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First Stage Solid Propellant Multi Debris Thermal Analysis

The crew launch vehicle considered for the Constellation (Cx) Program utilizes a first stage solid rocket motor. If an abort is initiated in first stage flight the Crew Module (CM) will separate and be pulled away from the launch vehicle via a Launch Abort System (LAS) in order to safely and quickly carry the crew away from the malfunction launch vehicle. Having aborted the mission, the launch vehicle will likely be destroyed via a Flight Termination System (FTS) in order to prevent it from errantly traversing back over land and posing a risk to the public. The resulting launch vehicle debris field, composed primarily of first stage solid propellant, poses a threat to the CM. The harsh radiative thermal environment induced by surrounding burning propellant debris may lead to CM parachute failure. A methodology, detailed herein, has been developed to address this concern and quantify the risk of first stage propellant debris leading to radiative thermal demise of the CM parachutes. Utilizing basic thermal radiation principles, a software program was developed to calculate parachute temperature as a function of time for a given abort trajectory and debris piece trajectory set. Two test cases, considered worst-case aborts with regard to launch vehicle debris environments, were analyzed using the simulation: an abort declared at Mach 1 and an abort declared at maximum dynamic pressure (Max Q). For both cases, the resulting temperature profiles indicated that thermal limits for the parachutes were not exceeded. However, short duration close encounters by single debris pieces did have a significant effect on parachute temperature, with magnitudes on the order of 10 s of degrees Fahrenheit. Therefore while these two test cases did not indicate exceedance of thermal limits, in order to quantify the risk of parachute failure due to radiative effects from the abort environment, a more thorough probability-based analysis using the methodology demonstrated herein must be performed.

Toleman, Benjamin M.↗

2011 Ground Testing Highlights Article

Two tests supporting development of the launch abort system for the Orion MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle were run in the NASA Ames Unitary Plan wind tunnel last year. The first test used a fully metric model to examine the stability and controllability of the Launch Abort Vehicle during potential abort scenarios for Mach numbers ranging from 0.3 to 2.5. The aerodynamic effects of the Abort Motor and Attitude Control Motor plumes were simulated using high-pressure air flowing through independent paths. The aerodynamic effects of the proximity to the launch vehicle during the early moments of an abort were simulated with a remotely actuated Service Module that allowed the position relative to the Crew Module to be varied appropriately. The second test simulated the acoustic environment around the Launch Abort Vehicle caused by the plumes from the 400,000-pound thrust, solid-fueled Abort Motor. To obtain the proper acoustic characteristics of the hot rocket plumes for the flight vehicle, heated Helium was used. A custom Helium supply system was developed for the test consisting of 2 jumbo high-pressure Helium trailers, a twelve-tube accumulator, and a 13MW gas-fired heater borrowed from the Propulsion Simulation Laboratory at NASA Glenn Research Center. The test provided fluctuating surface pressure measurements at over 200 points on the vehicle surface that have now been used to define the ground-testing requirements for the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle.

Ross, James C.↗

Rapid transaction-undo recovery using twin-page storage management

This paper presents a twin-page storage method, which is an alternative to the TWIST (twin slot) approach by Reuter, for rapid transaction-undo recovery. In contrast to TWIST, our twin-page approach allows dirty pages in the buffer to be written at any instant onto disk without the requirement of undo logging, and, when a transaction is aborted, no explicit undo is required. As a result, all locks accumulated by the aborted transaction can be released earlier, allowing other transactions waiting for the locks to proceed. Through maintenance of aborted transaction identifiers, invalid pages written by the aborted transaction coexist with other valid pages and are guaranteed not be accessed by subsequent transactions. Instead of an explicit undo, most of the invalid pages are overwritten by subsequent normal updates. Performance in terms of disk I/O and CPU overhead for transaction-undo recovery is analyzed and compared with TWIST. It is shown that our scheme is particularly suited for applications where there are a large number of updates written onto disk when transactions are aborted, and there are frequent aborts. The approach, however, is not as applicable to environments where transactions are typically short or rarely aborted, or most updates are not written onto disk before a commitment.

