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At least 307 records · Page 17

Privacy by Design in Distributed Edge Systems: Innovating Secure Workflows for Smart Cities

The proliferation of distributed edge systems, such as those in smart cities, healthcare, and industrial IoT, offers unprecedented opportunities for data processing closer to its source, thereby reducing latency and enhancing efficiency. However, these systems also present significant privacy challenges due to the handling of sensitive data from multiple sources. This article explores the critical need for designing privacy-preserving workflows in distributed edge systems to ensure data security while maximizing the potential of edge computing. By examining the challenges, technological advancements, and potential of privacy-by-design approaches, we highlight the importance of integrating advanced privacy-preserving techniques like federated learning, differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation, and zero-knowledge proofs. These innovations are crucial for enhancing data security, regulatory compliance, and public trust in smart city applications, ultimately leading to safer and more efficient urban environments.

Kotevska, Olivera↗

Distillation of secret-key from a class of compound memoryless quantum sources

We consider secret-key distillation from tripartite compound classical-quantum-quantum (cqq) sources with free forward public communication under strong security criterion. We design protocols which are universally reliable and secure in this scenario. These are shown to achieve asymptotically optimal rates as long as a certain regularity condition is fulfilled by the set of its generating density matrices. We derive a multi-letter formula which describes the optimal forward secret-key capacity for all compound cqq sources being regular in this sense. We also determine the forward secret-key distillation capacity for situations where the legitimate sending party has perfect knowledge of his/her marginal state deriving from the source statistics. In this case regularity conditions can be dropped. Our results show that the capacities with and without the mentioned kind of state knowledge are equal as long as the source is generated by a regular set of density matrices. We demonstrate that regularity of cqq sources is not only a technical but also an operational issue. For this reason, we give an example of a source which has zero secret-key distillation capacity without sender knowledge, while achieving positive rates is possible if sender marginal knowledge is provided.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

National-Tribal Critical Infrastructure Protection: Collaboration for Extraordinary National Security Benefit

This paper examines national and tribal collaborative opportunities to get ahead of the critical infrastructure insecurity problem. Recommendations are viewed through the lens of the Sandia Labs Tribal Cyber-Energy initiative and national security projects. Recommendations include 1) Collaboratively address national priority and shared challenges to gain faster and better solutions to national priority problems on a smaller yet comprehensive American Indian and Alaskan Native sovereign single-point of authority scale 2) Utilize newer standards-based technologies to provide scalable, capable, and manageable solutions for greatly expanded and connected national critical infrastructures 3) Employ Cyber-Physical-Resilient design preliminary analysis to define concept- to-disposition design requirements for preemptive critical infrastructure risk mitigation and baked-in security; 4) Develop data-centric protection to provide increased information asset protection as data shifts from data-owner operated on-premises infrastructure to virtual service provider data-steward owned and operated off-premises infrastructure; and 5) Balance shared solutions with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity and Risk Management frameworks, and the System Security Engineering Guidelines. As yet unallocated federal funding would support research, development, the timely application of National-Tribal critical infrastructure protection, and critical infrastructure Cyber disruption response and recovery with extraordinary mutual benefits for the foreseeable future. The Critical Infrastructure Insecurity Problem: Rapid modernization and expansive connectivity are due to advances in Information and Communications Technologies that have sweeping cyber impact across all critical infrastructure sectors. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Industrial Control Systems are particularly impacted as systems long separated from the Internet are now being connected and computerized. Virtualization and mobility create a Data Everywhere-User Anywhere paradigm that has evaporated the enterprise network perimeter. There are multi-front technological challenges at play, where long depended on technologies simply don't scale to current needs resulting in a digital dichotomy of competing old and new standards. New standards-based technologies scale but are not as well-known or as widely deployed, which leaves decision makers, stakeholders, and the workforce in a quandary, caught mid-stream between the technological past and the virtual future. Rapid and expansive cyber threat accompanies disruptive change in connectivity and computational dependencies. A lack of action will exacerbate the problem if new technologies roll out without baked-in security design. The Risk: If National-Tribal CIP collaboration to design in security is not done, then an ongoing state of insufficient bolt-on security and elevated threat exposure will remain for years to come.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

