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Comprehensive Study of the Potential of Extracting and Processing Critical Minerals from Coal-Based Resources - Phase I

The Phase I report prepared for the Department of Energy addresses U.S. Executive Order 13817 titled A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, issued on December 20, 2017, that lists 35 critical minerals that are vulnerable to supply disruption. A comprehensive review of each of the minerals was conducted to determine the criticality based primarily on extractability from coal-based resources. Several other factors were also considered such as gaps in supply and demand, use in current technology, and the existence of viable substitutes. It was determined that the critical minerals that show highest potential for extraction from coal-based resources are lithium, rare earth elements (REEs), cobalt, and manganese. All four of the critical minerals listed serve an important role in the technology industry, have few substitutes, and have a heavy import reliance. Most notably are lithium, which is widely used in the electric vehicle industry, and the REEs which can be found in virtually all electronic devices. The research of critical mineral extraction from coal-based resources was completed using a combination of literature review from public sources as well as cooperation from coal mines and power plants across the United States. Samples collected from six different geographical locations across the U.S. were subjected to sample preparation (i.e., pH measurement, moisture content, particle size analysis) and characterization studies using Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectroscopy (ICP-MS) and Scanning Electron Microscopy, Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (SEM-EDX) instruments. 27 samples of coal waste materials such as refuse, sludge, and fly ash were tested to characterize the rare earth element concentration by total rare earth elements (TREEs), heavy rare earth elements (HREEs), and light rare earth elements (LREEs). Of the 27 samples tested, 22 contained a TREE concentration higher than the threshold of 300 ppm, which is considered a viable feedstock material. 3 samples contained less than 300 ppm of TREEs; however, they were within 20 ppm of the threshold, and could potentially be considered viable sources in the future pending the advancement of more efficient extraction technologies. 2 of the 27 samples had significantly low TREE concentrations, which does not imply any potential for being a source for REEs. For the minerals identified as most critical in the literature review, a conceptual process flow diagram (PFD) was developed for their extraction from different coal-based feedstocks. The process targets selective recovery of one commodity (i.e., rare earths, lithium, cobalt, and manganese) via several hydrometallurgical separation methods. By identifying potentially extractable coal-based critical mineral resources, a study of the current and future market environments for each critical mineral, and a review of current processing methodologies for critical mineral extraction from coal-based resources, the foundation has been laid to further characterize and explore new resources and extraction techniques. As reliance on technologies in industries such as the production of electronic devices, batteries, and alloys containing critical minerals utilizing critical minerals continues to increase, a sound understanding of our nation’s dependence on and even the global criticality of certain critical minerals, will serve as a catalyst for innovation in virtually all fields of science.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Analysis of the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14349

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls will ensure that all waste packages are sub-critical, and the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is prevented for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages begin to degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Therefore, the possibility for the evolution of conditions in a GDF to result in criticality requires assessment. RWM established the 'Likelihood of Criticality' research project to develop qualitative and quantitative arguments to demonstrate that criticality after closure of a GDF is unlikely. The project included consideration of the criticality safety of disposal concepts for intermediate and high level waste, spent fuel, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in different generic geological settings. The results are underpinned by the construction of post-closure criticality scenarios that have been evaluated using high-level judgments about scenario credibility as well as modelling of evolving conditions in a GDF. In the latter case, a probabilistic modelling approach has been undertaken to address uncertainty in the calculation of concentrations and masses of fissile material that could occur at potential accumulation sites. The potential for criticality has been judged based on comparisons of the calculated fissile masses with minimum values required for criticality at different locations in the barrier system. This paper explains the novel approach taken to evaluating the likelihood of criticality in a GDF based on the probabilistic modelling of waste package evolution and plutonium and uranium migration. The role of this research in RWM's work to demonstrate the criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper, which also draws on the results of a parallel research project that demonstrates that, even if a criticality were to occur, then its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Understanding the consequences of hypothetical post-closure transient criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14439

