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DOE OSTI2015

U.S. department of energy safety design strategy review and approval beyond critical decision 3 for the high-level waste facility - 15525

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in Hanford, Washington, is the nation's largest environmental remediation construction project. In 2012, at the WTP's High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) restricted construction work at the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility because of unresolved technical issues associated with the facility and of misalignment of the design and nuclear safety basis. By 2013, as additional issues were discovered, ORP limited HLW design and procurement activities. Addressing the technical issues and the misalignment of the design basis with the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) is a priority for ORP. A proposal was developed to use the concept of a safety design strategy (SDS), as documented in DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, as a planning mechanism to support facility design and PDSA alignment. The standard provides the processes to develop an SDS that will ensure safety is integrated into design early in the project, by the start of preliminary design. Ultimately, as design progresses, an SDS is intended to support development of the project's PDSA. However, in this unique case, the HLW Facility design and construction phase has progressed beyond Critical Decision 3 and DOE-STD-1189-2008 was issued in 2008; 6 years after ORP approved the first WTP PDSA. In July 2013, ORP and the contractor recognized that the unresolved technical issues and design - safety basis misalignment should be addressed through a renewed look at nuclear safety requirements, and agreed that developing an SDS tailored to the criteria in DOE-STD-1189-2008 provided the best path forward to better integrate design and safety. Development of the SDS for the HLW Facility was one of many goals ORP established in a plan that describes how ORP will determine whether, and under what conditions, the contractor should be authorized to proceed with production engineering, procurement, and construction activities for the HLW Facility. Over the next several months, the contractor developed the draft SDS, identifying design basis accidents and control strategies for those accidents. ORP monitored progress and, when appropriate, provided recommendations. In April 2014, the contractor provided a draft SDS to ORP for initial review by an independent DOE Review Team. The Review Team was comprised of representatives from nuclear safety, criticality safety, engineering, fire protection, the Office of Environmental Management, the Assistant Manager WTP, and the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety. A unique draft document review and interactive review process, facilitated through work sessions and continuous communication with the contractor, culminated in the development of 147 technical comments on topics varying from SDS implementation to hydrogen deflagration in vessels. Comment resolution sought to improve project clarity, delineation of control strategies, and, holistically, facilitate integration of safety into design in the SDS, as it will guide the restart of the HLW Facility production engineering and limited procurement and construction activities. All comments were resolved in support of a contractor submission of the final SDS to ORP at the end of June 2014. Successful resolution of these comments was achieved by continuing the real-time response and incorporation interaction with the contractor to ensure that mutual objectives were satisfied. The response times were facilitated through telephone, E-mail, and a shared file server accessible to contractor and DOE reviewers across the DOE complex. As a measure of success of this process, the Safety Basis Approval Authority (ORP Manager) and the WTP Federal Project Director approved the SDS on August 1, 2014, with no conditions of approval. DOE and the contractor recognized that it would be difficult to implement the SDS without changes to the existing contractor's engineering and nuclear safety processes. Accordingly, the contractor developed or revised a significant number of engineering and nuclear safety plans and procedures to implement the SDS into the design process. Over the coming year, the contractor will conduct a gap analysis between the SDS and the presently approved PDSA to incorporate the design basis accidents and preferred control strategies developed from the SDS into the PDSA. In addition, ORP will conduct an assessment of the contractor's implementation of the SDS into the design process at the appropriate stage of implementation, within 6 to 12 months of approval. Although the SDS was developed late in the HLW project timeline, the document will facilitate alignment of design and the safety basis, and is a key step in the return to full production engineering for the HLW Facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Investigation and Recovery Following the Drum Event at INL's ARP-V Facility - 19517

