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National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiation Anomaly Detection Algorithms for Field-Acquired Gamma Energy Spectra

The Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) is developing a tactical, networked radiation detection system that will be agile, reconfigurable, and capable of rapid threat assessment with a high degree of fidelity and certainty. Our design is driven by the needs of users such as law enforcement personnel who must make decisions by evaluating threat signatures in urban settings. The most efficient tool available to identify the nature of the threat object is real-time gamma spectroscopic analysis, as it is fast and has a very low probability of producing false positive alarm conditions. Urban radiological searches are inherently challenged by the rapid and large spatial variation of background gamma radiation, the presence of benign radioactive materials in terms of the normally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), and shielded and/or masked threat sources. Multiple spectral anomaly detection algorithms have been developed by national laboratories and commercial vendors. For example, the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) a one-dimensional deterministic radiation transport software capable of calculating gamma ray spectra using physics-based detector response functions, was developed at Sandia National Laboratories. The nuisance-rejection spectral comparison ratio anomaly detection algorithm (or N-SCRAD), developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, uses spectral comparison ratios to detect deviation from benign medical and NORM radiation source and can work in spite of strong presence of NORM and or medical sources. RSL has developed its own wavelet-based gamma energy spectral anomaly detection algorithm called WAVRAD. Test results and relative merits of these different algorithms will be discussed and demonstrated.

networked sensor, gamma spectroscopy, false alarm ↗

Investigation of Shielding Material in Radioactive Waste Management - 13009

In this study, various waste packages have been prepared by using different materials. Experimental work has been performed on radiation shielding for gamma and neutron radiation. Various materials were evaluated (e.g. concrete, boron, etc.) related to different application areas in radioactive waste management. Effects of addition boric compound mixtures on shielding properties of concrete have been investigated for neutron radiation. The effect of the mixture addition on the shielding properties of concrete was investigated. The results show that negative effects of boric compounds on the strength of concrete decreasing by increasing boric amounts. Shielding efficiency of prepared mixture added concrete up to 80% better than ordinary concretes for neutron radiation. The attenuation was determined theoretically by calculation and practically by using neutron dose rate measurements. In addition of dose rate measurements, strength tests were applied on test shielding materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A GREEN'S FUNCTION APPROACH FOR DETERMINING DOSE RATES FOR SMALL GRAM QUANTITIES IN SHIPPING PACKAGINGS

The Small Gram Quantity (SGQ) concept is based on the understanding that small amounts of hazardous materials, in this case radioactive materials (RAM), are significantly less hazardous than large amounts of the same materials. This paper describes a methodology designed to estimate an SGQ for several neutron and gamma emitting isotopes that can be shipped in a package in compliance with 10 CFR Part 71 external radiation level limits regulations. The neutron and photon sources were calculated using both ORIGEN-S and RASTA. The response from a unit source in each neutron and photon group was calculated using MCNP5 with each unshielded and shielded container configuration. Effects of self-shielding on both neutron and photon response were evaluated by including either plutonium oxide or iron in the source region for the case with no shielded container. For the cases of actinides mixed with light elements, beryllium is the bounding light element. The added beryllium (10 to 90 percent of the actinide mass) in the cases studied represents between 9 and 47 percent concentration of the total mixture mass. For beryllium concentrations larger than 50 percent, the increase in the neutron source term and dose rate tend to increase at a much lower rate than at concentrations lower than 50%. The intimately mixed actinide-beryllium form used in these models is very conservative and thus the limits presented in this report are practical bounds on the mass that can be safely shipped. The calculated dose rate from one gram of each isotope was then used to determin the maximum amount of a single isotope that could be shipped in the Model 9977 Package (or packagings having the same or larger external dimensions as well as similar structural materials) and have the external radiation level within the regulatory dose limits at the surface of the package. The estimates of the mass limits presented would also serve as conservative limits for both the Models 9975 and 9978 packages. If a package contains a mixture of isotopes, the acceptability for shipment can be determined by a sum of fractions approach. It should be noted that the SGQ masses presented in this report represent limits that would comply with the external radiation limits under 10CFR Part 71. They do not necessarily bound lower limits that may be required to comply with other factors such as heat load of the package.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

