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DOE OSTI2025

Building a Collaborative Relationship between Contractor and Oversight at SRPPF

The success of Department of Energy (DOE) projects is dependent on a functional, healthy, and collaborative relationship between the contractor and the federal oversight. A healthy relationship marked by a collaborative mindset between these two groups, can facilitate better operational safety, operational efficiency, and regulatory compliance. This paper will explore aspects of such a relationship, the roles and responsibilities of the contractor and federal oversight, the present and historical relationships in the DOE complex, and best practices considered by the contractor and federal oversight used at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Due to the current design phase of the SRPPF, the contractor and federal oversight have a unique opportunity to begin establishing a strong relationship early in the project’s life. As a result of this dynamic, the two groups have already demonstrated their ability to successfully respond to ongoing design issues. In general, a strong criticality safety program is beginning to mature for the SRPPF alongside a developing criticality safety federal oversight group. This paper will discuss the various factors that have brought about this collaborative relationship. Lastly, a case study will be incorporated into this paper demonstrating the ability of the SRPPF contractor and federal oversight to overcome challenges relating to the SRPPF project. This case study may guide groups around the DOE Complex to create better, more functional relationships between the two parties. The case study will provide a detailed description of the issue and parties involved, highlight the factors that allowed the group to overcome the challenge via effective collaboration, and the outcome of the event. Increasing collaboration may benefit the complex, as a whole, in order to meet the mission demands of the DOE.

collaboration↗

DOE OSTI2025

Idaho National Laboratory Team Visits NCERC

The DOE/NRC Criticality Safety for Commercial-Scale High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) for Fuel Cycle and Transportation (DNCSH) initiative is a collaboration between the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission focused on criticality safety benchmarking for processing and transportation applications related to HALEU and Advanced Reactors. The project includes design, siting and construction of a horizontal split table (HST), which has long been recognized as a need for validating advanced reactor systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Nuclear Data Libraries Sensitivity Studies for ORSA Using SCALE

Subcritical assemblies offer valuable training capabilities in nuclear criticality safety (NCS) for individuals handling fissile material. At Oak Ridge National Laboratory(ORNL), the Oak Ridge Subcritical Assembly (ORSA), a new experimental facility, is being established to provide hands-on training for the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP).It is essential to accurately determine the neutron multiplication factor (keff) to ensure that ORSA remains subcritical and safe during operations. This study investigated the sensitivity of keff to variations across Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF/B) libraries, consisting of ENDF/B-VII.1, ENDF/B-VIII.0, and ENDF/B-VIII.1. The analysis was conducted using the CSAS6 sequence in the SCALE-6.3 code system. Individual isotopes in the ORSA model were replaced one at a time with ENDF/B-VII.1 as the base library and changing to ENDF/B-VIII.0or ENDF/B-VIII.1. The results demonstrated that the changes in keffof the nuclides associated with the ORSA model were mostly within the uncertainty of the base model (~24 pcm), except for primary nuclides like Uranium-235and H-poly with few other nuclides. The relative delta keff values of Uranium-235 and H-poly, expressed in pcm, were +280 and -212 in ENDF/B-VIII.0 and +332 and -275 in ENDF/B-VIII.1, respectively, which were notable changes in reactivity. These results demonstrated that ORSA was largely insensitive to variations across these nuclear data libraries.

Hong, Evan [North Carolina State University]↗

DOE OSTI2022

Effects of Chlorine Capture and a Proposed Density Law on the Reactivity of Plutonium Solution Systems