Contractors working under the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Idaho Field Office have been exhuming and processing buried legacy waste from early weapons development and productions operations since 1984. Since operations began, nearly 400,000 drums have passed through this process. On April 11, 2018, repackaged drums were staged in an airlock (radiological buffer area) awaiting transfer to another facility for characterization. Late in the evening after operations had ended, four of the drums over pressurized causing an energetic displacement of their lids. A significant fraction of drum contents was ejected and dispersed throughout the airlock. The event activated the fire detection system in the facility initiating an emergency response from the site fire department, radiological protection, and operations. Initial intervention by fire department personnel was unsuccessful at quenching the reaction, so the responders egressed to a safe distance and monitored the situation. After determining the event had terminated and it was safe to enter, the facility was assessed revealing significant contamination in the airlock from the ejected waste. The area surrounding the facility was surveyed and it was determined that no contamination was released outside the facility. The Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) Program Manager commissioned an investigation and recovery effort, which focused on three aspects: (1) technical investigation, (2) event and causal analysis, and (3) facility recovery. A team of highly qualified individuals from around the DOE Complex was assembled to support the technical investigation. The team included representatives from several Fluor Idaho, Fluor Corporate, Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (INL), LANL, SRNL, South West Research Institute, DOE Carlsbad Field Office, and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and DOE-Headquarters. This team addressed the reaction mechanism of the event by guiding the sampling activities and coordinating analysis and testing by the analytical laboratories. Independent and experienced investigators were brought in to conduct a rigorous event and cause analysis. The Causal Analysis Team pursued direct, root, and contributing causes. Interviews were conducted, and documents were reviewed to develop an event and causal analysis. The Accelerated Retrieval Project V Operations team mobilized to decontaminate and recover the facility. Significant progress has been made in this effort, area and airborne contamination levels have been significantly reduced allowing limited activities to resume. In addition, this group supported sample collection efforts as directed by the Technical Investigation Team. This paper reviews key findings and milestones from the technical investigation, the event and causal analysis, and facility recovery operations. From these elements of the investigation, lessons learned are identified that would benefit other organizations involved with legacy waste management and disposition. Waste management is common to all sites in the DOE Complex and the events and recovery efforts described in this paper may provide beneficial insights to these operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Technical Basis and Implementation of Groundwater Pathway Models Used for INL’s RH LLW Disposal Facility Performance Assessment

The Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated on INL in support of the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. RH LLW is generated on the INL site from spent nuclear fuel handling and operations at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF), the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and at the Material and Fuels Complex (MFC) in addition to other miscellaneous research activities. The facility has been designed to receive RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated debris, ion exchange resins used to purify cooling water, and activated metals generated during reactor core change outs, Naval spent fuel management, and nuclear R&D. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management [1] for all-pathways including groundwater and air, radon emissions limits, and inadvertent intrusion limits. The facility design includes a vault system incorporating robust concrete vaults oriented vertically in close-packed arrays, a hydraulic drainage system designed to limit water contact with the stainless steel waste canisters/liners and concrete vaults, and a robust monitoring system. Per the environmental assessment (EA) [2], all waste will be disposed of in stainless steel waste canisters/liners. During facility design and construction, site-specific data was collected to provide laboratory and field scale performance characteristics for the concrete vault and hydraulic drainage systems. Field-scale infiltration tests were conducted and monitored and the data was interpreted using numerical simulation. Based on interpretation of the observed laboratory and field test data, the facility performance assessment (PA) was developed. The PA groundwater pathway source release model differentially credits release from surface contaminated debris, ion exchange resins, and activated metals. It also credits failure of the steel waste canisters/liners with failure rates based on actual corrosion data. Once released, transport through the vadose zone and aquifer to downgradient receptor locations was simulated in the PA using a one-dimensional modeling approach based on historical three-dimensional modeling of historically-contaminated INL sites. This paper provides an overview of the groundwater pathway source release models and their technical implementation in the PA. It also describes the one-dimensional transport model used for the vadose zone and multi-dimensional model used for the aquifer.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Nuclear Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in the Design of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex

The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is being built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to replace aging uranium processes at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge Tennessee. Specifically, the processes housed in building 9212 are being replaced as this facility dates to the World War II Manhattan Project days of Y-12. When the UPF Project is completed it will consist of three main facilities along with several support facilities. The Main Processing Building (MPB) will house oxide production and metal casting operations. The Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB) will house wet chemistry operations (examples include recovery evaporation and calcination of solutions). The Personnel Support Building will be connected to both the SAB and the MPB and will serve as a transition facility for materials and personnel between the two. The MPB will also be connected to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Storage Facility (HEUMF) via a connector (HCON) to permit transfers from storage into UPF directly. This paper will summarize some of the more important lessons learned for the NCS practitioner working in a design environment rather than in a production or experimental environment. As the Chief NCS Engineer for the UPF Project I have been responsible for ensuring the technical evaluations produced on the project are high quality, technically accurate, and conform to the Y-12 NCS Program expectations. Ensuring nuclear criticality safety for processes that do not yet exist in reality is a challenge very different than that of ensuring subcriticality for processes in an operating facility. The biggest difference being that in design space – everything is imaginary whereas in the operating facility you have the benefit of being able to go out and look at the equipment and interview the operators. Ensuring that Nuclear Criticality Safety is integrated into design is a process that requires constant communication between the NCS staff and the broader engineering design team. Until the facility is constructed – nothing is physically stable and so rigorous documentation of decisions – to include any assumptions – is necessary to minimize errors. Non-NCS engineers will not understand the hazard or the physics of nuclear criticality. It is up to the NCS staff to provide training and communication to the team. The NCS staff must be patient and prepared to explain themselves many times and be as flexible as possible.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2016

