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At least 325 records · Page 18

Mitigation for Removal of Building 01-103 in the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

Building 01-103, the Drill Bit Repair Building was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. B18848 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and contributing to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed 2022). The Drill Bit Repair Building retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since its original construction. The design was modified slightly in 1996 with the addition of a removable and non-destructive chain-link fence. Nearby buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020) but the other buildings and storage yards remain. Therefore, the integrity of setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the building no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). Building 01-103 was constructed in 1985 to coincide with the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1. The design for the new Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. The buildings included administrative and engineering office space, warehouses, a radiograph building, and Building 01-103 as the drill bit maintenance and repair building, among others. The Drill Bit Repair Building was critical to the success of underground nuclear testing and is eligible under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by maintaining specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is the only recorded example of a facility built specifically for the maintenance of big-hole drill bits on the NNSS. As it retains both significance and integrity, it remains individually eligible under Criteria A and C. In addition to its individual significance, the Drill Bit Repair Building also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as a representative of a big-hole drilling support facility necessary for underground nuclear testing. The building and the equipment therein were designed specifically for testing at the NNSS, where much of the early technology and methods for big-hole drilling were developed. Its removal will result in not only the demolition of a contributing element but also a change in the physical features of the district’s setting that contribute to its historic significance. The change in setting will diminish the district’s integrity. However, the district still contains numerous examples of other buildings constructed for the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling and remains eligible under Criteria A and C.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Mitigation for Removal of Building 01-202681 in the Main Storage Yard of the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The Main Storage Yard was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. S2772 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and as contributing to the significance of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed). The Main Storage Yard retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, design, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since the original construction. Since the purpose of the yard is to maintain storage equipment that is actively being used, the design and feeling will change each time equipment is moved. Such actions reinforce the integrity of design and feeling. Buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020), but the other buildings and storage yard remain. Therefore, the setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the Main Storage Yard no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). The Main Storage Yard was designed to facilitate the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1 in 1985. The design for the overall Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. While the North Storage Yard largely serves as overflow storage, the Main Storage Yard holds the majority of drill rigs and drilling equipment needed to support big hole drilling. The Main Storage Yard and its contents were essential elements of the nuclear testing drilling program on the NNSS thus making it eligible for the NRHP under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by storing specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is an engineered landscape that now serves as an open-air repository of drilling technology and nuclear testing. In addition to its individual significance, the Main Storage Yard also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as it showcases a variety of big-hole drilling equipment, support facilities, and warehouses that were specially designed for nuclear testing at the NNSS. Despite the demolition of two contributing elements to date, the district still contains numerous examples of other facilities with the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling; therefore, the district still remains eligible under Criteria A and C.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Prototype Hanford Barrier Performance Monitoring Report: Fiscal Year 2024

This report provides an annual update on performance monitoring of the Prototype Hanford Barrier (PHB) at the Hanford Site. The PHB is part of a long-term study that serves as the scientific basis for many of the evapotranspiration-capillary barrier designs currently used globally and for future engineered barrier designs planned for remedial actions over waste and demolition sites at the Hanford Site. The PHB allows us to identify potential future issues and develop better monitoring techniques before these engineered barriers are constructed. Surface barriers like the PHB are essential for preventing water infiltration and curbing the spread of contaminants to groundwater. Effective monitoring of soil moisture levels above and below these barriers is crucial given that performance metrics could span up to 1,000 years. From July 2023 to June 2024, the water flux (as measured by tipping buckets) through the 2-m-thick silt loam layer of the PHB – a fine silty material that stores water under high capillary tension – remained well below the 0.5-mm-per-year performance threshold, demonstrating its effectiveness in preventing water penetration. In 2024, degraded tipping bucket gauges were replaced to ensure the accuracy of future data. Additionally, neutron probes revealed that the wetting front from the rainy season only penetrated to a maximum depth of 1.2 m into the silt loam. This further demonstrated the barrier's efficiency, as the wetting front did not fully penetrate the 2-m-thick capillary barrier. The western gravel slope of the PHB, composed of Hanford Site pit gravel of varying sizes, demonstrated low flux rates. In contrast, the eastern riprap slope exhibited higher flux rates. Zhang (2017) found that the riprap side slope of the PHB had the highest drainage rates in January and the lowest in late summer or early fall, indicating significant summer evaporation. Drainage rates increased significantly under enhanced precipitation conditions, far exceeding the design criterion, which could lead to water infiltration into the waste zone. The study introduced the “edge effect,” where elevated drainage rates from the riprap may migrate laterally beneath the barrier, compromising its ability to isolate waste, and recommended expanding the barrier and conducting further research to mitigate this issue. This report provides a review on surface barrier edge effects and their potential impact to subsurface contaminant migration.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Detonation Waves in High Explosives

