial processes, maritime transport, long-distance trucking, space heating on cold days, and railroads (Nadel, 2022). The role of this report is to provide informational context for state utility regulators to understand the impacts of and challenges associated with broader integration of low-carbon fuels, followed by examples of state regulatory actions taken to date to facilitate the development of low-carbon fuels. Setting clear guidance to calculate the environmental benefits of low-carbon fuels and continuing federal and state investments in research and development to reduce costs relative to fossil fuels will be important steps to take to signal the desire to grow the market for these fuels. State public utility commissions may play a key role in setting regulatory frameworks for low-carbon fuels and ensuring that ratepayer funds, if utilized, are done so to further the public interest. This report is intended to summarize decisions that states have made to date on low-carbon fuels. In the spirit of understanding the current market and sharing information, this report provides success stories, and lessons learned across states as regulators implement varying strategies to achieve decarbonization objectives while maintaining their focus on affordability, safety, and reliability of the energy system. The report begins with an introduction of the role of natural gas in the U.S. economy (Section I) and background information on natural gas use, decarbonization, and low-carbon fuels (Section II). Next, the report describes the current market by discussing the scale of current production, emissions intensity, resource potential, and costs of low-carbon fuels compared to geologic natural gas (Section III). Following these sections, the report describes four strategies states have employed to facilitate low-carbon fuels: opening exploratory dockets, approving voluntary tariffs for customers, approving interconnection tariffs for producers, and considering portfolio-wide procurement targets (Section IV). This section lists states that have taken actions in each category, citing utility filings, commission decisions, stakeholder comments, and other relevant sources. Finally, the report concludes with suggested questions regulators may wish to consider regarding low-carbon fuels, in the interest of preparing to make decisions in the future (Section V). These questions include: Are there existing regulatory or technical barriers to voluntary purchases of low-carbon fuels? Can customers work with utilities to procure low-carbon fuels; are producers able to interconnect projects without significant barriers to entry? Should the infrastructure and/or commodity costs of low-carbon fuels be socialized among all ratepayers, or borne solely by the large commercial and industrial (C&I) customers currently driving the market? Should regulated natural gas and/or electric utilities own and operate low-carbon fuel production? How should regulators consider the unique decarbonization potential of low-carbon fuels, particularly for hard-to-abate sectors, in decision-making? Is additional direction or clarity from state policymakers needed? What no-regrets approaches can help facilitate both near-term RNG development and long-term development of hydrogen and other zero-carbon fuels? We collectively wish to express our gratitude to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, for supporting this report and other technical assistance resources for state regulators on natural gas topics. State regulators operate under a variety of policy environments, and states have vastly different types of energy resources, infrastructure, and customers. While there is no optimal regulatory, policy, or technological solution that will be successful in every state, state regulators can benefit by exchanging lessons learned with their peers across the country. We look forward to continued engagement with our fellow commissioners, commission staff, NARUC, the U.S. Department of Energy, and other stakeholders to develop sound regulation in the public interest.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Factors Influencing the Evaluation of Spent Fuel Rail Routes - 19010

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering use of rail transport for future shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from where it currently resides to storage or disposal facilities. Rail carriers transporting in commerce certain quantities of 'rail security sensitive materials,' including SNF, face a regulatory requirement from the U.S. Department of Transportation to perform route risk assessments on an annual basis. In performing these assessments, each affected rail carrier must take into consideration twenty-seven different route factors, and document its rationale for selecting preferred and alternative routes on the basis of the safety and security risk analysis results. The major freight rail carriers operating in the U.S. have invested in the development of a proprietary tool, for rail carrier use only, to assist them in making route selections. This tool utilizes operations data input by each affected rail carrier in conjunction with geographic information systems (GIS) data to represent proximate risk factors, to be integrated and assigned to individual points and segments on the railroad network. Separate safety and security risk values are generated for each rail route under consideration. These values are then placed on an equivalent scoring basis and summed together to allow direct comparison between different route options and to rank order each route in terms of its relative attractiveness. Each affected rail carrier files an annual report for evaluation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that documents its route risk assessment approach and analysis results. DOE has developed its own decision-support tool, Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), which is capable of generating and analyzing routing options for transporting SNF by rail in addition to other freight modes. To better