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher-activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety for the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal all waste packages will be safely sub-critical. Containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is not possible for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Although the likelihood of a critical configuration developing is demonstrably low, it cannot be assumed to be zero over long post-closure timescales. The UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation for a GDF includes a specific requirement to consider the consequences of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. RWM has undertaken a programme of research to model and understand the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events. Initially focused on the scenario of fissile material relocation and accumulation following intermediate level waste (ILW) disposal, two bespoke computer models were developed. The quasi-steady-state (QSS) model considered critical systems maintained by accumulation of fissile materials where the temperature feedback remains negative throughout the transient. The rapid transient model (RTM) considered systems with positive temperature feedback. The QSS model development included a successful comparison with the Oklo natural reactors. With a requirement to consider post-closure criticality for a wider range of potential waste types under different illustrative disposal concepts, the initial transient criticality models had some limitations. For the QSS model this was the assumption of fixed geometry, while the complex functional inputs required in the RTM were not readily available for different materials. For the QSS model this paper describes the model development to allow changing volume; this has enabled its application to 'what-if' scenarios of flooding within a spent fuel waste package and the slumping of a stack of ILW packages. For rapid transient criticality this paper explains how the development of a simpler 'bounding approach' model to complement the RTM has enabled transient criticality analysis for a wider range of host materials. The role of this research in demonstrating post-closure criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper which also draws on the results of a parallel research project to demonstrate that the likelihood of post-closure criticality is low. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Power System Resilience Metrics Augmentation for Critical Load Prioritization

One of the major goals of new grid operation regimes, such as transactive energy systems (TESs), is to make the power grid more resilient to withstand natural or man-made disasters and potential reliability events, and to continue to serve the maximum number of its customers. But it is a well-known fact to system operators that not all customers are the same. This implies that any discussion of TESs’ impacts on the resilience of the power system should consider the needs of its critical customers (such as the power system operation centers, fire and police stations, and hospitals) over those of other customers. When evaluating the resilience of the system, bonus points must be awarded to any system that could maintain its power supply to critical customers during a disturbance that may cause an outage. This report discusses critical infrastructure (CI) as found in the literature and then categorizes it based on the field to which the operations belong (such as human life/safety-related, operations management, necessary city operation, industrial customers, etc.). Each of these CI categories is further divided into types of critical customers (e.g., the human life/safety-related category has different types of customers like hospitals, fire and police stations, etc.). The entire demand of each of the critical customer types is not categorized as critical load (CL); instead, only a portion of the total load of these critical customers is characterized as critical load. This is done based on the categories of equipment, the function of which is crucial in the operation of the overall facility. CL categorization is performed to provide the ratio of the critical load portion to the overall load , so that it can serve as a parameter in the resilience evaluation of the grid through a metrics-based approach. Such categorization is important as it helps to augment the existing quantifiable resilience metrics with CL categorization. The metrics for a power system need to not only consider how well a system performed during a disturbance event, but also how it reduced strain and supplied power to its CLs. The first step in this process is characterize CLs in the system. After CL characterization, the next step is the inclusion of these loads in the resilience metrics. To that end, in this report weight-based augmentation of resilience metrics is proposed, where certain customers (the ones that are categorized as critical) are assigned higher weights than others. Though an overview of assigning weights to customers is discussed, there is no one-size-fits-all approach for every power system. The decisions made about assigning such weights to customers vary greatly from one operator to another, based on their unique systems and the current and predicted states of critical customers. This decision-making can include the type of disturbance event, which might only affect certain parts of the system. In general, analyzing critical customers before an event helps understand system vulnerabilities. It also helps in planning and conducting operations during the event, evaluating system performance after the event, and supporting better planning for future events. An alternative to the current practices of managing the grid for outages is an innovative TES, which has the potential to provide a platform for including distributed energy resources for managing CLs. This report also describes how TES qualities can help (1) to maintain power supply to critical customers for uninterrupted operations and (2) to restore lost power supply to the critical customers rapidly.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Initial Efforts Organizing WPNCS SG-8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks

The Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) under the guidance of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has over 20 years of experience addressing concerns related to static and transient configurations encountered within the nuclear fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, storage, and geological disposal. One of the cornerstone activities of the WPNCS is the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), which was established to identify a comprehensive set of criticality benchmark data, evaluate the data, including quantification of overall uncertainties; compile the data into a standardized format, perform sample calculations utilizing modern nuclear data sets and codes utilized in nuclear criticality safety, and formally document the work into a single source of verified benchmark data. Annually, members of the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) contribute evaluated benchmark data that undergoes comprehensive technical review prior to publication in the ICSBEP Handbook. In the years since the ICSBEP was established, there has been much work to prepare benchmark data to support validation activities in nuclear criticality safety. The 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook contains acceptable benchmark specifications for 5,053 critical, subcritical, or near-critical configurations in 582 benchmark evaluations. Modern benchmark development benefits from decades of experienced international participants, a well-established handbook format, supplementary guides to deal with uncertainty quantification, and a comprehensive review process based upon independent reviews from international experts. The ICSBEP Handbook also contains 838 configurations deemed unacceptable to support criticality safety efforts. They are recorded, with the reasoning for their rejection, to preserve the experimental data, prevent reevaluation of data that are incomplete or contain known errors, and/or to potentially allow future reevaluation of the experiment pending the identification of sufficient data to resolve identified inconsistencies and errors. Users of the ICSBEP Handbook today might notice that the rigor and quality of modern criticality safety benchmarks is much greater than those prepared within the initial decade of the project. Benchmarks with 1s uncertainties in k eff greater than 1% were traditionally rejected unless they were identified as unique experiment types that encompassed materials, fuels, or designs not available from other benchmark experiments. However, benchmarks developed using modern experimental techniques and practices typically have uncertainties on the order of a few tenths of a percent. There have been ongoing efforts to improve the overall quality of previously published benchmark evaluations. Seventy-eight evaluations, containing approximately 600 configurations, have been revised just within the past decade. An additional eleven benchmarks are under revision for updated release in the 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. If some of the historic benchmarks were resubmitted in their current form to the TRG today, they would be rejected due to lack of data, missing components in the uncertainty analysis, or incomplete benchmark model development. The use of historic criticality safety benchmarks that underestimate the total uncertainty, lack properly quantified biases, or provide inadequate benchmark specifications do not sufficiently support modern criticality safety and nuclear data efforts. Although the ICSBEP Handbook is recognized by regulating bodies to support criticality safety, users are required to justify their reasons to ignore historic benchmark data and include additional safety margins within their designs. Discussions were held at the WPNCS 23rd Annual Meeting in September 2019 regarding the aforementioned issues. The resultant decision was to establish Subgroup 8 (SG-8): Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks. The current activities of SG-8 are discussed herein.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Pipeline Course with Hands-On Experimental Training at Lawrence Livermore's Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly Training Center

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Divisions at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have partnered with Prof. Massimiliano Fratoni of the University of California Berkeley to offer a semester long course on nuclear criticality safety. This course is part of a larger pipeline project among many of the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories designed to stimulate student interest in the field of criticality safety. The course focuses on teaching the fundamentals of criticality safety, familiarity with national and consensus standards, and preparing criticality safety evaluations. Students also receive hands-on experience with special nuclear material by performing experiments with the Inherently Safe Subcritical Assembly (ISSA) at LLNL. Guest lectures are taught remotely and in-person by criticality safety engineers at LLNL and LANL, giving students an opportunity to interact with professionals in the field. The students complete a semester long project involving developing and writing a criticality safety evaluation. As universities tend to focus heavily on nuclear power and advanced nuclear reactor design, this course gives students a better understanding and perspective of what criticality safety entails. The goal of this pipeline course is to introduce students to criticality safety as another available field for nuclear engineers. It is also a way for criticality safety programs to identify talented students who have the interest and aptitude to work in criticality safety for hire upon graduation. LLNL and LANL have both hosted past students as summer students, participated in student's graduate projects, and hired students as criticality safety engineers. This has provided a unique opportunity for criticality safety programs to spot young talent with better retention outcomes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Just a word or two: Nuclear criticality - 14376

What's in a name? The purpose is to demonstrate a need for better definitions, how to achieve that and how to use them. A controversial definition, nuclear criticality, and implementation of available directives for preparation of standards have been selected for illustration. The definitions of bias and a few other terms are discussed briefly. Reliable communication, supported by established standards, is essential to (nuclear) criticality safety. Sufficiently accurate, without necessarily being scientific, and consistent definitions are required. A term is the name of a concept (a general idea or understanding of something). A definition is a link between a term and a concept. A concept may be complex but the term and the concept description should be exchangeable in the text they are used. They have identical meanings. Established standards include ANSI/ANS and ISO consensus standards, the IAEA Safety Glossary and the IAEA Transport Regulations. The report LA-11627-MS and the associated ANS Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology are sources for the consensus standards. In the spring of 2015, ISO approved a new terminology standard for the nuclear fuel cycle (excluding reactors). In response to an ISO member state proposal, a definition of nuclear criticality, based on the IAEA Safety Glossary, was added at the very last moment by the high-level (not criticality safety only) working group preparing the new standard. The ISO criticality safety working group, after some discussion, did not provide any comment on a nuclear criticality definition to the terminology working group. As a concept, nuclear criticality has a very precise 'reactor physics' meaning. Criticality, as a term related to fission chain reactions, is used in some contexts to cover less precise meanings ('loosely') or as a constituent of a combined expression for rather different concepts. Criticality may thus be loosely used to mean 'criticality or something worse', a criticality accident, a different concept with is own definition. The new definition proposed by the ISO member state was based on such use. What does fraction of a critical mass, e.g. 40%, mean if the critical mass has an unspecified k{sub eff} value larger than unity? Bias, typically an estimated deviation from the correct value in a measured or a calculated value, is sometimes used to mean the opposite concept, bias correction. That is a direct cause of safety concern since the conflicting concepts may be used in the same document or evaluation. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Monte Carlo Criticality Analysis of Simple Geometrics COntaining Tungsten Rhenium Alloys Engrained with Uranium Dioxide and Uranium Mononitride