ILLICIT TRANSIT INTERDICTION GLOBAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to enhance the security of radioactive materials during transport by analyzing commonalities in cargo thefts conducted by non-state groups such as thieves and terrorists. This research focuses on identifying patterns and trends in the methods used to steal high-value cargo, with the goal of applying these insights to improve transport security of radioactive materials. Key questions addressed include the frequency of specific tools, techniques, and insider involvement in thefts, as well as the use of weapons, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized tools. Findings will inform security design improvements and industry practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. The study involves a comprehensive review of literature and case studies, utilizing data sources from 2018 to 2023. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to thefts of valuable cargo in transit, with a focus on incidents involving non-state actors. The methodology will include statistical and inferential analysis to identify trends, with results visualized through pie charts, frequency analyses, and terrain maps. The discussion will highlight the implications of findings and provide actionable recommendations for strengthening security measures. Limitations such as data availability and reporting inconsistencies will be acknowledged. Suggestions for future improvements will be constructed using existing case studies and expert feedback. The study’s outcomes aim to raise awareness within the industry, inform policy decisions, and enhance security protocols for radioactive material transport. Metrics for impact include the potential publication of findings, presentations at conferences to raise awareness, and the subsequent actions taken by stakeholders based on the research. By identifying trends and vulnerabilities and suggesting improvements, this research contributes to preventing the illicit use of nuclear and radiological materials.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

MO-AB-201-00: Radiation Safety Officer Update

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Preliminary Study on Recycling and Reuse of Metals from Decommissioning in Construction of Disposal Vaults in Slovakia - 17217

The decommissioning of nuclear installations represents a complex process resulting in the generation of large amounts of various waste materials. Majority of them are non-contaminated, however some of them may be hazardous as well (e.g. chemicals, asbestos, oil products, etc.). During decommissioning of NPP, significant quantities of materials with various levels of radionuclides concentration arise as well. All of these materials should be managed appropriately keeping in mind safety principles, legislative requirements, lessons learned and other relevant factors. Therefore, selection of an appropriate strategy for management of the materials arising from decommissioning is crucial and strongly influences the overall effectiveness of decommissioning process. In line with international incentives for optimization of radioactive material management, concepts of recycling and reuse of slightly radioactive materials are widely discussed and applications of these concepts are analyzed. Therefore, the paper is devoted to the preliminary study of potential for recycling of re-melted metals from decommissioning in form of reinforcement bars or mesh used in the construction of ferro-concrete disposal vaults within the near surface repository. The paper presents the preliminary results and discusses the technical and non-technical aspects related to the recycling scenario. Moreover, comparison of various scenarios related to the scrap metal clearance and recycling within nuclear industry is included. Key findings and lessons learned from study may be useful for the international community dealing with waste management optimization and in particular with recycling of materials within nuclear industry. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Antarctica Radiological Source Removals (Final Report)

On 18 May 2015, the research vessel Akademik Fedorov of the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) delivered four radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) from Antarctica to the port of St. Petersburg, Russia. The RTGs had been previously used in the work program of the former Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE). From the mid-1970s, RTGs have been used to provide autonomous power at geophysical and meteorological stations located in remote regions of Antarctica. The research was completed in the early 1990s, but not all the generators had been removed when the stations were decommissioned. The remaining four unsecured RTGs, with their strontium-90 ( 90 Sr) radiological material and a combined total activity of 80,000 curies (Ci), still posed a potential risk as they could be used for nefarious purposes. Therefore, a plan of action for the removal of the RTGs from Antarctica was developed. This was done within the framework of the international program for the disposal of Russian RTGs. Financial support and technical oversight was provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), while logistical support was provided by the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) and by subsidiaries of the Russian Federation’s Rosatom State Corporation. Recovering and repatriating the RTGs from the continent of Antarctica to the Russian Federation proved to be a very difficult task, including satisfying all the legal aspects within a very tight timeframe. This involved indemnification issues, adhering to new laws enacted after the Soviet Union era, and obtaining all the necessary permits and certifications for transport of the RTGs by air, sea, and land. It was an international, collaborative effort involving the cooperation of multiple organizations to complete the legal work and preparation of necessary documents. In addition, AARI needed to create a separate structure within its organization to manage the process, including the provision of special medical screenings, training, and certifications of its institute personnel. This was done so AARI could fulfill its obligation for the safe handling of radioactive materials while in the field. Recovery of the RTGs required overcoming several logistical hurdles. The Akademik Fedorov, which transported the RTGs back to the Russian Federation, required retrofits to accommodate the RTGs for safe and secure transport of radioactive material. The United States Project Team (USPT) inspected the vessel while it was in dry dock in Turku, Finland, being retrofitted with their design. Special sleds had to be designed to transport RTGs, as well as equipment for identifying crevasses in the glaciers, over the Antarctic packed snow and ice. Provision of adequate fuel supplies for the long trek to the interior of Antarctica to recover one of the RTGs also had to be addressed. With the successful recovery, repatriation, and disassembly of the RTGs, the Radioactive Heat Sources (RHSs) were extracted and dispositioned, thus eliminating any risk of these radioactive sources being used for terrorist purposes. Successful completion of the project also fulfilled the requirements of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty concerning the need to remove unused radioactive materials.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Incorporation of 40 CFR 192 as an ARAR when Implementing MARSSIM (USACE Input to the MARSSIM Committee for MARSSIM Revision 2) - 18526

