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At least 307 records · Page 17

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NASA NTRS1981

Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS). Phase 1 report

An integrated avionics system which provides expanded functional capabilities that significantly enhance the utility and safety of general aviation at a cost commensurate with the general aviation market is discussed. Displays and control were designed so that the pilot can use the system after minimum training. Functional and hardware descriptions, operational evaluation and failure modes effects analysis are included.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1981

Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS), Phase 1

Demonstration advanced anionics system (DAAS) function description, hardware description, operational evaluation, and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) are provided. Projected advanced avionics system (PAAS) description, reliability analysis, cost analysis, maintainability analysis, and modularity analysis are discussed.

Bailey, A. J.↗

NASA NTRS1984

F-15 digital electronic engine control system description

A digital electronic engine control (DEEC) was developed for use on the F100-PW-100 turbofan engine. This control system has full authority control, capable of moving all the controlled variables over their full ranges. The digital computational electronics and fault detection and accomodation logic maintains safe engine operation. A hydromechanical backup control (BUC) is an integral part of the fuel metering unit and provides gas generator control at a reduced performance level in the event of an electronics failure. The DEEC's features, hardware, and major logic diagrams are described.

Myers, L. P.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Compiler-Assisted Multiple Instruction Rollback Recovery Using a Read Buffer

Multiple instruction rollback (MIR) is a technique to provide rapid recovery from transient processor failures and was implemented in hardware by researchers and slow in mainframe computers. Hardware-based MIR designs eliminate rollback data hazards by providing data redundancy implemented in hardware. Compiler-based MIR designs were also developed which remove rollback data hazards directly with data flow manipulations, thus eliminating the need for most data redundancy hardware. Compiler-assisted techniques to achieve multiple instruction rollback recovery are addressed. It is observed that data some hazards resulting from instruction rollback can be resolved more efficiently by providing hardware redundancy while others are resolved more efficiently with compiler transformations. A compiler-assisted multiple instruction rollback scheme is developed which combines hardware-implemented data redundancy with compiler-driven hazard removal transformations. Experimental performance evaluations were conducted which indicate improved efficiency over previous hardware-based and compiler-based schemes. Various enhancements to the compiler transformations and to the data redundancy hardware developed for the compiler-assisted MIR scheme are described and evaluated. The final topic deals with the application of compiler-assisted MIR techniques to aid in exception repair and branch repair in a speculative execution architecture.

Alewine, Neal Jon↗

NASA NTRS1993

Overview of the Systems Special Investigation Group investigation

The Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) carried a remarkable variety of electrical, mechanical, thermal, and optical systems, subsystems, and components. Nineteen of the fifty-seven experiments flown on LDEF contained functional systems that were active on-orbit. Almost all of the other experiments possessed at least a few specific components of interest to the Systems Special Investigation Group (Systems SIG), such as adhesives, seals, fasteners, optical components, and thermal blankets. Almost all top level functional testing of the active LDEF and experiment systems has been completed. Failure analysis of both LDEF hardware and individual experiments that failed to perform as designed has also been completed. Testing of system components and experimenter hardware of interest to the Systems SIG is ongoing. All available testing and analysis results were collected and integrated by the Systems SIG. An overview of our findings is provided. An LDEF Optical Experiment Database containing information for all 29 optical related experiments is also discussed.

Mason, James B.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Potential Damage to Flight Hardware from MIL-STD-462 CS02 Setup

The MIL-STD-462 CS02 conducted susceptibility test setup, performed during electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing, consists of an audio transformer with the secondary used as an inductor and a large capacitor. Together, these two components form an L-type low-pass filter to minimize the injected test signal input into the power source. Some flight hardware power input configurations are not compatible with this setup and break into oscillation when powered up. This can damage flight hardware and caused a catastrophic failure to an item tested in the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Large EMC Test Facility.

Harris, Patrick K.↗

NASA NTRS1997

SCARLET Photovoltaic Concentrator Array Selected for Flight Under NASA's New Millennium Program

The NASA Lewis Research Center continues to demonstrate its expertise in the development and implementation of advanced space power systems. For example, during the past year, the NASA New Millennium Program selected the Solar Concentrator Array with Refractive Linear Element Technology (SCARLET) photovoltaic array as the power system for its Deep Space-1 (DS-1) mission. This Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) managed DS-1 mission, which represents the first operational flight of a photovoltaic concentrator array, will provide a baseline for the use of this technology in a variety of future government and commercial applications. SCARLET is a joint NASA Lewis/Ballistic Missile Defense Organization program to develop advanced photovoltaic array technology that uses a unique refractive concentrator design to focus sunlight onto a line of photovoltaic cells located below the optical element. The general concept is based on previous work conducted at Lewis under a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contract with AEC-Able Engineering, Inc., for the Multiple Experiments to Earth Orbit and Return (METEOR) spacecraft. The SCARLET II design selected by the New Millennium Program is a direct adaptation of the smaller SCARLET I array built for METEOR. Even though SCARLET I was lost during a launch failure in October 1995, the hardware (designed, built, and flight qualified within 6 months) provided invaluable information and experience that led to the selection of this technology as the primary power source for DS-1.