The critical mass and dimensions of simple geometries containing highly enriched uraniumdioxide (UO2) and uraniummononitride (UN) encapsulated in tungsten-rhenium alloys are determined using MCNP5 criticality calculations. Spheres as well as cylinders with length to radius ratios of 1.82 are computationally built to consist of 60 vol.% fuel and 40 vol.% metal matrix. Within the geometries the uranium is enriched to 93 wt.% uranium-235 and the rhenium content within the metal alloy was modeled over a range of 0 to 30 at.%. The spheres containing UO2 were determined to have a critical radius of 18.29 cm to 19.11 cm and a critical mass ranging from 366 kg to 424 kg. The cylinders containing UO2 were found to have a critical radius ranging from 17.07 cm to 17.844 cm with a corresponding critical mass of 406 kg to 471 kg. Spheres engrained with UN were determined to have a critical radius ranging from 14.82 cm to 15.19 cm and a critical mass between 222 kg and 242 kg. Cylinders which were engrained with UN were determined to have a critical radius ranging from 13.811 cm to 14.155 cm with a corresponding critical mass of 245 kg to 267 kg. The critical geometries were also computationally submerged in a neutronaically infinite medium of fresh water to determine the effects of rhenium addition on criticality accidents due to water submersion. The monte carlo analysis demonstrated that rhenium addition of up to 30 at.% can reduce the excess reactivity due to water submersion by up to $5.07 for UO2 fueled cylinders, $3.87 for UO2 fueled spheres and approximately $3.00 for UN fueled spheres and cylinders.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Postclosure Criticality Consequence Analysis - Scoping Phase

Commercial generation of energy via nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) has generated thousands of metric tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the disposal of which is the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982). Any repository licensed to dispose of the SNF must meet requirements regarding the long-term performance of the repository. In evaluating the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently being used to store the SNF but were not designed for permanent disposal. As part of a multiyear plan that is currently being developed for the DOE, a two-phase study has been initiated to examine the potential consequences, with respect to long-term repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. Phase I, a scoping phase, consists of generating an approach intended to be a starting point for the development of the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be required either to exclude criticality from or include criticality in a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate. The Phase I approach will be used to guide the analyses and simulations done in Phase II to further the development of these modeling tools and techniques as well as the overall knowledge base. The purpose of this report is to document the approach created during Phase I. The study discussed herein focuses on the consequences of criticality in a DPC; it does not address the probability of occurrence of a criticality event. This approach examines two types of criticality events for SNF disposed of in a single type of DPC: a steady-state criticality and a transient criticality. The steady-state critical event is characterized by a relatively low constant power output over 10,000 years, while the transient critical event is characterized by a power spike that lasts on the order of seconds. Possible effects of the criticality are an increase in the radionuclide inventory; an increase in temperature; and a change in the chemistry inside the waste package, along with a change in radionuclide solubilities, fuel degradation rates, and steel corrosion rates. Additionally, for transient criticality the possibility of mechanical damage to the engineered and natural barriers also exists.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Supplier's Status for Critical Solid Propellants, Explosive, and Pyrotechnic Ingredients

