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The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) for Extreme Fast Charging (XFC) Infrastructure (BA-1359) is responsible for gathering data from multiple sources to monitor the safety and security properties (cyber and physical) of multiple XFC. The data is processed and analyzed by software running on the SIS Core and SIS Aggregator systems.
With the current transition from analog to digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants, the number and variety of software-based systems have significantly increased. The sophisticated nature and increasing complexity of software raises trust in these systems as a significant challenge. The trust placed in a software system is typically termed software dependability. Software dependability analysis faces uncommon challenges since software systems’ characteristics differ from those of hardware systems. The lack of systematic science-based methods for quantifying the dependability attributes in software-based instrumentation as well as control systems in safety critical applications has proved itself to be a significant inhibitor to the expanded use of modern digital technology in the nuclear industry. Dependability refers to the ability of a system to deliver a service that can be trusted. Dependability is commonly considered as a general concept that encompasses different attributes, e.g., reliability, safety, security, availability and maintainability. Dependability research has progressed significantly over the last few decades. For example, various assessment models and/or design approaches have been proposed for software reliability, software availability and software maintainability. Advances have also been made to integrate multiple dependability attributes, e.g., integrating security with other dependability attributes, measuring availability and maintainability, modeling reliability and availability, quantifying reliability and security, exploring the dependencies between security and safety and developing integrated analysis models. However, there is still a lack of understanding of the dependencies between various dependability attributes as a whole and of how such dependencies are formed. To address the need for quantification and give a more objective basis to the review process -- therefore reducing regulatory uncertainty -- measures and methods are needed to assess dependability attributes early on, as well as throughout the life-cycle process of software development. In this research, extensive expert opinion elicitation is used to identify the measures and methods for assessing software dependability. Semi-structured questionnaires were designed to elicit expert knowledge. A new notation system, Causal Mechanism Graphing, was developed to extract and represent such knowledge. The Causal Mechanism Graphs were merged, thus, obtaining the consensus knowledge shared by the domain experts. In this report, we focus on how software contributes to dependability. However, software dependability is not discussed separately from the context of systems or socio-technical systems. Specifically, this report focuses on software dependability, reliability, safety, security, availability, and maintainability. Our research was conducted in the sequence of stages found below. Each stage is further examined in its corresponding chapter. Stage 1 (Chapter 2): Elicitation of causal maps describing the dependencies between dependability attributes. These causal maps were constructed using expert opinion elicitation. This chapter describes the expert opinion elicitation process, the questionnaire design, the causal map construction method and the causal maps obtained. Stage 2 (Chapter 3): Elicitation of the causal map describing the occurrence of the event of interest for each dependability attribute. The causal mechanisms for the “event of interest” were extracted for each of the software dependability attributes. The “event of interest” for a dependability attribute is generally considered to be the “attribute failure”, e.g. security failure. The extraction was based on the analysis of expert elicitation results obtained in Stage 1. Stage 3 (Chapter 4): Identification of relevant measurements. Measures for the “events of interest” and their causal mechanisms were obtained from expert opinion elicitation for each of the software dependability attributes. The measures extracted are presented in this chapter. Stage 4 (Chapter 5): Assessment of the coverage of the causal maps via measures. Coverage was assessed to determine whether the measures obtained were sufficient to quantify software dependability, and what measures are further required. Stage 5 (Chapter 6): Identification of “missing” measures and measurement approaches for concepts not covered. New measures, for concepts that had not been covered sufficiently as determined in Stage 4, were identified using supplementary expert opinion elicitation as well as literature reviews. Stage 6 (Chapter 7): Building of a detailed quantification model based on the causal maps and measurements obtained. Ability to derive such a quantification model shows that the causal models and measurements derived from the previous stages (Stage 1 to Stage 5) can form the technical basis for developing dependability quantification models. Scope restrictions have led us to prioritize this demonstration effort. The demonstration was focused on a critical system, i.e. the reactor protection system. For this system, a ranking of the software dependability attributes by nuclear stakeholders was developed. As expected for this application, the stakeholder ranking identified safety as the most critical attribute to be quantified. A safety quantification model limited to the requirements phase of development was built. Two case studies were conducted for verification. A preliminary control gate for software safety for the requirements stage was proposed and applied to the first case study. The control gate allows a cost effective selection of the duration of the requirements phase.
