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DOE OSTI2015

Effect of Control Blade History, and Axial Coolant Density and Burnup Profiles on BWR Burnup Credit

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have initiated a multiyear project to investigate the application of burnup credit (BUC) for boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation systems (often referred to as casks) and spent fuel pools (SFPs). This work is divided into two main phases. The first phase investigated the applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used in SFPs to transportation and storage casks and the validation of reactivity calculations and spent fuel compositions within these methods. The second phase focuses on extending BUC beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents the analysis of the effects of control blade insertion history, and moderator density and burnup axial profiles for extended BWR BUC.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2015

Effects of Lower Drying-Storage Temperatures on the DBTT of High-Burnup PWR Cladding

The purpose of this research effort is to determine the effects of canister and /or cask drying and storage on radial hydride precipitation in, and potential embrittlement of, high-burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) cladding alloys during cooling for a range of peak drying-storage temperatures and hoop stresses. Extensive precipitation of radial hydrides could lower the failure hoop stresses and strains, relative to limits established for as-irradiated cladding from discharged fuel rods stored in pools, at temperatures below the ductile- to-brittle transition temperature (DBTT).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2019

First Road / River Barge Security Transport of SNF under the New German Transport Security Guidelines - 19102

A transfer of 342 spent fuel assemblies from NPP Obrigheim to NPP Neckarwestheim, both located alongside the river Neckar in the south of Germany, is required to promote the decommissioning process of NPP Obrigheim, which started in 2008 after the NPP had been shut down three years before. The spent fuel storage facility in Neckarwestheim offers sufficient storage space to accept the 342 SNF assemblies, stored in fifteen dry casks type CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK. After several transport feasibility studies had been conducted, Daher Nuclear Technologies GmbH was awarded the commission to plan, prepare and conduct the SNF transport. Since the combined road / river barge transport promised to be the most suitable mode of transportation Daher Nuclear Technologies started to prepare its security concept, a prerequisite to apply for and attain the transport license mandatory for transporting spent nuclear fuel in Germany. In March 2014 the company applied for the transport license, which, after more than three years and numerous amendments to the security concept, was finally granted to Daher Nuclear Technologies on May 16, 2017 by the German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (successor organization of the BfS). Simultaneously to the license application phase the transport equipment - amongst others the heavy-duty trucks and trailers, the pusher tugs, the river barge and transport frames - had to be provided and modified to meet the intensified requirements of the New German Transport Security Guidelines Road / Rail as well as several other legal regulations referring to the transport of dangerous goods by road and inland waterways (e.g. ADR - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and ADN - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). The planning process involved various meetings with representatives of different authorities and administrative bodies incl. accredited experts as well as subcontractors. Tremendous training efforts had to be undertaken to train more than 100 transport participants regarding security measures, health, safety and environmental measures, as well as the proper handling of radioactive material. This also included the training of the security staff, that had to be qualified in compliance with the new Transport Security Guidelines Road and Rail. Finally, in June 2017, when all preparations where complete, all requirements met, and all permits obtained, the first ever security SNF transport on a German river was performed. Three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK transport and storage casks were transported in one batch via heavy-duty truck-trailer from the NPP Obrigheim to the NPP's own harbor, to be rolled on to the river barge, that would carry the three casks upstream the river Neckar to the approx. fifty kilometer distant NPP Neckarwestheim. The journey on the river took about eleven hours, in which several bridges and locks had to be passed. The entire transport was escorted by qualified security staff and auxiliary police forces on waterways and alongside on roads. It attracted nationwide public attention, due to its pioneer status and the fact, that there hadn't been any SNF or HLW shipments in Germany since 2011. After the convoy safely arrived at NPP Neckarwestheim's pier the three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK casks were rolled off the river barge via heavy-duty truck-trailers to be stored in the on-site interim storage facility. This first transport was a success and was followed by four additionally successful security transports in September, October, November and December 2017. The public attention receded significantly during the transport campaign, which ended on December 19, 2017 with the transfer of the last three of fifteen casks to the on-site interim storage facility in Neckarwestheim. With the last cask safely transferred to the interim storage facility Daher Nuclear Technologies successfully completed the transport campaign on schedule, meeting one of EnBW's fundamental objectives to finish the transfer of the 342 SNF assemblies by the end of 2017. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