Development of the Licensing Procedure and Regulatory Framework for the Spent Fuel Storage facility in Korea - 16423

The Public Engagement Commission on SNF management (PECOS) published the recommendation report on the spent fuel management of Korea in June, 2015. Based on this report, the future national policy for spent fuel management of Korea has been established, taking into consideration the national/international trends on policy and technology development. Regardless of the recommendation report of PECOS, Spent fuel storage casks are necessary in Korea. Therefore, various types of spent fuel storage casks are now being developed by Korea vendors. For example, Concrete storage casks and dual purpose metal casks are now under development by the KORAD (Korea Radioactive waste agency) for future use in the interim storage facility. Unfortunately, there is no independent licensing procedure for spent fuel storage casks in Nuclear Safety Act (NSA) because is the casks are considered an integral part of the interim storage facility safety equipment. Furthermore, the definition of radioactive waste in the NSA was changed recently. Now, spent fuel is separated from the definition of 'radioactive waste'. Spent fuel can only become radioactive waste by the decision through the meeting of the relative ministers of Korea government. For that reason, the licensing procedure for interim spent fuel storage facilities was separated from the current 'disposal facility, etc.' in accordance with the article 63 of NSA. The aim of this study is to develop the licensing procedure for the storage cask, and also to develop a revised draft of interim storage facility procedure within the NSA. Once this independent licensing procedure on the spent fuel storage cask is introduced to the NSA, it is expected that developers or operators can develop and commercialize the storage cask in Korea. In this study, an independent licensing procedure for the spent fuel storage facility was developed including the storage cask licensing procedure for the NSA. The procedure was composed of the permit for construction and operation of interim storage facility, criteria for permit, inspection criteria, periodic safety review, and decommissioning criteria, etc. The detailed contents of these requirements were also developed to introduce the regulatory framework for the interim storage facility. Particularly, periodic safety review and decommissioning criteria were developed in accordance with the recommendation of IRRS (International Regulatory Review Service) of IAEA. The developed licensing procedure for spent fuel storage facility will be introduced in NSA in response to the revised definition of NSA and the recommendation report of PECOS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Replacement of Melter 2 at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) - 18608

The original DWPF melter was replaced in 2002 with an identical unit, and radioactive operation of Melter 2 commenced in 2003. After nearly 14 years of service, a lower electrode failure of Melter 2 occurred in February 2017 which required its removal and replacement with Melter 3. The scope of the replacement outage involves several significant evolutions: - Shutdown of Melter 2 and placement into a safe state; - Remote external and internal inspection of Melter 2 to chronicle its condition prior to removal; - Disassembly and removal of Melter 2 from the process cell; - Placement of Melter 2 into a storage box and transport to a storage vault; - Preparation and initial testing of Melter 3 prior to transport to the DWPF; - Transport to the DWPF and installation of Melter 3 in the process cell; - Final startup testing and initiation of radioactive operation. Upon determination that repair of Melter 2 was not feasible, DWPF created an outage team to integrate schedules and resources needed to execute melter replacement as well as including maintenance scope for facility work that can only be performed when the melter is de-energized. The execution of this scope required integration with other mission critical outage activities already in progress, and planned to start, including initial facility tie-in scope for the new Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). This unplanned addition of the melter replacement scope to the existing outage scope resulted in the longest facility outage period since the initiation of radioactive operations at the DWPF in 1996. Successful completion of this scope across all Liquid Waste facilities would require balance - for schedules, resources, priority, funding, etc. To overcome the significant challenges created by this additional scope, a WAR Room was established to ensure adequate integration and coordination of critical resources, and daily progress. The execution of this scope has required the integration of nearly two dozen work groups across multiple facilities at Savannah River Site (SRS), in addition to support from nearly a dozen vendors. The melter replacement outage was executed with a high degree of disciplined operation to ensure the facility was ready to resume glass pouring operation in time to support restart of the Liquid Waste program at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This paper will provide a brief overview of Melter 2 operational history. The execution of the removal and replacement operations will be described with a specific focus on lessons learned and opportunities where the outage execution diverged from the original Melter 1 replacement outage. It is expected to be of interest to vitrification facilities, as well as facilities, which require remote maintenance and replacement of large process equipment. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Decommissioning of obsolete Nuclear Facilities in the UJV Rez, a. s. - 19027