Amid growing concerns over foreign manufacturing for components and devices deployed in critical energy infrastructure, this research from the national labs will highlight best practices for developing and maintaining a supply chain security program. Tools for asset inventory, tips for developing and maintaining software- and hardware-bills-of-materials (SBOMs and HBOMs), recommended contractual language for vendor agreements, and identification of responsibilities will be shared. We discuss the one-time requirements to enable a successful supply chain security program and the best ways to operationalize this program for maximum impact, including development of robust practices for vulnerability tracking, patch management, and workarounds, with understanding of the reliability and uptime requirements for utilities. The recommendations shared are based on a cyber-informed engineering approach to identification of high-consequence impacts and the engineering controls related to supply chain management that can best mitigate these impacts. This approach allows for prioritization of resources. Additionally, we highlight relative up-front and ongoing costs associated with recommended controls. Viewers will leave with an understanding what a supply chain security program is, and what steps, prioritized for resource-constrained organizations, can build a robust program.
High performance computing environments are often used for a wide variety of workloads ranging from simulation, data transformation and analysis, and complex workflows to name just a few. These systems may process data at various security levels but in so doing are often enclaved at the highest security posture. This approach places significant restrictions on the users of the system even when processing data at a lower security level and exposes data at higher levels of confidentiality to a much broader population than otherwise necessary. The traditional approach of isolation, while effective in establishing security enclaves poses significant challenges for the use of shared infrastructure in HPC environments. This report details current state-of-the-art in virtualization, reconfigurable network enclaving via Software Defined Networking (SDN), and storage architectures and bridging techniques for creating secure enclaves in HPC environments.
The US Department of Energy Office of Science and the National Nuclear Security Administration initiated the Exascale Computing Project (ECP) in 2016 to prepare mission-relevant applications and scientific software for the delivery of the exascale computers starting in 2023. The ECP currently supports 24 efforts directed at specific applications and six supporting co-design projects. These 24 application projects contain 62 application codes that are implemented in three high-level languages—C, C++, and Fortran—and use 22 combinations of graphical processing unit programming models. The most common implementation language is C++, which is used in 53 different application codes. The most common programming models across ECP applications are CUDA and Kokkos, which are employed in 15 and 14 applications, respectively. This article provides a survey of the programming languages and models used in the ECP applications codebase that will be used to achieve performance on the future exascale hardware platforms.
Just like rover or rocket technology sent into space, the software that controls these technologies must be extensively tested to ensure reliability and effectiveness. Ames Research Center invented the open-source Java Pathfinder (JPF) toolset for the deep testing of Java-based programs. Fujitsu Labs of America Inc., based in Sunnyvale, California, improved the capabilities of the JPF Symbolic Pathfinder tool, establishing the tool as a means of thoroughly testing the functionality and security of Web-based Java applications such as those used for Internet shopping and banking.
SAND2024-08475O The Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Cybersecurity Detection and Response Suite is a solution for distributed energy resource (DER) systems. The DER Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) solution that uses alerts from signature- and behavior-based Intrusion Detection Systems are intended to be deployed as bump-in-the-wire (BITW) devices in front of DER equipment. The fielded application would use multiple intrusion detection systems that report data to SOAR to respond to cyberattacks. The suite consists of two software components: • The proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) secures grid-edge photovoltaic smart inverters and other equipment in distributed energy resource systems. It is a distributed BITW solution; cyber and physical data are automatically processed using network inspection tools and custom machine learning algorithms to detect abnormal events and correlate cyber-physical events. • The Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response for Distributed Energy Resources (SOAR4DER) application ingests data from several intrusion detection systems to quickly block attacks and revert DER systems to good states. Using a collection of intrusion detection system technologies on a BITW device, it incorporates physical and cyber data to detect abnormal and potential malicious behaviors. Multiple SOAR playbooks then use the intrusion detection system data streams to automatically defend the system. SOAR4DER system testing showed detection and response times under 30 seconds for all adversary reconnaissance, denial-of-service attacks, malicious Modbus commands, brute-force logins, and machine-in-the-middle attacks. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.