Wu, Kun-Lung↗

Aerodynamic and Aeroacoustic Wind Tunnel Testing of the Orion Spacecraft

The Orion aerodynamic testing team has completed more than 40 tests as part of developing the aerodynamic and loads databases for the vehicle. These databases are key to achieving good mechanical design for the vehicle and to ensure controllable flight during all potential atmospheric phases of a mission, including launch aborts. A wide variety of wind tunnels have been used by the team to document not only the aerodynamics but the aeroacoustic environment that the Orion might experience both during nominal ascents and launch aborts. During potential abort scenarios the effects of the various rocket motor plumes on the vehicle must be accurately understood. The Abort Motor (AM) is a high-thrust, short duration motor that rapidly separates Orion from its launch vehicle. The Attitude Control Motor (ACM), located in the nose of the Orion Launch Abort Vehicle, is used for control during a potential abort. The 8 plumes from the ACM interact in a nonlinear manner with the four AM plumes which required a carefully controlled test to define the interactions and their effect on the control authority provided by the ACM. Techniques for measuring dynamic stability and for simulating rocket plume aerodynamics and acoustics were improved or developed in the course of building the aerodynamic and loads databases for Orion.

Ross, James C.↗

Safety and rescue during STS operations

The space shuttle means, provided to the crew, of abort/escape for noncatastrophic mishap scenaries, during Space Transportation Systems (STS) operations, are discussed. From vehicle ingress until launch, the crew can escape the launch pad by use of slidewire baskets. For various emergencies during ascent, the crew can fly an intact abort. Such aborts include return to launch site, transoceanic abort landing, abort once around, and abort to orbit. The crew can fly the orbiter to an emergency airfield, or to an over ocean bailout for more serious ascent or on-orbit emergencies. For failures during landing, the crew can quickly egress the orbiter from the overhead hatch, or by use of an inflatable slide mounted at the side hatch.

Oconnor, Bryan↗

Determining Exercise Strength Requirements for Astronaut Critical Mission Tasks: Reaching Under G-Load

The critical mission tasks assessments effort seeks to determine the physical performance requirements that astronauts must meet in order to safely and successfully accomplish lunar exploration missions. These assessments will determine astronaut preflight strength, fitness, and flexibility requirements, and the extent to which exercise and other countermeasures must prevent the physical deconditioning associated with prolonged weightlessness. The purpose is to determine the flexibility and strength that crewmembers must possess in order to reach Crew Exploration Vehicle controls during maneuvers that result in sustained acceleration levels ranging from 3.7G to 7.8G. An industry standard multibody dynamics application was used to create human models representing a 5th percentile female, a 50th percentile male, and a 95th percentile male. The additional mass of a space suit sleeve was added to the reaching arm to account for the influence of the suit mass on the reaching effort. The human model was merged with computer models of a pilot seat and control panel for the Crew Exploration Vehicle. Three dimensional paths were created that guided the human models hand from a starting position alongside its thigh to three control targets: a joystick, a keyboard, and an overhead switch panel. The reaching motion to each target was repeated under four vehicle acceleration conditions: nominal ascent (3.7G), two ascent aborts (5.5G and 7.8G) and lunar reentry (4.6G). Elbow and shoulder joint angular excursions were analyzed to assess range of motion requirements. Mean and peak elbow and shoulder joint torques were determined and converted to equivalent resistive exercise loads to assess strength requirements. Angular excursions for the 50th and 95th percentile male models remained within joint range of motion limits. For the 5th percentile female, both the elbow and the shoulder exceeded range of motion limits during the overhead reach. Elbow joint torques ranged from 10 N-m (nominal ascent) to 60 N-m (ascent abort). Shoulder joint torques ranged from 65 N-m (nominal ascent) to 280 N-m (ascent abort). Maximal equivalent exercise loads reached 30 lb in tricep extension, 9 lb in bicep curl, 110 lb in unilateral pullover and unilateral bench press for nominal conditions (lunar reentry), and 188 lb in unilateral pullover and unilateral bench press. The location of the pilot seat was found to be inadequately located to allow a 5th percentile female to reach the switches on the overhead panel. Elbow strength requirements were found to be well within population norms. Shoulder strength was found to be a limiting factor. Reaching under nominal ascent and lunar reentry conditions was found to require near maximal shoulder strength. Reaching under ascent abort conditions requires shoulder strength well beyond population norms. Pilot seats must adjust to accomodate a 5th percentile female. Exercise countermeasures must maintain maximal pullover and bench press strength to allow pilots to reach and operate controls during lunar reentry. Reaching will not be possible during ascent abort conditions. Flight controls should be built into armrests or flight control must be accomplished by autonomous systems during acceleration exceeding 4.6G.

