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At least 325 records · Page 18

Atmospheric entry of nuclear-powered vehicles due to accidental/inadvertent termination of operations

The entries of the radioactive components into earth's atmosphere resulting from an accident or inadvertent abort of a space vehicle powered by nuclear-thermal-rockets are investigated. The study is made for a typical piloted Mars mission vehicle incapacitated by an accident or malfunction during the trans-Mars-injection maneuver due to simultaneous multiple failures of its component systems. The three different accident/abort modes considered are the following: (1) a constant-rate angular pitching motion of the vehicle, (2) a constant-acceleration angular pitching motion of the vehicle, and (3) the rocket engine breaks away from the rest of the vehicle with a finite relative (dispersion) velocity. The speeds and angles of the atmospheric entries are calculated for each mode for different values of the time of the accident, pitching rate, acceleration, and dispersion velocity. For the most severe entry speeds and flight-path angles, the stagnation-point pressures, heat transfer rates, thickness, and mass per unit area of the heat shields necessary to protect the radioactive components from disintegrating, deceleration g-loads, and high ground-impact velocities are calculated. The study points out that the high g-loads and high ground-impact velocities are the most serious problems that must be addressed.

Menees, Gene P.↗

Update to the safety program for the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators for the Galileo and Ulysses missions

With the rescheduling of the Galileo and Ulysses launches and the use of new upper stages following the Challenger accident, the aerospace nuclear safety program for the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators (GPHS-RTGs) was extended to accommodate the new mission scenarios. As in the original safety program, the objectives were to determine the response of the GPHS-RTG to the various postulated accident environments and to determine the risk (if any) associated with these postulated accidents. The extended GPHS-RTG safety program was successfully completed in sufficient time to prepare an updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) with revisions for the October 1989 launch of the Galileo spacecraft.

Bennett, Gary L.↗

Report of Apollo 204 Review Board

The Nation's space program requires that man and machine achieve the highest capability to pursue the exploration of space. The Apollo 204 Review Board was charged with the responsibility of reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, reporting its findings relating to the cause of the accident, and formulating recommendations so that inherent hazards are reduced to a minimum. The Board is very concerned that its description of the defects in the Apollo Program that led to the condition existing at the time of the Apollo 204 accident will be interpreted as an indictment of the entire manned space flight program and a castigation of the many people associated with that program. This report, rather than presenting a total picture of that program, is concerned with the deficiencies uncovered.

Source record↗

Some inadequacies of the current human factors certification process of advanced aircraft technologies

Automation related accidents or serious incidents are not limited to advanced technology aircraft. There is a full history of such accidents with conventional technology aircraft. However, this type of occurrence is far from sparing the newest 'glass cockpit' generation, and it even seems to be a growing contributor to its accident rate. Nevertheless, all these aircraft have been properly certificated according to the relevant airworthiness regulations. Therefore, there is a growing concern that with the technological advancement of air transport aircraft cockpits, the current airworthiness regulations addressing cockpit design and human factors may have reached some level of inadequacy. This paper reviews some aspects of the current airworthiness regulations and certification process related to human factors of cockpit design and focuses on questioning their ability to guarantee the intended safety objectives.

Paries, Jean↗

STS-75 Flight Day 5

On this fifth day of the STS-75 mission, the flight crew, Cmdr. Andrew Allen, Pilot Scott Horowitz, Payload Cmdr. Franklin Chang-Diaz, Payload Specialist Umberto Guidoni (Italy), and Mission Specialists Jeffrey Hoffman, Maurizio Cheli (ESA) and Claude Nicollier (ESA), are shown viewing the tethered satellite and performing experiments, both onboard the shuttle and with the TSS. An accident occurs in which the tether breaks and the satellite is shown floating away from the shuttle. There is an in-orbit interview with reporters from Johnson Space Center after the accident occurred, in which they discuss the reasons for the accident and how the experiment can be salvaged.