A Threshold Helium Leakage Detection Switch with Ultra Low Power Operation

Detecting helium leakage is important in many applications, such as in dry cask nuclear waste storage systems. This work develops a helium detection system based on the relative permittivity (dielectric constant) difference between air and helium. This difference changes the status of an electrostatic microelectromechanical system (MEMS) switch. The switch is a capacitive-based device and requires a very negligible amount of power. Exciting the switch’s electrical resonance enhances the MEMS switch sensitivity to detect low helium concentration. This work simulates two different MEMS switch configurations: a cantilever-based MEMS modeled as a single-degree-freedom model and a clamped-clamped beam MEMS molded using the COMSOL Multiphysics finite-element software. While both configurations demonstrate the switch’s simple operation concept, the clamped-clamped beam was selected for detailed parametric characterization due to its comprehensive modeling approach. The beam detects at least 5% helium concentration levels when excited at 3.8 MHz, near electrical resonance. The switch performance decreases at lower excitation frequencies or increases the circuit resistance. The MEMS sensor detection level was relatively immune to beam thickness and parasitic capacitance changes. However, higher parasitic capacitance increases the switch’s susceptibility to errors, fluctuations, and uncertainties.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2016

GNS Castor V/21 Headspace Gas Sampling 2014

Prior to performing an internal visual inspection, samples of the headspace gas of the GNS Castor V/21 cask were taken on June 12, 2014. These samples were taken in support of the CREIPI/Japanese nuclear industry effort to validate fuel integrity without visual inspection by measuring the 85 Kr content of the cask headspace

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2015

Technical Basis for Peak Reactivity Burnup Credit for BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel in Storage and Transportation Systems

Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission have initiated a multiyear project to investigate application of burnup credit for boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation casks. This project includes two phases. The first phase (1) investigates applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used in spent fuel pools (SFPs) to storage and transportation systems and (2) evaluates validation of both reactivity (k eff ) calculations and burnup credit nuclide concentrations within these methods. The second phase will focus on extending burnup credit beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents the first phase, including an analysis of lattice design parameters and depletion effects, as well as both validation components. Initial efforts related to extended burnup credit are discussed in a companion paper. Peak reactivity analyses have been used in criticality analyses for licensing of BWR fuel in SFPs over the last 20 years. These analyses typically combine credit for the gadolinium burnable absorber present in the fuel with a modest amount of burnup credit. Gadolinium burnable absorbers are used in BWR assemblies to control core reactivity. The burnable absorber significantly reduces assembly reactivity at beginning of life, potentially leading to significant increases in assembly reactivity for burnups less than 15–20 GWd/MTU. The reactivity of each fuel lattice is dependent on gadolinium loading. The number of gadolinium-bearing fuel pins lowers initial lattice reactivity, but it has a small impact on the burnup and reactivity of the peak. The gadolinium concentration in each pin has a small impact on initial lattice reactivity but a significant effect on the reactivity of the peak and the burnup at which the peak occurs. The importance of the lattice parameters and depletion conditions are primarily determined by their impact on the gadolinium depletion. Criticality code validation for BWR burnup credit at peak reactivity requires a different set of experiments than for pressurized-water reactor burnup credit analysis because of differences in actinide compositions, presence of residual gadolinium absorber, and lower fission product concentrations. A survey of available critical experiments is presented along with a sample criticality code validation and determination of undercoverage penalties for some nuclides. The validation of depleted fuel compositions at peak reactivity presents many challenges which largely result from a lack of radiochemical assay data applicable to BWR fuel in this burnup range. In addition, none of the existing low burnup measurement data include residual gadolinium measurements. An example bias and uncertainty associated with validation of actinide-only fuel compositions is presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2015

Technical basis for peak reactivity burnup credit for BWR spent nuclear fuel in storage and transportation systems - 14601

Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission have initiated a multiyear project to investigate application of burnup credit for boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation casks. This project includes two phases. The first phase (1) investigates applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used in spent fuel pools (SFPs) to storage and transportation systems and (2) evaluates validation of both reactivity (k{sub eff}) calculations and burnup credit nuclide concentrations within these methods. The second phase will focus on extending burnup credit beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents the first phase, including an analysis of lattice design parameters and depletion effects, as well as both validation components. Initial efforts related to extended burnup credit are discussed in a companion paper. Peak reactivity analyses have been used in criticality analyses for licensing of BWR fuel in SFPs over the last 20 years. These analyses typically combine credit for the gadolinium burnable absorber present in the fuel with a modest amount of burnup credit. Gadolinium burnable absorbers are used in BWR assemblies to control core reactivity. The burnable absorber significantly reduces assembly reactivity at beginning of life, potentially leading to significant increases in assembly reactivity for burnups less than 15-20 GWd/MTU. The reactivity of each fuel lattice is dependent on gadolinium loading. The number of gadolinium-bearing fuel pins lowers initial lattice reactivity, but it has a small impact on the burnup and reactivity of the peak. The gadolinium concentration in each pin has a small impact on initial lattice reactivity but a significant effect on the reactivity of the peak and the burnup at which the peak occurs. The importance of the lattice parameters and depletion conditions are primarily determined by their impact on the gadolinium depletion. Criticality code validation for BWR burnup credit at peak reactivity requires a different set of experiments than for pressurized-water reactor burnup credit analysis because of differences in actinide compositions, presence of residual gadolinium absorber, and lower fission product concentrations. A survey of available critical experiments is presented along with a sample criticality code validation and determination of undercoverage penalties for some nuclides. The validation of depleted fuel compositions at peak reactivity presents many challenges which largely result from a lack of radiochemical assay data applicable to BWR fuel in this burnup range. In addition, none of the existing low burnup measurement data include residual gadolinium measurements. An example bias and uncertainty associated with validation of actinide-only fuel compositions is presented. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Oxyhydroxides on aluminum spent nuclear fuel: formation studies and removal practices to prevent radiolytic gas production

Aluminum-clad nuclear fuel has been at the forefront in research and commercial reactors. After being removed from the reactor, the spent nuclear fuel is placed in large-volume water basins (wet storage) that are constantly monitored for water quality to minimize corrosion/deterioration. The water provides both radiation shielding and cooling for the freshly removed fuel. It is highly desired to have a pathway for fuel to be transitioned to dry storage in sealed casks, so that spent nuclear fuel can be safely transported and dispositioned in a permanent repository, and basin capacity can be made available for temporary wet storage of fresher spent fuel. A challenge for safe, road-ready dry storage is the hydrated aluminum oxides (oxyhydroxides) that are prevalent on aluminum spent nuclear fuel that has been stored under water for years. If water is released from the oxyhydroxides during dry storage, it can create corrosion within the storage canister, and hydrogen can be generated through radiolysis of the oxyhydroxides, causing pressurization and flammability risks. The focus of this project is to develop knowledge of the oxyhydroxide growth and production of gases through radiolysis and to apply empirical models for predicting these phenomena. The expertise developed will be used to formulate conditions and parameters for oxyhydroxide removal/dehydration from fuel cladding through vacuum or forced-air gas drying, to prevent problems during permanent dry storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Thermal Analysis Evaluations Using the Dry Cask Simulator

Different thermal analysis models were developed to simulate the dry cask simulator (DCS). The DCS is an experiment designed to simulate dry storage of a single boiling water reactor fuel assembly under a variety of heat loads and internal pressures. The DCS was set up and tested in both a vertical and horizontal configuration to determine cladding temperatures in vertical and horizontal dry cask storage systems. The models included a detailed STAR-CCM+ model with the fuel assembly geometry explicitly modeled, a porous STAR-CCM+ model with the fuel assembly geometry modeled as porous media region with calculated effective properties, and a COBRA-SFS model. COBRA-SFS is a thermal-hydraulic code developed for steady-state and transient analysis of multi assembly spent-fuel storage and transportation systems. STAR-CCM+ is a commercial computation fluid dynamics (CFD) code. Both a detailed and porous STARCCM+ model were developed to look at the effective thermal conductivity (keff) approach to modeling a fuel assembly. A keff fuel model is typically model in CFD thermal analyses due to its significantly lower computational costs. The models were run for a combination of low and high canister pressures (100 kPa and 800 kPa) and low and high internal heat loads (0.5 kW and 5 kW). Results from all three models were compared against experimental data taken from the DCS for the peak cladding temperature (PCT) and inlet air mass flow.

Suffield, Sarah R.↗

DOE OSTI2015

EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2017

FATIGUE BEHAVIOR OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL RODS IN SIMULATED TRANSPORTATION ENVIRONMENT

Nuclear fuel rod is composed of cladding tube and a specified number of fuel pellets contained. In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to be transported to at least one storage facility before permanent disposal. The fatigue behavior of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods under reversed cyclic bending must be understood in order to evaluate their vibration integrity in a transportation environment. This is especially important for high-burnup SNFs (>45 GWd/MTU). This report presents the experimental results related to Zircaloy (Zry)-4 - based surrogate rods and high-burnup SNFs, based on recent work performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The surrogate rod was made of Zry-4 cladding and alumina pellets, and high-burnup fuel rods were discharged from H.B. Robinson pressurized water reactor. The reversed cyclic bending testing was conducted at 5 Hz under loading control. The effect of pre-hydriding and burnup or irradiation on the flexural rigidity and fatigue life of cladding-pellet system were discussed. The fatigue data obtained are extremely useful to the future certification of SNF storage and transportation cask.