Schaffner, Grant↗

Sensitivity Analysis of Launch Vehicle Debris Risk Model

As part of an analysis of the loss of crew risk associated with an ascent abort system for a manned launch vehicle, a model was developed to predict the impact risk of the debris resulting from an explosion of the launch vehicle on the crew module. The model consisted of a debris catalog describing the number, size and imparted velocity of each piece of debris, a method to compute the trajectories of the debris and a method to calculate the impact risk given the abort trajectory of the crew module. The model provided a point estimate of the strike probability as a function of the debris catalog, the time of abort and the delay time between the abort and destruction of the launch vehicle. A study was conducted to determine the sensitivity of the strike probability to the various model input parameters and to develop a response surface model for use in the sensitivity analysis of the overall ascent abort risk model. The results of the sensitivity analysis and the response surface model are presented in this paper.

Gee, Ken↗

MLAS and LAS: Project Comparison of Lessons Learned

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. This presentation will compare both projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives and highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program.

Dittemore, Gary↗

CFD 2030 Grand Challenge: CFD-in-the-Loop Monte Carlo Flight Simulation for Space Vehicle Design

Flight qualification of space vehicles is markedly different from those typically employed for aircraft. The concept of an extensive flight test campaign for a space vehicle does not exist, and vehicle designers must look to alternative techniques for demonstrating robust and reliable performance of their vehicles prior to operational flight. A space vehicle may undergo only a handful of flight tests in its development cycle, with each flight representing a drastically different flight phase or flight configuration. For instance, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle and Orion spacecraft will only see a total of four flight demonstrations before flying a crew on its first operational mission, and each flight demonstrates a unique vehicle configuration and/or set of flight conditions. The SLS will be flown only one time before it becomes operational (Artemis 1). The Orion spacecraft Crew Module (CM) will have been tested twice, once on a Delta IV launch vehicle (Exploration Flight Test 1) and once as a fully integrated system with the SLS launch vehicle (Artemis 1). The Orion Launch abort system will have been tested twice, once in a pad abort scenario (Pad Abort 1) and once in an inflight abort scenario (Ascent Abort 2) on a modified Peacekeeper booster. Both of these latter tests involve only a boiler plate CM, not a functional Orion spacecraft. Thus, unlike aircraft, there is very little opportunity for engineers to assess and evaluate their preflight predictions. Instead, space vehicle designers rely on Monte Carlo flight simulations with detailed dispersions of predicted nominal flight behavior to determine how robust their design is to errors and uncertainties in the flight conditions their vehicle may encounter. These Monte Carlo analyses entail thousands of trajectory simulations to demonstrate that the vehicle can meet design requirements at a specified level of reliability. From an aerodynamics and aerothermodynamics perspective, these trajectory simulations are fueled by an extensive aerodynamic database that covers the complete range of expected flight conditions, vehicle configurations, and flight attitudes expected in a given mission. Today, these databases amount to a table of engineering parameters that can be quickly interrogated by the trajectory simulator. The aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic databases are assembled via a series of ground tests, empirical and analytical analysis, physics-based computational analysis, applicable past flight performance data, and in some cases, engineering judgment. These databases generally take years to assemble for a new space vehicle system and in the case of SLS/Orion, over a decade of test and analysis have been expended to develop the extensive databases required to cover the myriad of configurations and potential flight conditions required for the system. Recently, it has been proposed that Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) and computing capability may be reaching a point where it is foreseeable that CFD could be integrated directly into the production trajectory simulation tools used to design NASA’s space vehicles. To demonstrate this, NASA has embarked on two demonstrations of this type of capability, one where six degree of freedom flight trajectory simulation equations are embedded in an existing CFD solver and another where a production CFD solver is loosely coupled with a production trajectory simulation tool. These efforts represent an initial demonstration of a future approach to flight trajectory simulation, but they are a far cry from the capability required to perform a full-up CFD-in-the-loop Monte Carlo trajectory simulation. Therefore, this represents a viable grand challenge for computational methods addressing space vehicle design and development. The final paper/presentation will discuss the many hurdles, beyond simply raw computational power, to realizing this grand challenge and how they map directly to the CFD Vision 2030 ojectives. Among these are the wide range of flight conditions, including accelerating/decelerating flight, encountered by a space vehicle during launch and/or entry. The vehicle can also encounter numerous configuration changes, some of which can be quite drastic, during the course of its flight, so robust, automated geometry modeling, grid generation, and adaptation will play a huge role in reaching this goal. Multiply this by 1000’s of trajectory simulations occurring simultaneously in a given Monte Carlo analysis, and the problem readily scales to absorb virtually any size of supercomputer envisioned today. The concept of CFD-in-the-loop Monte Carlo trajectory simulation poses a formidable challenge for emerging and future computing systems, and it has the potential to shave years off the development cycle for aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic performance predictions as compared to today’s space vehicle design approach.