Source record↗

Weather Avoidance Using Route Optimization as a Decision Aid: An AWIN Topical Study

The aviation community is faced with reducing the fatal aircraft accident rate by 80 percent within 10 years. This must be achieved even with ever increasing, traffic and a changing National Airspace System. This is not just an altruistic goal, but a real necessity, if our growing level of commerce is to continue. Honeywell Technology Center's topical study, "Weather Avoidance Using Route Optimization as a Decision Aid", addresses these pressing needs. The goal of this program is to use route optimization and user interface technologies to develop a prototype decision aid for dispatchers and pilots. This decision aid will suggest possible diversions through single or multiple weather hazards and present weather information with a human-centered design. At the conclusion of the program, we will have a laptop prototype decision aid that will be used to demonstrate concepts to industry for integration into commercialized products for dispatchers and/or pilots. With weather a factor in 30% of aircraft accidents, our program will prevent accidents by strategically avoiding weather hazards in flight. By supplying more relevant weather information in a human-centered format along with the tools to generate flight plans around weather, aircraft exposure to weather hazards can be reduced. Our program directly addresses the NASA's five year investment areas of Strategic Weather Information and Weather Operations (simulation/hazard characterization and crew/dispatch/ATChazard monitoring, display, and decision support) (NASA Aeronautics Safety Investment Strategy: Weather Investment Recommendations, April 15, 1997). This program is comprised of two phases, Phase I concluded December 31, 1998. This first phase defined weather data requirements, lateral routing algorithms, an conceptual displays for a user-centered design. Phase II runs from January 1999 through September 1999. The second phase integrates vertical routing into the lateral optimizer and combines the user interface into a prototype software testbed. Phase II concludes with a dispatcher and pilot evaluation of the route optimizer decision aid. This document describes work completed in Phase I in contract with NASA Langley August 1998 - December 1998. This report includes: (1) Discuss how weather hazards were identified in partnership with experts, and how weather hazards were prioritized; (2) Static representations of display layouts for integrated planning function (3) Cost function for the 2D route optimizer; (4) Discussion of the method for obtaining, access to raw data of, and the results of the flight deck user information requirements definition; (5) Itemized display format requirements identified for representing weather hazards in a route planning aid.

Source record↗

Safety Metrics for Human-Computer Controlled Systems

The rapid growth of computer technology and innovation has played a significant role in the rise of computer automation of human tasks in modem production systems across all industries. Although the rationale for automation has been to eliminate "human error" or to relieve humans from manual repetitive tasks, various computer-related hazards and accidents have emerged as a direct result of increased system complexity attributed to computer automation. The risk assessment techniques utilized for electromechanical systems are not suitable for today's software-intensive systems or complex human-computer controlled systems.This thesis will propose a new systemic model-based framework for analyzing risk in safety-critical systems where both computers and humans are controlling safety-critical functions. A new systems accident model will be developed based upon modem systems theory and human cognitive processes to better characterize system accidents, the role of human operators, and the influence of software in its direct control of significant system functions Better risk assessments will then be achievable through the application of this new framework to complex human-computer controlled systems.

Leveson, Nancy G↗

A Model-based Framework for Risk Assessment in Human-Computer Controlled Systems

The rapid growth of computer technology and innovation has played a significant role in the rise of computer automation of human tasks in modem production systems across all industries. Although the rationale for automation has been to eliminate "human error" or to relieve humans from manual repetitive tasks, various computer-related hazards and accidents have emerged as a direct result of increased system complexity attributed to computer automation. The risk assessment techniques utilized for electromechanical systems are not suitable for today's software-intensive systems or complex human-computer controlled systems. This thesis will propose a new systemic model-based framework for analyzing risk in safety-critical systems where both computers and humans are controlling safety-critical functions. A new systems accident model will be developed based upon modem systems theory and human cognitive processes to better characterize system accidents, the role of human operators, and the influence of software in its direct control of significant system functions. Better risk assessments will then be achievable through the application of this new framework to complex human-computer controlled systems.