Piszczor, Michael F., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

NASA NTRS2019

Novel concept for detection of a fluid flow fault in a pumped fluid heat rejection system

A pumped fluid heat rejection system (HRS) requires continuous flow of the working fluid to ensure that the components controlled by the HRS stay within their allowable temperature limits. An interruption of flow could result in violations of hardware qualification limits and mission failure. Some of these violations can happen within a few hours. Hence, quick detection of a flow fault to invoke mitigation measures is very critical. In typical pumped fluid HRS, dual or triple pumps are employed to switch the backup units in case the primary unit were to fail. The key metric for the selection of a fault detection system is that it should detect the fault much before the fault’s impact on the thermal health of the HRS controlled components is realized. A trade study was conducted to select such a system for the Europa Clipper Mission to Europa, a moon of Jupiter that is planned for a launch in 2023. Out of the several concepts studied, the most attractive one was a novel and simple concept that uses a low power film heater attached to a section of the HRS tubing. While the fluid flows at its nominal rate, the high thermal coupling of the flowing fluid leads to the tube being close to the fluid’s temperature. However, when the flow stops, the heater warms the small thermal mass of the tubing to a high temperature in a short span of time (~15 minutes). This large temperature rise would then imply that the flow must have stopped. This paper will describe the various concepts considered, the chosen concept, its implementation, and the results of developments tests to validate its performance.

Schmidt, Tyler↗

NASA NTRS1982

The implementation and use of Ada on distributed systems with high reliability requirements

The use and implementation of Ada in distributed environments in which the hardware components are assumed to be unreliable is investigated. The possibility that a distributed system can be programmed entirely in Ada so that the individual tasks of the system are unconcerned with which processor they are executing on, and that failures can occur in the underlying hardware is considered. The reduced cost of computer hardware and the advantages of distributed processing (for example, increased reliability through redundancy and greater flexibility) indicate that many aerospace computer systems can be distributed. The use of Ada and distributed systems is a good combination for aerospace embedded systems.

Knight, J. C.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Turbofan engine demonstration of sensor failure detection

In the paper, the results of a full-scale engine demonstration of a sensor failure detection algorithm are presented. The algorithm detects, isolates, and accommodates sensor failures using analytical redundancy. The experimental hardware, including the F100 engine, is described. Demonstration results were obtained over a large portion of a typical flight envelope for the F100 engine. They include both subsonic and supersonic conditions at both medium and full, nonafter burning, power. Estimated accuracy, minimum detectable levels of sensor failures, and failure accommodation performance for an F100 turbofan engine control system are discussed.

Merrill, Walter C.↗

NASA NTRS1987

An innovative design for autonomous backup attitude control of the Gamma Ray Observatory

The Gamma Ray Observatory is a NASA funded three-axis stabilized spacecraft which will carry four scientific instruments to observe gamma ray phenomena. The requirement to protect the scientific mission from system failures led to the attitude control and determination system design described in this paper. The design employs nine control modes with error detection, hardware substitution, and autonomous mode switching. The system architecture evolved to eliminate cross-dependence between the primary on-board computer (OBC) and the backup control processor electronics. Cross strapping of sensors and actuators and separation of the input/output electronics ensure that a reliable set of sensors and actuators will be available for backup mode operation. The OBC software includes failure detection, hardware reconfiguration, and mode switching logic which provide the ability to autonomously transfer, upon anomaly, to a reliable backup mode. Verification of this mode transition design is done in four test programs: at the unit level, by analytical simulation, by a hybrid breadboard electronics-simulation setup, and by a flight hardware-simulation test.

Tai, F.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Intelligent Design and Intelligent Failure

Good Evening, my name is Greg Jerman and for nearly a quarter century I have been performing failure analysis on NASA's aerospace hardware. During that time I had the distinct privilege of keeping the Space Shuttle flying for two thirds of its history. I have analyzed a wide variety of failed hardware from simple electrical cables to cryogenic fuel tanks to high temperature turbine blades. During this time I have found that for all the time we spend intelligently designing things, we need to be equally intelligent about understanding why things fail. The NASA Flight Director for Apollo 13, Gene Kranz, is best known for the expression "Failure is not an option." However, NASA history is filled with failures both large and small, so it might be more accurate to say failure is inevitable. It is how we react and learn from our failures that makes the difference.