A material at high temperature can react or decompose. For an energetic material, the reaction is exothermic and releases chemical energy that would further increase the temperature. Under some circumstances, when a reaction is triggered, such a reaction can propagate and the material rapidly releases a large amount of energy giving rise to an explosion. Examples of such materials are aerosols, suspensions of solid particles or liquid droplets in a gas; such as coal dust, grain dust and fuel-air explosions. Frequently, explosions are due to accidents. A spectacularly destructive example is the recent explosion of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate (thousands of tons) in Beirut, Lebanon (August 2020); see for example Beirut explosion. Ammonium nitrate is used as a fertilizer. It and the aerosols are not considered to be explosives due to the limited conditions for which an explosion can occur. An aerosol gets the oxidizer from the surrounding air. Burning requires diffusion of the oxidizer to the particle surface where the reaction occurs. A large density of small particles is required for a fast enough reaction to support an explosion. In contrast, an explosive is an energetic material with both fuel and oxidizer mixed on a molecular scale (either premixed gases or within molecules of a solid). This allows fast enough reactions over a wide range of conditions to support a self-propagating reactive wave known as a detonation wave. A detonation wave can be controlled and an explosive used for useful purposes such as in mining, construction, demolition, explosive welding, argon flash lamp, pulsed power using a magnetic flux generator [see also Goforth et al., 2015], jet cutter with shaped charge, explosive art, and generating conditions to study the response of materials at high strain rates and high pressures [see for example, Marsh, 1980]. Explosives are also used in conventional munitions and nuclear weapons. The focus of this book is on the theory and phenomenology of solid high explosives (HEs); in particular, plastic-bonded explosives (PBXs). Some aspects of detonation wave theory are needed to interpret explosive data. Hence, the theory is presented before the detonation wave phenomenology. A familiarity with fluid flow, specifically the notion of shock waves and the shock loci are assumed. In the remainder of this chapter we give a brief overview on the basic properties of detonation waves and PBXs.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

NRIC DOME Crane Trade Study and Recommendation

The National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) is a national program that was established as part of the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA). NRIC’s mission is to accelerate the demonstration and deployment of advanced nuclear energy through its mission to inspire stakeholders and the public, empower innovators, and deliver successful outcomes through efficient coordination of partners and resources. NRIC is designed to bridge the gap between research, development, and the marketplace to help convert some of the nation’s most promising advanced nuclear reactors into commercial applications. The NRIC Demonstration of Microreactor Experiments (DOME) facility, formerly known as Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR II), located at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is intended to allow industrial and other partners the opportunity to test Advanced Microreactors up to 20MW thermal power. The 75-ton capacity polar crane located in the EBR II facility was rendered inoperable to support planned facility demolition in 2015; small holes were flame cut in the girders; hoists and cables were removed; oil was drained from gear boxes; trolley drive, and then filled with absorbent; and the electrical and control umbilical’s were disconnected, removed and disposed. Subsequently, the decision was made to convert the EBR II facility into the DOME test bed.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Recommendations for an Applicant to Calculate Activity Data for Greenhouse Gases Estimates

