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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

International Space Station Powered Bolt Nut Anomaly and Failure Analysis Summary

A key mechanism used in the on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) pressurized elements is the Common Berthing Mechanism. The mechanism that effects the structural connection of the Common Berthing Mechanism halves is the Powered Bolt Assembly. There are sixteen Powered Bolt Assemblies per Common Berthing Mechanism. The Common Berthing Mechanism has a bolt which engages a self aligning Powered Bolt Nut (PBN) on the mating interface (Figure 1). The Powered Bolt Assemblies are preloaded to approximately 84.5 kN (19000 lb) prior to pressurization of the CBM. The PBNs mentioned below, manufactured in 2009, will be used on ISS future missions. An on orbit functional failure of this hardware would be unacceptable and in some instances catastrophic due to the failure of modules to mate and seal the atmosphere, risking loss of crew and ISS functions. The manufacturing processes that create the PBNs need to be strictly controlled. Functional (torque vs. tension) acceptance test failures will be the result of processes not being strictly followed. Without the proper knowledge of thread tolerances, fabrication techniques, and dry film lubricant application processes, PBNs will be, and have been manufactured improperly. The knowledge gained from acceptance test failures and the resolution of those failures, thread fabrication techniques and thread dry film lubrication processes can be applied to many aerospace mechanisms to enhance their performance. Test data and manufactured PBN thread geometry will be discussed for both failed and successfully accepted PBNs.

Sievers, Daniel E.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Common Cause Failure Modeling: Aerospace Versus Nuclear

Aggregate nuclear plant failure data is used to produce generic common-cause factors that are specifically for use in the common-cause failure models of NUREG/CR-5485. Furthermore, the models presented in NUREG/CR-5485 are specifically designed to incorporate two significantly distinct assumptions about the methods of surveillance testing from whence this aggregate failure data came. What are the implications of using these NUREG generic factors to model the common-cause failures of aerospace systems? Herein, the implications of using the NUREG generic factors in the modeling of aerospace systems are investigated in detail and strong recommendations for modeling the common-cause failures of aerospace systems are given.

Stott, James E.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) Power Processing Unit (PPU) Capacitor Failure Root Cause Analysis

The NASA s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) project is developing an advanced ion propulsion system for future NASA missions for solar system exploration. A critical element of the propulsion system is the Power Processing Unit (PPU) which supplies regulated power to the key components of the thruster. The PPU contains six different power supplies including the beam, discharge, discharge heater, neutralizer, neutralizer heater, and accelerator supplies. The beam supply is the largest and processes up to 93+% of the power. The NEXT PPU had been operated for approximately 200+ hr and has experienced a series of three capacitor failures in the beam supply. The capacitors are in the same, nominally non-critical location-the input filter capacitor to a full wave switching inverter. The three failures occurred after about 20, 30, and 135 hr of operation. This paper provides background on the NEXT PPU and the capacitor failures. It discusses the failure investigation approach, the beam supply power switching topology and its operating modes, capacitor characteristics and circuit testing. Finally, it identifies root cause of the failures to be the unusual confluence of circuit switching frequency, the physical layout of the power circuits, and the characteristics of the capacitor.

Soeder, James F.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) Power Processing Unit (PPU) Capacitor Failure Root Cause Analysis

The NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT) project is developing an advanced ion propulsion system for future NASA missions for solar system exploration. A critical element of the propulsion system is the Power Processing Unit (PPU) which supplies regulated power to the key components of the thruster. The PPU contains six different power supplies including the beam, discharge, discharge heater, neutralizer, neutralizer heater, and accelerator supplies. The beam supply is the largest and processes up to 93+% of the power. The NEXT PPU had been operated for approximately 200+ hours and has experienced a series of three capacitor failures in the beam supply. The capacitors are in the same, nominally non-critical location the input filter capacitor to a full wave switching inverter. The three failures occurred after about 20, 30, and 135 hours of operation. This paper provides background on the NEXT PPU and the capacitor failures. It discusses the failure investigation approach, the beam supply power switching topology and its operating modes, capacitor characteristics and circuit testing. Finally, it identifies root cause of the failures to be the unusual confluence of circuit switching frequency, the physical layout of the power circuits, and the characteristics of the capacitor.

