The Silicon Tracker of the Beam Test Engineering Model of the GLAST Large Area Telescope
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SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Abstract not provided.
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Results of field studies for monofacial and bifacial modules and how they compared with initial assumptions.
Abstract not provided.
Presentation for U.S. Department of Energy Hydrogen Program's Annual Merit Review and Peer Evaluation Meeting for TA060, NREL activities for offshore wind-hydrogen.
Abstract not provided.
This presentation discusses why we measure irradiance, what makes bifacial irradiance challenging, recommendations for monitoring rear POA irradiance, and a field comparison study.
Metallic waste forms developed to immobilize high-level radioactive wastes generated in advanced (closed) fuel cycles are being evaluated as part of the US DOE Fuel Cycle Research and Development program. The electrometallurgical reprocessing of used metallic fuels to recover U and Pu generates two waste streams: salt waste comprised of electro-refiner salt contaminated with oxidized fission products and metallic waste comprised of activated cladding and metallic fission products that were not oxidized under the processing conditions. Metallic waste forms can be made by directly melting the cladding and fuel wastes with small amounts of trim metals to form a multiphase alloy material in which radionuclides and other waste constituents are immobilized within chemically durable intermetallic and iron-based solid solution phases. Some components of the waste streams serve as important constituents of phases comprising the waste form, such as Mo and Zr, which form Fe{sub 2}Mo and Fe{sub 2}Zr intermetallic phases. Other waste constituents are accommodated as substitutional contaminants, such as Tc within the Fe{sub 2}Mo intermetallic and U/TRU within the Fe{sub 2}Zr intermetallic. Sufficient amounts of these host phases must be available to accommodate all radionuclides in the waste stream. The compositional flexibility of the host phases to incorporate waste components is being utilized to formulate metal waste forms that will accommodate variations in waste streams compositions that will occur over long-term fuel reprocessing operations. Small amounts of trim metals can be added to tailor the phase assembly to match the waste stream composition and facilitate waste form processing. For example, additional Zr may be added during waste form production to ensure all U/TRU is sequestered in a durable Fe{sub 2}Zr host phase and trim Cr, Mo, and Ni can be added to supplement the amounts provided by the steel cladding to improve the durability of a metallic waste form. (authors)
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Project overview
Vulnerability and patch management is an integral part of a robust cybersecurity program, yet it grows increasingly complex due to the sheer amount of data that must be analyzed. Particularly in Operational Technology (OT) environments, analysis must be done manually because of the lack of automated solutions. Additionally, there are many steps in this process, from the initial discovery of the vulnerability to the implementation of its remediation, and each step in the process requires different data in order to be performed effectively. In this work, we provide approaches and strategies to assist operators in industrial or OT environments throughout the vulnerability management cycle. Security advisories provide key information about mitigation strategies, or actions that can be taken when a patch is unavailable or cannot be installed. Details of these strategies are not shared in public vulnerability databases and must be found manually. We approach this problem by designing a solution to automatically identify that information within vendor security advisories and retrieve it for operator use. We start with an approach that requires domain-specific knowledge of certain frequently-seen reference websites. Next, an approach that can work on an arbitrary website but relies on certain keywords. Finally, an approach that uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) methods and does not require specific knowledge or keywords. Each of these approaches is more general than its predecessor; we demonstrate high accuracy for all approaches Advisories also often contain details of affected products in non-standard or natural language formats. While this information can be easily understood when read by an operator, the non-standard format acts as a barrier to effective automation. We provide an approach for the first step in this process: identifying vendors in security advisories and mapping them to a standard framework for representing digital assets and software products. We evaluate five established string similarity algorithms, plus one of our own design that combines string similarity and information theory, on the task of mapping vendors to their corresponding entries in the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) repository. Our results show that our proposed metric outperforms all others. Due to the constraints on time, finances, and personnel for organizations, Large Language Models (LLMs) may seem like attractive opportunities for security operators to speed up information gathering; however, it is still not clear whether LLMs can handle vulnerability management tasks well. To answer this question, we perform an empirical study of LLMs’ ability to provide consistent, accurate information about vulnerabilities in order to guide organizations in their adoption of LLMs. We observe poor performance for all models tested, suggesting that these models are not well-suited to the consistent retrieval of accurate vulnerability information. Finally, once vulnerabilities have been identified and any additional information has been obtained, operators must decide which remediation actions to implement based on their available resources. This already-complex problem becomes even more so when we consider that a vulnerability may have multiple avenues for remediation. We formulate this scenario as two knapsack problems and provide solutions, which we then compare against several existing strategies for vulnerability prioritization seen in real operational environments.
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