understand how affected rail carriers are likely to route SNF shipments in accordance with regulatory requirements and those route factors likely to be most influential in impacting DoE's evaluation of alternative SNF rail routes, a study was undertaken by DOE with the following objectives: - Review the shipment routes that have been historically used by rail carriers to move high hazard materials, including SNF; - Identify the physical, operational and proximate characteristics (attributes) associated with the rail segments that comprise these routes; - Evaluate the relationships between these attributes; - Make suggestions for how to streamline the factors used in DoE's rail route evaluations; - Contrast these relationships with how the factors are used by the rail carriers in applying their tool This paper describes the study approach, analysis results, and implications for rail route selection methodology. Differences between this evaluation and railroad industry information about rail route assessments are also discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Storage Field Development Plan: One Earth Energy

This Storage Field Development plan presents the Storage Complex characterization results, construction, monitoring, and operational plans, and costs associated with the proposed One Earth Sequestration Carbon Capture and Storage (OES-CCS) site in McLean County, Illinois, near Gibson City. The proposed storage complex, known as the Mt. Simon Storage Complex, comprises the Cambrian Mt. Simon Sandstone reservoir and the primary seal, the Cambrian Eau Claire Formation. The lowermost Underground Source of Drinking Water (USDW) identified for the site is the Ordovician St. Peter Sandstone. Geologic characterization of the Mt. Simon Storage Complex at the OES-CCS site was performed by the Illinois Storage Corridor CarbonSAFE Phase III project, which also prepared and submitted three UIC Class VI applications to construct three injection wells; the permit applications were submitted and are in the federal EPA review process. A characterization well, OEE #1, was drilled to collect site-specific data. These data were analyzed and used to develop the UIC Class VI applications. The OEE #1 well will be converted to an in-zone monitoring (IZM) well for the injection phase. The proposed buildout for the OES-CCS site includes (1) three injection wells (OES #1, OES #2, and OES #3), (2) two IZM wells, (3) two above confining zone (ACZ) monitoring wells, one of which will be used to monitor the lowermost USDW, (4) capture and compression facilities, and (5) transportation facilities, i.e., pipelines. A pre-operational testing program was proposed in the Class VI permit application and will be employed at the site pending approval. Additional pre-injection (baseline), syn-injection, and post-injection monitoring and site care procedures will be followed by OES to ensure that injection activities are protective of human health and the environment. Injection is scheduled to begin in 2025, distributed across the three injection wells in accordance with the permit operating conditions. One Earth Sequestration intends to inject up to 90 million tonnes of CO 2 over a period of approximately 20 years. Injection will begin at approximately 0.5 million tonnes of CO 2 annually and ramp up to a maximum of 4.5 million tonnes annually. Daily injection rates are expected to range from 1,400 to 1,500 tonnes per day initially and reach a maximum of approximately 4,225 tonnes per day, depending on site geology and injectivity at each injection well location, and CO 2 availability. The costs associated with the OES-CCS project include pre-operational costs (e. g. additional seismic data acquisition and well drilling), capture and transportation facility and equipment costs, predicted field operating expenditures (OpEx), and decommissioning and post-injection site care (PISC) costs. The risks associated with project activities, such as site construction, injection operations, and verification of secure storage were evaluated, and mitigation strategies proposed to alleviate those risks.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Innovating the next generation of commercial smart building software

Nearly 30% of commercial building energy use is wasted due to equipment faults and HVAC controls problems. The result is increased emissions, compromised comfort and productivity, and less reliable coordination of building power needs with a clean grid. The energy impact alone represents $17 billion in potential savings. Today’s smart building software provides a robust solution to address these operational deficiencies. Energy management and information systems (EMIS) are saving up to 9% on average, with two-year paybacks. They are being incorporated into energy management processes, commissioning services, and utility programs. As effective as they are, two barriers prevent even deeper benefits; limited personnel to fix problems once they are identified, and the expense and time to manually implement changes in control systems. In partnership with the research community, the EMIS industry is developing new capabilities to overcome these barriers. Moving beyond siloed products for either fault detection and diagnostics, or optimal control, these new capabilities empower users to not only automatically identify faults, but also to push corrective action, and control improvements to their buildings. In this paper, several areas for enhancements are documented: ‘one-time’ correction of faults such as setpoints, schedules, and economizer lockouts; short-term active testing for automated proportional integral derivative (PID) loop tuning and functional testing; and continuous supervisory control for demand flexibility and year-round efficiency. Results are presented from a pair of partner implementations out of a dozen providers integrating these enhancements into their products, including field tests from across the country, and insights into operator acceptance and integration into operations and maintenance practices.