CFD 2030↗

Aeroacoustics of Space Vehicles

While for airplanes the subject of aeroacoustics is associated with community noise, for space vehicles it is associated with vibro-acoustics and structural dynamics. Surface pressure fluctuations encountered during launch and travel through lower part of the atmosphere create intense vibro-acoustics environment for the payload, electronics, navigational equipment, and a large number of subsystems. All of these components have to be designed and tested for flight-certification. This presentation will cover all three major sources encountered in manned and unmanned space vehicles: launch acoustics, ascent acoustics and abort acoustics. Launch pads employ elaborate acoustic suppression systems to mitigate the ignition pressure waves and rocket plume generated noise during the early part of the liftoff. Recently we have used large microphone arrays to identify the noise sources during liftoff and found that the standard model by Eldred and Jones (NASA SP-8072) to be grossly inadequate. As the vehicle speeds up and reaches transonic speed in relatively denser part of the atmosphere, various shock waves and flow separation events create unsteady pressure fluctuations that can lead to high vibration environment, and occasional coupling with the structural modes, which may lead to buffet. Examples of wind tunnel tests and computational simulations to optimize the outer mold line to quantify and reduce the surface pressure fluctuations will be presented. Finally, a manned space vehicle needs to be designed for crew safety during malfunctioning of the primary rocket vehicle. This brings the subject of acoustic environment during abort. For NASAs Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), abort will be performed by lighting rocket motors atop the crew module. The severe aeroacoustics environments during various abort scenarios were measured for the first time by using hot helium to simulate rocket plumes in the Ames unitary plan wind tunnels. Various considerations used for the helium simulation and the final confirmation from a flight test will be presented.

launch vehicle↗

2007 Research and Engineering Annual Report

Selected research and technology activities at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center are summarized. These following activities exemplify the Center's varied and productive research efforts: Developing a Requirements Development Guide for an Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System; Digital Terrain Data Compression and Rendering for Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance Systems; Nonlinear Flutter/Limit Cycle Oscillations Prediction Tool; Nonlinear System Identification Using Orthonormal Bases: Application to Aeroelastic/Aeroservoelastic Systems; Critical Aerodynamic Flow Feature Indicators: Towards Application with the Aerostructures Test Wing; Multidisciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool Development Using a Genetic Algorithm; Structural Model Tuning Capability in an Object-Oriented Multidisciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool; Extension of Ko Straight-Beam Displacement Theory to the Deformed Shape Predictions of Curved Structures; F-15B with Phoenix Missile and Pylon Assembly--Drag Force Estimation; Mass Property Testing of Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed Hardware; ARMD Hypersonics Project Materials and Structures: Testing of Scramjet Thermal Protection System Concepts; High-Temperature Modal Survey of the Ruddervator Subcomponent Test Article; ARMD Hypersonics Project Materials and Structures: C/SiC Ruddervator Subcomponent Test and Analysis Task; Ground Vibration Testing and Model Correlation of the Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed; Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed: Performance Design and Analysis; Crew Exploration Vehicle Launch Abort System-Pad Abort-1 (PA-1) Flight Test; Testing the Orion (Crew Exploration Vehicle) Launch Abort System-Ascent Abort-1 (AA-1) Flight Test; SOFIA Flight-Test Flutter Prediction Methodology; SOFIA Closed-Door Aerodynamic Analyses; SOFIA Handling Qualities Evaluation for Closed-Door Operations; C-17 Support of IRAC Engine Model Development; Current Capabilities and Future Upgrade Plans of the C-17 Data Rack; Intelligent Data Mining Capabilities as Applied to Integrated Vehicle Health Management; STARS Flight Demonstration No. 2 IP Data Formatter; Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS) Flight Demonstration No. 2 Range User Flight Test Results; Aerodynamic Effects of the Quiet Spike(tm) on an F-15B Aircraft; F-15 Intelligent Flight Controls-Increased Destabilization Failure; F-15 Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Improved Adaptive Controller; Aeroelastic Analysis of the Ikhana/Fire Pod System; Ikhana: Western States Fire Missions Utilizing the Ames Research Center Fire Sensor; Ikhana: Fiber-Optic Wing Shape Sensors; Ikhana: ARTS III; SOFIA Closed-Door Flutter Envelope Flight Testing; F-15B Quiet Spike(TM) Aeroservoelastic Flight Test Data Analysis; and UAVSAR Platform Precision Autopilot Flight Results.

Stoliker, Patrick↗

A Review of the MLAS Parachute Systems

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is dedicated to Max Faget, the renowned NASA spacecraft designer. The MLAS flight test vehicle consists of boost skirt, coast skirt and the MLAS fairing which houses a full scale boilerplate Orion Crew Module (CM). The objective of the flight test is to prove that the CM can be released from the MLAS fairing during pad abort conditions without detrimental recontact between the CM and fairing, achieving performance similar to the Orion launch abort system. The boost and coast skirts provide the necessary thrust and stability to achieve the flight test conditions and are released prior to the test -- much like the Little Joe booster was used in the Apollo Launch Escape System tests. To achieve the test objective, two parachutes are deployed from the fairing to reorient the CM/fairing to a heatshield first orientation. The parachutes then provide the force necessary to reduce the total angle of attack and body angular rates required for safe release of the CM from the fairing. A secondary test objective after CM release from the fairing is to investigate the removal of the CM forward bay cover (FBC) with CM drogue parachutes for the purpose of attempting to synchronously deploying a set of CM main parachutes. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft D(sub 0) ribbon parachutes, and the remaining four are standard G-12 cargo parachutes. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft D(sub 0) ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after separation from the fairing. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design, previously proven as a spin/stall recovery parachute; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs; a discussion of the rigging techniques used to interface the parachute system to the vehicle; and a brief description of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis. An overview of the Objective system, rationale for the MLAS approach and the future of the program will also be presented. We hope to have flight test results to report at the time of the Conference Presentation.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗

The NASA MLAS Flight Demonstration - A Review of a Highly Successful Test

NASA has tested the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is not Maximum, but rather dedicated to Max Faget, The renowned NASA Spacecraft designer. In the fall of 2009, the mission was flown, with great success, from the NASA Wallops Flight Facility. The MLAS flight test vehicle prototype consists of a boost ring, coast ring, and the MLAS fairing itself, which houses an Orion Command Module (CM) boilerplate. The objective of the MLAS flight test is to reorient the fairing with the CM, weighing approximately 29,000 lbs and traveling 290 fps, 180 degrees to an orientation suitable for the release of the CM during a pad abort and low altitude abort. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachutes, and the remaining four are standard G-12 cargo parachutes. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast ring separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after separation from the fairing. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design, previously proven as a spin/stall recovery parachute; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs; a discussion of the rigging techniques used to interface the parachute system to the vehicle; a brief description of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis; and a summary of the results of the flight test, including video of the flight test and subsequent summary analysis. . A discussion of the flight test which was highly successful as well as the flight test observations will be a significant portion of the review.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗

A Review of the NASA MLAS Flight Demonstration

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has tested the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is not Maximum, but rather dedicated to Max Faget, the renowned NASA Spacecraft designer. In July 2009, the mission was flown, with great success, from the NASA Wallops Flight Facility. The MLAS flight test vehicle prototype consists of a boost skirt, coast skirt, and the MLAS fairing itself, which houses an Orion Command Module (CM) boilerplate. The objective of the MLAS flight test is to reorient the fairing with the CM, weighing approximately 29,000 lbs and traveling 290 fps, 180 degrees to an orientation suitable for the release of the CM during a pad abort or low altitude abort. The boost and coast skirts provide the necessary thrust and stability to establish the flight test conditions and are released prior to the reorientation of the fairing. A secondary test objective after successful release of the CM from the fairing is to demonstrate the removal of the CM forward bay cover (FBC) with the CM drogue parachutes, and subsequent deployment of the CM main parachutes attached to the FBC. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachutes already proven as a spin/stall parachute for military aircraft, and the remaining four are G-12 cargo parachutes modified for increased strength and reefing. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft DO ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as CM drogue parachutes. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs including discussions of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis; a summary of the results of the highly successful flight test, including video of the flight test; and an overview of the subsequent post-test analysis.

Taylor, Anthony P.↗

Orion MPCV GN and C End-to-End Phasing Tests

End-to-end integration tests are critical risk reduction efforts for any complex vehicle. Phasing tests are an end-to-end integrated test that validates system directional phasing (polarity) from sensor measurement through software algorithms to end effector response. Phasing tests are typically performed on a fully integrated and assembled flight vehicle where sensors are stimulated by moving the vehicle and the effectors are observed for proper polarity. Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) Phasing Test was conducted from inertial measurement to Launch Abort System (LAS). Orion Exploration Flight Test 1 (EFT-1) has two end-to-end phasing tests planned. The first test from inertial measurement to Crew Module (CM) reaction control system thrusters uses navigation and flight control system software algorithms to process commands. The second test from inertial measurement to CM S-Band Phased Array Antenna (PAA) uses navigation and communication system software algorithms to process commands. Future Orion flights include Ascent Abort Flight Test 2 (AA-2) and Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1). These flights will include additional or updated sensors, software algorithms and effectors. This paper will explore the implementation of end-to-end phasing tests on a flight vehicle which has many constraints, trade-offs and compromises. Orion PA-1 Phasing Test was conducted at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) from March 4-6, 2010. This test decreased the risk of mission failure by demonstrating proper flight control system polarity. Demonstration was achieved by stimulating the primary navigation sensor, processing sensor data to commands and viewing propulsion response. PA-1 primary navigation sensor was a Space Integrated Inertial Navigation System (INS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) (SIGI) which has onboard processing, INS (3 accelerometers and 3 rate gyros) and no GPS receiver. SIGI data was processed by GN&C software into thrust magnitude and direction commands. The processing changes through three phases of powered flight: pitchover, downrange and reorientation. The primary inputs to GN&C are attitude position, attitude rates, angle of attack (AOA) and angle of sideslip (AOS). Pitch and yaw attitude and attitude rate responses were verified by using a flight spare SIGI mounted to a 2-axis rate table. AOA and AOS responses were verified by using a data recorded from SIGI movements on a robotic arm located at NASA Johnson Space Center. The data was consolidated and used in an open-loop data input to the SIGI. Propulsion was the Launch Abort System (LAS) Attitude Control Motor (ACM) which consisted of a solid motor with 8 nozzles. Each nozzle has active thrust control by varying throat area with a pintle. LAS ACM pintles are observable through optically transparent nozzle covers. SIGI movements on robot arm, SIGI rate table movements and LAS ACM pintle responses were video recorded as test artifacts for analysis and evaluation. The PA-1 Phasing Test design was determined based on test performance requirements, operational restrictions and EGSE capabilities. This development progressed during different stages. For convenience these development stages are initial, working group, tiger team, Engineering Review Team (ERT) and final.

Neumann, Brian C.↗

TPSAS-NF1676L-11132-DND

The Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight Test occurred on May 6th, 2010 at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The test was the first for the Orion vehicle and was primarily a test of the Orion Launch Abort System’s ability to execute an abort from the launch pad. The test was successful, and, in most cases, results were well within predicted outcomes. For this test, the thermal control subsystem was an inherent part of the flight operations team. The thermal team provided pre-launch predictions of component temperatures, set component temperature limits, and monitored those limits during the flight operations process as part of the primary flight operations team. The thermal team was also responsible for day-of-flight predictions of the main abort motor’s propellant mean bulk temperature, a key launch constraint for the test. After the test, thermal data was collected, reviewed, and compared against pre-launch predictions showing very good agreement in most areas. Based on the pre-test and flight operations experience, a detailed list of lessons learned has been developed and will be reviewed prior to potential future Orion or other such flight tests.

Joseph F Gasbarre↗

TPSAS-NF1676L-11021-DND

The Orion Pad Abort 1 Flight Test occurred on May 6th, 2010 at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The test was the first for the Orion vehicle and was primarily a test of the Orion Launch Abort System’s ability to execute an abort from the launch pad. The test was successful and in most cases results were well within predicted outcomes. For this test, the thermal control subsystem was an inherent part of the flight operations team. The thermal team provided pre-launch predictions of component temperatures, set component temperature limits, and monitored those limits during the flight operations process as part of the primary flight operations team. The thermal team was also responsible for day-of-flight predictions of the main abort motor’s propellant mean bulk temperature, a key launch constraint for the test. After the test, thermal data was collected, reviewed, and compared against pre-launch predictions showing very good agreement in most areas. Based on the pre-test and flight operations experience, a detailed list of lessons learned has been developed and will be reviewed prior to potential future Orion or other such flight tests.

Joseph F Gasbarre↗

The Ejectable Data Recorder: A Lean, Risk-Informed Approach for Hardware Development

NASA is developing the Orion spacecraft to transport crew from the Earth to the Moon as part of the Artemis series of missions. To provide a crew escape capability from pre-launch through ascent, the Orion vehicle is equipped with a Launch Abort System (LAS), built by Lockheed Martin, which pulls the capsule away from the launch vehicle in the event of an abort scenario. The Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight occurred on July 2, 2019,and tested a production version of the LAS to ensure that it can operate as intended, and to collect a large data set from hundreds of sensors on the vehicle to support Orion flight certification. In the original AA-2 architecture, a single-string set of communications antennas on the LAS would downlink all of the in-flight test data to ground stations. However, that communications architecture was predicted to have data dropouts during abort and jettison of the LAS, and would not support data transmission at all after LAS jettison. As a result, a comprehensive trade study was completed, yielding the addition of antennas on the crew module (CM), a buffer/rebroadcast capability for key portions of the flight, and an ejectable data recorder (EDR) subsystem. This EDR subsystem would serve as a backup to the radio frequency (RF) communications system, and would be non-flight critical, providing a unique capability that enabled management to take a different approach with the hardware and software development. The Crew Module and Separation Ring were developed as “Class 1”Flight Hardware, albeit with some tailoring approaches to enable efficiencies. The Class 1 designation requires full rigor for flight hardware and software, documenting everything that happens to a piece of hardware from procurement through disposal, requiring a full spectrum of acceptance tests, and the highest rigor of quality assurance processes. At the other end of the spectrum, Class 3hardware is controlled, but not intended for flight, and leaves the level of rigor up to the project manager. This classification is often used for research and development projects. Similarly,Class-1E has been recently defined at NASA for ISS payloads and technology development projects that are not flight critical and do not need the full rigor of Class 1 to be successful. The EDR subsystem was challenged at commencement to adopt a skunkworks and agile-like approach to hardware development, allowing for a different risk posture than the rest of the AA-2 hardware. After initially pursuing Class 1 processes, the EDR subsystem design evolved to incorporating numerous commercial components, leading to re-designation as a Class-1E subsystem. The resulting EDR subsystem was fully successful in meeting all flight system requirements, and achieved 100% retrieval of flight test data. This paper will discuss the risk posture of the EDR subsystem and the subsequent tailoring that was enacted as part of its Class-1E status.

EDR↗