In 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) directed the NRC staff to address climate change issues and consider the impacts of the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in its environmental reviews for major licensing actions (NRC 2009b). To implement this direction from the Commission, the staff issued guidance in 2011 and updated guidance in 2014 in Attachment 1 to Interim Staff Guidance COL/ESP-ISG-026 (NRC 2011; NRC 2014). This guidance provides a simpler method than the method described in RG 4.2 Rev. 3, that an applicant can use to meet the plant parameter envelope (PPE) value from the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Licensing of New Nuclear Reactors (NR GEIS). NRC staff estimated the 97-year lifecycle GHG emissions from a reference 1000 megawatt electrical (MWe) light-water reactor (LWR) for various activities associated with construction, operation (including uranium fuel cycle), and decommissioning of nuclear power plants and presented the results in Appendix H of the NR GEIS. Appendix H of the NR GEIS includes estimates of direct emissions from construction equipment and emergency diesel engines in a nuclear facility and indirect emissions from workforce vehicular traffic, fuel transportation and the uranium fuel cycle. The NR GEIS Section 3.3 extended the estimates in Appendix H for the installation of two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors on the same site. Scaling factors were used to extrapolate the GHG emissions of a reference 1000 MWe reactor to a two-unit nuclear reactor plant (each reactor unit generating 1000 MWe). GHG emission estimates for building, operation, decommissioning and safe storage (SAFSTOR) for a two-unit nuclear reactor plant would be based on the plant’s physical size, and therefore estimates for these source categories were assumed to be twice the value of the reference 1000 MWe reactor. However, GHG emissions from the fuel cycle (including fuel transportation) were scaled upward by a factor of 3, based on plant efficiencies greater than the 80 percent assumption in Appendix H. Table 1 below shows the PPE emissions for two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors as provided in NR GEIS. The total GHG emissions for two 1000 MWe reactors were calculated as 2,534,000 metric tons (MT) of CO 2 equivalent (CO 2 (e)) based on a 97 year GHG life cycle period. The GHG emissions lifetime of 97 years for a reference nuclear reactor includes a 7-year building phase, 40 years of operation, 10 years of active decommissioning, and 40 years of SAFSTOR operations (NRC 2024). Construction equipment and vehicular traffic from workers commute would contribute to the GHG emissions during a 7-year building phase. Uranium fuel cycle, vehicular traffic, fuel and waste transportation, and testing of standby diesel generators would contribute to GHG emissions during the 40-year operations phase. While NRC’s regulations allow up to 60 years of reactor facility decommissioning, Appendix H estimated that most of the GHGs would occur over an estimated 10-year period during which to the licensee would engage in significant demolition and earth-moving activities, as discussed in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0586 (NRC 2002). Vehicular traffic by the workforce during a 40-year SAFSTOR period would additionally contribute GHG emissions. The carbon footprint for a 40-year SAFSTOR period was separately analyzed from the decommissioning activities as provided in Table YYYY-2 of the staff issued guidance in 2011 (NRC 2011).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of Technologies to Mitigate the Presence of Gaseous Elemental Mercury in Waste Disposal Containers

A study was conducted to evaluate sorbent technologies that can mitigate the presence of elemental mercury (Hg⁰) in waste containers for mercury-contaminated debris (MCD). Decontamination and demolition (D&D) activities at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) facilities generate MCD requiring offsite disposal. The debris is packaged in appropriate waste containers and may be temporarily stored onsite prior to transport for treatment and/or disposal. During transportation of loads that had no visible liquid Hg at the point of origin, temperature changes can cause Hg⁰ to evaporate, condense, and form droplets on container walls. Furthermore, vibration during transportation could cause beads of Hg to be released from the debris, container walls, and ceiling, resulting in pools of liquid Hg⁰ on the container floor. Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limitations for commercial disposal facilities, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and ORR mixed low-level waste landfills prohibit the presence of any free liquids in containers identified as a solid waste form. Potential solutions to mitigate the presence of residual liquids that could be formed through vapor condensation include the use of sorbents or similar materials to capture and stabilize volatile Hg⁰ vapors and thus ensure compliance with landfill WAC requirements. This report summarizes data from small-scale laboratory experiments conducted to evaluate sorbent materials for Hg⁰ vapor suppression and sorption of liquid Hg⁰ that could form under relevant transportation and disposal conditions. A series of experiments was conducted to evaluate commercial sorbent materials and their effectiveness for Hg⁰ sorption across a temperature range from 19.4°C to 60°C. The impact of residual moisture on sorption was investigated under relevant conditions, and leaching tests were performed to assess the stability of Hg⁰ captured sorbent materials. The results provide estimates for sorbent quantities needed for a given Hg⁰ mass loading based on experimental results exposing sorbents to gaseous and liquid Hg⁰ at various mass ratios. Overall, sorbents that were most effective for Hg⁰ vapor suppression were brominated activated carbons, mackinawite-based sorbents coated on vermiculite, and sulfur-modified granular activated carbon. Elevated temperatures and moisture conditions did not result in significant increases of Hg⁰ headspace concentrations, and the materials also demonstrated high sorption capacities for the sorption of liquid Hg⁰.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 572 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from August 2020 through May 2023, as set forth in the SAFER Plan for CAU 572; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. • Corrective actions were completed during decontamination and demolition (D&D) and disposal activities, and were performed from August 2022 through September 2025.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Application for Permit to Operate a Class II Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site - U10c Disposal Site

