Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “planetary protection”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 307 records · Page 17
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Keeping the Air Clean and Safe: An Anthrax Smoke Detector

Scientists at work in the Planetary Protection division at NASA s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) sterilize everything before blasting it to the Red Planet. They take great pains to ensure that all spacecraft are void of bacterial life, especially the microscopic bacteria that can live hundreds of years in their spore states. No one is quite sure what Earthly germs would do on Mars, but scientists agree that it is safest to keep the Martian terrain as undisturbed as possible. Errant Earth germs would also render useless the instruments placed on exploration rovers to look for signs of life, as the life that they registered would be life that came with them from Earth. A team at JPL, headed by Dr. Adrian Ponce, developed a bacterial spore-detection system that uses a simple and robust chemical reaction that visually alerts Planetary Protection crews. It is a simple air filter that traps micron-sized bacterial spores and then submits them to the chemical reaction. When the solution is then viewed under an ultraviolet light, the mixture will glow green if it is contaminated by bacteria. Scientists can then return to the scrubbing and cleaning stages of the sterilization process to remove these harmful bacteria. The detection system is the space-bound equivalent of having your hands checked for cleanliness before being allowed to the table; and although intended to keep terrestrial germs from space, this technology has awesome applications here on Mother Earth. The bacterial spore-detection unit can recognize anthrax and other harmful, spore-forming bacteria and alert people of the impending danger. As evidenced in the anthrax mailings of fall 2001 in the United States, the first sign of anthrax exposure was when people experienced flu-like symptoms, which unfortunately, can take as much as a week to develop after contamination. Anthrax cost 5 people their lives and infected 19 others; and the threat of bioterrorism became a routine concern, with new threats popping up nearly everyday. The attacks threatened the safety that so many Americans took for granted, as the very air that people breathed became suspect. Any building with a circulation system, where large groups congregate, was now a potential target.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2019

Analysis of Bioreduction Strategies for a Solid Rocket Motor on an Interplanetary Mission to Europa

The Europa Lander De-Orbit stage braking motor must comply with the Planetary Protection requirements established for a category IV mission. In its mission to Europa, a motor that hasn’t gone through bioreduction environments will carry microbial spores and other biosignature molecules that might jeopardize a mission of astrobiological concern as well as future missions to come. A motor with solid rocket propellant represents exclusive challenges associated to the calculation of high numbers of an encapsulated bioburden hidden behind a nozzle plug. Existing techniques for bioburden reduction are analysed in perspective to motor assembly facilities and the series of events that are involved in manufacturing a solid rocket motor. These techniques include antimicrobial effects of chemical components already present within the motor and bioreduction due to assembly and operational environments induced in the motor. Analysis of the manufacturing process, adhered bioburden and recent investigations into the effectiveness of microbiological techniques in finding inherent antimicrobial properties have generated a step by step outline of Planetary Protection for lander mission associated solid rocket motors.

Velez-Justiniano, Yo-Ann↗
NASA NTRS2018

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Containment Facilities Integrated into a Curation Receiving Laboratory for Restricted Earth Return Missions

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection (PP) Office require sample containment and biohazard testing upon return to Earth. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, this is Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment. In the U.S., the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health houses the primary recommendations, standards, and design requirements for all BSL labs. Past mission concept studies for constructing a NASA Curation Receiving Laboratory with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (USD). As an alternative option, we have conducted a trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a fraction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional BSL-4 construction methods without compromising the preservation of the samples or Earth. For the design/construction requirements of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we used the established HHS document standards and protocols for manipulation of agents in Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSC; i.e., negative pressure gloveboxes) that are currently followed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.

Calaway, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Thinking Inside the Box: A Hands-on Student Activity for Building a Contamination Containment Glovebox to Encourage Problem Solving in a Collaborative Environment

Engineers from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and education experts from the Virginia Space Grant Consortium (VSGC) partnered together to create a hands-on student activity to teach students about problem solving, working in a collaborative environment, and about the unique career fields of contamination control and planetary protection. The activity focuses on contamination containment gloveboxes, which are sealed containers where operators outside the glovebox can safely manipulate hazardous or contamination-sensitive materials inside the glovebox through glove ports on the container. The activity utilizes common household materials and teams of students work together to design and build a glovebox using the materials provided. Once the glovebox has been constructed, students perform a task under a time constraint by using their glovebox to assemble a puzzle “contaminated” with corn starch. In a post-activity debrief, teams discuss lessons learned such as how the actual built glovebox differed from the sketched design, the challenge of managing a budget for materials, how the team dealt with surprises, and if their glovebox allowed enough room for the operator to perform the task. This activity has been part of VSGC’s Virginia Earth System Science Scholars (VESSS) summer academy program for high school students since 2016, and has been an engaging method to teach students teamwork, creativity, hands-on experimentation, communication, and reasoning skills while also teaching them about unique engineering fields such as contamination control and planetary protection.