Hatanaka, Iwao↗

Synthesis of Two-Photon Materials and Two-Photon Liquid Crystals

The duration of the grant was interrupted by two major accidents that the PI met with-- an auto accident in Pasadena, CA during her second summer at JPL which took almost eight months for recovery and a second accident during Fall 2000 that left her in crutches for the entire semester. Further, the time released agreed by the University was not given in a timely fashion. The candidate has been given post-grant expire time off. In spite of all these problems, the PI synthesized a number of new two-photon materials and studied the structure-activity correlation to arrive at the best-optimized structure. The PI's design proved to be one of the best in the sense that these materials has a hitherto unreported two-photon absorption cross section. Many materials based on PI's design was later made by the NASA colleague. This is Phase 1. Phase II of this grant is to orate liquid crystalline nature into this potentially useful materials and is currently in progress. Recent observations of nano- and pico-second response time of homeotropically aligned liquid crystals suggest their inherent potentials to act as laser hardening materials, i.e., as protective devices against short laser pulses. The objective of the current project is to exploit this potential by the synthesis of liquid crystals with high optical nonlinearity and optimizing their performance. The PI is trying structural variations to bring in liquid crystalline nature without losing the high two-photon cross section. Both Phase I and Phase II led to many invited presentations and publications in reputed journals like 'Science' and 'Molecular Crystals'. The list of presentations and reprints are enclosed. Another important and satisfying outcome of this grant is the opportunity that this grant offered to the budding undergraduate scientists to get involved in a visible research of international importance. All the students had a chance to learn a lot during research, had the opportunity to present their work at the National level conferences. They continue to retain their interest in their research and went on to accomplish further laurels.

Subramaniam, Girija↗

CFD Applications in Support of the Space Shuttle Risk Assessment

The paper describes a numerical study of a potential accident scenario of the space shuttle, operating at the same flight conditions as flight 51L, the Challenger accident. The interest in performing this simulation is derived by evidence that indicates that the event itself did not exert large enough blast loading on the shuttle to break it apart. Rather, the quasi-steady aerodynamic loading on the damaged, unbalance vehicle caused the break-up. Despite the enormous explosive potential of the shuttle total fuel load (both liquid and solid), the post accident explosives working group estimated the maximum energy involvement to be equivalent to about five hundreds of pounds of TNT. This understanding motivated the simulation described here. To err on the conservative side, we modeled the event as an explosion, and used the maximum energy estimate. We modeled the transient detonation of a 500 lbs spherical charge of TNT, placed at the main engine, and the resulting blast wave propagation about the complete stack. Tracking of peak pressures and impulses at hundreds of locations on the vehicle surface indicate that the blast load was insufficient to break the vehicle, hence demonstrating likely crew survivability through such an event.

Baum, Joseph D.↗

Shared Problem Models and Crew Decision Making

The importance of crew decision making to aviation safety has been well established through NTSB accident analyses: Crew judgment and decision making have been cited as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents in commercial air transport, general aviation, and military aviation. Yet the bulk of research on decision making has not proven helpful in improving the quality of decisions in the cockpit. One reason is that traditional analytic decision models are inappropriate to the dynamic complex nature of cockpit decision making and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions. A new model of dynamic naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove more useful for training or aiding cockpit decision making. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulation and National Transportation Safety Board accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation and reflect the crew's metacognitive skill. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relation between communication that serves to build performance. Implications of these findings for crew training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Satellite Delivery of Aviation Weather Data

With aviation traffic continuing to increase worldwide, reducing the aviation accident rate and aviation schedule delays is of critical importance. In the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has established the Aviation Safety Program and the Aviation System Capacity Program to develop and test new technologies to increase aviation safety and system capacity. Weather is a significant contributor to aviation accidents and schedule delays. The timely dissemination of weather information to decision makers in the aviation system, particularly to pilots, is essential in reducing system delays and weather related aviation accidents. The NASA Glenn Research Center is investigating improved methods of weather information dissemination through satellite broadcasting directly to aircraft. This paper describes an on-going cooperative research program with NASA, Rockwell Collins, WorldSpace, Jeppesen and American Airlines to evaluate the use of satellite digital audio radio service (SDARS) for low cost broadcast of aviation weather information, called Satellite Weather Information Service (SWIS). The description and results of the completed SWIS Phase 1 are presented, and the description of the on-going SWIS Phase 2 is given.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗

So What's an RTG and Are They Safe?