ModuleOT is an open hardware security platform which provides all features necessary for securing remote energy resources. The platform consists of a physical bump in-the wire device which runs a custom-built application built with Go and Python and leverages AES-NI Instruction set available on modern hardware for cryptographic acceleration. By combining these features, ModuleOT acts as an all-in-one low-cost solution to enable cryptographically secured communications to any critical remote servers or devices. Because the software application has been built using Golang, this source can be easily compiled for different hardware platforms. The module is designed to provide the following core features: (1) encrypted communications across an untrusted network, (2) certificate-based authentication with secure storage, (3) hardware cryptographic acceleration, (4) IP-based whitelisting, (5) local firewall management, and (6) legacy (RS485) device support.
Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.
Quantum networks development is crucial to realizing a production-grade network that can support distributed sensing, secure communication, and utility-scale quantum computation. However, the transition from laboratory demonstration to deployable networks requires software implementations of architectures and protocols tailored to the unique constraints of quantum systems. This paper reviews the current state of software implementations for quantum networks, organized around a three-plane abstraction of infrastructure, logical, and control/service planes. We cover software for both designing quantum network protocols (e.g., SeQUeNCe, QuISP, and NetSquid) and operating testbeds, with a focus on essential control/service plane functions such as entanglement, topology, and resource management, in a proposed taxonomy. Our review highlights a persistent gap between theoretical architecture and protocol proposals and their realization in simulators or testbeds, particularly in dynamic topology and network management. We conclude by outlining open challenges and proposing a roadmap for developing scalable software architectures to enable hybrid, large-scale quantum networks.
High performance computing environments are often used for a wide variety of workloads ranging from simulation, data transformation and analysis, and complex workflows to name just a few. These systems may process data at various security levels but in so doing are often enclaved at the highest security posture. This approach places significant restrictions on the users of the system even when processing data at a lower security level and exposes data at higher levels of confidentiality to a much broader population than otherwise necessary. The traditional approach of isolation, while effective in establishing security enclaves poses significant challenges for the use of shared infrastructure in HPC environments. This report details current state-of-the-art in reconfigurable network enclaving through Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and their applicability to secure enclaves in HPC environments. SDN and NFV methods are based on a solid foundation of system wide virtualization. The purpose of which is very straight forward, the system administrator can deploy networks that are more amenable to customer needs, and at the same time achieve increased scalability making it easier to increase overall capacity as needed without negatively affecting functionality. The network administration of both the server system and the virtual sub-systems is simplified allowing control of the infrastructure through well-defined APIs (Application Programming Interface). While SDN and NFV technologies offer significant promise in meeting these goals, they also provide the ability to address a significant component of the multi-tenant challenge in HPC environments, namely resource isolation. Traditional HPC systems are built upon scalable high-performance networking technologies designed to meet specific application requirements. Dynamic isolation of resources within these environments has remained difficult to achieve. SDN and NFV methodology provide us with relevant concepts and available open standards based APIs that isolate compute and storage resources within an otherwise common networking infrastructure. Additionally, the integration of the networking APIs within larger system frameworks such as OpenStack provide the tools necessary to establish isolated enclaves dynamically allowing the benefits of HPC while providing a controlled security structure surrounding these systems.
In a rapidly changing world, wildlife ecologists strive to correctly model and predict complex relationships between animals and their environment, which facilitates management decisions impacting public policy to conserve and protect delicate ecosystems. Recent advances in monitoring systems span scientific domains, including animal and weather monitoring devices and landscape classification mapping techniques. The current challenge is how to combine and use detailed output from various sources to address questions spanning multiple disciplines. WolfScout wildlife and weather tracking system is a software tool capable of filling this niche. WolfScout automates integration of the latest technological advances in wildlife GPS collars, weather stations, drought conditions, and severe weather reports, and animal demographic information. The WolfScout database stores a variety of classified landscape maps including natural and manmade features. Additionally, WolfScout’s spatial database management system allows users to calculate distances between animals’ location and landscape characteristics, which are linked to the best approximation of environmental conditions at the animal’s location during the interaction. Through a secure website, data are exported in formats compatible with multiple software programs including R and ArcGIS. The WolfScout design promotes interoperability in data, between researchers, and software applications while standardizing analyses of animal interactions with their environment.
Network design goals are often functional with little consideration for security. Growth and maintenance of critical infrastructure mission-focused networks can be ad hoc and preclude large-scale technology replacements, reconfigurations, or even patching. These restrictions are contributing factors to increased vulnerabilities. Over 90% of all attacks begin with phishing and include lateral movement (Frinke 2019). Adopting a software-defined networking (SDN) approach is an effective mitigation strategy for many existing vulnerabilities. SDNs deny-by-default approach to networking restricts an adversary’s freedom of movement without impacting an organization’s mission. SDN implementations require a process that identifies an organization’s mission-specific network communications. A well-defined traffic engineering process ensures that only known devices communicate with each other on specific ports.