In the early 1970's a program was initiated at the Naval Surface Warfare Center/Indian Head Division (NSWC/IHDIV) to address the well-known problems associated with availability and suppliers of critical ingredients. These critical ingredients are necessary for preparation of solid propellants and explosives manufactured by the Navy. The objective of the program was to identify primary and secondary (or back-up) vendor information for these critical ingredients, and to develop suitable alternative materials if an ingredient is unavailable. In 1992 NSWC/IHDIV funded Chemical Propulsion Information Agency (CPIA) under a Technical Area Task (TAT) to expedite the task of creating a database listing critical ingredients used to manufacture Navy propellant and explosives based on known formulation quantities. Under this task CPIA provided employees that were 100 percent dedicated to the task of obtaining critical ingredient suppliers information, selecting the software and designing the interface between the computer program and the database users. TAT objectives included creating the Explosive Ingredients Source Database (EISD) for Propellant, Explosive and Pyrotechnic (PEP) critical elements. The goal was to create a readily accessible database, to provide users a quick-view summary of critical ingredient supplier's information and create a centralized archive that CPIA would update and distribute. EISD funding ended in 1996. At that time, the database entries included 53 formulations and 108 critical used to manufacture Navy propellant and explosives. CPIA turned the database tasking back over to NSWC/IHDIV to maintain and distribute at their discretion. Due to significant interest in propellant/explosives critical ingredients suppliers' status, the Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee (PDCS) approached the JANNAF Executive committee (EC) for authorization to continue the critical ingredient database work. In 1999, JANNAF EC approved the PDCS panel task. This paper is designed to emphasize the necessity of maintaining a JANNAF community supported database, which monitors PEP critical ingredient suppliers' status. The final product of this task is a user friendly, searchable database that provides a quick-view summary of critical ingredient supplier's information. This database must be designed to serve the needs of JANNAF and the propellant and energetic commercial manufacturing community as well. This paper provides a summary of the type of information to archive each critical ingredient.

Sims, B. L.↗

Preliminary Design of Critical Experiments Involving Commercially Available B 4 C Neutron Absorber Plates with Low-Enriched UO 2 Fuel

The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) is an initiative to provide high-quality benchmark data in a standardized format for criticality safety analysts to use to validate calculational tools and nuclear data. In the last released 2022 version, the ICSBEP handbook contains over 5,000 critical experiment descriptions, results, and associated models. This paper describes the critical configurations proposed and calculations performed as part of the conceptual design phase of Integral Experiment Request (IER) 554 (IER-554). The goal of IER-554 is to add to the benchmark experiments available to the criticality safety community by designing critical experiments that can analyze how adding commercially available Boralcan plates to an assembly of low-enriched UO2 fuel rods affects the effective neutron multiplication factor (k eff ). Boralcan, a neutron absorber product developed by Rio Tinto, is made of B4C in an Al 1100 matrix and is commonly used for criticality suppression in fuel storage pools. In the current version of the ICSBEP handbook, only a few dated critical experiments involve B4C materials, and none involve Boralcan in a thin plate shape. The experiments designed as part of IER-554 are intended to be performed at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiments (SPRF/CX) apparatus at Sandia National Laboratories. SPRF/CX is a well-characterized assembly considered trustworthy by the benchmarking community because of the numerous high-quality evaluations with very low experimental uncertainties included in the ICSBEP handbook. Figure 1 illustrates the assembly for a particular configuration from LCT-078, one of the published benchmarks in the ICSBEP handbook. The experiments will be moderated and reflected by light water at ambient atmospheric pressure. Before the plates are inserted in the critical assembly, they will be characterized with x-ray computed tomography (XCT) to identify the sizes and distribution of the B 4 C powder particles inside the plates. The preliminary design calculations were performed with SCALE 6.3.0 using the KENO V.a sequence for the criticality calculations, the CE-TSUNAMI-3D sequence for the sensitivity and uncertainty studies, and the ENDF/B-VII.1 Continuous Energy cross section library. All the calculation results presented have 10 pcm statistical uncertainties. A set of critical experiments with Boralcan plates could increase the confidence of the criticality safety community in its modeling methods when using this type of neutron absorber material. Experiments would also help validate k eff calculations, and the industry could use these validations to change the B loading credit limits from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission standard review plan for dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel. This paper summarizes only part of the analysis documented in the preliminary design report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A novel approach to criticality accident detection for a legacy facility

For operations on the Sellafield site involving fissile material a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) has traditionally been installed unless an omission case can be made. An omission case would examine if, in the absence of all controls, a criticality could reasonably be expected or whether the potential dose to an operator would remain below a maximum acceptable dose. It is a UK legal requirement for adequate emergency arrangements to be in place for hazards on a nuclear licensed site. For facilities where criticality is credible there is a regulatory expectation that a -Criticality Warning System- should be in place. A -Criticality Warning System- is not necessarily a full CAAS and alternative means of criticality detection may be part of an adequate emergency plan. The Sellafield site has a Magnox fuel reprocessing facility which has been operated since the 1960's. Evaporation of the Medium Active (MA) liquid waste from this process is undertaken in an associated building. Following extensive review of the plant and process a number of maloperations which can route fissile material to the MA evaporator were identified. Adequate controls to prevent these scenarios were shown to be in place. In the unlikely event of a failure of controls leading to sustained loss of fissile material a criticality incident may occur and hence an emergency plan was determined to be necessary. The novel emergency arrangements which were developed utilized the existing gamma monitor network located across multiple building floors. These gamma monitors are present for radiological safety. This emergency arrangement would require rapid interpretation of the gamma alarms by an operator and the manual triggering of a criticality evacuation alarm. The gamma monitors were demonstrated to be able to detect the minimum incident of concern (10{sup 15} fissions) as well as being able to alarm during the ramp up in power of a large criticality incident (10{sup 18} fissions). It was shown that a criticality accident could readily be distinguished from a radiological event (e.g. loss of containment). To support this work, criticality excursion analysis was used to examine the likely characteristics of a criticality in the MA evaporator. This novel arrangement was justified due to a number of factors including: the limited remaining operational lifetime of this facility (<5 years), the low frequency of maloperation coupled with a failure of controls and the crucial risk reduction provided by the continued reprocessing of Magnox fuel. Furthermore, the time and cost involved with design and installation of a standard CAAS would be substantially greater than a plan based upon existing instrumentation. These arguments were accepted by the UK regulator the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Artificial Neural Network Representation of Dynamic Criticality Excursion Experiment Data