When one considers space missions to the outer edges of our solar system and far beyond, our sun cannot be relied on to produce the required spacecraft (s/c) power. Solar energy diminishes as the square of the distance from the Sun. At Mars it is only 43% of that at earth. At Jupiter, it falls off to only 3.6% of Earth's. By the time we get out to Pluto, solar energy is only .066% what it is on Earth. Beyond the orbit of Mars, it is not practical to depend on solar power for a s/c. However, the farther out we go the more power we need to heat the s/c and to transmit data back to Earth over the long distances. On Earth, knowledge is power. In the outer solar system, power is knowledge. Solar arrays only operate at 19% efficiency, are very vulnerable to damage from radiation and temperature extremes, and cannot be used for even nearby missions that operate in extended darkness, or under the surface of a planet or moon. Twenty-six U.S. space missions, from the Transit to Cassini, have used radioisotope power systems and heater units to take s/c to the far reaches of our solar system and have demonstrated an outstanding record of safety and reliability. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG's) have proven to be safe, reliable, maintenance-free, and capable of providing both thermal and electrical power for decades under the harsh environments of deep space. RTG's have no problem operating in the high radiation belts of space, the extreme temperatures, or the severe dust storms of Mars, and they have proven to be the most reliable power source ever flown on U.S. s/c. For example, the two Pioneer s/c operated for more than two decades and the Voyager s/c may last for 40 years. RTG's are not nuclear reactors, they serve only as power generators and are not involved in the propulsion of the s/c. They operate on the principle of thermoelectric generation that converts heat directly into electricity, they have no moving parts, are extremely reliable, and have met or exceeded all safety and performance expectations. Federal laws and regulations require analysis and evaluation of the safety risks and any potential environmental impacts. Extensive safety testing of RTG's and RTG components has been performed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to demonstrate the ability to survive accidents related to Space Shuttle launches and assure that the systems would be safe under all accident conditions, including accidents at or near the launch pad or during orbital reentry. Many design improvements have been made over the four decades that RTG's have been flown on space missions. This paper outlines the operation and safety standards of RTG's and the advanced developments expected to be used on future deep space missions such as the Europa Orbiter, Pluto/Kuiper Express, Solar Probe, Europa Lander, and Titan Explorer missions.

Barret, Chris↗

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers, aviation, and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment: Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multi-dimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for training will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Decision Making in Action: Applying Research to Practice

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. A similar observation has been made in nuclear power plants. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multidimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for spaceflight and training for offshore installations will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Decision Making in Action

The importance of decision-making to safety in complex, dynamic environments like mission control centers and offshore installations has been well established. NASA-ARC has a program of research dedicated to fostering safe and effective decision-making in the manned spaceflight environment. Because access to spaceflight is limited, environments with similar characteristics, including aviation and nuclear power plants, serve as analogs from which space-relevant data can be gathered and theories developed. Analyses of aviation accidents cite crew judgement and decision making as causes or contributing factors in over half of all accidents. A similar observation has been made in nuclear power plants. Yet laboratory research on decision making has not proven especially helpful in improving the quality of decisions in these kinds of environments. One reason is that the traditional, analytic decision models are inappropriate to multidimensional, high-risk environments, and do not accurately describe what expert human decision makers do when they make decisions that have consequences. A new model of dynamic, naturalistic decision making is offered that may prove useful for improving decision making in complex, isolated, confined and high-risk environments. Based on analyses of crew performance in full-mission simulators and accident reports, features that define effective decision strategies in abnormal or emergency situations have been identified. These include accurate situation assessment (including time and risk assessment), appreciation of the complexity of the problem, sensitivity to constraints on the decision, timeliness of the response, and use of adequate information. More effective crews also manage their workload to provide themselves with time and resources to make good decisions. In brief, good decisions are appropriate to the demands of the situation. Effective crew decision making and overall performance are mediated by crew communication. Communication contributes to performance because it assures that all crew members have essential information, but it also regulates and coordinates crew actions and is the medium of collective thinking in response to a problem. This presentation will examine the relations between leadership, communication, decision making and overall crew performance. Implications of these findings for spaceflight and training for offshore installations will be discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Communication Research in Aviation and Space Operations: Symptoms and Strategies of Crew Coordination

The day-to-day operators of today's aerospace systems work under increasing pressures to accomplish more with less. They work in operational systems which are complex, technology-based, and high-risk; in which incidents and accidents have far-reaching and costly consequences. For these and other reasons, there is concern that the safety net formerly built upon redundant systems and abundant resources may become overburdened. Although we know that human ingenuity can overcome incredible odds, human nature can also fail in unpredictable ways. Over the last 20 years, a large percentage of aviation accidents and incidents have been attributed to human errors rather than hardware or environmental factors alone. A class of errors have been identified which are not due to a lack of individual, technical competencies. Rather, they are due to the failure of teams to utilize readily available resources or information in a timely fashion. These insights began a training revolution in the aviation industry called Cockpit Resource Management, which later became known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) as its concepts and applications extended to teams beyond the flightdeck. Then, as now, communication has been a cornerstone in CRM training since crew coordination and resource management largely resides within information transfer processes--both within flightcrews, and between flightcrews and the ground operations teams that support them. The research I will describe takes its roots in CRM history as we began to study communication processes in order to discover symptoms of crew coordination problems, as well as strategies of effective crew management. On the one hand, communication is often the means or the tool by which team members manage their resources, solve problems, maintain situational awareness and procedural discipline. Conversely, it is the lack of planning and resource management, loss of vigilance and situational awareness, and non-standard communications that are implicated in accidents and incidents. NASA/Ames Crew Factors researchers have been developing a model of effective crew coordination in order to understand the sources of performance breakdowns, and to develop effective solutions and interventions. Because communication is a primary mechanism by which information is received and transmitted, and because it is observable behavior, we focus on these group processes in order to identify patterns of communication that distinguish effective from less effective crew performance. Since a prime objective is to develop training recommendations for enhancing communication skills, we interpret our findings in the context of relevant task and environmental conditions, role and procedural constraints, and the normal real-time parameters of flight operations. Another research objective is to consider how communication and coordination can be enhanced through design. For example, flight deck and hardware design as well as procedural and software design may greatly influence the efficiency with which crews communicate and coordinate their work. In addition, teams and tasks may be designed, organized, and trained so that team interactions with each other are based upon appropriately shared knowledge, procedures and situation awareness. In short, we are interested in enhancing communication practices through (1) the training of specific communication skills, and (2) the design of equipment, tasks, procedures, and teams that optimize smooth, unambiguous communication processes. Two examples of communication research will be described; one in aviation and one in space operations. The first example is a high-fidelity full mission simulation study which investigates the affect of flightdeck automation on crew coordination and communication (contrasting crew performance in the DC-9 vs. MD88). Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

NAPS as an Alertness Management Strategy

Today, 24-hour operations are necessary to meet the demands of our society and the requirements of our industrialized global economy. These around-the-clock demands pose unique physiological challenges for the humans who remain central to safe and productive operations. Optimal alertness and performance are critical factors that are increasingly challenged by unusual, extended, or changing work/rest schedules. Technological advancements and automated systems can exacerbate the challenges faced by the human factor in these environments. Shift work, transportation demands, and continuous operations engender sleep loss and circadian disruption. Both of these physiological factors can lead to increased sleepiness, decreased performance, and a reduced margin of safety. These factors can increase vulnerability to incidents and accidents in operational settings. The consequences can have both societal effects (e.g., major destructive accidents such as Three Mile Island, Exxon Valdez, Bhopal) and personal effects (e.g., an accident driving home after a night shift).

Rosekind, Mark R.↗