UJV Rez, a. s. (further also UJV) is a leading institution in all areas of nuclear R and D in the Czech Republic and has had a dominant position in the nuclear program since it was established in 1955 as the Nuclear Research Institute Rez. The activities of UJV encompass nuclear physics, chemistry, nuclear power and many other topics. The main issues addressed at UJV in past decades have included research, development and services for NPPs, the fuel cycle and irradiation services for research and development in the industrial sector and medicine. UJV also manages most institutional radioactive wastes (RAW) produced in the Czech Republic (approx. 90 %). After more than 60 years of activities of the UJV in the nuclear field, there were obsolete nuclear facilities to be decommissioned. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities UJV is the only ongoing decommissioning project in the Czech Republic. Preparations for decommissioning began in 1996. Safety analysis report (SAR) was performed comprising the identification and characterization of potential sources of risk, potentially exposed receptors and exposure pathways, potential chemical compounds, radionuclides and media of concern. The results of the SAR enabled to determine the priorities of the decommissioning, the decommissioning the expenses and as well as project implementation. The decommissioning project was revised on the base of information obtained during decommissioning. The decommissioning was divided into two phases according to the level of risk and the financing limitations. The Ministry of Finance significantly financially contributed the decommissioning, although the UJV also contributed a considerable amount. Overall cost is close to the amount of Eur 27 million. Decommissioning started in 2003 and will be finished in 2018. Almost all facilities have already been successfully decommissioned. In the following table, the status of decommissioning of facilities is described. 1) Reloading site for RAW storage (Building 211/6): last item in progress 2003 - 2018; 2) Special Sewage System: decommissioned 2004 - 2005, reused; 3) Liquid RAW storage tanks (Building 211/3): decontaminated 2004 - 2013, reused; 4) Technology for RAW treatment (Building 241): decommissioned 2003 - 2011; 5) Contaminated equipment (Building 250): decommissioned 2003 - 2016; 6) Systems for storage of sealed sources (Building 261); decommissioned 2003 - 2005; 7) Decay tanks (Building 211/5); decommissioned 2003 - 2014, reused; 8) Old bituminating unit (Building 211/3); decommissioned 2004 - 2008; 9) Surface RAW storage site; decommissioned 2009 - 2014. Later, other unused decommissioning facilities, which were not included in the decommissioning project financed by the state, were included. These facilities are continuously decommissioned and financed from own resources of UJV. These facilities are like facilities already decommissioned: radiochemical laboratories, (including glove boxes), liquid RW storage tanks (including sewage systems), liquid RW treatment technology, hot cells, accumulated RW, etc. Realization started 2016 and expected duration is till 2026. Estimated budget is approximately Eur 17 million. The decommissioning of nuclear facilities in UJV is being carried out on the high level of radiation protection and up to now there was no extraordinary event or accident, although some challenges we were forced to address. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Technical Basis and Implementation of Groundwater Pathway Models Used for INL's RH LLW Disposal Facility Performance Assessment - 19440

The Idaho National Laboratory's (INL's) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated by INL in support of the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. RH LLW is generated on the INL site from spent nuclear fuel handling and operations at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF), the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and at the Material and Fuels Complex (MFC) in addition to other miscellaneous research activities. The facility has been designed to receive RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated materials, ion exchange resins used to purify cooling water, and activated metals generated during reactor core change outs, Naval spent fuel management, and nuclear R and D. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management for all-pathways including groundwater and air, radon emissions limits, and inadvertent intrusion limits. The facility design includes a vault system incorporating robust concrete vaults oriented vertically in close-packed arrays, a hydraulic drainage system designed to limit water contact with the stainless steel waste canisters and concrete vaults, and a robust monitoring system. Per the environmental assessment (EA), all waste will be disposed of in stainless steel waste canisters. During facility design and construction, site-specific data was collected to provide laboratory and field scale performance characteristics for the concrete vault and hydraulic drainage systems. Field-scale infiltration tests were conducted and monitoring data was interpreted using numerical simulation. Based on interpretation of the observed laboratory and field test data, the facility performance assessment (PA) was developed. The PA groundwater pathway source release model differentially credits release from surface contaminated waste, ion exchange resins, and activated metals. It also credits steel waste canisters with failure rates based on actual corrosion data. Once released, radionuclide transport through the vadose zone and aquifer to downgradient receptor locations was simulated in the PA using a one-dimensional modeling approach based on three-dimensional modeling of historically-contaminated INL sites. This paper provides an overview of the groundwater pathway source release models and their technical implementation in the PA. It also describes the one-dimensional transport model used for the vadose zone and multi-dimensional model used for the aquifer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2016