Casillas, Armando↗

Preliminary Long-term Safety Assessment for the Planned LLW Disposal Facility at Al-Tuwaitha, Iraq - 18142

Before 1991, Iraq had a significant nuclear program which encompassed ten nuclear sites spread out across the country. The largest nuclear site was located at the Al-Tuwaitha site near Baghdad where 18 nuclear facilities were concentrated. During the first Gulf War in 1991, all sites suffered significant damage from bombing and subsequent looting. Currently, the Ministry of Science and Technology is responsible for the ten heavily damaged nuclear sites and for the management of radioactive waste in Iraq in general. The task of decommissioning the damaged nuclear facilities and managing the resulting waste is being supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission (EC), and the United States (US). In the framework of its Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), the EC has launched a cooperation project to support the planned construction of an engineered repository for short-lived low- and intermediate level waste for the safe disposal of radioactive waste resulting from the decommissioning activities, as well as for waste from the continuing use of radioisotopes in medicine and the oil and gas industry in the country. The main objectives of this project, which was awarded to a Consortium led by NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services GmbH and joined by DBE Technology GmbH of Germany and JAVYS a.s. of Slovakia, are the development of an initial conceptual level basic design and preliminary safety assessment report (PSAR) and the subsequent detailed engineering design and supporting pre-construction safety assessment report (PCSAR). The current paper focuses on the development of the PSAR. Special focus is given to the long-term calculations and difficulties associated with the limited data base in regard to site characterization as well as the expected inventory for the future repository. Because of the ongoing security concerns in Iraq, the Ministry of Science and Technology had already selected the Al-Tuwaitha Site as the best suited location for the planned surface repository at the start of the project. Although some site characterization work had already been carried out prior to the start of the project, certain data for modelling the geology and hydrology of the site are still lacking. Missing data have been compensated by conservative assumptions and the assessment of alternative scenarios. Consequently, for the development of the simplified GoldSim{sup R} computer model used to carry out the long-term calculations supporting the PSAR, existing site information was used and, as appropriate, amended or replaced by conservative assumptions. Due to the nature of the waste, data on the expected inventory are associated with large uncertainties. Although certain estimates related to the future volume of the waste exist, little to no information is available on the expected radionuclide vector and respective activities. Therefore, the long-term calculations were carried out for a generic inventory including a broad range of radionuclides that are to be expected as being important considering the kind of waste to be disposed of in the facility. Based on the results of these calculations, the maximum total capacity of the facility was estimated and converted into activity limits for individual radionuclides that will be integrated into the existing general WAC for the facility. Compliance with these WAC will then guarantee the safety of the repository in regard to potential radionuclide releases via the groundwater pathway. In parallel to the determination of activity limits for the WAC, long-term calculations were carried using different estimates for the expected total activity to determine the general suitability of the proposed technical solution of the repository for receiving the total amount of Iraqi radioactive waste principally acceptable for surface disposal. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tonopah Test Range Air Monitoring: CY2018 Meteorological, Radiological, and Wind Transported Particulate Observations

In 1963, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]), implemented Operation Roller Coaster on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and an adjacent area of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range). This operation resulted in radionuclide-contaminated soils at the Double Tracks site and Clean Slate I, II, and III sites. This report documents observations made during ongoing monitoring of radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions at stations installed adjacent to the Clean Slate sites and at the TTR Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Range Operations Center (ROC). The primary objective of the monitoring effort is to support the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) in the safe remediation of the environmental legacy of nuclear device development and testing by determining if wind blowing across the Clean Slate sites is transporting particles of