During fissionable material processing, all normal and credible abnormal conditions must remain safely subcritical. Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) uses a number of methods to determine subcriticality, one of which is the use of neutron transport codes such as MCNP6. In order to create models for use with MCNP6, both the geometry and materials in fissionable material processes must be known, or assumptions must be made and quantified for the impact to bias. One of the systems with a significant amount of bias due to material modeling assumptions is in the area of aqueous plutonium processing. These solutions are typically plutonium nitrate solutions or plutonium chloride solutions, which are modeled as fictitious plutonium metal-water mixtures because little is known about the actual density of the solution and there is no current predictive capability approved for use at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for modeling them. This research is currently underway to fill the gap and develop an algorithm for use with MCNP6 to model the density of plutonium chloride solutions. The method is to be validated with experimental data for density, and also validated with critical experiments using MCNP6. Note that the Chlorine Worth Study (CWS) was performed in December 2021 to help bridge the gap in chlorine data for critical experiments, and is currently awaiting International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) review. This study was performed by LANL at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Additional information regarding this experiment may currently be found in LA-UR- 22-29180. Additionally, the Chemistry-Actinide Analytical Chemistry (C-AAC) at LANL has performed a number of solution density measurements for PuCl 3 -HC 1 -H 2 O, allowing for such data be used to create a semi-empirical density via the Pitzer method. The published dataset for the measurements is documented in LA-UR-22-25454. This method has already been tested successfully for aqueous plutonium nitrate solutions in SCALE. Current solution density measurements exist of plutonium concentrations of 0-~142g/L, all at 2M HC1, at temperatures 20-40°C. Additional data was taken for HC1-corrected density values, which essentially mimics the data for a pure PuCl x -water solution. The calculations in this report aim to support the current research by demonstrating the difference in system reactivity for the current modeling method when compared to the new proposed modeling with a density law implementation, which is being written as a Python tool to be used with MCNP6.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2025

Benchmark Gap Assessment for the Manufacturing of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuels

This document develops basic critical conditions for spheres—moderated and unmoderated, as well as reflected and unreflected—in consideration of nuclear criticality safety of a potential fuel production facility producing high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel of several different types like tristructural-isotropic (TRISO), uranium metal and alloys, oxide and non-metallic forms. In addition to spherical arrangements, TRISO particle manufacturing process–specific equipment is modeled as it would be for the criticality safety analysis. The objective is to develop representative systems that can then be used for comparison with existing benchmarks. SCALE/TSUNAMI is used to assess the similarity index between these systems to assess validation gaps for possible fuel production applications of proposed advanced reactors. Several different fuel types were evaluated, including TRISO, uranium metal, uranium molybdenum, uranium zirconium, uranium dioxide, uranium nitride, uranium hydride, U-ZrH, and uranium chloride. This selection of fuel types covers a breadth of proposed reactor types, as well as intermediate steps in the production and fabrication of the fuel

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Impact of recent ENDF nuclear data update, high initial enrichment and high burnup fuel on critical experiments applicability determination via the integral index c k for burnup credit validation