Clemson University Wind Turbine Drivetrain Test Facility

In November of 2009, Clemson University was awarded a competitive grant from the U.S. Department of Energy to design, build and operate a facility for full-scale, highly accelerated mechanical testing of next-generation wind turbine drivetrain technologies. The primary goal of the project was to design, construct, commission, and operate a state-of-the-art sustainable facility that permits full-scale highly accelerated testing of advanced drivetrain systems for large wind turbines. The secondary goal was to meet the objectives of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, especially in job creation, and provide a positive impact on economically distressed areas in the United States, and preservation and economic recovery in an expeditious manner. The project was executed according to a managed cooperative agreement with the Department of Energy and was an extraordinary success. The resultant new facility is located in North Charleston, SC, providing easy transportation access by rail, road or ship and operates on an open access model such that it is available to the U.S. Wind Industry for research, analysis, and evaluation activities. The 72 m by 97 m facility features two mechanical dynamometer test bays for evaluating the torque and blade dynamic forces experienced by the rotors of wind turbine drivetrains. The dynamometers are rated at 7.5 MW and 15 MW of low speed shaft power and are configured as independent test areas capable of simultaneous operation. All six degrees of freedom, three linear and three rotational, for blade and rotor dynamics are replicated through the combination of a drive motor, speed reduction gearbox and a controllable hydraulic load application unit (LAU). This new LAU setup readily supports accelerated lifetime mechanical testing and load analysis for the entire drivetrain system of the nacelle and easily simulates a wide variety of realistic operating scenarios in a controlled laboratory environment. The development of these two dynamometer test rigs is the first significant achievement for the project. These test rigs embody a new manner of test due to the system configuration and completely new design with a free floating loading hub in the LAU. This project provided the catalyst for the advancement to this new test rig configuration that has been adopted by every significant wind turbine test rig constructed since the inception of this project. There are currently two different vendors supplying these new systems. Catalyzing this new design is the second major success of the project. With the increased market penetration of wind energy over the past decade, many regions and countries have developed specific electrical grid specifications and performance codes for large wind farms to ensure operational reliability and stability. These grid codes provide requirements for interconnection with the grid during low or high voltage phenomena, typically encountered during and after system fault events. Given the installed infrastructure of the Wind Turbine Drivetrain Testing Facility (WTDTF), a natural expansion of facility capability was to include the necessary equipment for performing fault ride-through evaluations of wind turbines to the Low Voltage Ride Through (LVRT) codes. Once the decision was made to expand the scope of the original grant into fault ride-through testing, it was clear that there are several markets, not just wind, which could benefit from this type of test and that simple fault ride-through testing could be extended into a broader scope of electrical testing capabilities. It was at this point that Clemson University was awarded a second grant to build a 15 MW Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Grid Simulator in order to establish world class electrical testing capabilities to compliment the mechanical testing at the WTDTF. This third significant achievement resulted in the 15 MW HIL Grid Simulator as the corner stone of the Duke Energy eGRID Center and is collocated with the WTDTF in the SCE&G Energy Innovation Center at the new Facility in North Charleston, SC, USA. Before the eGRID was completed, it was recognized that the ability to test solar farm equipment was but a small step away thru the addition of enhanced equipment to provide for DC testing. In yet another expansion/success, a 2.5 MW rectifier system was designed and implemented by Clemson staff to enhance the Center’s capabilities. The program required over 250,000 man-hours of on-site construction labor reworking the brownfield facility on the former Navy Base, clearly satisfying one of the major goals of the Reinvestment Act. This was done while winning numerous awards for design and construction of the facility, including the Top US Project for 2014 from the Trade Journal Engineering News Record. The project was a major collaborative developmental activity managed by Clemson University staff that involved the DOE and many partners and organizations.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2015

Visibility and Visual Characteristics of the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System Power Tower Facility