This paper outlines time dependent considerations in applying the artificial neural network (ANN) paradigm to dynamic nuclear criticality excursion experiment data. The ANN amongst a variety of uses, can apply to function fitting of multiple input-multiple output data sets, pattern recognition, cluster analysis, and time series prediction. The ANN is a component of Machine Learning (ML) data analysis. The practical application of ML to criticality safety has been funded through the Y-12 Plant Directed Research and Demonstration (PDRD) program to support criticality safety and emergency planning efforts. The initial effort considered function fitting of criticality excursion data. Recent efforts successfully extended the ANN to criticality safety code validation. The initial ANN work applied to criticality excursions centered around multivariate function fitting of static (tabular) data taken from the French Consequences Radiologiques d'un Accident de Criticite (CRAC) and SILENE reactor campaigns. The former report (LeCorche) summarized important tabular data for the first 44 CRAC experiments. The initial ANN was trained to specific time-independent inputs, then applied to predict peak fission rate and total fissions for a wide variety of fissile solutions process conditions. This work extends that effort to apply the ANN paradigm to dynamic prediction of time-dependent criticality excursion experiment data. A dynamic criticality excursion in fissile solution represents a complex multiphysics phenomenon. Factors include among other things, coupled neutronic, multiphase fluid flow, temperature, pressure, acoustic shock, boiling heat transfer, reactivity feedback, and radiolytic gas considerations. There have been many efforts to model (over time) as coupled ordinary and (space) as partial differential equations (ODE, PDE). The ANN representation noted here does not rely on solving explicit ODE or PDEs. Rather the intent is to demonstrate that as a time series, the criticality excursion can be predicted by training specific ANN architectures to experimental input and output time series exclusively. The rationale for extending this work to the time-dependent regime is important in developing a 'criticality excursion emulator' solely on the basis of learning characteristics from experiment dynamic data. An emulator is different than a computer code simulator driven by the solution of ODEs and PDEs given select 'tuning parameters' that match outputs to experiments. A criticality excursion emulator, derived exclusively from an ANN or ML, could predict most likely excursion characteristics, trained from historic dynamic experiment data, presented with input values within the range of those experiments. The work noted shows that generic time-series ANN architectures can be satisfactorily applied to the prediction of dynamic, extremely chaotic criticality excursion power given an initial time dependent input series. In reality, an excursion emulator could be driven by user-supplied initial (t=0), time independent or constant values to generate time dependent outputs. Thus ongoing work includes developing a custom ANN such that initial dynamic conditions would be predicted. Those results then serve as inputs to a customized ANN architecture currently in development. (author)

42 ENGINEERING↗

The DOE Criticality safety support group - A retrospective perspective - 14580

The Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Support Group (CSSG) came into being as a response to the DNFSB recommendation 1997-2 'Criticality Safety' which dealt with the continuation of criticality safety at defense nuclear facilities in the Department of Energy Enterprise. The DNFSB was concerned over the lack of capability management of practical experience pertinent to avoiding a criticality accident in non-reactor environments. One of the specific recommendations of 1997-2 was to 'Identify a core group of criticality experts experienced in the theoretical and experimental aspects of neutron chain reactions to advise on the above steps and assist in resolving future technical issues'. The CSSG, a group of 10 recognized experts in criticality safety, was chartered in late 1997 to address the recommendation. Members of the CSSG are drawn from DOE employees and contractor staff to provide advice and technical support to help meet the criticality safety needs of DOE missions, including stockpile stewardship, materials stabilization, transportation, storage, facilities life cycle (design through decommissioning), and waste disposal. The CSSG is an integral part of the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) developed to maintain and enhance the operational and technical criticality safety expertise and capability within the Department of Energy Enterprise. This paper outlines the history, purpose and continuing contribution of the CSSG as well as providing an understanding of the interfaces between the DOE CSSG, the DOE Criticality Safety Coordinating Team (CSCT), the ANS Nuclear Criticality Safety Division and the EFCOG Criticality Safety Subgroup. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Neutron Absorber Plate Characterization Plan for Criticality Experiments Design