One example special case for Final Status Surveys (FSSs) occurs at Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) sites at which the radioactive materials are from the processing of uranium or thorium ores for their source material content. At these sites, EPA's Health and Environmental Protection Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings, in 40 CFR 192, are applicable. Also, 40 CFR 192 may be invoked at non-UMTRCA sites through the CERCLA as an Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement (ARAR) due to the presence of radium (Ra)-226 or Ra-228, even though the source of residual radioactive material was not a uranium or thorium mill tailings facility. However, the regulatory requirements in these standards infringe on some of the recommendations in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). Specifically, the soil cleanup standards for Ra-226 or Ra-228 are specified as averages over an area of 100 square meters (m{sup 2}). Note that in the 40 CFR 192 rulemaking, an averaging area of 100 m{sup 2} was used as a reasonable footprint for a home. One goal of the 40 CFR 192 standards was to protect future homes from indoor radon, and the specified averaging area was a component implemented for the protection of health. In addition, 40 CFR 192 is silent regarding elevated measurement criteria (EMC)-type requirements for smaller areas of elevated radioactive material within the 100-m{sup 2} footprint. At UMTRCA sites and CERCLA sites where UMTRCA is an ARAR, the following approach for FSSs is acceptable: - Survey units (SUs) may be classified, as appropriate, and survey activities may be adjusted accordingly for Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 SUs. - Class 1 soil SUs should provide for evaluation of portions that are no greater than 100 m{sup 2} in size, consistent with the 40 CFR 192 standards. - Class 2 and 3 soil SUs are not expected to exceed the 40 CFR 192 soil cleanup standard, so they do not require evaluation of portions that are no greater than 100 m{sup 2} in size. - Compliance with 40 CFR 192 can be demonstrated through analysis of soil samples or composite soil samples from each SU, in conjunction with gamma radiation scanning or in situ gamma radiation measurements of each SU. When appropriate, these gamma radiation scans or in situ measurements correlated to soil sampling may be used in place of soil sampling. - By demonstrating that the average over 100 m{sup 2} meets the 40 CFR 192 soil cleanup standard, the EMC criteria for small elevated areas of activity are not required for the purposes of MARSSIM, but may be developed. These minor modifications to the standard MARSSIM radiological survey approach are acceptable for UMTRCA sites or CERCLA sites where UMTRCA is an ARAR. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Atmospheric {sup 41}Ar Plume Tracking of the UF Training Reactor Using a Large-Volume NaI Detector

The ability to track and monitor gaseous radioactive materials is important in the event of a radioactive release such as from a nuclear power plant accident, weapons testing, or other unintended release scenarios. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is currently in place to monitor for weapons testing and has been used to monitor nuclear power plant accidents. However, only 80 radionuclide stations for the IMS exist in the world and are stationary, limiting the resolution of any radioactive plumes detected. Furthermore, the IMS radionuclide stations are designed to be sensitive specifically to atmospheric radio-xenon and no other radionuclides. Historically, monitoring radioactive releases has been limited to the detection of radio-xenon and radio-krypton, both arising as fission products from nuclear fuel. After the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, scientists were interested in finding the dose the public received from released radioactive material. This was achieved by analyzing radiation monitors in the exhaust stack and filters within the reactor building. furthermore, a series of 20 thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD's), 8 air sampling station positioned around Three Mile Island, and a helicopter survey which used a NaI(Tl) detector array provided data on radionuclides, specifically {sup 137}Cs, that escaped the confines of the reactor building. The TLD's and air sampling stations were stationary, and therefore limited the resolution of the radioactive release plume. The helicopter survey using the NaI detectors was limited by the technology available at the time. The NaI detector array output was compressed from 1024 channels to 256 channels, limiting the energy resolution of the spectral data. The helicopter used a microwave ranging system to establish position. Since this survey was taken in October of 1982, advancements in technology allow spectral data to be saved in its full 1024 channel format and the advent of GPS can give a more accurate account of the detector position. An updated mobile system for tracking a radioactive release would help to alleviate these issues as well as gain the ability to track a radioactive release in real-time. We investigate the feasibility of mobile tracking through study and measurement of the {sup 41}Ar plume released from the University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) research reactor. We use a large-volume NaI(Tl) detector placed on the roof near the reactor. This detector may also be placed and moved on a cart to survey the area surrounding the reactor. We compare the spectral data taken when the reactor is running at full power to the background to analyze the effectiveness of the detector at identifying atmospheric {sup 41}Ar. Finally we discuss the implications of these measurements with regards to validation of plume models and the capability to track releases over a localized area from the source. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Uranium mining and norm, a North American perspective - 15545