Soeder, James F.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Effect of Preconditioning and Soldering on Failures of Chip Tantalum Capacitors

Soldering of molded case tantalum capacitors can result in damage to Ta205 dielectric and first turn-on failures due to thermo-mechanical stresses caused by CTE mismatch between materials used in the capacitors. It is also known that presence of moisture might cause damage to plastic cases due to the pop-corning effect. However, there are only scarce literature data on the effect of moisture content on the probability of post-soldering electrical failures. In this work, that is based on a case history, different groups of similar types of CWR tantalum capacitors from two lots were prepared for soldering by bake, moisture saturation, and longterm storage at room conditions. Results of the testing showed that both factors: initial quality of the lot, and preconditioning affect the probability of failures. Baking before soldering was shown to be effective to prevent failures even in lots susceptible to pop-corning damage. Mechanism of failures is discussed and recommendations for pre-soldering bake are suggested based on analysis of moisture characteristics of materials used in the capacitors' design.

multilayer ceramic capacitor (MLCC)↗
NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Failure

Good Evening, my name is Greg Jerman and for nearly a quarter century I have been performing failure analysis on NASA's aerospace hardware. During that time I had the distinct privilege of keeping the Space Shuttle flying for two thirds of its history. I have analyzed a wide variety of failed hardware from simple electrical cables to cryogenic fuel tanks to high temperature turbine blades. During this time I have found that for all the time we spend intelligently designing things, we need to be equally intelligent about understanding why things fail. The NASA Flight Director for Apollo 13, Gene Kranz, is best known for the expression "Failure is not an option." However, NASA history is filled with failures both large and small, so it might be more accurate to say failure is inevitable. It is how we react and learn from our failures that makes the difference.

Jerman, Gregory↗
NASA NTRS2015

Predicting Time Series Outputs and Time-to-Failure for an Aircraft Controller Using Bayesian Modeling

Safety of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is paramount, but the large number of dynamically changing controller parameters makes it hard to determine if the system is currently stable, and the time before loss of control if not. We propose a hierarchical statistical model using Treed Gaussian Processes to predict (i) whether a flight will be stable (success) or become unstable (failure), (ii) the time-to-failure if unstable, and (iii) time series outputs for flight variables. We first classify the current flight input into success or failure types, and then use separate models for each class to predict the time-to-failure and time series outputs. As different inputs may cause failures at different times, we have to model variable length output curves. We use a basis representation for curves and learn the mappings from input to basis coefficients. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our prediction methods on a NASA neuro-adaptive flight control system.

Statistics↗
NASA NTRS2016

Orion Burn Management, Nominal and Response to Failures

An approach for managing Orion on-orbit burn execution is described for nominal and failure response scenarios. The burn management strategy for Orion takes into account per-burn variations in targeting, timing, and execution; crew and ground operator intervention and overrides; defined burn failure triggers and responses; and corresponding on-board software sequencing functionality. Burn-to- burn variations are managed through the identification of specific parameters that may be updated for each progressive burn. Failure triggers and automatic responses during the burn timeframe are defined to provide safety for the crew in the case of vehicle failures, along with override capabilities to ensure operational control of the vehicle. On-board sequencing software provides the timeline coordination for performing the required activities related to targeting, burn execution, and responding to burn failures.