After being used in nuclear installations, depleted fuel can still be highly reactive and must be handled securely to prevent any radiological or criticality concerns. In particular, spent fuel from use in nuclear power reactors must be stored and transported in specifically designed containers using neutron absorber materials to prevent criticality. Various neutron absorber material types exist and are manufactured by various entities, as thoroughly described in the Handbook of Neutron Absorber Materials for Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage and Transportation Applications written by EPRI. Presently, one of the most modern and most widely used types of neutron absorber material contains particles of boron carbide, or B 4 C, embedded in aluminum matrix: Boralcan, manufactured by Rio Tinto. It is very important for the community to know as much as possible about such neutron absorber materials. Therefore, in the recent years, a US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration–Nuclear Criticality Safety Program funded project initiated design of an experiment that places Boralcan neutron-absorbing plates in an established critical assembly using low-enriched uranium fuel at the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiments (SPRF/CX) apparatus at Sandia National Laboratories. The goal of the experiment is to produce high-quality benchmark data to submit to the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), for use in validating calculational tools and nuclear data by criticality safety analysts. The project, named IER-554, is currently in its final design stage, following a successful preliminary design. In the work documented in the design study, ten critical configurations using Boralcan neutron absorber plates were designed, and the experiment was proven to be feasible, with a predicted low k eff uncertainty around 100 pcm. An overview of the modeled cutout of the critical assembly with a Boralcan plate is shown in Figure 1, representing one of the configurations planned for the critical experiments. Before the plates are inserted in the critical assembly, it is necessary to know more about their composition and uniformity. This summary focuses on the plate characterization plans. Each plate will undergo (1) neutron transmission measurements at different locations to determine the 10 B areal density and (2) an in-depth x-ray computed tomography (XCT) examination to obtain the exact Sizes and distribution of the B4C powder particles inside the plates. In parallel, plate modeling studies are performed with a goal to determine the validity of the currently used approximation of modeling the neutron absorber plates as a homogeneous mixture of Aluminum 1100 alloy and B4C— instead of explicitly modeling the B4C particles. By using the experimental 10 B areal density measurements, and the exact size and location of the B4C particles obtained by XCT, a plate model can theoretically be built that reproduces the plate with extremely high fidelity. The results of this modeling study could increase the confidence of the criticality safety community in its modeling methods when using this type of neutron absorber material, and the industry could use these validations to change the boron loading credit limits from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission standard review plan for dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel. The modeling calculations are performed with SCALE 6.3.0 using the KENO V.a sequence for criticality calculations with the ENDF/B-VIII.0 continuous-energy cross section library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Health Physics Research Reactor Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Overview

From the countless critical experiments performed in the world during the past century, high-quality integral benchmarks experiments have been collected and gathered into the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook), managed by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Working Group. This information preservation and dissemination effort is crucial for reactor licensing as well as criticality and radiation transport modeling validation. This summary reports on the status of a tentative benchmark addition to the ICSBEP Handbook. The proposed benchmark arises from legacy operation data of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR). The HPRR was a small, unmoderated, unshielded fast burst reactor that was used for research in health physics and radiobiology as well as teaching and training. As part of a comprehensive investigation of the available HPRR operation data and characteristics, different possibilities for use of the valuable results were studied. A critical experiment benchmark evaluation was performed, analyzing data coming from sub-critical and critical operation of the HPRR during operator training, steady-state irradiation of samples and before critical bursts. The results of the evaluation do not satisfy for the ICSBEP standards as the benchmark relative standard uncertainty is of about 4% for k eff , and the relative difference between sample calculations and expected k eff results is of about 1.5%. Due to those unsatisfactory results, it was decided not to pursue critical experiments evaluation of the HPRR presently and to focus instead on shielding type data for the creation of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) and shielding category benchmark, which is currently very scarce in the ICSBEP handbook—especially concerning critical, pulsed assembly, or reactor operation data. Several dosimetry and shielding experiments from HPRR burst operation were evaluated, with different benchmark metrics as sulfur fluence, Element 57 dose, or neutron fluence at different distances and under different shield materials conditions. An evaluation focusing on the Element 57 neutron dose as a benchmark metric was submitted to the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) meeting in October 2021, and the inclusion of the evaluation in the ICSBEP Handbook was deferred. The main change proposed by the international experiment evaluation experts is to use the neutron fluence measured by Bonner spheres as a benchmark metric. This represents a quantity closer to that actually measured by the experimentalists of the HPRR compared to the Element 57 dose, which adds another step of data transformation, thus potentially adding uncertainty to the benchmark. The evaluation has been updated and will be submitted to the 2022 ICSBEP TRG meeting for inclusion in the 2023 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. The evaluation is performed using the KENO and MAVRIC combination from the SCALE 6.2.4 code suite which was previously used in similar CAAS benchmarks to allow for the use of variance reduction techniques.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Preliminary Designs for Criticality Safety Benchmarks—Iron/Steel/Chromium Series