This report presents the results of a study conducted to document the visibility and visual characteristics of the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System (ISEGS), a utility-scale solar power tower facility located on land administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management in southern California. Study activities consisted of field observations of the ISEGS facility and comparison of the observations made in the field with the visual contrast assessments and visual simulations in the ISEGS Final Environmental Impact Statement (Final EIS) and supporting documents created prior to ISEGS construction. Field observations of ISEGS were made from 19 locations within 35 mi (56 km) of the facility in the course of one week in September 2014. The study results established that reflected sunlight from the receivers was the primary source of visual contrast from the operating ISEGS facility. The ISEGS facility was found to be a major source of visual contrast for all observations up to 20 mi (32 km), and was easily visible at 35 mi. Glare from individual heliostats was frequently visible, and often brighter than the reflected light from the receivers. Heliostat glare caused discomfort for one or more viewers at distances up to 20 mi. The ISEGS power blocks were brightly lit at night, and were conspicuous at the observation distance of approximately 6 mi (10 km). The facility is substantially brighter and is seen more clearly in the field than in photographs of the facility or in the prepared simulations, which were based on photographs. The simulations of the ISEGS facility in the Final EIS, which were evaluated as part of this study, sometimes lacked spatial accuracy and realism. The evaluated simulations generally under-represented the actual visual contrast from the project, and some of the contrast ratings in the Final EIS predicted substantially lower levels of visual contrast than were actually observed for the operating facility.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2018

California CO 2 Storage Assurance Facility Enterprise (C2SAFE): Final Technical Report

The California CO 2 Storage Assurance Facility Enterprise (C2SAFE) project conducted a preliminary study into the feasibility of a commercial-scale carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) storage complex located in California’s Southern San Joaquin Valley (SSJV). The work represents the first phase of a multi-phased development approach outlined by the United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Carbon Storage Assurance and Facility Enterprise (CarbonSAFE) program meant to develop carbon storage sites capable of permanently storing 50 million metric tonnes of CO 2 , or greater, injected over a typical facility life of 20 to 30 years. This report represents the culmination of work performed under C2SAFE and outlines a phased implementation plan for large-scale, industrial carbon capture and permanent storage in California’s SSJV. The report is meant to be a standalone document and as such provides high-level summaries of all tasks of the project, but is also meant to complement the other three topical reports issued by the project – reports referenced herein. The study considered multiple scenarios including an east-side storage facility, a west-side storage facility, and potential multi-site storage facilities. The east-side storage facility is to be located at Clean Energy Systems, Inc.’s Kimberlina Power Plant, or nearby, and the west-side facility will be located at the California Resources Corporation’s (CRC’s) Elk Hills oil field. The majority of carbon emissions are planned to be captured from existing sources and transported to the selected and verified storage site(s). Capture from the single closest source to the eastern storage facility and the sources within the Elk Hills field would meet the CarbonSAFE storage goal of 50 million tonnes. The study has shown there is sufficient storage capacity to meet this requirement and more; thus, capture from any of the numerous additional large nearby sources would substantially leverage the CarbonSAFE investment. A comparison of preliminary CO 2 capture, transportation, and storage costs to economic value and incentives in the state shows current market conditions make it economically feasible to develop large-scale industrial storage sites in California’s SSJV. The business case for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in California’s SSJV appears economically viable today for large CO 2 point sources involved in the production of transportation fuels, such as oilfield cogeneration units and steam boilers. The overall levelized CCS cost is estimated at roughly 125 per tonne of CO 2 , which includes CO 2 amine-solvent post-combustion capture, transportation, and storage. The levelized CO 2 capture cost is based on today’s technology, with no future cost reduction factored in for technology improvement. The sum of the value of incentives and revenue from California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) credits (discounted roughly 20% from their current transaction value), sale of California cap-and-trade emission allowances, and Section 45Q tax credits—either for saline storage or the Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) credit plus CO 2 sales revenue—is about 165/tonne-CO 2 . The economic viability of CCS for Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC) power plants in the SSJV is more site-specific. A plant providing power solely to the electric grid, if it added CCS, should be eligible for Section 45Q tax credits and could sell its excess cap-and-trade emission allowances, but it would not generate LCFS credits. Using the cost and incentive values detailed in this report, it would not be economical for such a plant to add CCS today, barring other considerations. An NGCC plant within an oilfield (e.g., CRC Elk Hills and NRG Sunrise) that provides power to the oilfield as well as to the grid should receive “partial credit” in terms of generating LCFS credits if it added CCS (pro-rated for the fraction of power going to the oilfield). Such a plant should also be eligible for Section 45Q tax credits and garner revenue from selling its excess cap-and-trade emission allowances. Using the cost and incentive values described in this report, the economic viability of adding CCS today would depend on the relative fractions of electricity supplied to the oilfield and the grid. As the value of cap-and-trade emission allowances grows over time (either by market forces or the escalating floor price), the relative fraction of power needing to remain in the oilfield to achieve “breakeven” would diminish. At some point, even plants providing all their power to the grid would be candidates for economical CCS application. The C2SAFE team has proposed to expand upon the knowledge gained during this study by conducting a detailed feasibility assessment under a follow-on phase of the program, Phase II – Feasibility. This would include detailed data collection at the two sites, analysis, reporting, stakeholder outreach, and risk mitigation activities to support the development of a commercial carbon storage complex in the SSJV.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Jupiter Laser Facility Annual Report, FY 2025