Student activity↗
NASA NTRS2017

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Facilities for Meeting Restricted Earth Return Containment Requirements

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office require sample containment and biohazard testing in a receiving laboratory as directed by NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8020.12D - ensuring the preservation and protection of Earth and the sample. Currently, NPR 8020.12D classifies Restricted Earth Return for robotic sample return missions from Mars, Europa, and Enceladus with the caveat that future proposed mission locations could be added or restrictions lifted on a case by case basis as scientific knowledge and understanding of biohazards progresses. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 standards and protocols are used to study the most dangerous high-risk diseases and unknown biological agents on Earth. Over 30 BSL-4 facilities have been constructed worldwide with 12 residing in the United States; of theses, 8 are operational. In the last two decades, these brick and mortar facilities have cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars dependent on the facility requirements and size. Previous mission concept studies for constructing a NASA sample receiving facility with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have also been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As an alternative option, we have recently conducted an initial trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a faction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in approximately 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional construction methods without compromising the preservation of the sample or Earth.

Calaway, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Thermal Analysis of Landers using Radioisotope Power Systems on Ice Worlds

The surfaces of Ice Worlds record evidence of interior processes, chemical potential, habitability, and potentially life within the interior. Volatile and organic chemistry at the surface is critical in determining habitability and detecting the presence of past or extant life. Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) could be an enabling technology for in situ missions to ice worlds, providing both power and heat for long durations where solar power would not be feasible. However, it is necessary to understand the potential impact of RPS upon the local environment, to ensure that the rejected heat from RPS does not compromise science measurements or planetary protection requirements. To address these concerns, an RPS Ice World Lander Study was carried out in 2019 to investigate possible requirements on RPS surface mission concepts and approaches to excess heat management. The study focused on two destinations that are representative of the range of potential environments: Europa and Enceladus.Initial analysis showed that, due to the very low pressures on the surfaces of most ice world targets, surface melting does not occur because the water ice does not meet the triple-point. A 4 kW heat source suspended above the surface of Europa or Enceladus would not cause any melting, only sublimation.The study used a surface sublimation limit of 10 cm over a two-year period (the baseline for the recent Europa Lander study). To stay within this limit, Europa, with its relatively warm surface, could tolerate only 10 W/m2 of surface heat flux. Enceladus, with its relatively cold pure ice composition, could tolerate up to 100 W/m2.Various lander and heat shield configurations were analyzed for their heat flux radiated from the RPS to the surface. For a given heat shield configuration, the study team determined the minimum height of the RPS above the surface for which the heat flux would be within the accepted parameters for Europa and for Enceladus. Based on these thermal analyses, such RPS-powered landers could remain compliant with science investigation and planetary protection requirements with only modest mass allocated to spacecraft thermal accommodations.

Perl, Scott↗
NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2

Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.

Rummel, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Using a Blender to Assess the Microbial Density of Encapsulated Organisms

There are specific NASA requirements for source-specific encapsulated microbial density for encapsulated organisms in non-metallic materials. Projects such as the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) that use large volumes of non-metallic materials of planetary protection concern pose a challenge to their bioburden budget. An optimized and adapted destructive hardware technology employing a commercial blender was developed to assess the embedded bioburden of thermal paint for the MSL project. The main objective of this optimization was to blend the painted foil pieces in the smallest sizes possible without excessive heating. The small size increased the surface area of the paint and enabled the release of the maximum number of encapsulated microbes. During a trial run, a piece of foil was placed into a blender for 10 minutes. The outside of the blender was very hot to the touch. Thus, the grinding was reduced to five 2-minute periods with 2-minute cooling periods between cycles. However, almost 20% of the foil fraction was larger (>2 mm). Thus, the largest fractions were then put into the blender and reground, resulting in a 71% increase in particles less than 1 mm in size, and a 76% decrease in particles greater than 2 mm in size. Because a repeatable process had been developed, a painted sample was processed with over 80% of the particles being <2 mm. It was not perceived that the properties (i.e. weight and rubber-like nature) of the painted/foil pieces would allow for a finer size distribution. With these constraints, each section would be ground for a total of 10 minutes with five cycles of a 2-minute pulse followed by a 2-minute pause. It was observed on several occasions that a larger blade affected the recovery of seeded spores by approximately half an order of magnitude. In the standard approach, each piece of painted foil was aseptically removed from the bag and placed onto a sterile tray where they were sized, cut, and cleaned. Each section was then weighed and placed into a sterile Waring Laboratory Blender. Samples were processed on low speed. The ground-up samples were then transferred to a 500-mL bottle using a sterile 1-in. (.2.5-cm) trim brush. To each of the bottles sterile planetary protection rinse solution was added and a modified NASA Standard Assay (NASA HBK 6022) was performed. Both vegetative and spore plates were analyzed.