The nuclear criticality safety community uses critical benchmarks extensively when analyzing nuclear systems. Having benchmarks sensitive to important materials of interest helps to ensure safety and constrain results. Critical benchmarks are also invaluable to the nuclear data community, which uses these benchmarks as a check and measure of quality of nuclear data libraries. Additionally, integral benchmarks are often used to validate the performance of computational tools for simulating nuclear systems. Many integral benchmarks have been documented in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) handbook, the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) handbook, and the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive Database (SINBAD). The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory, is the only general purpose critical experiments facility in the United States of America. NCERC regularly designs and executes critical experiments and other measurements useful to a wide variety of fields including nuclear criticality safety, commercial nuclear energy, nonproliferation, and nuclear data. NCERC has recently developed tools to visualize gaps and deficiencies in existing criticality benchmarks – this work is still ongoing. Through this work and other reviews, some high priority deficiencies have been identified. This paper aims to highlight three areas where additional critical benchmarks would be useful to the nuclear criticality safety community and various other groups. Additionally, NCERC is seeking feedback in regard to these proposed measurements to make sure they are as useful to as many communities as possible.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Delayed Critical and Subcritical Experiments with Polyethylene Moderated Unreflected Thin 15 in. Diameter HEU Metal Plates

The thin ~15 in. diameter highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal plates were assembled to delayed criticality at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in 1969 with various thicknesses of polyethylene (varying from 1/16 to 2$\frac{3}{8}$ inches) between uranium metal plates. The average 235 U enrichment was 93.27 wt. %. These unreflected critical configurations contained 4$\frac{2}{3}$ to 20$\frac{5}{6}$ thin 15 in. diameter HEU metal plates (on loan from Los Alamos National Laboratory [LANL] and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory [ORNL] on June 3, 1969). Depending on the thickness of polyethylene, the enriched uranium masses varying from 28,053 to 135,148 grams. Fractional plate sections consisted of the appropriate number of 60° pie sections. In addition to the measurement at delayed criticality, subcritical measurements were also performed by the inverse kinetic rod drop method. Prompt neutron decay constant measurements were also performed by the Rossi alpha and randomly pulsed neutron method using a time-tagged spontaneous fission californium neutron source; these are briefly reported here. At the time of these measurements in 1969, the thin HEU metal plates were in near-pristine condition with extremely little oxidation, allowing better descriptions of the uranium plates than the use of these plates in a heavily oxidized and deteriorated condition in recent reflected benchmark experiments at the LANL facility at the Nevada Test Site with these same thin highly enriched uranium metal plates. This report documents the experimental information for the measurements performed so that later researchers can perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Nuclear Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Program (ICSBEP) or a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) benchmark. Data from the experiments described should be acceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments for the ICSBEP and the NEA nuclear criticality safety benchmark program once the uncertainty analysis on the measured neutron multiplication factors is completed. Additional data—such as the dimensional inspection reports, uranium isotopic information, and other relevant particulars—should be retrieved from the Y-12 Plant or LANL and incorporated in the final ICSBEP benchmark. Based on previous ICSBEP benchmarks with this enriched uranium metal at ORCEF, the uncertainties in $k_{eff}$ could be as low as ± 0.0002 for some configurations. Other experiments with smaller-diameter than 15 in. diameter HEU metal plates have been benchmarked in HEU-METFAST-001. The prompt neutron time decay measurements could be the basis for an International Reactor Physics Benchmark Program. Preparation of the present report is part of an effort at ORNL to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other US Department of Energy critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time. This work for this report publication was supported by the Nuclear Criticality, Radiation Transport and Safety NCSP Program at ORNL.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