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is located approximately 105 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is the federal lands management authority for the NTS and National Security Technologies LLC (NSTec) is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS is posted with signs along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The site will be used for the disposal of refuse, rubbish, garbage, sewage sludge, pathological waste, Asbestos-Containing Material (ACM), industrial solid waste, hydrocarbon-burdened soil, hydrocarbon-burdened demolition and construction waste, and other inert waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids or regulated under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) will not be accepted for disposal at the site. Waste regulated under the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), excluding Polychlorinated Biphenyl [PCB], Bulk Product Waste (see Section 6.2.5) and ACM (see Section 6.2.2.2) will not be accepted for disposal at the site. The disposal site will be used as the sole depository of permissible waste which is: (1) Generated by entities covered under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number for the NTS; (2) Generated at sites identified in the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO); (3) Sensitive records and media, including documents, vugraphs, computer disks, typewriter ribbons, magnetic tapes, etc., generated by NNSA/NSO or its contractors; (4) ACM generated by NNSA/NSO or its contractors according to Section 6.2.2.2, as necessary; (5) Hydrocarbon-burdened soil and solid waste from areas covered under the EPA Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number for the NTS; (6) Other waste on a case-by-case concurrence by NDEP/BFF. The generator of permissible waste is responsible for preparing documentation related to waste acceptance criteria, waste characterization, and load verification. Waste and Water (WW) personnel are responsible for operating the disposal site and reviewing documentation to determine if the waste is acceptable.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of failed and nickel-coated 3093 beam clamp components at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP).