In 2012, NUREG/CR-7109 reported on the validation of burnup credit calculations involving major and minor actinides and major fission products which was investigated for pressurized and boiling water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel enrichments up to 5 wt% 235 U and assembly-average burnups up to 60 GWd/MTU. Recently, there has been interest in increasing the maximum enrichment used in PWR fuel as high as 8 wt% 235 U and correspondingly increasing the maximum assembly-average burnups to approximately 75 GWd/MTU. These proposed increases in enrichment and burnup necessitate reinvestigation of the validation basis for k eff calculations for this expanded application space. Additionally, the 2012 study was performed by using the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF)/B-VII.0 nuclear data with the SCALE 6 covariance library, and the effects of using the newly released ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data and covariance libraries should be evaluated. In this work, published in NUREG/CR-7309 in 2025, the validation assessment was performed consistently with NUREG/CR-7109: modeling irradiated fuel assemblies in the Generic Burnup Credit (GBC)-32 cask defined in NUREG/CR-6747. The TSUNAMI-3D sequence was used to generate sensitivity data for the application model, and the data were compared with sensitivity data from select benchmark models. The integral parameter c k is the metric of similarity used in this study and is consistent with NUREG/CR-7109, where a c k value in excess of 0.8 indicates sufficient similarity for use in validation. A new set of benchmark experiments with sensitivity data has been assembled for this effort. The number of experiments with available sensitivity data is now 2,104, compared to 474 in NUREG/CR-7109. This increase was facilitated by the efforts of the Nuclear Energy Agency to generate sensitivity data for a majority of the experiments in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook to supplement the data available in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID). The complete set of benchmarks considered here includes experiments for low-enriched uranium (LEU), intermediate enriched uranium (IEU), and a mixture of uranium and plutonium (MIX) from the ICSBEP Handbook and VALID, as well as ORNL models of the Haut Taux de Combustion (HTC) experiments and other potentially relevant models not included in VALID. The updated similarity study shows that none of the extended burnup and higher enrichment combinations considered show a significant decrease in the number of potentially applicable experiments, meaning sufficient critical experiments exist for the validation of BUC criticality safety calculations, with initial enrichments up to 8 wt% 235 U and burnups up to 80 GWd/MTU. Additionally, both the ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data libraries can be used for validation since the number of critical experiments applicable for validation increases for most cases with the most recent nuclear data compared to the previous one. As in previous BUC validation studies, the French HTC experiments are the most similar in a majority of the application cases studied, especially from representative discharge burnups ranging from 40 to 80 GWd/MTU. In conclusion, these results match the conclusions presented in NUREG/CR-7109 regarding validation of the primary actinides in BUC analyses.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect the waste streams, containing various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu, that are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g.changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

DOE OSTI2025

Control Selection for the Neutralization Tank in the Aqueous Recovery System at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility

The Aqueous Recovery System (ARS) at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) recovers and purifies plutonium (Pu) using aqueous chemistry techniques. The neutralization tanks in the ARS collect waste streams with various impurities and greatly reduced concentrations of Pu than are produced during aqueous processing. Criticality safety is primarily achieved in the ARS by using geometrically favorable process vessels. However, due to the geometry of neutralization tanks, each tank is administratively limited to no more than 450 g Pu, thus representing the transition from geometry to mass control. To ensure that this mass limit is not exceeded, an administrative control requires taking two samples of any solution to be sent to a neutralization tank. Normal operations are expected to result in less than 50 g Pu in a neutralization tank filled to its capacity of 250 L. Process upsets may cause an inadvertent transfer of up to 1000 g Pu to a neutralization tank, producing a system that is potentially not subcritical for all possible configurations of the tank. To ensure that a neutralization tank remains safety subcritical, passive engineered controls (e.g. changing tank geometry or adding fixed poisons), active engineered controls (e.g. interlocks), and administrative controls (e.g. soluble poisons and valve isolation) were considered and their viability evaluated. Ultimately, the team chose an administrative, dual-valve isolation strategy. This paper will thoroughly discuss the various control strategy options and why many of the options were not feasible for maintaining criticality safety.

Dressman, Phillip M. [Savannah River Nuclear Solut↗

DOE OSTI2021

A High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Transportation Concept

The uranium 235U enrichment commonly used in fuel production for U.S. light water nuclear reactors typically does not exceed 5 wt%. In contrast, many of the currently investigated advanced reactor concepts demand fuel with higher enrichments. This includes high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), characterized by a 235U enrichment of 5 to 20 wt%. The necessity of HALEU transportation in the fuel production cycle leads to new challenges caused by various technical and regulatory hurdles. Current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission–approved transportation package designs for UF6 with enrichments above 5 wt% provide relatively small payloads [=116 kg (250 lb)]. Furthermore, in accordance with 10 CFR 71.55, package design activities for fissile material enriched above 5 wt% need to consider water infiltration in the containment as part of the criticality safety evaluations. This study presents a transportation package concept for HALEU advanced nuclear reactor fuel with a significantly higher payload of up to 376 kg (830 lb) of fissile material per package and up to 1881 kg (4149 lb) of HALEU per legal weight truck. The anticipated chemical form of the transported material is UO2 downblended from available highly enriched uranium. The concept utilizes a combination of existing transportation packaging, 18 inner canisters, and a novel basket design that includes a borated aluminum flux trap. Criticality and shielding evaluations; fundamental structural, confinement, and thermal assessments; and studies on package operations are presented. The results of this study build significant confidence in the technical feasibility of a high-capacity HALEU transportation package concept while demonstrating the concept’s potential to meet U.S. regulatory requirements.