Benardini, James N.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Teleoperation from Mars Orbit: A proposal for Human Exploration

For a human expedition to Mars, a case can be made that the best strategy for initial exploration is not to actually land the humans on Mars, but to put the humans into Mars orbit and operate on the surface by the technology of teleoperation. This will provide the results of human exploration, but at greatly reduced risk and cost. Teleoperation of Mars surface robots from a Mars-orbital habitat will operation near real time operation with minimum time delay, giving a virtual presence on the surface. By use of teleoperation, it is possible to vastly simplify the surface exploration mission. We now have no need to develop a human-rated Mars Lander and Mars Ascent Vehicle, and we can send geologists & biologists on the mission; not VTOL pilots. It is a cheaper, simpler, and safer way to explore, and hence it will be a faster way to explore. It has the excitement of being there, at a fraction of the price. Tele-exploration from Mars orbit also allows human (virtual) presence at a wide variety of locations. With an orbital base controlling surface telerobotics, human explorers are not stuck with one base location, but can explore all over Mars. They can explore the polar caps and also near-equatorial canyon regions, from the same orbiting base. This frees the mission from landing site constraints. With no need to select a "grab bag" site that contains a large number of geologically diverse features at or near a single location; it is now possible go to all the best sites-- paleolake sites, river beds, volcanic calderas, lava tube sites, layered terrain, canyons, possible shoreline features, the North and South poles. A near-polar inclination 24-hr 39-minute period Mars orbit, for example, will put the orbital station in line-of-sight of a given region for about 8 hours per day-- one teleoperation shift. Since present day life could exist on Mars, planetary protection is also needed to preserve the (possible) fragile Mars biosphere from competition from ferocious Earth life. Isolated biospheres on Earth have been devastated when they have been exposed to alien life forms introduced-accidentally or deliberately-- from another continent. If there is life on Mars, we will wish to protect it from having to compete with introduced Earth biota. Reverse planetary protection-protecting the Earth biosphere from exposure to Mars microorganisms-is also an important consideration. Exploring from orbit will reduce biological risk by keeping humans from exposure to possible Mars microbes. A telerobotic mission will need no quarantine on return to Earth, and avoids the difficult human question of how to isolate Mars mission astronauts infected by Martian microorganisms.

Landis, Geoffrey A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Recovery Rate is an Improved Metric for Monitoring Bioburden in Cleanrooms

The Astromaterials Acquisition and Curation Office maintains seven cleanrooms for curating extraterrestrial samples from a variety of sample return missions. These cleanrooms are monitored for inorganic and particulate contamination and are maintained at ISO 7 to ISO 4 equivalent standards as dictated by collection requirements. As part of the advanced curation effort and to prepare for future sample collections from carbonaceous asteroids and eventually Mars we have begun monitoring the microbiology of these cleanrooms. Insights gained from monitoring these labs can be applied to improving planetary protection efforts.