radionuclide-contaminated soil beyond the physical and administrative boundaries of the sites, and to provide information for designing long-term monitoring of the sites. The monitoring program in 2018 included five stations. Station 400, located within TTR Area 3 and near the ROC, monitors conditions near the local workforce center. Stations 401 and 403 are located on the northern and southeastern perimeter fence lines, respectively, of the Clean Slate III site. Stations 404 and 405 are along the northern and eastern boundary fence, respectively, at Clean Slate II. The stations are generally downwind of the contaminated areas during either northwesterly or southerly winds, which are the predominant wind directions. The stations—which are similar in design to the Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations operating at locations surrounding the Nevada National Security Site and TTR—include meteorological instruments and continuous-flow, low-volume air samplers. Three pressurized ionization chambers for measuring gamma energy are in use at Stations 400, 401, and 403. Saltation sensors and saltation traps are deployed at the stations adjacent to the Clean Slate sites. Detailed meteorological data are recorded on data loggers, with periodic uploads via a satellite system to the Western Regional Climate Center (WRCC) at Desert Research Institute (DRI), to monitor instrument and site conditions. Air filter samples are collected every two weeks and the deposits in the saltation traps are collected when a sufficient sample mass for analysis has accumulated (generally a six- to eight-month interval). Monitoring at TTR in calendar year (CY) 2018 provided surveillance of both ambient conditions, and ground disturbance associated with remediation activities at Clean Slate II and III. The first half of CY2018 data from Stations 404 and 405 at Clean Slate II were collected during remediation activities at that site, and data collected during the final third of the year at Stations 401 and 403 at Clean Slate III coincided with remediation work at the site. Ambient conditions prevailed at Station 400 throughout the year. Dust transport by suspension and saltation is strongly dependent on wind speed. Concentrations of PM 10 (particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter ≤10 micrometers [μm], a size fraction of small particles that are suspended in the air and can be easily inhaled) remain low until winds exceed approximately 32 kilometers per hour (km/hr) (20 miles per hour [mph]). Saltation particle counts also increase above the same general threshold wind speed. Wind speeds in excess of 32 km/hr (20 mph) occur less than three percent of the time at the sites. Ground disturbing remediation activities were carried out at Clean Slate II from October 31, 2017, until July 26, 2018. Station 404 is located closest to the remediation area and is downwind of the area when winds are from the south. By late November, analysis of dust from the air sampler at Station 404 registered increases in plutonium-239+240 ( 239+240 Pu) concentrations. Peak plutonium concentrations, accompanied by elevated gross alpha concentrations and the detection of americium-241 ( 241 Am) by gamma spectroscopy, occurred between March and May 2018. During spring and early summer of 2018, elevated radionuclide concentrations were also measured in dust collected from the air sampler at Station 405, which is more than twice the distance from the remediation activity as Station 404. A minor but sustained increase in gross alpha concentration of suspended dust collected at Stations 400, 401, and 403 was also observed starting in May 2018 and continuing into August. Stations 401 and 403 are approximately 4.8 to 6.4 km (three to four miles) from Clean Slate II and Station 400 is approximately 13 km (eight miles) from that site. The radionuclide content of material that saltated into the passive Big Spring Number Eight (BSNE) traps during the Clean Slate II remediation period increased in both the traps facing toward and away from the fenced contamination area at Station 404, with the largest increases in concentration (almost five times the previous 239+240 Pu concentration) observed in the traps facing the fenced area. The radionuclide concentration in material in the trap facing away from the fence more than doubled from that measured in 2017. A similar increase was observed for the saltation trap facing away from the fenced area at Station 405, although no increase was observed for material captured in the trap facing the fenced area. Particles ranging in size from 50 to 500 µm generally move by saltation processes and are not expected to significantly contribute to dose for someone breathing in the standard respiratory zone for adult humans (1.5 to 1.7 m [4.9 to 5.6 ft] above ground level) because they are too large to be entrained in the air as suspended dust. Remediation activities at Clean Slate III began on September 5, 2018, and continued until a brief hiatus started on December 20, 2018. Although Station 401 is much closer to the remediation area than Station 403, the