The U.S. Department of Energy and its contractor, Bechtel Jacobs Company (BJC), are undertaking a major effort to clean up the former gaseous diffusion facility (K-25) located in Oak Ridge, TN. The decontamination and decommissioning activities require systematic removal of contaminated equipment and machinery followed by demolition of the buildings. As part of the cleanup activities, a beam clamp, used for horizontal life lines (HLLs) for fall protection, was discovered to be fractured during routine inspection. The beam clamp (yoke and D-ring) was a component in the HLL system purchased from Reliance Industries LLC. Specifically, the U-shaped stainless steel yoke of the beam clamp failed in a brittle mode at under less than 10% of the rated design capacity of 14,500 lb. The beam clamp had been in service for approximately 16 months. Bechtel Jacobs approached Argonne National Laboratory to assist in identifying the root cause of the failure of the beam clamp. The objectives of this study were to (1) review the prior reports and documents on the subject, (2) understand the possible failure mechanism(s) that resulted in the failed beam clamp components, (3) recommend approaches to mitigate the failure mechanism(s), and (4) evaluate the modified beam clamp assemblies. Energy dispersive x-ray analysis and chemical analysis of the corrosion products on the failed yoke and white residue on an in-service yoke indicated the presence of zinc, sulfur, and calcium. Analysis of rainwater in the complex, as conducted by BJC, indicated the presence of sulfur and calcium. It was concluded that, as a result of galvanic corrosion, zinc from the galvanized components of the beam clamp assembly (D-ring) migrated to the corroded region in the presence of the rainwater. Under mechanical stress, the corrosion process would have accelerated, resulting in the catastrophic failure of the yoke. As suggested by Bechtel Jacobs personnel, hydrogen embrittlement as a consequence of corrosion was also explored as a failure mechanism. Corroded and failed yoke samples had hydrogen concentrations of 20-60 ppm. However, the hydrogen content reduced to 4-11 ppm (similar to baseline as-received yoke samples) when the corrosion products were polished off. The hydrogen content in the scraped off corrosion product powders was >7000 ppm. These results indicate that hydrogen is primarily present in the corrosion products and not in the underlying steel. Rockwell hardness values on the corroded yoke and D-rings were R{sub c} {approx} 41-46. It was recommended to the beam clamp manufacturer that the beam clamp components be annealed to reduce the hardness values so that they are less susceptible to brittle failure. Upon annealing, hardness values of the beam clamp components reduced to R{sub c} {approx} 25. Several strategies were recommended and put in place to mitigate failure of the beam clamp components: (a) maintain hardness levels of both yokes and D-rings at R{sub c} < 35, (b) coat the yoke and D-rings with a dual coating of nickel (with 10% phosphorus) to delay corrosion and aluminum to prevent galvanic corrosion since it is more anodic to zinc, and (c) optimize coating thicknesses for nickel and aluminum while maintaining the physical integrity of the coatings. Evaluation of the Al- and Ni-coated yoke and D-ring specimens indicated they appear to have met the recommendations. Average hardness values of the dual-coated yokes were R{sub c} {approx} 25-35. Hardness values of dual-coated D-ring were R{sub c} {approx} 32. Measured average coating thicknesses for the aluminum and nickel coatings for yoke samples were 22 {micro}m (0.9 mils) and 80 {micro}m (3 mils), respectively. The D-rings also showed similar coating thicknesses. Microscopic examination showed that the aluminum coating was well bonded to the underlying nickel coating. Some observed damage was believed to be an artifact of the cutting-and-polishing steps during sample preparation for microscopy.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Predicting Building Envelope Construction from In-Situ Thermal Testing

When embarking on a retrofit of a building envelope, it is critical to understand the composition of its assembly. This practice is currently done by destructive and invasive material testing or demolition, which is sometimes not possible when in historic or protected buildings. To address this problem, in-situ thermal testing can be utilized along with machine learning classification algorithms to infer the composition of an assembly. In this paper, a proof-of-concept K-nearest neighbors classification model is developed to classify assembly composition from effective thermal resistance, effective thermal mass, and assembly cladding. This model was trained and tested utilizing a synthetic dataset producing an F1-score of 94.6%. This model was also validated with experimental data from a 100-year old wall assembly, confirming the model’s real-world validity. The paper presents a framework for inferring as-built envelope assemblies, all without having to damage or disturb the building and its occupants.

Pilet, Tyler J.↗

Material flows and GHG emissions from housing stock evolution in US counties, 2020–60

The evolution of housing stocks determines demand for construction materials and energy, and associated emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHGs). The contribution of construction to building life-cycle emissions is growing as buildings become more energy efficient and the energy supply decarbonizes. A housing stock model is developed for counties in the United States using dynamic vacancy rates which endogenously influence stock out- and inflows. Stocks of three house types and 10 construction cohorts are projected for all contiguous US counties for the period 2020–60. Inflows and outflows of construction materials are then estimated along with GHG emissions associated with material production and construction activities in scenarios defined by stock turnover rates, population share by house type, and floor area characteristics of new houses. The results provide new insights into the drivers of construction-related emissions at local and national levels, and identify opportunities for their reduction. Demolition material flows grow in relation to construction material flows over the analysis period. Increasing the stock turnover rate increases future floor area per person, material requirements, and emissions from construction. Scenarios with reduced floor area and more multifamily homes in new construction have lower floor area growth, material requirements, and emissions from construction.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Searching for Dark Matter with Superconducting Qubits

