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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Aviation Trends Related to Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project Technical Challenges

Current and future aviation safety trends related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project's three technical challenges (engine icing characterization and simulation capability; airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability; and atmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation technology capability) were assessed by examining the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database (1989 to 2008), incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident/incident database (1989 to 2006), and literature from various industry and government sources. The accident and incident data were examined for events involving fixed-wing airplanes operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91 for atmospheric conditions related to airframe icing, ice-crystal engine icing, turbulence, clear air turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility (fog, low ceiling, clouds, precipitation, and low lighting). Five future aviation safety risk areas associated with the three AEST technical challenges were identified after an exhaustive survey of a variety of sources and include: approach and landing accident reduction, icing/ice detection, loss of control in flight, super density operations, and runway safety.

Reveley, Mary S.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Shuttle derived vehicle analysis solid booster unmanned launch vehicle concept definition study, volume 2

The technical effort associated with the selection and definition of the recommended SRB-X concept is documented. Included are discussions concerning the trades leading to the selected concept, the analysis that established the concept's basic subsystem characteristics, selected configuration description and performance capabilities, launch site operations and facility needs, development schedule, cost characteristics, risk assessment, and a cursory comparison with other launch systems.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1988

Space Station atmospheric monitoring systems

A technology assessment study on atmospheric monitoring systems was performed by Battelle Columbus Division for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's John F. Kennedy Space Center under Contract No. NAS 10-11033. In this assessment, the objective was to identify, analyze, and recommend systems to sample and measure Space Station atmospheric contaminants and identify where additional research and technology advancements were required. To achieve this objective, it was necessary to define atmospheric monitoring requirements and to assess the state of the art and advanced technology and systems for technical and operational compatibility with monitoring goals. Three technical tasks were defined to support these needs: Definition of Monitoring Requirements, Assessment of Sampling and Analytical Technology, and Technology Screening and Recommendations. Based on the analysis, the principal candidates recommended for development at the Space Station's initial operational capability were: (1) long-path Fourier transform infrared for rapid detection of high-risk contamination incidences, and (2) gas chromatography/mass spectrometry utilizing mass selective detection (or ion-trap) technologies for detailed monitoring of extended crew exposure to low level (ppbv) contamination. The development of a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry/matrix isolation-Fourier transform infrared system was recommended as part of the long range program of upgrading Space Station trace-contaminant monitoring needs.

Air Pollution, Indoor/analysis↗
DOE OSTI2024

Integration of Safety, Security, and Safeguards During Design and Operations: A Technical Assessment and Regulatory Considerations for Advanced Reactor and Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facilities

This report presents the current state of knowledge, technology, methodologies, and tools that could be implemented to realize the robust integration of safety, security, and safeguards (3S) for advanced nuclear reactors (ARs) and advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities. This report was motivated by the global development of ARs which are expected to play a key role in meeting domestic energy and climate objectives. Domestically, with many ARs in the early design phase, the integration of 3S provides an opportunity to achieve risk reduction while using less resources than traditional light water reactors by leveraging interdependencies and synergies between each domain. In addition, domestic policy considerations encourage the convergence of each 3S domain through facility design and operations. Therefore, there is a need to better understand the interdependencies and integration between 3S across ARs and advanced reactor fuel cycle facilities’ lifecycles including design, construction, and operational phases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Lean Thinking Principles and Kaizen Practices for the Successful Development and Implementation of the Ares I-X Flight Test Rocket and Mission

On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. Positive lessons learned from Ares I-X were that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices are effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by the success of Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.

Askins, B. R.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Lean Thinking Principles and Kaizen Practices for the Successful Development and Implementation of the Ares I-X Flight Test Rocket and Mission

On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. A positive lesson learned from Ares I-X was that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices was very effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value added activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.

Askins, B. R.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of ASCE 4-16 and AISC 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components

This report describes the assessment of ASCE Standards 4-16 and 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based (RIPB) seismic design of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) at nuclear power plants. This work was performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Regulatory Research (RES), to support potential endorsement of these industry standards for the design of nuclear power plants based on the RIPB approach. Currently, the NRC endorses a deterministic design approach for demonstrating the design adequacy of SSCs based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and NRC Regulatory Guides. In the RIPB approach, the design criteria are developed to achieve a target performance goal, which is defined by the annual frequency of occurrence of the design basis earthquake (i.e., Seismic Design Category) and the acceptable level of structural performance (i.e., Limit State) for the SSCs. ASCE 4-16 provides methods for performing a seismic analysis of structures to obtain the seismic response of these structures (e.g., building displacements, accelerations, in-structure response spectra) which are used in the design of the SSCs. It also provides methods for performing seismic analysis of SSCs to determine the seismic demands (e.g. member forces and displacements) needed to design individual SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provides the criteria for the seismic design of SSCs using the seismic demands developed in ASCE 4-16. The use of ASCE Standard 43-18 (Draft), along with ASCE 4-16, provides the criteria for the seismic design of the SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (DRAFT) relies on other consensus codes and standards such as ACI 349 for reinforced concrete, AISC/N690 for steel structures, ASME Section III for pressure-retaining mechanical components and Containments, and IEEE-344 for Class 1E equipment. The goal of this technical review was to assess the adequacy of the provisions in these standards for use by the NRC in developing regulatory guidance for design of SSCs in nuclear power plants, based on the RIPB approach. The research reported herein describes the basis for acceptance of the new standards and identifies areas where additional staff guidance is needed for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants. This technical review has determined that ASCE 4-16 and ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provide an appropriate framework for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants using a Risk-Informed Performance-Based approach. However, some of the criteria therein warrant exceptions, qualifications, and/or clarifications.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI1994

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 2, July-December 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 179 Consideration of Postaccident Consequences in the Determination of Safety Objectives for Future Nuclear Power Plants in France, D. Queniart, A. Sugier, and J. Lochard; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 187 Nuclear Safety Research: The Phebus FP Severe Accident Experimental Program, P. von der Hardt, A. V. Jones, C. Lecomte, and A. Tattegrain; 205 Containment Performance Analysis of the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, S. H. Kim, R. P. Taleyarkhan, and V. Georgevich; 213 Assessment of Fission Product Deposits in the Reactor Coolant System: The DEVAP Program, G. Le Marois and M. Megnin; 222 Erratum to “A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion," Vol. 35, No. 1, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 223 Effects of Normal Aging on Calibration and Response Time of Nuclear Plant Resistance Temperature Detectors and Pressure Sensors, H. M. Hashemian; DESIGN FEATURES: 235 Defense in Depth Against the Hydrogen Risk—A European Research Program, F. Fineschi; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 246 Technical Note: A Preliminary Analysis of the Risks to Hong Kong Resulting from Potential Accidents of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Z. Shi and X. Wei; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 253 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; SPECIAL SECTION ON TMI-2 VESSEL INVESTIGATION PROJECT: 256 Three Mile Island—New Findings 15 Years After the Accident A. M. Rubin and E. Beckjord; 269 Relocation of Molten Material to the TMI-2 Lower Head, J. R. Wolf, D. W. Akers, and L. A. Neimark; 280 Insight Into the TMI-2 Core Material Relocation Through Examination of Instrument Tube Nozzles, L. A. Neimark; 288 Physical and Radiochemical Examinations of Debris from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. W. Akers and B. K. Schuetz; 301 Results of Metallographic Examinations and Mechanical Tests of Pressure Vessel Samples from the TMI-2 Lower Head, D. R. Diercks and G. E. Korth; 313 Margin-to-Failure Calculations for the TMI-2 Vessel, J. Rempe, L. Stickler, S. Chavez, G. Thinnes, R. Witt, and M. Corradini; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 328 1993 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program Results, L. N. Vanden Heuvel, J. W. Cletcher, D. A. Copinger, J. W. Minarick, B. W. Dolan, and P. D. O’Reilley; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 339 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 345 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 234 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements; 356 1995 International Incineration Conference; 358 Fifth International Controls and Instrumentation Conference; 359 ANS International Topical Meeting on Safety of Operating Reactors; 359 Fifth International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 360 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment Methodology and Applications; 351 The Authors; 357 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 35.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1988

Space Station Information Systems

The utility of the Space Station is improved, the ability to manage and integrate its development and operation enhanced, and the cost and risk of developing the software for it is minimized by three major information systems. The Space Station Information System (SSIS) provides for the transparent collection and dissemination of operational information to all users and operators. The Technical and Management Information System (TMIS) provides all the developers with timely and consistent program information and a project management 'window' to assess the project status. The Software Support Environment (SSE) provides automated tools and standards to be used by all software developers. Together, these three systems are vital to the successful execution of the program.

Pittman, Clarence W.↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Rapid Sequential Separation Method for Determination of Actinides and TENORM in Fracking Wastes - 20223

With recent advances in unconventional drilling technology in the US and around the world, the risks of environmental contamination and exposure due to technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials (TENORM) from fracking wastes have also surfaced. Although the Permian Basin (southeastern New Mexico, western Texas) has long been a modest producer of oil, the advent of fracking technology a decade ago turned it into hot property for producers. A 2018 assessment of undiscovered, technically recoverable continuous oil and gas resources by the U.S. Geological Survey estimates an average 46.3 billion barrels of oil and 281 trillion cubic feet of gas. This is likely to increase the use of unconventional drilling and TENORM generation. TENORM concentrations in oil and gas exploration and production waste can be several hundred to several thousand times higher than background TENORM concentrations. Both the thorium and uranium decay chains contribute to airborne radionuclides arising from the radon gas escaping the ground and subsequently decaying as airborne particulates. Additionally, radon decay products {sup 210}Pb and {sup 210}Po can build up in scale on the internal surfaces of oil and gas handling pipes and in sludge in refineries, becoming potential inhalation and ingestion hazards for workers. Furthermore, southeastern NM is also home to world's only licensed and operating transuranic nuclear waste repository, the DoE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Plutonium isotopes ({sup 239+240}Pu) and {sup 241}Am, are expected to account for more than 99% of the total radioactivity scheduled for disposal in the WIPP repository. Thus, an improved understanding of the environmental fate and transport of TENORM, liberated by unconventional drilling, is essential to assess how best to protect individuals and the environment. In this context, accurate measurement of TENORM and actinides in environmental and biological samples is essential. In this presentation, a new sequential method for the separation and pre-concentration of actinides (Pu, Am, Np) and TENORM (Po, U and Th) derived from oil and gas exploration is proposed. The TEVA method involves a rapid co-precipitation step to remove matrix interferences from the samples, followed by plutonium oxidation state adjustment to Pu (IV) and an incubation period of ∼ 1 hour at 50-60 deg. C to allow the resultant Po (II) to oxidize into Po(IV). The polonium, neptunium, thorium and plutonium are then separated on a TEVA column, while americium and uranium are separated on a TRU column. After separation, the alpha counting source was prepared by micro-precipitation with copper sulfide (CuS) for polonium and neodymium fluoride (NdF{sub 3}) for actinides. The efficiency and reliability of the procedures were tested by analyzing filter, drinking water and frack sand samples. The method is simple, robust and can be performed quickly with excellent removal of interferences, high chemical recovery and very good alpha peak resolution. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗
NASA NTRS1982

Need for, and financial feasibility of, satellite-aided land mobile communications

Questions regarding the role of a mobile-satellite system in augmenting the terrestrial communications system are considered, and a market assessment study is discussed. Aspects of an investment analysis are examined, taking into account a three phase financial study of four postulated land Mobile Satellite Service (LMSS) systems, project profitability evaluation methods, risk analysis methods, financial projections, potential investor acceptance standards, and a risk analysis. It is concluded that a satellite augmented terrestrial mobile service appears to be economically and technically superior to a service depending exclusively on terrestrial systems. The interest in the Mobile Satellite Service is found to be worldwide, and the ground equipment market is potentially large.

Castruccio, P. A.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Multi-Mechanism Flood Hazard Assessment: Example Use Case Studies

Multi-mechanism flood (MMF) events are caused by the combined effects of more than one flooding mechanism. Although floods can result from the occurrence of individual flood mechanisms, they can (and often do) result from multiple flooding mechanisms. MMF events may be more severe than single mechanism events, or they may differ in characteristics. To facilitate comprehensive risk-informed decision-making to protect against and mitigate the effects of flood events, understanding the hazard contributions from MMFs is important. Nevertheless, conventional probabilistic flood hazard assessment approaches typically focus on individual flood hazard mechanisms. This report is part of a research project funded by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) intended to assist NRC in developing the technical basis for guidance on developing probabilistic estimates of flood hazards for combinations of flood mechanisms. Specifically, the purpose of this report is to document two case studies to illustrate approaches for quantifying MMF hazards for inland and coastal flooding scenarios.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

DER Cybersecurity Standards: Assessment and Gap Analysis

The purpose of this report is to share the comprehensive gap analysis of existing cybersecurity standards applicable to Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within the electric power sector. This analysis aims to identify critical deficiencies in current standards, assess their alignment with industry needs, and provide actionable recommendations for enhancing cybersecurity measures. The scope encompasses various DER technologies, including solar, wind, energy storage, and hydrogen fuel cells, and emphasizes the significance of establishing robust cybersecurity frameworks and standards to safeguard these increasingly integrated systems. The report provides valuable insights for stakeholders in the DER ecosystem, including manufacturers, utilities, and regulators. It underscores the importance of continued development and refinement of cybersecurity standards to keep up with the technical advances in DERs and associated cybersecurity challenges. The analysis evaluated IEC, IEEE, ISA, ISO, and UL standards relevant to DER cybersecurity. Standards were assessed on their coverage of key requirements including data availability, integrity, confidentiality, access control, authentication, encryption, and system hardening. For each standard, the analysis assessed its alignment with current industry practices, regulatory compliance, effectiveness in addressing known risks, coverage of emerging risks, and how it promotes interoperability. The evaluation also considered potential integration challenges and barriers to adoption.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2024

Assessment of Some IASMS-relevant Data Sources for Aviation Safety

An In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) [1,2] is a set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) necessary for monitoring known hazards and emergent risks, assessing safety data for anomalies, precursors, and trends, mitigating hazards that reach safety thresholds, and assuring efficacy of controls in mitigating hazards. An IASMS will continually monitor the NAS to collect data on the status of aircraft, air traffic management systems, weather, and airports. Within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) System-Wide Safety (SWS) project’s technical challenge called In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) for Commercial Aviation Operations, which we often refer to as Technical Challenge 6 (TC-6), we have performed an assessment of several aviation data sources we have found that are relevant to assessing the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS) in the context of an IASMS. This assessment includes understanding the nature of the data themselves and using some data analytics tools on these data to show how they can be used to identify potential safety issues. We also describe how the data and analytics are part of a system that can allow for other data and analytics to be performed and for the results to be visualized for use by appropriate operators to identify potential safety issues and develop mitigations. This report is a step toward the ultimate goal of TC-6, which is to develop a prototype IASMS system that demonstrates the potential of an IASMS and inspire operators to build analogous systems to make the best possible use of the significant investments that they make in collecting, storing, and managingdata related to their operations.

aviation safety↗
NASA NTRS1998

Insight into mechanisms of reduced orthostatic performance after exposure to microgravity: comparison of ground-based and space flight data

Since the beginning of human spaceflight, the value of understanding mechanisms of physiological adaptation to microgravity became apparent to life scientists who were interested in maintining crew health and developing countermeasures agains adverse effects of the mission. However, several characteristics associated the the logistics of spaceflight presented significant limitations to the scientific study of human adaptation to microgravity. Because space missions are so infrequent and involve minimal numbers of crewmembers, meaninful statistical analysis of data are limited. Reproducibility of results from spaceflight experiments is difficult to assess since there are few repeated space missions involving the same crewmembers. Since the emphasis of space missions is placed on operations, experiments are compromised without adequate control over various factors (e.g., time, diet, physical activities, etc.) that can impact measured responses. With the mimimal opportunity to collect spaceflight data, there is a high risk of experiments that simultaneously interfere with other experiments by the increasing demand on the crewmembers to participate in mumerous experiments proposed by multiple investigators. The technology and ability to measure physiological functions necessary to test specific hypotheses can be severely limited by physical space and power constraints of the space enviroment. Finally, technical and logistical aspects of space missions such as launch delays, extended missions, and inflight operational emergencies can significantly compromise the timing and control of experiments. These limitations have stimulated scientists to develop ground-based analogs of microgravity in an effort to investigate the effects of spaceflight on physiological function in a controlled experimental setting. The purpose of this paper is to provide a selected comparison of data collected from ground-based experiments with those obtained from spaceflight in an effort to assess the adequacy of ground analogs of actual flight for the study of human physiological adaptation to microgravity. Specifically, results from ground and spaceflight will be used to provide insight into mechanisms underlying adaptations of blood pressure regulation and reduced orthostatic performance to the microgravity environment.

Non-NASA Center↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Current cybersecurity challenges for distributed energy resources (DERs) stem from the integration of various systems and the cyber-physical security concerns they bring. Although frameworks exist for industrial control systems and other energy systems, a simple guided tool that can prioritize recommended actions for controls specific to DERs is lacking. Additionally, the novelty of the field has made it difficult to create a standardized procedure for DERs with cybersecurity in mind. In response to this critical need to address cybersecurity risk management, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed a framework and accompanying web application known as the Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF) (Powell, 2019). A brief overview of the DERCF can be found in Section 1.2. This document provides a guide to cybersecurity best practices identified by technical research and site visits where the framework was used to assess the cybersecurity posture of DER systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Cloud-Based Applications Enabling a Scalable Risk-Informed Predictive Maintenance Strategy Across the Nuclear Fleet

The current light water reactor fleet uses time-based or failure-based maintenance strategies to achieve high-capacity factors. But to make nuclear more competitive in the energy market, these reactors could utilize emerging technologies in terms of artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing to enable a cost-effective, predictive maintenance strategy. This report examines the feasibility of cloud computing for the nuclear industry’s needs in terms of the cloud’s computing capabilities, feasibility, and regulatory concerns. The technical viability of cloud computing was analyzed using one year worth of data from a boiling water reactor’s safety relief valve. Models were hosted on a local desktop, Idaho National Laboratory’s high-performance computer, and Microsoft Azure. Data was loaded, processed, and two types of models were trained in an A/B fashion. Based on the speed at which these actions were completed, it was used to determined that cloud computing has adequate computing resources. Additionally, the computing power can scale with the demanded load. To enable cloud computing in the existing fleet, additional sensors, networks, and other requirements must be implemented to ensure a smooth transition from current maintenance strategies. However, there is a benefit as the plant no longer needs manage their own servers, software, cybersecurity, and IT support staff. Many of these features can be offloaded on to the cloud provider. A comprehensive analysis was completed that showed the current annual cost of operating is more expensive than using cloud computing resources. Lastly, the regulatory framework does not explicitly address AI or autonomous control. Currently, the NRC and other regulatory bodies are evaluating providing guidance to address gaps rather than new regulations to address the use of AI and ML. But since many of the AI applications are focused on non-safety related applications, such as balance-of-plant components, they will likely have little or no regulatory restrictions or necessary approvals. Demonstrating how AI can improve maintenance and operation of these non-safety related systems seems like the likely path forward for implementing AI and cloud computing resources inside nuclear power plants (NPPs).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