Planetary Protection↗
NASA NTRS2026

The Contaminant Footprint of Landed Spacecraft: Toward an Inventory and Modelling Framework

All spacecraft generate and carry contaminants, i.e., unwanted and potentially harmful material. When a spacecraft lands and operates in near-vacuum, as onto Earth’s Moon, it introduces contaminants into its environment that may compromise mission science objectives and engineering performance. Contamination of solar system bodies may irrevocably degrade targets of unique value to planetary scientists, for instance, as lunar landed spacecraft introduce propellant effluents into the otherwise pristine ice of the Moon’s permanently shadowed regions. NASA’s planetary protection discipline seeks to ensure that solar system bodies are not contaminated, for scientific purposes, by terrestrial material (i.e., forward contamination). This interest aligns with planetary science interest in mitigating the transport of terrestrial contaminants onto solar system bodies and in controlling types of contamination that could compromise the scientific value of samples or measurements. NASA, and other entities that practice planetary science, have compelling and multidisciplinary interests in the preservation of special regions and sampling sites of high scientific value – including lunar permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) – from inadvertent contamination by any spacecraft, and in understanding the contamination of such regions by all spacecraft. Organic molecular contamination here represents a primary threat. Organic molecules will be introduced to solar system bodies by nominal landed spacecraft and crew processes – including by the action of descent and ascent engines; natural materials outgassing; and crew environmental and life support system sources. Molecular contaminants can also travel in the free-molecular sense at global scale across near-vacuum bodies, including into regions where they may be permanently trapped. This presentation will address a high-level study to identify sources of contaminants – in particular, organic material – generated by landed spacecraft along with the transport vectors by which these contaminants can reach sites of scientific interest on bodies like the Moon. A vision for an integrated modeling framework for the organic contamination footprint of spacecraft missions, individually and collectively, will also be described and presented along with initial conclusions related to organic molecular transport.

Gas Dynamics↗
NASA NTRS2020

SOTERIA: Searching for Organisms Through Equipment Recovery at Impact Areas

All spacecraft sent to the Moon have carried viable microorganisms with them. Because the Moon’s surface environment is sterilizing to life and the Moon itself is not considered to house indigenous life forms, NASA policy has not required the elimination or even the measurement of microbial contamination on lunar space equipment prior to launch. Yet multiple exposure studies have demonstrated that microorganisms can likely survive high-velocity impacts and exposure to space stresses for some time. Does any of the Earth biomass residing on lunar hardware remain viable? The Artemis program offers a chance to take advantage of this natural experiment, through a mission that is both feasible and promises to generate unprecedented data on microbial survival. We propose a two-phased mission in which imaging would be conducted to obtain data on previously crashed spacecraft near the Lunar South Pole, then astronauts would recover spacecraft debris to return to Earth for analysis of viable life and biosignatures. We propose the name SOTERIA for this planetary protection mission, for the Greek goddess of safety and delivery from harm.

astrobiology↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Waste Container Filtration to Minimize Microbial Escape During Long-Term Storage on Mars

In the search for life on Mars, keeping its surface pristine and free of microbes due to human presence is of utmost importance. Astronauts will use emptied logistics containers during their Mars stay to store waste. These containers will be left on the planet’s surface and are a potential source of microorganism contamination. It is desired for these containers to be free from leaks for a minimum of 50 years. If leaks do occur, a likely location will be at any ports. At these locations the mating surfaces will be sealed using a flexible gasket material like a thin metal or a polymer. Eventually these seals will fail. To mitigate these effects, a particulate filter can be employed to equilibrate the pressure between the Martin environment and inside the container. To meet planetary protection requirements, the filter can only allow particulates smaller than 0.2 μm diameter to pass. This paper discusses why a particulate filter may be needed and how such a filter could be tested to survive and operate in the harsh Martian environment.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Waste Container Filtration to Minimize Microbial Escape During Long-Term Storage on Mars

In the search for life on Mars, keeping its surface pristine and free of microbes due to human presence is of utmost importance. Astronauts will use emptied logistics containers during their Mars stay to store waste. These containers will be left on the planet’s surface and are a potential source of microorganism contamination. It is desired for these containers to be free from leaks for a minimum of 50 years. If leaks do occur, a likely location will be at any ports. At these locations the mating surfaces will be sealed using a flexible gasket material like a thin metal or a polymer. Eventually these seals will fail. To mitigate these effects, a particulate filter can be employed to equilibrate the pressure between the Martin environment and inside the container. To meet planetary protection requirements, the filter can only allow particulates smaller than 0.2 m diameter to pass. This paper discusses why a particulate filter may be needed and how such a filter could be tested to survive and operate in the harsh Martian environment.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRS2002

Microbiological cleanliness of the Mars Exploration Rover spacecraft

Planetary protection for Mars missions is described, and the approach being taken by the Mars Exploration Rover Project is discussed. Specific topics include alcohol wiping, dry heat microbial reduction, microbiological assays, and the Kennedy Space center's PHSF clean room.

planetary protection Mars Exploration Rover MER↗