Dear JLF community, I cannot believe I am now entering my third year as JLF director — time definitely flies when you are having fun! FY25 was another pivotal year for the Jupiter Laser Facility, marked by both scientific achievement and growing visibility for our community. Building on the successful reopening and refurbishment of the facility, we continued to demonstrate how JLF drives innovation in high energy density and fusion energy science, laser technology, and workforce development. Across Janus, Titan, and COMET, users executed a diverse portfolio of experiments, from dynamic compression and opacity measurements to laser plasma interactions, laboratory astrophysics, and advanced diagnostics. These efforts are highlighted in this report, including the development of new probes that capture the time evolution of plasmas on a single shot, and diagnostics and platforms that are already impacting experiments at NIF and other large facilities. JLF continues to serve as both a testbed for new ideas and a bridge to larger scale campaigns. FY25 also showcased the broader role of JLF within the Laboratory and the national HED science ecosystem. The NIF JLF User Groups Meeting in February brought nearly 180 participants to Livermore and highlighted the scientific progress made during JLF’s first full year of renewed operations. JLF research and users were recognized with Director’s Institutional Awards and Early and Mid Career awards, underscoring the quality and impact of the work performed here. Our team also contributed prominently to national conversations about laser safety, plasma physics, and inertial fusion energy through invited talks, conferences, and professional society leadership. JLF’s integration with LaserNetUS deepened this year as well. We launched a new technical exchange program across LaserNetUS facilities and kicked it off with a JLF team visit to the BELLA Center at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. These exchanges are strengthening operations, sharing best practices, and improving the user experience across the network. Filming for the LaserNetUS “Behind the Scenes” series and participation in the annual LaserNetUS meeting further increased the visibility of our facility and our users. At the same time, JLF continues to play a central role in ambitious new programs, such as the Big Aperture Thulium laser effort funded through one of the DOE Office of Science Microelectronics Science Research Centers, which will use JLF infrastructure to explore next generation high rep rate lasers for EUV and x-ray source development. A core part of our mission remains training the next generation of scientists. In FY25, we welcomed another cohort of summer students, who joined experimental teams on Titan and presented their research at LLNL’s student poster symposium and national inertial fusion energy meetings. JLF users and early career scientists showcased their work at conferences across the country, highlighting experiments performed at the facility. These hands on experiences, and the mentoring provided by our staff and user teams, are central to JLF’s identity as a true user facility. Finally, FY25 reinforced JLF’s role as a focal point for partnerships and outreach. We hosted visits from international collaborators, science leaders, and we shared the story of the facility through venues such as the Big Ideas Lab podcast. These interactions help connect our work to a broader scientific and policy audience and open new pathways for collaboration. As we look ahead, the combination of refurbished hardware, new capabilities like STILETTO and enhanced short pulse performance on Titan, strong partnerships across LLNL and LaserNetUS, and a growing user community positions JLF for an even more ambitious program in the coming years. I am deeply grateful to our technical and operations staff for their dedication, to our LLNL partners for their continued support, and to our users for bringing bold, creative ideas to the facility. I look forward to more experiments, capabilities, partnerships, and groundbreaking science in the years to come! With brightest regards, Félicie Albert, JLF Director.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

NASA NTRS1991

Nuclear thermal propulsion test facility requirements and development strategy

The Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) subpanel of the Space Nuclear Propulsion Test Facilities Panel evaluated facility requirements and strategies for nuclear thermal propulsion systems development. High pressure, solid core concepts were considered as the baseline for the evaluation, with low pressure concepts an alternative. The work of the NTP subpanel revealed that a wealth of facilities already exists to support NTP development, and that only a few new facilities must be constructed. Some modifications to existing facilities will be required. Present funding emphasis should be on long-lead-time items for the major new ground test facility complex and on facilities supporting nuclear fuel development, hot hydrogen flow test facilities, and low power critical facilities.