Dark matter is an enduring mystery in our quest to understand the fundamental constituents of our universe. Low mass bosons, such the axion or hidden photon, are compelling dark matter candidates. We leverage their potential interactions with electromagnetic fields, whereby the dark matter (of unknown mass) on rare occasion converts into a single photon, to devise a method of detecting these candidates. Current dark matter searches operating at microwave frequencies use a resonant cavity to coherently accumulate the field sourced by the dark matter and a near standard quantum limited (SQL) linear amplifier to read out the cavity signal. To further increase sensitivity to the dark matter signal and enable future searches, sub-SQL detection techniques are required.In this thesis, I report the development of a novel microwave photon counting technique and a new exclusion limit on hidden photon dark matter. We operate a superconducting qubit to make repeated quantum non-demolition measurements of cavity photons and apply a hidden Markov model analysis to reduce the noise to 15.7 dB below the quantum limit, with overall detector performance limited by a residual background of real photons. With the present device, we perform a hidden photon search and constrain the kinetic mixing angle to less than 1.68 x 10-15 in a band around 6.011 GHz (24.86 micro-eV) with an integration time of 8.33 s. This demonstrated noise reduction technique enables future dark matter searches to be sped up by a factor of 1300. By coupling a qubit to an arbitrary quantum sensor, more general sub-SQL metrology is possible with the techniques presented in this work.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Ultrasonic Device Would Open Pipe Bombs

Piezoelectric ultrasonic transducer, energized by frequency generator and power supply, vibrates shell of pipe bomb while hardly disturbing explosive inner material. Frequency-control circuitry senses resonance in shell and holds generator at that frequency to induce fatigue cracking in threads of end cap. In addition to disarming bombs, ultrasonically induced fatigue may have other applications. In manufacturing, replaces some machining and cutting operations. In repair of equipment, cleanly and quickly disassembles corroded parts. In demolition of buildings used to dismember steel framework safely and controllably.

El-Raheb, Michael S.↗

Causes of failure of airship shed

The causes of the collapse of airship shed, which was being taken down at Niediergorsdorf, are discussed. This shed, which was built of iron, was 184 m long, 28 m high, and 35 m wide. The demolition of the shed had been assigned to unskilled men who proceeded to remove certain key structural supports, leaving the structure in such a condition that relatively small eccentricities of the columns or spans or of lateral forces could easily have caused the columns or spans to break down. A small gust of wind would have perhaps sufficed to bring the building down. An analysis is also given of the suction effects on the roof of an air shed in Staaken. The damage to this shed, which occurred during a storm, was due to the fact that the shed had no opening in its top for equalizing the air pressure within and without. The location of the plates blown off the roof correspond to the point of greatest suction.

Sonntag, R↗

Disturbance, the uncertainty principle and quantum optics

It is shown how a disturbance-type uncertainty principle can be derived from an uncertainty principle for joint measurements. To achieve this, we first clarify the meaning of 'inaccuracy' and 'disturbance' in quantum mechanical measurements. The case of photon number and phase is treated as an example, and it is applied to a quantum non-demolition measurement using the optical Kerr effect.

Martens, Hans↗

Experimental Studies in Helicopter Vertical Climb Performance

Data and analysis from an experimental program to measure vertical climb performance on an eight-foot model rotor are presented. The rotor testing was performed using a unique moving-model facility capable of accurately simulating the flow conditions during axial flight, and was conducted from July 9, 1992 to July 16, 1992 at the Dynamic Model Track, or 'Long Track,' just prior to its demolition in August of 1992. Data collected during this brief test program included force and moment time histories from a sting-mounted strain gauge balance, support carriage velocity, and rotor rpm pulses. In addition, limited video footage (of marginal use) was recorded from smoke flow studies for both simulated vertical climb and descent trajectories. Analytical comparisons with these data include a series of progressively more detailed calculations ranging from simple momentum theory, a prescribed wake method, and a free-wake prediction.

McKillip, Robert M., Jr.↗

The Ames 12-Foot Pressure Tunnel: Tunnel Empty Flow Calibration Results and Discussion

An empty test section flow calibration of the refurbished NASA Ames 12-Foot Pressure Tunnel was recently completed. Distributions of total pressure, dynamic pressure, Mach number, flow angularity temperature, and turbulence are presented along with results obtained prior to facility demolition. Axial static pressure distributions along tunnel centerline are also compared. Test section model support geometric configurations will be presented along with a discussion of the issues involved with different model mounting schemes.

Peter T Zell↗