Odegard, Ryan↗
NASA NTRS2016

Analysis and Characterization of Damage and Failure Utilizing a Generalized Composite Material Model Suitable for Use in Impact Problems

A material model which incorporates several key capabilities which have been identified by the aerospace community as lacking in state-of-the art composite impact models is under development. In particular, a next generation composite impact material model, jointly developed by the FAA and NASA, is being implemented into the commercial transient dynamic finite element code LS-DYNA. The material model, which incorporates plasticity, damage, and failure, utilizes experimentally based tabulated input to define the evolution of plasticity and damage and the initiation of failure as opposed to specifying discrete input parameters (such as modulus and strength). The plasticity portion of the orthotropic, three-dimensional, macroscopic composite constitutive model is based on an extension of the Tsai-Wu composite failure model into a generalized yield function with a non-associative flow rule. For the damage model, a strain equivalent formulation is utilized to allow for the uncoupling of the deformation and damage analyses. In the damage model, a semi-coupled approach is employed where the overall damage in a particular coordinate direction is assumed to be a multiplicative combination of the damage in that direction resulting from the applied loads in the various coordinate directions. Due to the fact that the plasticity and damage models are uncoupled, test procedures and methods to both characterize the damage model and to covert the material stress-strain curves from the true (damaged) stress space to the effective (undamaged) stress space have been developed. A methodology has been developed to input the experimentally determined composite failure surface in a tabulated manner. An analytical approach is then utilized to track how close the current stress state is to the failure surface.

Finite Element Method↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The System Complexity Metric (SCM) Predicts System Costs and Failure Rates

A complex system has many parts and interactions and so is difficult to understand. Systems with higher complexity generally have higher costs and failure rates. A System Complexity Metric (SCM) is defined to be the sum of the number of nodes, N, in the system block diagram plus the number of one-way interactions, I, between the nodes. SCM = N + I. SCMs are easily determined by direct inspection of high level block diagrams of life support systems. System cost was found to be directly proportional to SCM. The system MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure) is the inverse of the system failure rate. MTBF = 1/f. The system MTBF was found to be proportional to SCM^(-2.2) for estimated preflight MTBFs. As is typical for systems that are not extensively tested and redesigned to eliminate unexpected failure modes, the life support flight failure rates were about ten times higher than the preflight estimates and the MTBFs one-tenth the preflight estimates. The system MTBF was found to be proportional to SCM^(-2.6) for observed flight MTBFs.

System compleity↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Investigation of Rectifier Diode Failures in the NEXT-C Power Processing Unit

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster-Commercial (NEXT-C) project is tasked with developing flight electric propulsion systems, including both thrusters and power processing units (PPUs). In 2018, the beam supply in a NEXT-C engineering prototype PPU experienced an output rectifier diode failure during development thermal-vacuum testing. A failure investigation led by NASA GRC identified the root cause of the failure as a thermal runaway caused by increased reverse recovery losses in the diodes when the PPU was run at its maximum operating temperature. Significant reverse recovery performance variations were identified in diodes with the same part number but manufactured by different vendors. The failure investigation was able to collect evidence of the increased reverse recovery and replicate the diode failures in a controlled laboratory environment.

George L Thomas↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Investigation of Rectifier Diode Failures in the NEXT-C Power Processing Unit

NASA's Evolutionary Xenon Thruster-Commercial (NEXT-C) project is tasked with developing flight electric propulsion systems, including both thrusters and power processing units (PPUs). In 2018, the beam supply in a NEXT-C engineering prototype PPU experienced an output rectifier diode failure during development thermal-vacuum testing. A failure investigation led by NASA GRC identified the root cause of the failure as a thermal runaway caused by increased reverse recovery losses in the diodes when the PPU was run at its maximum operating temperature. Significant reverse recovery performance variations were identified in diodes with the same part number but manufactured by different vendors. The failure investigation was able to collect evidence of the increased reverse recovery and replicate the diode failures in a controlled laboratory environment.