Allen, George C.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Transonic turbine blade cascade testing facility

NASA LeRC has designed and constructed a new state-of-the-art test facility. This facility, the Transonic Turbine Blade Cascade, is used to evaluate the aerodynamics and heat transfer characteristics of blade geometries for future turbine applications. The facility's capabilities make it unique: no other facility of its kind can combine the high degree of airflow turning, infinitely adjustable incidence angle, and high transonic flow rates. The facility air supply and exhaust pressures are controllable to 16.5 psia and 2 psia, respectively. The inlet air temperatures are at ambient conditions. The facility is equipped with a programmable logic controller with a capacity of 128 input/output channels. The data acquisition system is capable of scanning up to 1750 channels per sec. This paper discusses in detail the capabilities of the facility, overall facility design, instrumentation used in the facility, and the data acquisition system. Actual research data is not discussed.

Verhoff, Vincent G.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Transonic turbine blade cascade testing facility

Verhoff, Vincent G.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Space facilities: Meeting future needs for research, development, and operations

The National Facilities Study (NFS) represents an interagency effort to develop a comprehensive and integrated long-term plan for world-class aeronautical and space facilities that meet current and projected needs for commercial and government aerospace research and development and space operations. At the request of NASA and the DOD, the National Research Council's Committee on Space Facilities has reviewed the space related findings of the NFS. The inventory of more than 2800 facilities will be an important resource, especially if it continues to be updated and maintained as the NFS report recommends. The data in the inventory provide the basis for a much better understanding of the resources available in the national facilities infrastructure, as well as extensive information on which to base rational decisions about current and future facilities needs. The working groups have used the inventory data and other information to make a set of recommendations that include estimates of cast savings and steps for implementation. While it is natural that the NFS focused on cost reduction and consolidations, such a study is most useful to future planning if it gives equal weight to guiding the direction of future facilities needed to satisfy legitimate national aspirations. Even in the context of cost reduction through facilities closures and consolidations, the study is timid about recognizing and proposing program changes and realignments of roles and missions to capture what could be significant savings and increased effectiveness. The recommendations of the Committee on Space Facilities are driven by the clear need to be more realistic and precise both in recognizing current incentives and disincentives in the aerospace industry and in forecasting future conditions for U.S. space activities.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2003

X-Ray Testing Constellation-X Optics at MSFC's 100-m Facility

In addition to the 530-m-long X-Ray Calibration Facility (XRCF), NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) operates a 104-m-long (source-to-detector) X-ray-test facility. Originally developed and still occasionally used for stray-light testing of visible-fight optical systems, the so-called "Stray-Light Facility" now serves primarily as a convenient and inexpensive facility for performance evaluation and calibration of X-ray optics and detectors. The facility can accommodate X-ray optics up to about 1-m diameter and 12-m focal length. Currently available electron-impact sources at the facility span the approximate energy range 0.2 to 100 keV, thus supporting testing of soft- and hard-X-ray optics and detectors. Available MSFC detectors are a front-illuminated CCD (charge-coupled device) and a scanning CZT (cadmium--zinc--telluride) detector, with low-energy cut-offs of about 0.8 and 3 keV, respectively. In order to test developmental optics for the Constellation-X Project, led by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), MSFC undertook several enhancements to the facility. Foremost among these was development and fabrication of a five-degree-of-freedom (5-DoF) optics mount and control system, which translates and tilts the user-provided mirror assembly suspended from its interface plate. Initial Constellation-X tests characterize the performance of the Optical Alignment Pathfinder Two (OAP2) for the large Spectroscopy X-ray Telescope (SXT) and of demonstration mirror assemblies for the Hard X-ray Telescope (HXT). With the Centroid Detector Assembly (CDA), used for precision alignment of the Chandra (nee AXAF) mirrors, the Constellation-X SXT Team optically aligned the individual mirrors of the OAPZ at GSFC. The team then developed set-up and alignment procedures, including transfer of the alignment from the optical alignment facility at GSFC to the X-ray test facility at MSFC, using a reference flat and fiducials. The OAPZ incorporates additional ancillary features --- fixed aperture mask and movable sub-aperture mask --- to facilitate X-ray characterization of the optics. Although the OAPZ was designed to- have low sensitivity to temperature offsets and gradients, analyses showed the necessity of active temperature control for the X-ray performance testing. Thus, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) implemented a thermal control and monitoring system, designed to hold the OAP2 close to its assembly.

O'Dell, Stephen↗