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290 records · Page 17

Nozomi Cis-Lunar Phase Orbit Determination

Japan's Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) launched Nozomi, its first mission to the planet Mars using the newly developed M-V launch vehicle on July 3, 1998. Scientific objectives of the mission are to study the structure and dynamics of the Martian upper atmosphere and its interaction with the solar wind. Nozomi is a cooperative mission between ISAS and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The NASA contribution includes navigation and tracking services provided by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). The spacecraft also serves as an engineering demonstration of basic technology for planetary exploration. One of the new technologies was a unique trajectory, developed by ISAS, which used solar gravitational perturbations at the weak stability boundary as an aid to achieve an Earth-Mars transfer orbit. This trajectory saves approximately 120 m/s of Delta V compared to direct hyperbolic insertion and is considered an enabling technology for the mission. Nozomi was the first spacecraft to employ this trajectory and provided on-orbit validation of the technique. The trajectory was achieved by initially placing the spacecraft in a highly elliptical cis-lunar phasing orbit. Six maneuvers were performed during this period to correct injection errors and target an outbound lunar swingby in September 1998. The gravity assist from the lunar swingby raised apogee to the vicinity of the weak stability boundary. After three more targeting maneuvers, Nozomi performed an inbound lunar swingby followed immediately by a powered Earth swingby in late December 1998. A 420 m/s Trans Mars Insertion (TMI) burn at the final Earth periapsis was intended to place the spacecraft on a heliocentric trajectory leading to Mars orbit insertion in October 1999. Orbit determination for Nozomi is performed in parallel by both ISAS and the Multi-Mission Navigation (MMNAV) group at JPL. This was an advantage for the mission because each group would generate solutions based on data collected from their respective tracking networks. Spacecraft events, such as sequence uplinks and maneuvers, were generally scheduled during passes at the Usuda tracking station in Japan. As a result, maneuver design and reconstruction was derived from MMNAV solutions based on JPL tracking data obtained immediately prior to or following maneuvers. Data was also exchanged between ISAS and MMNAV so orbit determination could be performed on joint data sets in support of critical targeting late in the cis-lunar phase. In this paper, information regarding the MMNAV orbit determination effort for the first six months of the mission is presented. The spacecraft trajectory is characterized first, followed by a discussion of the orbit determination estimation procedure and models. Results from selected orbit solutions are presented and compared against reconstructed trajectories. One area of emphasis in this paper is orbit determination in the vicinity of the weak stability boundary. Precise navigation was necessary to target the second lunar swingby and the powered Earth swingby. Delivery accuracy of 150 m was required for these critical encounters, but a number of factors contributed to the general degradation of orbit determination accuracy. This included the fact that the spacecraft was at apogee, at a range of 1.7 million km and moving at less than I km/sec perpendicular to the line of sight. Nozomi was also close to zero degrees declination where there are known limitations on orbit determination performance. Finally, S-band tracking data was acquired through the Nozomi backup low gain antenna. This antenna is offset from the axis of this spin stabilized spacecraft and superimposed large signatures in the Doppler and range data. These difficulties were overcome by combining long data arcs, spanning several maneuvers, with a high fidelity solar pressure model. The model included a physically accurate representation of the spacecraft structure and a high time resolution orientation model. Observation modeling included the removal of the spin induced Doppler bias, spin signature and per pass correction of range calibration errors applied for data leading up to critical events. As a result, all orbit determination goals were met. A second area of emphasis in this paper is the JPL tracking and orbit determination effort in support of the TMI maneuver. TMI occurred out of contact with ground stations and the JPL Goldstone tracking complex had the first pass following the bum. As a result, MMNAV had the responsibility to make a rapid assessment of the maneuver performance. MMNAV made the determination that a 100 m/s under bum had occurred and promptly informed ISAS via voice lines. ISAS immediately began preparations for a correction maneuver (TMIc), which had to be performed during the next Usuda pass. The near real time assessment by MMNAV provided accurate antenna frequency and pointing updates for the spacecraft acquisition at Usuda and the close coordination between the two agencies enabled the design and successful execution of the TMc maneuver. Propellant consumption during the correction burn dictated that the mission be redesigned. ISAS developed a new plan which adds 3 full solar orbits, two Earth swingbys and one lunar swingby with arrival at Mars in January 2004. The final Mars orbit will still enable the mission to achieve all of its science objectives.

Ryne, Mark↗

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