George L. Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2022

A Discussion of the Failure of a Quad Diode Module and Efforts to Assure the Flight Spares

In 2019 the International Space Station (ISS) experienced an on on-orbit failure that affected 1 of 28 Battery Charge Discharge Units (BCDUs). Telemetry pointed to a short circuit failure of a Power Rectifier Quad Diode Module. Astronauts removed the failed unit from service which was then returned to Earth for failure analysis. The failure analysis confirmed that the quad diode module had failed short circuit. The investigation identified silver dendrites had grown on the insulated, sloped edge of the mesa semiconductor die of the failed diode and also a 2nd diode in the same quad diode module. Voids between the diode’s protective encapsulating ring and the die provided space within which dendrites were able to form and cause catastrophic failure. The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) convened a EEE Parts Sub-Team to investigate root cause and to assist with risk assessment for all of the flight diode modules (4 distinct production lots) and the flight spares (from a 5th lot). Analysis of the original diode manufacturer’s read and record screening test data identified some lots which contained diodes with parametric instabilities that could signal conditions suited for silver dendrite formation. Computed Tomography (CT) X-ray screening inspection was performed on flight spare modules to identify diodes that do not exhibit voids between the edge of die and encapsulating ring as a mitigation against dendrite formation.

Jay Brusse↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Successes and Failures of Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spaceflight Over the Last Ten Years: Failures and Fix-ups 2013 - 2022 RAMS XV Conference

This project is an overview and analysis of the past ten years (2013 – present) in global spaceflight, highlighting the orbital launches of countries, particularly the failures that occurred, the reasons they occurred, and a breakdown of the related statistics and background information. The analysis is conducted from a perspective of reliability and maintainability engineering and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to formulate a quantifiable understanding of the data and how it is pertinent to Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) in spaceflight. There is a breakdown by country or group, timelines, and number of launches. The failures over the years are categorized, all given a broad analysis of subsystem failures and details of events. A few failures are given a more in-depth analysis of root causes and failure modes determined by their unique or common nature. The data is retrieved from online, publicly available sources.

Quinn Slaugenhoupt↗
NASA NTRS2025

Localization of Ad-Hoc Lunar Constellations in Communication Failure Modes for Distributed Spacecraft Autonomy

As Lunar missions increase in complexity, inspired by NASA’s Artemis Program, they will require reliable and sufficient Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capability to support the upcoming Lunar users. The navigation service should also be compatible with the smaller platforms, like CubeSats, being sent by the public and private sectors. A non-dedicated, ad-hoc Lunar navigation constellation can provide PNT services on-demand using the non-dedicated swarm assets. Swarm members cooperatively and autonomously localize themselves with minimal interaction from Earth, freeing up valuable bandwidth and ground segment resources. The autonomous localization of Lunar constellations utilizes neighbor two-way intersatellite link (ISL) measurements in a distributed extended Kalman filter (DEKF) system to minimize operating costs. Because the decentralized Lunar PNT system relies on relay communication amongst the agents, network failures or loss of assets among ad-hoc Lunar constellations may impact localization performance. This study presents an evaluation of localization performance under increasing levels of network degradation. A simulation of an ad-hoc Lunar PNT swarm is augmented to include system faults and the impacts of intermittent and permanent failures on localization performance are evaluated. We investigate three potential causes of network degradation: single spacecraft loss, multiple spacecraft loss, and antenna failure. The numerical assessments from the simulation show that the LPNT system under study, based on an autonomous decentralized concept of operation, is highly robust and resilient to communication failures. Minor faults, such as single spacecraft loss, solar interference, technical malfunctions, message delays, and antenna outages, have minimal impact on state estimation, with only a 4.47% and 3.75% degradation in median position error for assets and a representative ground user, respectively, compared to an ideal communication scenario. However, major faults, such as hardware failures or meteor strikes leading to the loss of multiple spacecrafts, are more concerning. The permanent loss of three spacecraft results in a more severe performance degradation, with median position error increasing by 23.3% for assets and 11.7% for a representative ground user, despite the Lunar PNT system remaining functional.

Yeji Kim↗
DOE OSTI2024

ECAR-7517 Rev 1 MARVEL I&C Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

The purpose of this document is to perform a single-failure analysis through the use of a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Safety Related components of the MARVEL Instrumentation and Control (I&C) System. The intent is that this document will meet the requirements for a single-failure analysis described in IEEE-379, “IEEE Standard for Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems”, to verify that this design does indeed meet the single failure criterion. Principles of IEEE-352, “IEEE Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems” are followed to ensure the analysis is consistent with industry standards.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