Eidelpes, Elmar↗

DOE OSTI2026

ObstacleSense: Low-Power Neuromorphic Vision for Corridor Obstacle Awareness in Low-Level ADAS

The automotive industry’s pursuit of Level 5 autonomy is constrained by substantial perception-compute power requirements, often reaching 1, 000 + watts in full autonomy stacks. Reducing this energy burden requires rethinking perception not only at the high-end autonomy level, but also at the foundational Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) level where low-power, safety-critical sensing can have broad impact. Neuromorphic vision provides a promising starting point: HD Dynamic Vision Sensors (DVS) can operate below 100 mW at the sensor level by reporting only asynchronous brightness changes. However, low-power sensing alone is insufficient if downstream perception reintroduces dense, energy-intensive computation. In particular, many event-driven object-detection pipelines still rely on CNN backbones, while purely spiking alternatives often trade away accuracy or ignore deployment constraints. We introduce ObstacleSense, a highly compact, CNN-free hybrid ANN–SNN framework for Level 0–1 forward-corridor obstacle awareness. Instead of performing full-scene object detection with a convolutional feature backbone, ObstacleSense targets the safety-critical question of whether the ego corridor is occupied and how far the nearest obstacle is. The architecture combines polarity-conditioned event encoding, lightweight temporal spiking dynamics, axial spatial mixing, and coarse-to-fine range estimation within a regular fixed-grid compute pattern. This design avoids the dense CNN backbone commonly used in event-based detection while maintaining a small state footprint suitable for eventual small-FPGA deployment. Before hardware mapping, we evaluate the software implementation using a model-side power proxy derived from MACs, weight and activation traffic, and spiking state updates under shared FP16 assumptions. On simulated CARLA event corpora, the deployment-oriented model achieves 0.9464 objectness F1, 0.9978 grid-level mAP, and 0.8987 m distance Mean Absolute Error at an estimated 1.92 mW proxy cost, while maintaining performance on unseen generalization test sequences.

Johnson-Scott, Zac [ORNL]↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

Reference Fuel↗

DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Provable Repair of Vision Transformers

Vision Transformers have emerged as state-of-the-art image recognition tools, but may still exhibit incorrect behavior. Incorrect image recognition can have disastrous consequences in safety-critical real-world applications such as self-driving automobiles. In this paper, we present Provable Repair of Vision Transformers (PRoViT), a provable repair approach that guarantees the correct classification of images in a repair set for a given Vision Transformer without modifying its architecture. PRoViT avoids negatively affecting correctly classified images (drawdown) by minimizing the changes made to the Vision Transformer’s parameters and original output. Here, we observe that for Vision Transformers, unlike for other architectures such as ResNet or VGG, editing just the parameters in the last layer achieves correctness guarantees and very low drawdown. We introduce a novel method for editing these last-layer parameters that enables PRoViT to efficiently repair state-of-the-art Vision Transformers for thousands of images, far exceeding the capabilities of prior provable repair approaches.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Water ingress testing of Pressure Cooker 1006027150 REVAB-021