The United States (U.S.) is no longer the unambiguous leader in the vitally important field of high performance computing (HPC). Japan, the European Union (EU), and China have fielded systems that are on par with our fastest supercomputers. The supply chain for everything from semiconductors to scientific software is globally distributed. Yet our economic future and security depend critically on our ability to innovate faster than our competitors, and the speed of innovation depends increasingly on large-scale computational science and engineering and thus HPC. How should the United States respond to this challenge? This report seeks to initiate a new and potentially transformative national discussion on this vital question. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program is well-positioned to make informed, targeted decisions about where the United States should cooperate and where it should compete in the global market for scientific exploration and discovery. By setting its sights on problems critical to our nation and the world, by establishing productive new collaborations, and by making strategic investments, ASCR can restore and maintain U.S. scientific leadership in the critical areas described in this report while strengthening our research infrastructure and training a large, diverse cohort of scientists. In doing so, ASCR and its scientists will pave the way for a secure and prosperous future for America. For more than 30 years, the ASCR program has provided the HPC and networking capabilities and expertise needed to support DOE’s mission to advance the national, economic, and energy security of the United States. The program now faces the challenge of developing and deploying the next generation of HPC systems and technologies, as well as supporting the application of HPC and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to a wide range of scientific and engineering research problems. Through its research and development efforts, the ASCR program must also advance the state of the art in HPC and accelerate the pace of scientific discovery and technological innovation. Fulfilling this promise will require significantly increased investments, as well as innovative policies and programs. This subcommittee is aware that we are making recommendations and calls for action at a time when federal resources are limited. We understand that a wide range of competing priorities must be balanced by the nation’s leaders and that there is a need to leverage resources in new ways and seek efficiencies in facilities and operations. However, we must not let these realities limit our imagination or silence our advocacy. The ASCR program is a key part of the U.S. research infrastructure and an important component of economic growth and U.S. competitiveness. ASCR has a responsibility to pursue its mission, including advanced scientific computing, applications of AI technologies, and the required advanced research facilities, with determination and enthusiasm. To fulfill the scientific enterprise’s responsibility to the nation, the ASCR program must not only develop and publish a clear vision with an associated list of goals, priorities, and recommendations but also demonstrate scientific leadership by consistently securing long-term funding. This will allow the program to build on its achievements to date, to realize its ambitious vision, and to make lasting contributions to the field.
Enterprise Business Information Services Division (EBIS) supports the Laboratory and its functions through the implementation and support of business information systems on behalf of its business community. EBIS Five Strategic Focus Areas: (1) Improve project estimating, planning and delivery capability (2) Improve maintainability and sustainability of EBIS Application Portfolio (3) Leap forward in IT Leadership (4) Comprehensive Talent Management (5) Continuous IT Security Program. Portfolio Management is a strategy in which software applications are managed as assets
Ada has the potential to be a part of the most significant change in software engineering technology within NASA in the last twenty years. Thus, it is particularly important that all NASA centers be aware of Ada experience and plans at other centers. Ada activity across NASA are covered, with presenters representing five of the nine major NASA centers and the Space Station Freedom Program Office. Projects discussed included - Space Station Freedom Program Office: the implications of Ada on training, reuse, management and the software support environment; Johnson Space Center (JSC): early experience with the use of Ada, software engineering and Ada training and the evaluation of Ada compilers; Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC): university research with Ada and the application of Ada to Space Station Freedom, the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle, the Aero-Assist Flight Experiment and the Secure Shuttle Data System; Lewis Research Center (LeRC): the evolution of Ada software to support the Space Station Power Management and Distribution System; Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL): the creation of a centralized Ada development laboratory and current applications of Ada including the Real-time Weather Processor for the FAA; and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC): experiences with Ada in the Flight Dynamics Division and the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (EUVE) project and the implications of GSFC experience for Ada use in NASA. Despite the diversity of the presentations, several common themes emerged from the program: Methodology - NASA experience in general indicates that the effective use of Ada requires modern software engineering methodologies; Training - It is the software engineering principles and methods that surround Ada, rather than Ada itself, which requires the major training effort; Reuse - Due to training and transition costs, the use of Ada may initially actually decrease productivity, as was clearly found at GSFC; and real-time work at LeRC, JPL and GSFC shows that it is possible to use Ada for real-time applications.