first increase in gross alpha and 239+240 Pu concentrations was noted in dust from filters collected at Station 403 in early November 2018. The highest radionuclide concentrations of 2018 at the Clean Slate III stations were recorded in air samples taken from Stations 401 and 403 in late December 2018 and these concentrations were comparable between the two station locations. Gamma rate data measured by the PICs was slightly higher than the annual average at Stations 401 and 403 after remediation activities began, but no single measurement was outside of the range observed in 2018 prior to remediation activities. No increase in radionuclide concentration was observed for the Clean Slate III remediation time period on air filters collected from the other stations. Radiological monitoring at Station 400—which is located at the ROC, and therefore the closest regularly staffed work location to the Clean Slate sites—recorded a higher mean gross alpha activity from dust collected on air sampler filters than in previous years. The individual biweekly air filters yielded measurements of gross alpha that were at or below the mean plus one standard deviation measured in CY2017, except for the period from April 25, 2018, through September 12, 2018. Nonetheless, gamma spectroscopy of all air filters from Station 400 identified only naturally occurring radionuclides, with no detection of americium-241 ( 241 Am) (which is used as an indicator of plutonium-241[ 241 Pu]). Alpha spectroscopy of selected air filters collected at Station 400 did not detect plutonium-238 ( 238 Pu) or 239+240 Pu above the analytical detection limit. Gross beta and gamma exposure rate data were comparable to data from regional CEMP stations. No saltation traps are deployed at Station 400. Considering the ambient monitoring periods during CY2018, the monitoring stations adjacent to the Clean Slate sites recorded above-background 238 Pu and 239+240 Pu concentrations (SNL, 1998; Turner et al., 2003) in samples collected by passive saltation traps and on selected air filters. These observations were consistent with previous years and indicated that radionuclide movement occurred under ambient conditions by processes of both saltation and suspension. The presence of radionuclides in all saltation traps, both upwind and downwind of the fenced contamination areas, was consistent with previous radiological survey results (EG&G, 1979) that show lower concentration radiologically contaminated material dispersed outside the fenced area. Although 239+240 Pu concentrations in the air filter samples were sometimes orders of magnitude higher than background, the concentrations were below risk-based action levels defined for an industrial area worker scenario (U.S. DOE, 2014). The interception of airborne dust with above-background radionuclide concentrations demonstrates that dispersal processes are continuing. Strong winds are the driver for both suspension and saltation of dust and soil. The recorded wind speed and PM10 during remediation activities at Clean Slate II and III identified discrete wind events lasting approximately five to eight hours each, which accounted for the greatest PM 10 concentrations at the monitoring stations. These events captured the effect of winds from the northwest and from the south. The observed differences in dust loading and radionuclide concentrations for the monitoring stations when they were either upwind or downwind of the contamination area identify the remediation area as a source of plutonium contaminated dust. The increase in concentration of radionuclides in airborne dust during the remediation activities, compared with measurements under previous ambient conditions (mean 239+240 Pu concentrations during remediation activities are approximately nine to 40 times higher compared to pre-remediation concentrations, depending on monitoring station), highlights the impact of land disturbance on wind-borne contaminant transport from the Clean Slate test areas. The meteorological and particulate matter monitoring indicated that conditions for wind-borne contaminant movement exist at the Clean Slate sites, and that transport of radionuclide-contaminated soil by both suspension and saltation occurred under ambient conditions and accelerated when the sites were disturbed. The 239+240 Pu alpha spectroscopy results indicated that airborne concentrations during remediation activities ranged from 2 × 10-16 to 380 × 10-16 µCi/ml. These results can be compared to the derived air concentration limit for 239 Pu of 6 × 10-11 µCi/ml for occupational workers contained in Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 835, Occupational Radiation Protection. Even though the air sampling results document an increase in concentration during remediation activities, the observed concentrations are less than 0.06 percent of the occupational limit. The Corrective Action Unit (CAU) closure strategy uses a risk-based approach, whereby acceptable contaminant concentrations are determined as a function of anticipated human exposure.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