Jerman, Gregory↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Enabling Reliable, Fault-Tolerant Autonomous Lunar Habitats with High-Performance Spaceflight Computing

The lunar surface presents unfavorable constraints and harsh living conditions. To address these challenges, autonomous habitats will require complex integrated systems that combine advanced software, high-performance hardware, and cutting-edge sensors to ensure sustainability, safety, and operational efficiency. Consequently, maintaining a sustainable presence on the Moon requires reliable infrastructure and efficient development, precise monitoring, and utilization of resources within a lunar installation. These elements are essential not only to ensure that lunar settlement can be long-term, self-sustaining, and resource-efficient, but also to serve as a foundation for future missions and eventual human habitation on Mars. Humans are not native to the Moon; therefore, our survival and ability to thrive will depend on autonomous systems that can foster safety and resilience through high-availability architectures, graceful degradation, and highly fault-tolerant spaceflight hardware capable of continuing operation during failures. This requires advanced human-rated distributed systems architectures with specialized electronics, scalable capabilities, and an integrated design approach. Unlike current practices focused on short-term missions and regularly maintained components, permanent lunar compute systems must be designed for extended operations beyond mission durations. This paper explores the necessity of transitioning toward fault- tolerant, highly autonomous hardware systems designed for multi-year missions. It also identifies critical subsystems that require high levels of autonomy, supported by radiation-hardened processors and extreme thermal loads, which are essential to mitigate long-term degradation and ensure sustainable lunar habitation. Finally, the paper aligns with NASA’s identified Civil Space Shortfalls, particularly in high-performance onboard computing, advanced data acquisition, extreme-environment avionics, radiation monitoring and countermeasures, and autonomous health management. It proposes NASA’s new High-Performance Spaceflight Computing (HPSC) processor as a turnkey solution, delivering 100 times the performance-per-watt of legacy rad-hard CPUs and enabling onboard AI, edge computing, and fault-tolerant features essential for sustained lunar autonomy and beyond.

Sarkis S Mikaelian↗

NASA NTRS2003

PEM-INST-001: Instructions for Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit (PEM) Selection, Screening, and Qualification

Potential users of plastic encapsulated microcircuits (PEMs) need to be reminded that unlike the military system of producing robust high-reliability microcircuits that are designed to perform acceptably in a variety of harsh environments, PEMs are primarily designed for use in benign environments where equipment is easily accessed for repair or replacement. The methods of analysis applied to military products to demonstrate high reliability cannot always be applied to PEMs. This makes it difficult for users to characterize PEMs for two reasons: 1. Due to the major differences in design and construction, the standard test practices used to ensure that military devices are robust and have high reliability often cannot be applied to PEMs that have a smaller operating temperature range and are typically more frail and susceptible to moisture absorption. In contrast, high-reliability military microcircuits usually utilize large, robust, high-temperature packages that are hermetically sealed. 2. Unlike the military high-reliability system, users of PEMs have little visibility into commercial manufacturers proprietary design, materials, die traceability, and production processes and procedures. There is no central authority that monitors PEM commercial product for quality, and there are no controls in place that can be imposed across all commercial manufacturers to provide confidence to high-reliability users that a common acceptable level of quality exists for all PEMs manufacturers. Consequently, there is no guaranteed control over the type of reliability that is built into commercial product, and there is no guarantee that different lots from the same manufacturer are equally acceptable. And regarding application, there is no guarantee that commercial products intended for use in benign environments will provide acceptable performance and reliability in harsh space environments. The qualification and screening processes contained in this document are intended to detect poor-quality lots and screen out early random failures from use in space flight hardware. However, since it cannot be guaranteed that quality was designed and built into PEMs that are appropriate for space applications, users cannot screen in quality that may not exist. It must be understood that due to the variety of materials, processes, and technologies used to design and produce PEMs, this test process may not accelerate and detect all failure mechanisms. While the tests herein will increase user confidence that PEMs with otherwise unknown reliability can be used in space environments, such testing may not guarantee the same level of reliability offered by military microcircuits. PEMs should only be used where due to performance needs there are no alternatives in the military high-reliability market, and projects are willing to accept higher risk.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗

NASA NTRS1985

Effect of system workload on operating system reliability - A study on IBM 3081

This paper presents an analysis of operating system failures on an IBM 3081 running VM/SP. Three broad categories of software failures are found: error handling, program control or logic, and hardware related; it is found that more than 25 percent of software failures occur in the hardware/software interface. Measurements show that results on software reliability cannot be considered representative unless the system workload is taken into account. The overall CPU execution rate, although measured to be close to 100 percent most of the time, is not found to correlate strongly with the occurrence of failures. Possible reasons for the observed workload failure dependency, based on detailed investigations of the failure data, are discussed.

Iyer, R. K.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Developing Approaches for Certification of Uninspectable Fracture Critical AM Components

Introduction - Human-rated spaceflight hardware is subject to the Fracture Control requirements in NASA-STD5019, which are intended to control the risk of component failure due to undetected cracks or defects. - All hardware in this mission class is classified for Fracture Control – Exempt, Non-fracture Critical, or Fracture Critical - Fracture Critical: A classification that identifies a part where failure due to the presence of a crack is a catastrophic hazard ➔ Pressure vessels, engine components, primary structure, etc. - Axiom 1: Material and manufacturing process produce structures and components with cracks or defects. - Axiom 2: The presence of a crack or defect of sufficient size reduces the strength and life of the structure. - Damage Tolerance: demonstration that a component can survive the service life (with a safety factor) in the presence of an undetected flaw or damage. - Components are manufactured from aerospace quality materials using controlled processes. - Components are inspected for damage (cracks, flaws, defects, etc.). - Components are shown by test or analysis to be tolerant to undetected flaws.

Will Tilson↗