Cyber Testing for Resilient Industrial Control Systems™ (CyTRICS™) is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) program for cybersecurity vulnerability testing, digital subcomponent enumeration, and forensic assessment. CyTRICS leverages best-in-class test facilities and analytic capabilities at six DOE National Laboratories and strategic partnerships with key stakeholders including technology developers, manufacturers, asset owners and operators, and interagency partners. During the program’s development, CyTRICS established a unique methodology for prioritizing digital components within operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in the Energy Sector Industrial Base (ESIB) for cyber vulnerability testing. The CyTRICS Prioritization Process leverages multiple characteristics of systems, components, and their contextual deployment to calculate a quantification of individual digital components for CyTRICS testing. The initial version of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process was premised largely upon the impact which could result to an industrial control system if the digital component under testing was compromised, either through malicious means, faulty engineering, or other modes. The worldwide compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform, first reported in December 2020, through malicious interference with the digital patching cycle was a watershed event in cyber supply chain security. The SolarWinds compromised demonstrated the strategic importance of certain types of ubiquitous software, and the ability to generate widespread cybersecurity effects. To address this challenge and as a part of the Department of Energy’s response to the SolarWinds compromise, DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) directed the National Laboratories to evolve the CyTRICS Prioritization Process methodology to encompass additional factors related to the strategic importance of digital components. CESER directed CyTRICS researchers to identify, characterize, and append strategic factors to the CyTRICS Prioritization Process to provide additional weight to these characteristics. National Laboratory expert researchers identified functionality, distribution, and platform characteristics for digital components in ICS and OT that they assessed would be likely targeted in strategic initial-access cyber attack. CyTRICS has termed these factors “ICS Beachhead Systems,” leveraging a definition first advanced by Schneider Electric, which is intended as a blanket term to encompass digital components, products, and systems in OT. This paper describes the ICS Beachhead Systems identified and the rationale for inclusion. As a next step in the research and refinement process, the National Laboratories will validate this initial set of characteristics against digital components evaluated by the CyTRICS program and current implementation of the CyTRICS Prioritization Process. After validation, CyTRICS researchers will then develop a scoring methodology to generate a quantitative score to assess the degree to which a digital component is characterized as an ICS Beachhead System. Finally, the National Laboratories will append this scoring to the existing CyTRICS Prioritization Process algorithm.
The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is working towards the goal of developing and demonstrating the next generation of nuclear materials management for the peaceful use of civilian nuclear energy. A major milestone of the campaign is the “Lab-scale demonstration of an advanced safeguards and security system,” due in 2020. This implementation plan describes how tools developed in the MPACT campaign will be used to meet this milestone. These tools consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modelling, simulation and integration of data and information for safeguard and security analysis. The plan is focused on demonstrating an advanced safeguard and security systems for electrochemical processing plants, but also identifies activities needed to address advanced reactor, aqueous processing and other advanced fuel cycle facilities. A key component to achieving the 2020 milestone is the development of a virtual distributed test bed that incorporates the instruments, data, analysis tools, and models currently under development and provides a framework to link and normalize the data in a way that simulates a facility, including uncertainty quantification. This virtual distributed test bed will integrate computer simulated facilities that make up a fuel cycle of interest, with distributed test beds located in actual operating facilities and laboratories. The MPACT campaign recently issued roadmaps for both Modelling & Simulation and Advanced Integration which address this component, and activities necessary to achieve the 2020 milestone. Research, development and testing of specific technologies have been supported by the MPACT campaign in coordination with other DOE-NE and DOE-NNSA programs. These technologies provide the essential data needed by the safeguard and security systems, and feed into the data analysis and facility models. This plan will identify these technologies, their current status and activities needed to demonstrate the technologies at the laboratory scale. Wherever possible, test of technologies in field conditions using suitable nuclear materials will be used to define performance. Where necessary, surrogate materials and/or simulation will be used to provide useful information for the demonstration. When completed, the 2020 milestone will provide a demonstration of advanced safeguard and security technologies, including advanced modelling, simulation and analysis approaches, applied to electrochemical processing. It will also identify applications of the technology and approaches in other advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts.