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At least 325 records · Page 18

Colloquium : Neutrino detectors as tools for nuclear security

For over 40 years, physicists have discussed possible uses for neutrino detectors in nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and fissile materials security. Neutrinos are an attractive fission signature because they readily pass through matter. The same property makes neutrinos challenging to detect in systems that would be practical for nuclear security applications. This Colloquium presents a broad overview of several potential neutrino applications, including the near-field monitoring of known reactors, far-field monitoring of known or discovery of undeclared reactors, detection of reactor waste streams, and detection of nuclear explosions. Recent detector advances have made near-field monitoring feasible, whereas farther-field reactor detection and waste stream detection monitoring may be possible in some cases with further research and development. Very long-range reactor monitoring and nuclear explosion detection do not seem feasible for the foreseeable future due to considerable physical and/or practical constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Randomized prospective phase III trial of 68 Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT molecular imaging for prostate cancer salvage radiotherapy planning [PSMA-SRT]

Salvage radiotherapy (SRT) for prostate cancer (PCa) recurrence after prostatectomy offers long-term biochemical control in about 50–60% of patients. SRT is commonly initiated in patients with serum PSA levels < 1 ng/mL, a threshold at which standard-of-care imaging is insensitive for detecting recurrence. As such, SRT target volumes are usually drawn in the absence of radiographically visible disease. 68 Ga-PSMA-11 (PSMA) PET/CT molecular imaging is highly sensitive and may offer anatomic localization of PCa biochemical recurrence. However, it is unclear if incorporation of PSMA PET/CT imaging into the planning of SRT could improve its likelihood of success. The purpose of this trial is to evaluate the success rate of SRT for recurrence of PCa after prostatectomy with and without planning based on PSMA PET/CT. Methods We will randomize 193 patients to proceed with standard SRT (control arm 1, n = 90) or undergo a PSMA PET/CT scan (free of charge for patients) prior to SRT planning (investigational arm 2, n = 103). The primary endpoint is the success rate of SRT measured as biochemical progression-free survival (BPFS) after initiation of SRT. Biochemical progression is defined by PSA ≥ 0.2 ng/mL and rising. The randomization ratio of 1:1.13 is based on the assumption that approximately 13% of subjects randomized to Arm 2 will not be treated with SRT because of PSMA-positive extra-pelvic metastases. These patients will not be included in the primary endpoint analysis but will still be followed. The choice of treating the prostate bed alone vs prostate bed and pelvic lymph nodes, with or without androgen deprivation therapy (ADT), is selected by the treating radiation oncologist. The radiation oncologist may change the radiation plan depending on the findings of the PSMA PET/CT scan. Any other imaging is allowed for SRT planning in both arms if done per routine care. Patients will be followed until either one of the following conditions occur: 5 years after the date of initiation of randomization, biochemical progression, diagnosis of metastatic disease, initiation of any additional salvage therapy, death. Discussion This is the first randomized phase 3 prospective trial designed to determine whether PSMA PET/CT molecular imaging can improve outcomes in patients with PCa early BCR following radical prostatectomy.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Development of an ideal observer that incorporates nuisance parameters and processes list-mode data

Observer models were developed to process data in list-mode format in order to perform binary discrimination tasks for use in an arms-control-treaty context. Data used in this study was generated using GEANT4 Monte Carlo simulations for photons using custom models of plutonium inspection objects and a radiation imaging system. We evaluated observer model performance and then presented using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. Lastly, we studied the ideal observer under both signal-known-exactly conditions and in the presence of unknowns such as object orientation and absolute count-rate variability; when these additional sources of randomness were present, their incorporation into the observer yielded superior performance.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Arms Reduction Treaties and Attribute Measurement [Slides]

This set of slides provides an overview of the drivers and current state of technology for arms control treaty verification systems. This overview includes the definitions of “authentication,” “certification,” “attribute,” “template,” and “information barrier” as well as a discussion of first, second and third generation attribute measurement systems. We include examples of U.S./Russian interactions and conclude with discussion of the concepts of joint design and random selection.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Reductions without Regret: Avoiding Wrong Turns, Roach Motels, and Box Canyons

This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead: Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61: and A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead. Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances ₋ a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons ₋ we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NSO News October 2013