The requirements of this water ingress test are defined in PA-RD-01009, TA-55 Criticality Safety Requirements. “The container design should be capable of preventing the entry of more than 50 ml water when subjected to water spray at a flow of up to 2 inches water per hour for 2 hours or when immersed in water up to a depth of 6 inches above the top of the container for the same period of time.” The six allen screw fasters on the lid of the container were torqued to approximately 45 inch-pounds with a calibrated torque wrench in a crisscross pattern to ensure equal force distribution. The container management team of ORI-2 has developed a standard practice of gathering 5 data points to increase the statistical confidence in the data. This method has been demonstrated in previous LA-URs and approved official memorandums as follows: LANL Memo, SPE-2: 19-016 dated August 22, 2019; LANL Memo, SPE-2:19-020 dated September 24, 2019; and LA-UR-19-28268, Water Ingress Testing of Commercially Available Containers for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗

DOE OSTI2020

Selected Uses of TSUNAMI in Critical Experiment Design and Analysis

Validation in criticality safety is performed by comparing the results of critical experiments with the calculated results from models of the experiments using the computational method to be validated. Laboratory critical experiments are controlled systems that achieve a k eff of approximately 1 and enable investigation of the parameters at which such a critical condition is achieved. For the critical experiments used in a validation to capture the biases of the materials and neutron energy spectra of interest, those materials must be included in the experiment such that they influence k eff or another observable parameter with statistical significance. This paper discusses the use of sensitivity uncertainty (S/U) methods to develop critical experiments for various purposes. S/U techniques are useful for understanding the underlying components of nuclear data which affect the k eff or another parameter of a given configuration. S/U calculations are most commonly used to compare existing experiments to applications of interest; however, S/U techniques can also be used to identify, optimize, or assess features of proposed experiments so that they can better test specific portions of nuclear data or match an application of interest. The S/U techniques discussed here are from the TSUNAMI code system. The two primary codes discussed in this work are TSUNAMI-3D, which implements the KENO criticality code to calculate the sensitivity of k eff to nuclear data, and TSAR, which calculates the sensitivity of a reactivity difference between two configurations based on their TSUNAMI-3D generated sensitivity profiles. The methods used in these tools are discussed in more detail in the SCALE manual. This paper is one of a series on the development and use of TSUNAMI tools. The other papers address development of TSUNAMI methods and a review of TSUNAMI applications.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Pitch Variation Experiments in Water-Moderated Square-Pitched U(6.9)O 2 Fuel Rod Lattices with Fuel to Water Volume Ratios Spanning 0.08 to 0.67

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Research Initiative funded the design and construction of the Seven Percent Critical Experiment (7uPCX) at Sandia National Laboratories. The start-up of the experiment facility and the execution of the experiments described here were funded by the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program. The 7uPCX is designed to investigate critical systems with fuel for light water reactors in the enrichment range above 5% 235 U. The 7uPCX assembly is a water-moderated and -reflected array of aluminum-clad square-pitched U(6.90%)O 2 fuel rods. Other critical experiments performed in the 7uPCX assembly are documented in LEU-COMP-THERM-078, LEU-COMP-THERM-080, LEU-COMPTHERM- 096, LEU-COMP-THERM-097, and LEU-COMP-THERM-101. The twenty-seven critical experiments in this series were performed in 2020 in the SCX at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility. The experiments are grouped by fuel rod pitch. Case 1 is a base case with a pitch of 0.8001 cm and no water holes in the array. Cases 2 through 6 have the same pitch as Case 1 but contain various configurations with water holes, providing slight variations in the fuel-to-water ratio. Similarly, Case 7 is a base case with a pitch of 0.854964 cm and no water holes in the array. Cases 8 through 11 have the same pitch as Case 7 but contain various configurations with water holes. Cases 12 through 15 have a pitch of 1.131512 cm and differ according to the number of water holes in the array, with Case 12 having no water holes. Cases 16 through 19 have a pitch of 1.209102 cm and differ according to number of water holes in the array, with Case 16 having no water holes. Cases 20 through 23 have a pitch of 1.6002 cm and differ according to number of water holes in the array, with Case 20 having no water holes. Cases 24 through 27 have a pitch of 1.709928 cm and differ according to number of water holes in the array, with Case 24 having no water holes. As the experiment case number increases, the fuel-to-water volume ratio decreases.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