Wang, Jy-An John↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

The Savannah River Site (SRS) L Area Facility provides for the safe receipt, storage, handling, and shipping of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and has received more than 47,000 SNF assemblies since 1964. In order to consolidate receipt and storage analysis, L Area criticality safety has historically used several aluminum-clad “reference fuels” to establish bounding storage, handling, and cask loading limits and then applied a reactivity comparison approach to demonstrate that candidate fuels may be processed under the reference fuel limits. Currently, only aluminum-clad SNF from off-site research reactors are transferred on-site. The Accelerated Basin De-Inventory (ABD) program will begin the removal of bundled Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel (NASNF) from the L Area disassembly basin for dissolution and disposition, which has driven the need for a non-aluminum reference fuel. This paper discusses the process and results of creating a new fictional homogenous NASNF highly enriched uranium reference fuel, “MITZ,” to be used in nuclear criticality safety evaluations for upcoming SNF disposition operations. Data demonstrating the relationship between neutron multiplication behavior and fuel spacing is generated for the new reference fuel MITZ as well as existing reference fuels representing several types of SNF assemblies.

Reference Fuel↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reference Fuel Development for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

Reference Fuel↗

DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of Radiological Release From Fueled Irradiation Experiments During Manual Handling (Slides)

Irradiation experiments are manually handled at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) by qualified operators using long handled tools. Standard handling evolutions include insertion and removal from the reactor vessel, transfer to/from a storage location or cask in the ATR canal, and handling/reconfigurations at a canal working tray. Such routine handling has the potential to result in mechanical damage to the experiment boundary which is credited to retain fission products. Since damage can occur due to operator error, this is an anticipated occurrence. This work determines the radiological consequences to receptors inside the ATR facility, as well as public receptors. Given the wide variety of fuel types tested at the ATR, a generic approach to the analysis is taken. The radiological inventory is determined to bound a variety of fuel types (e.g., ceramic and molten fuel matrices) and fission powers on the U-235 enrichment spectrum. The source term analysis considers different release fractions to bound different fuel types and burnups. The postulated handling events occur underwater; thus, retention of the released isotopic content is considered within the canal water column. Retention of radionuclides in the water column is determined using a modified approach of United States (US) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183. Radiological dose to the facility receptor is determined using a compartment release model. Dose to the public receptor is determined using atmospheric dispersion models using site specific atmospheric conditions with the use of the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) program version 7.2.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI2020

Damaged Fuel in the United States - 20325

Throughout the history of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the U.S., many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. Since they can no longer be handled, stored, or transported in accordance with established regulations, they are classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in damaged fuel cans to be used in conjunction with storage and/or transportation systems. These systems have a limited number of slots that can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless-steel container that confines damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and is closed at one end by mesh endpoints that allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of extreme caution, a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S. because relevant regulations do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead, these regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included among the approved contents to be considered acceptable. In many cases, damaged SNF is encapsulated in damaged fuel cans to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and/or damaged assemblies to known volumes within loaded casks. A damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), which used data from U.S. reactors compiled from 1968 to June 30, 2013, to produce Form GC-859, 'Nuclear Fuel Data Survey.' According to this form, there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies, for a combined total of 241,468. Of these, 4,521 were classified as failed. Some were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods combined to make consolidated assemblies. These consolidated assemblies may include damaged fuel or were perhaps consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing 0 - 264 entire fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in each damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 un-canistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Damaged Fuel in the United States