All soils and rocks contain naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). Many ores and raw materials contain relatively elevated levels of natural radionuclides and processing such materials can further increase the concentrations of natural radionuclides, sometimes referred to as technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials (TENORM). Examples of NORM minerals include uranium ores, monazite (a source of rare earth minerals), and phosphate rock used to produce phosphate fertilizer. Such activities have the potential to result in above background radiation exposure to workers and the public. Following a brief review of the sources and exposure from NORM in these varied industries, this paper will then present an overview of uranium mining and recovery in North America including discussion on the methods currently being used, production of NORM materials and wastes associated with these uranium recovery methods and the radiological composition of the NORM wastes produced by uranium recovery. The paper includes descriptions of the methods and associated NORM produced by both conventional (underground, open pit) and in situ recovery (ISR) mining methods and identifies the responsible government agencies in the US and Canada assigned the authority to regulate and control these NORM materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Estimating Am-241 activity in the body: comparison of direct measurements and radiochemical analyses

The assessment of dose and ultimately the health risk from intakes of radioactive materials begins with estimating the amount actually taken into the body. An accurate estimate provides the basis to best assess the distribution in the body, the resulting dose, and ultimately the health risk. This study continues the time-honored practice of evaluating the accuracy of results obtained using in vivo measurement methods and techniques. Results from the radiochemical analyses of the 241Am activity content of tissues and organs from four donors to the United States Transuranium and Uranium Registries were compared to the results from direct measurements of radioactive material in the body performed in vivo and post mortem. Two were whole body donations and two were partial body donations The skeleton was the organ with the highest deposition of 241Am activity in all four cases. The activities ranged from 30 Bq to 300 Bq. The skeletal estimates obtained from measurements over the forehead were within 20% of the radiochemistry results in three cases and differed by 78% in one case. The 241Am lung activity estimates ranged from 1 Bq to 30 Bq in the four cases. The results from the direct measurements were within 40% of the radiochemistry results in 3 cases and within a factor of 3 for the other case. The direct measurement estimates of liver activity ranged from 2 Bq to 60 Bq and were generally lower than the radiochemistry results. The results from this study suggest that the measurement methods and calibration techniques used at the In Vivo Radiobioassay and Research Facility to quantify the activity in the lungs, skeleton and liver are reasonable under the most challenging conditions where there is 241Am activity in multiple organs. These methods and techniques are comparable to those used at other Department of Energy sites. This suggests that the current in vivo methods and calibration techniques provide reasonable estimates of radioactive material in the body. Not unexpectedly, there can be significant uncertainty in the estimates especially when activity is also present in other organs.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Risk Based Security Management at Research Reactors

This presentation provides a background of what led to the international emphasis on nuclear security and describes how nuclear security is effectively implemented so as to preserve the societal benefits of nuclear and radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ONSITE TRANSPORTATION AUTHORIZATION CHALLENGES AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Prior to 2008, transfers of radioactive material within the Savannah River Site (SRS) boundary, referred to as onsite transfers, were authorized by Transportation Safety Basis (TSB) documents that only required approval by the SRS contractor. This practice was in accordance with the existing SRS Transportation Safety Document (TSD). In 2008 the Department of Energy Savannah River Field Office (DOE-SR) requested that the SRS TSD be revised to require DOE-SR approval of all Transportation Safety Basis (TSB) documents. As a result, the primary SRS contractor embarked on a multi-year campaign to consolidate old or generate new TSB documents and obtain DOE-SR approval for each. This paper focuses on the challenges incurred during the rewriting or writing of and obtaining DOE-SR approval of all Savannah River Site Onsite Transportation Safety Basis documents.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioactive waste repository when contacted by water provides borates that absorb neutrons

A container holds radioactive material. A sub-criticality controller protects the radioactive material from reaching a criticality from contact with the water. The sub-criticality controller includes a metallic composition having at least one metal component and at least one borate component bonded to the at least one metal component. The metallic composition forms borates when the metallic composition contacts the water.