In this month’s newsletter, we have chosen to highlight some of the Russian responses to President Obama’s Berlin speech. These responses have been only lightly covered in the US press, but illustrate some of the challenges that the United States will face in future nuclear weapons arms control treaties and negotiations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Performance Evaluation of State-of-the-Art Commercial UWB RFID Systems for Chain of Custody Process

On demand and real time monitoring and tracking of the stated condition of a nuclear warhead and its components through the dismantlement and disposition process from the point of entry to the point of exit using radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags is a powerful technology for improving chain of custody process. The chain of custody process for on-demand and real-time monitoring may significantly be improved by the use of RFID tags in terms of maintaining the continuity of knowledge for weapons and their components. In addition to tracking of the stated condition of a nuclear warhead and its components through the dismantlement and disposition process from the point of entry to the point of exit may also be aided by use of RFID tags. Most of the commercially available RFID tags use narrowband signaling to communicate with their readers. RFID systems that use narrowband signaling for tag-reader communications face a myriad of technical challenges related to the physical properties and the propagation characteristics of continuous wave RF signals. Although there are no passive UWB RF tags available in the market at this time, several active UWB RFID systems are available in the market that have shown promise for their high performance around metallic objects and accurate positioning capabilities. In this paper, we present the results of LLNL’s performance benchmarking of the state-of-the-art commercial “active” UWB RFID systems for their possible use in arms control applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Request for Planning Funds for a Research and Study Abroad Facility in Geneva, Switzerland in Affiliation with the European Laboratory for Particle Physics

To create a research and study abroad program that would allow U.S. undergraduate students access to the world-leading research facilities at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), the World Health Organization, various operations of the United Nations and other international organizations based in Geneva.The proposal is based on the unique opportunities currently existing in Geneva. The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is now operational at CERN, data are being collected, and research results are already beginning to emerge. At the same time, a related reduction of activity at U.S. facilities devoted to particle physics is expected. In addition, the U.S. higher-education community has an ever-increasing focus on international organizations dealing with world health pandemics, arms control and human rights, a nexus also centered in Geneva.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Results from laboratory tests of the two-dimensional Time-Encoded Imaging System.

A series of laboratory experiments were undertaken to demonstrate the feasibility of two dimensional time-encoded imaging. A prototype two-dimensional time encoded imaging system was designed and constructed. Results from imaging measurements of single and multiple point sources as well as extended source distributions are presented. Time encoded imaging has proven to be a simple method for achieving high resolution two-dimensional imaging with potential to be used in future arms control and treaty verification applications.

Marleau, Peter↗

The feasibility of mobile computing for on-site inspection.

With over 5 billion cellphones in a world of 7 billion inhabitants, mobile phones are the most quickly adopted consumer technology in the history of the world. Miniaturized, power-efficient sensors, especially video-capable cameras, are becoming extremely widespread, especially when one factors in wearable technology like Apple s Pebble, GoPro video systems, Google Glass, and lifeloggers. Tablet computers are becoming more common, lighter weight, and power-efficient. In this report the authors explore recent developments in mobile computing and their potential application to on-site inspection for arms control verification and treaty compliance determination. We examine how such technology can effectively be applied to current and potential future inspection regimes. Use cases are given for both host-escort and inspection teams. The results of field trials and their implications for on-site inspections are discussed.

Horak, Karl Emanuel↗

Quantitative adaptation analytics for assessing dynamic systems of systems: LDRD Final Report

Our society is increasingly reliant on systems and interoperating collections of systems, known as systems of systems (SoS). These SoS are often subject to changing missions (e.g., nation- building, arms-control treaties), threats (e.g., asymmetric warfare, terrorism), natural environments (e.g., climate, weather, natural disasters) and budgets. How well can SoS adapt to these types of dynamic conditions? This report details the results of a three year Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project aimed at developing metrics and methodologies for quantifying the adaptability of systems and SoS. Work products include: derivation of a set of adaptability metrics, a method for combining the metrics into a system of systems adaptability index (SoSAI) used to compare adaptability of SoS designs, development of a prototype dynamic SoS (proto-dSoS) simulation environment which provides the ability to investigate the validity of the adaptability metric set, and two test cases that evaluate the usefulness of a subset of the adaptability metrics and SoSAI for distinguishing good from poor adaptability in a SoS. Intellectual property results include three patents pending: A Method For Quantifying Relative System Adaptability, Method for Evaluating System Performance, and A Method for Determining Systems Re-Tasking.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy for Non-Destructive Assay of Nuclear Materials

This project addresses the need for improved non-destructive assay techniques for quantifying the actinide composition of spent nuclear fuel and for the independent verification of declared quantities of special nuclear materials at key stages of the fuel cycle. High-energy delayed gamma-ray spectroscopy following neutron irradiation is a potential technique for directly assaying spent fuel assemblies and achieving the safeguards goal of quantifying nuclear material inventories for spent fuel handling, interim storage, reprocessing facilities, repository sites, and final disposal. Other potential applications include determination of MOX fuel composition, characterization of nuclear waste packages, and challenges in homeland security and arms control verification.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

US public perspectives on security

We report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2011 on public assessments of contemporary and emerging interstate nuclear threats, support for strategic arms control, and preferences for responding to limited nuclear attacks on the United States. Additionally, we analyze public views of the threat of terrorism, including cyber attacks, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and preferences for responding to an act of radiological terrorism against the United States. Also, we report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2011 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public views on energy requirements, preferences for energy sources, energy conservation versus development, energy independence, implications of events at Fukushima, Japan, for US public support of nuclear generation, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and trust in nuclear risk assessments from government and other public sources. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Data Mining Techniques to Estimate Plutonium, Initial Enrichment, Burnup, and Cooling Time in Spent Fuel Assemblies

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored a multi-laboratory, university, international partner collaboration to (1) detect replaced or missing pins from spent fuel assemblies (SFA) to confirm item integrity and deter diversion, (2) determine plutonium mass and related plutonium and uranium fissile mass parameters in SFAs, and (3) verify initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU), and cooling time (CT) of facility declaration for SFAs. A wide variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques were researched to achieve these goals [Veal, 2010 and Humphrey, 2012]. In addition, the project includes two related activities with facility-specific benefits: (1) determination of heat content and (2) determination of reactivity (multiplication). In this research, a subset of 11 integrated NDA techniques was researched using data mining solutions at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for their ability to achieve the above goals.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Data Mining Techniques to Estimate Plutonium, Initial Enrichment, Burnup, and Cooling Time in Spent Fuel Assemblies

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored a multi-laboratory, university, international partner collaboration to (1) detect replaced or missing pins from spent fuel assemblies (SFA) to confirm item integrity and deter diversion, (2) determine plutonium mass and related plutonium and uranium fissile mass parameters in SFAs, and (3) verify initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU), and cooling time (CT) of facility declaration for SFAs. A wide variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques were researched to achieve these goals [Veal, 2010 and Humphrey, 2012]. In addition, the project includes two related activities with facility-specific benefits: (1) determination of heat content and (2) determination of reactivity (multiplication). In this research, a subset of 11 integrated NDA techniques was researched using data mining solutions at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for their ability to achieve the above goals.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Proliferation Persuasion. Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology

Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits? My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the United States. By clarifying when countries are able to leverage steps towards the bomb for international political gain, my work advances our understanding of proliferation and coercive diplomacy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Crystal Compton Camera

Stand-off detection is one of the most important radiation detection capabilities for arms control and the control of illicit nuclear materials. For long range passive detection one requires a large detector and a means of “seeing through” the naturally occurring and varying background radiation, i.e. imaging. Arguably, Compton imaging is the best approach over much of the emission band suitable for long range detection. It provides not only imaging, but more information about the direction of incidence of each detected gamma-ray than the alternate approach of coded-aperture imaging. The directional information allows one to reduce the background and hence improve the sensitivity of a measurement. However, to make an efficient Compton imager requires localizing and measuring the simultaneous energy depositions when gamma-rays Compton scatter and are subsequently captured within a single, large detector volume. This concept has been demonstrated in semi-conductor detectors (HPGe, CZT, Si) but at ~ $1k/cm 3 these materials are too expensive to build the large systems needed for standoff detection. Scintillator detectors, such as NaI(Tl), are two orders of magnitude less expensive and possess the energy resolution required to make such an imager. However, they do not currently have the ability to localize closely spaced, simultaneous energy depositions in a single large crystal. In this project we are applying a new technique that should, for the first time ever, allow cubic-millimeter event localization in a bulk scintillator crystal.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