Over the years of commercial nuclear power plant operations in the United States (U.S.), many fuel assemblies have lost the capability to perform all of their desired functions. These assemblies have lost the capability to be handled, stored, or transported to meet regulations resulting in them being classified as damaged fuel. The causes of these failed assemblies are diverse and plant-specific. The majority of these failed assemblies are contained in a damaged fuel can that will be used in conjunction with a storage and/or transportation system. The storage and transportation systems have a limit on how many slots can be filled with damaged fuel cans. A damaged fuel can is generally a stainless steel container that confines damaged SNF and is closed on its end by screened openings. These screened openings allow gaseous and liquid media to escape but minimize the dispersal of gross particulate material. Out of an abundance of caution a few reactors have loaded high burnup fuel into damaged fuel cans. Damaged fuel is not licensed for storage or transport in the U.S., because the regulations for storage and transport do not specify exactly how to classify damaged fuel. Instead the regulations license/certify packages that specify approved contents. Damaged fuel must be included in the approved contents to be a viable option. In many cases damaged SNF is encapsulated in a damaged fuel can to ensure it can confine gross fuel particles, debris, and or damaged assemblies to a known volume within a loaded cask. This damaged fuel can may then be utilized in the same way as an assembly in a storage and transportation design system. Some storage cask systems utilize top and bottom plugs to confine debris in damaged fuel. The most recent domestic documentation on damaged SNF was performed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and used data from U.S. reactors concluding in June 30th 2013 to produce Form GC-859, “Nuclear Fuel Data Survey”. Based on this form there were 136,821 boiling water reactor (BWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies and 104,647 pressurized water reactor (PWR) SNF assemblies for a total of 241,468 SNF assemblies in the U.S. Out of these 241,468 SNF assemblies, 4,521 assemblies were classified as failed. Some assemblies were also disassembled and the fuel rods or pieces of fuel rods were combined together to make a consolidated assembly. A consolidated assembly may include damaged fuel, or it could have been consolidated as part of a demonstration project. The GC-859 data includes 2,550 consolidated assemblies containing between 0 and 264 whole fuel rods. These consolidated assemblies could be placed in single assembly canisters and stored in the spent fuel pool. For dry storage and transportation, a single assembly canister is generally placed in a damaged fuel can. In addition to the consolidated assemblies, 2,391 uncanistered fuel rod pieces exist, which were removed from 494 assemblies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Friction Experiment Data Analysis

The Spent Fuel Waste Disposition (SFWD) program under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is planning a seismic shake table test of full-scale dry storage systems of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to close the gap related to the seismic loads on the fuel assemblies in dry storage systems. This test will allow for quantifying the strains and accelerations on surrogate fuel assembly during representative earthquakes. A concrete layer will be installed on the shake table before the test to simulate conditions representative of an ISFSI pad. In the shake table tests with the vertical cask, the cask will be free-standing because this is representative of all, except two, ISFSIs in the U.S. with vertical dry storage casks. The static and dynamic friction coefficients between the steel bottom of the cask and the concrete layer on the shake table are important parameters that will affect cask behavior during the test. These parameters must be known for the pre- and post-test modelling, data analysis, and model validation. The friction experiment was performed at the Engineering Department of the University of New Mexico (UNM) to determine the friction coefficients between a steel plate with the same finish as the bottom of the vertical cask manufactured for the test and different concrete surfaces. In this experiment the steel plate was fixed and the concrete sample was pulled over the plate with a constant displacement rate using an MTS machine. This allowed for collecting continuous horizontal force data over the length of the steel plate. Four displacement rates and three vertical loads were used. The tests were performed with four concrete blocks with different degrees of the surface roughness - light sandblast, light to medium sandblast, medium bush hammer, and heavy sandblast. The total number of tests was 48. The data were used to calculate static and dynamic friction coefficients.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Pretest Modeling A Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Shake Test

The U.S. Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program is planning to conduct a series of full-scale shake table tests to simulate hypothetical earthquake conditions and record the response of surrogate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in a dry canister storage system mockup. The shake table motions will represent a range of hypothetical earthquake conditions at hypothetical locations in the continental U.S. to generally define the range of mechanical loads that SNF can be expected to experience during extended dry storage periods. This paper describes the pretest predictions made with LS-DYNA models of the mockup storage systems. The test will use two dry storage system configurations, a mockup vertical concrete cask (VCC) and a mockup horizontal storage module (HSM). The test will use a production-quality canister and basket. Within the canister will be four instrumented fuel assemblies with fuel rods containing surrogate mass and 28 instrumented dummy assemblies that are intended to match the mass and outer dimension of a fuel assembly. The finite element models include models of the VCC and HSM on the shake table to calculate the system level dynamic responses and separate single fuel assembly models to calculate stress and strain in fuel assembly components. Both types of models include nonlinear behavior like rod-to-rod contact and the ability for VCC’s to rock and slide. This paper presents the expected response of the VCC, HSM, and fuel assemblies to the shake table testing that is planned to start in April of 2024. The earthquake conditions represent seismic hazards in the 2,000-to-20,000-year return period range. The test data is expected to confirm the expectation that fuel rod cladding will remain intact, fuel assembly structural components like guide tubes will remain intact, and no significant VCC sliding or tipping will occur in the range of conditions to be tested with the shake table.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