Xiong, Yongliang↗

Lessons Learned: Tribal Community Engagement, Remediation and Restoration of a Uranium Mine Tailings Site, Navajo Nation - 12484

In May, 2011 New World Environmental Inc. was awarded a contract by the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency to remediate an illegal radioactive waste disposal site located in the Navajo Nation. The initial scope included the excavation and shipment of an estimated 3,000 cubic yards of Uranium mine tailings and associated industrial waste. In this instance Stakeholders were supportive of the project, remediation and restoration, yet the movement of residual radioactive materials through tribal communities was a controversial issue. Other Stakeholder issues included site security, water sources for remediation activities, local residents' temporary re-location and care of livestock, right of way permissions and local workforce development. This presentation recaps the technical and non-technical issues encountered in the remediation and restoration the seven acre site and the outreach to surrounding communities. Cultural and equity issues resulting from historical problems associated with this and other sites in the immediate area and education and training. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Physical Protection of Spent Fuel Shipments: Resolution of Stakeholder Concerns Through Rulemaking - 12284

In 1999, the State of Nevada brought its concerns about physical protection of current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments, and future SNF shipments to a federal repository, before the NRC in a 1999 petition for rulemaking (PRM-73-10). In October 2010, the NRC published a rulemaking decision which would significantly strengthen physical protection of SNF in transit. The newest articulation of the rule (10 CFR 73.37) incorporates regulatory clarifications and security enhancements requested in Nevada's 1999 petition for rulemaking, codifies the findings of the Nuclear NRC and DOE consequence analyses into policy guidance documents and brings forward into regulations the agency and licensee experience gained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although at present DOE SNF shipments would continue to be exempt from these NRC regulations, Nevada considers the rule to constitute a largely satisfactory resolution to stakeholder concerns raised in the original petition and in subsequent comments submitted to the NRC. This paper reviews the process of regulatory changes, assesses the specific improvements contained in the new rules and briefly describes the significance of the new rule in the context of a future national nuclear waste management program. Nevada's petition for rulemaking led to a generally satisfactory resolution of the State's concerns. The decade plus timeframe from petition to rulemaking conclusion saw a sea change in many aspects of the relevant issues - perhaps most importantly the attacks on 9/11 led to the recognition by regulatory bodies that a new threat environment exists wherein shipments of SNF and HLW pose a viable target for human initiated events. The State of Nevada has always considered security a critical concern for the transport of these highly radioactive materials. This was one of the primary reasons for the original rulemaking petition and subsequent advocacy by Nevada on related issues. NRC decisions on the majority of the concerns expressed in the petition, additional developments by other regulatory bodies and the change in how the United States sees threats to the homeland - all of these produced a satisfactory resolution through the rulemaking process. While not all of the concerns expressed by Nevada were addressed in the proposed rule and significant challenges face any programmatic shipment campaign in the future, the lesson learned on this occasion is that stakeholder concerns can be resolved through rulemaking. If DOE would engage with stakeholders on its role in transport of SNF and HLW under the NWPA, these concerns would be better addressed. Specifically the attempts by DOE to resist transportation and security regulations now considered necessary by the NRC for the adequate protection of the shipments of highly radioactive materials, these DOE efforts seem ill advised. One clear lesson learned from this successful rulemaking petition process is that the system of stakeholder input can work to better the regulatory environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Breakdown-prone volume in terahertz wave beams

This study was motivated by the recently proposed concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials by a focused terahertz (THz) radiation [V. L. Granatstein and G. S. Nusinovich, J. Appl. Phys. 108, 063304 (2010)]. According to this concept, a high-power THz radiation should be focused in a small spot where the field intensity exceeds the breakdown threshold. In the presence of free electrons in such a breakdown-prone volume, a THz discharge will occur there. However, this volume should be so small that in the absence of ionizing sources in its vicinity the probability to have there any free electrons is low. Then, the increased breakdown rate in a series of THz pulses would indicate the presence of hidden radioactive materials in the vicinity of the focused spot. For this concept, it is important to accurately determine the breakdown-prone volume created by a focused THz radiation. This problem is analyzed in this paper, first, for the case of a single wave beam and, then, for the case of crossing wave beams of different polarizations. The problem is studied first ignoring the diffraction spread of wave beams in the vicinity of the focal plane and, then, with the account for the diffraction spreading. Then, relations between the THz wave power, the range of such a system and the breakdown-prone volume are analyzed. Finally, the effect of the atmospheric turbulence on propagation and focusing of THz wave beams in air is considered.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