An Overview of the Safety Case for Small Modular Reactors

Several small modular reactor (SMR) designs emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to lessons learned from the many technical and operational challenges of the large Generation II light-water reactors. After the accident at the Three Mile Island plant in 1979, an ensuing reactor redesign effort spawned the term inherently safe designs, which later evolved into passively safe terminology. Several new designs were engineered to be deliberately small in order to fully exploit the benefits of passive safety. Today, new SMR designs are emerging with a similar philosophy of offering highly robust and resilient designs with increased safety margins. Additionally, because these contemporary designs are being developed subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, they incorporate a number of intrinsic design features to further strengthen their safety and security. Several SMR designs are being developed in the United States spanning the full spectrum of reactor technologies, including water-, gas-, and liquid-metal-cooled ones. Despite a number of design differences, most of these designs share a common set of design principles to enhance plant safety and robustness, such as eliminating plant design vulnerabilities where possible, reducing accident probabilities, and mitigating accident consequences. An important consequence of the added resilience provided by these design approaches is that the individual reactor units and the entire plant should be able to survive a broader range of extreme conditions. This will enable them to not only ensure the safety of the general public but also help protect the investment of the owner and continued availability of the power-generating asset. Examples of typical SMR design features and their implications for improved plant safety are given for specific SMR designs being developed in the United States.

Ingersoll, Daniel T↗

Decision Analysis Methods For the Analysis of Nuclear Terrorism Threats with Imperfect Information

Protection of commercial nuclear fuel cycles against adversary groups who may attempt to steal weapons-usable material is an issue of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. The wide array of potential nuclear fuel cycle configurations and the security measures that could be deployed to protect them pose a daunting system design problem. In general, there are billions of potential design configurations. Moreover, the design choices are not independent – the effectiveness of one design feature or security measure can affect the desirability of other design choices. To explore this issue, we develop a mixed-integer optimization problem that solves a complex decision tree to allocate security resources across a commercial nuclear fuel cycle configuration. A nominal UREX+ reprocessing facility is used to demonstrate how the model allocates resources across a particular fuel cycle facility and shows how the problem can be scaled up to include other facilities and design features in the fuel cycle. In our model, the defender first chooses a set of safeguards to implement in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist theft from various unit operations in the reprocessing facility. The attacker observes the defender’s strategy choice and executes an attack to acquire material, including the possibility of declining to attack at all. The model considers the terrorist as an intelligent adversary with a set of attack strategies known to the defender. The strategic choices made by both the defender and attacker affect the probability of a successful attack by the terrorist and in turn affect the distribution of consequences to the defender. We use a decision tree to illustrate the interactions among costs, decisions, correlated uncertainties, and outcomes, and then show how to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer program with an equivalent solution. The novel features of our formulation include the following. First, as discussed above, we use a sequential game-theoretic formulation (a Stackelberg game). This formulation assumes the attacker can observe the defender’s actions before the attack is executed. Many previous game-theoretic studies have assumed attacker and defender act simultaneously without knowledge of the other’s strategy choice. We believe the sequential game formulation is more applicable for knowledgeable insider adversaries, the focus of this study. Second, we build on our previous work that has developed a methodology to reflect the correlation among probability distributions represented as discrete chance nodes in a decision tree. We illustrate how this methodology can be applied to two chance nodes in a decision tree that relate the quality of the materials that might be stolen or diverted by an adversary with the yield of a weapon that might be constructed from that material. In a decision tree, the dependence of the yield on the quality of the material could be modeled with conditional probabilities of the weapon yield given the quality of the materials obtained. For three outcome discretizations, this would require the assessment of nine conditional probabilities from domain experts as part of the model building effort. In contrast, our methodology will allow this same representation of the tree based on the assessment of the correlation between these two chance nodes by the experts, which we believe is a much easier and more reliable assessment task. The advantage of this approach increases as the number of dependent chance nodes grows in a decision tree representation of this problem. Third, we extend this approach to the approximation of the dependence between discrete binary events such as success or failure represented by binary chance nodes in a decision tree or in the special case of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) based on an event tree. This extension is a novel application in this domain, and uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate conditional probabilities on the binary chance nodes when the number of correlated uncertainties is more than two. Fourth, we show how these decision trees or probability trees can be formulated and solved as equivalent integer programming (IP) problems. The advantages of the IP representation include the opportunity to use the computing power associated with powerful optimization solver algorithms available on high speed computers to solve very large versions of these trees, and the ability to include several such models of different facilities into a much larger IP with connecting constraints that represent budget restrictions, number of available inspection opportunities in a given time window, or other dependencies among these facilities. Policy makers can use the resulting model to inform their decisions about how to assess terrorism risk and to safeguard the commercial nuclear fuel cycle.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Computer Network Security- The Challenges of Securing a Computer Network

This article is intended to give the reader an overall perspective on what it takes to design, implement, enforce and secure a computer network in the federal and corporate world to insure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. While we will be giving you an overview of network design and security, this article will concentrate on the technology and human factors of securing a network and the challenges faced by those doing so. It will cover the large number of policies and the limits of technology and physical efforts to enforce such policies.

Scotti, Vincent, Jr.↗

The role of bioenergy in a climate-changing world

Bioenergy has been under intense scrutiny over the last ten years with significant research efforts in many countries taking place to define and measure sustainable practices. We describe here the main challenges and policy issues and provide policy recommendations for scaling up sustainable bioenergy approaches globally. The 2016 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs defined under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) will not reach global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission targets of 2 °C. Sustainable biomass production can make a significant contribution. Substantive evidence exists that many bioenergy cropping systems can bring multiple benefits and off-set environmental problems associated with fossil fuels usage as well as intensive food production and urbanization. We provide evidence that there are many approaches to land use for bioenergy expansion that do not lead to competition for food or other needs. We should focus on how to manage these approaches on a synergistic basis and how to reduce tradeoffs at landscape scales. Priorities include successful synergies between bioenergy and food security (integrated resource management designed to improve both food security and access to bioenergy), investments in technology, rural extension, and innovations that build capacity and infrastructure, promotion of stable prices to incentivize local production and use of double cropping and flex crops (plants grown for both food and non-food markets) that provide food and energy as well as other services. The sustainable production of biomass requires appropriate policies to secure long-term support to improve crop productivity and also to ensure environmental as well as economic and social benefits of bioenergy cropping systems. Continuous support for cropping, infrastructure, agricultural management and related policies is needed to foster positive synergies between food crops and bioenergy production. In comparison to fossil fuels, biofuels have many positive environmental benefits. Potential negative effects caused by land-use change and agriculture intensification can be mitigated by agroecological zoning, best management practices, the use of eco-hydrology and biodiversity-friendly concepts at field, watershed and landscape scales. Global climate and environmental changes related to the use of fossil fuels and inequitable development make it unethical not to pursue more equitable energy development that includes bioenergy. Here, to achieve sustainable development, competitiveness and costs of bioenergy production need to be addressed in a manner that considers not only economic gains but also development of local knowledge and social and environmental benefits.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives include: • Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. • Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacturer, etc.), and assessment video feeds. • All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. • Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. • Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). • Automated creation of reports and data visualization. • Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: • For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” • For personnel safety needs: o Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. o Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual (Ref TBD). • For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Remote Monitoring System Design Requirements for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Nevada National Security Site

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) worked with other sites within the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration weapons complex to develop design requirements for a Remote Monitoring System. System objectives included: Continuous monitoring of packaging (containers) within a Facility's buildings to meet Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) inventory requirements. Remotely access and receive monitoring data for tamper detection/alarm, tracking information, environmental conditions, equipment metadata (serial number, date of manufacture, etc.), and assessment video feeds. All data processing, storage/retrieval, and communications will be protected in a manner commensurate with its trust level and classification. Remotely collected and processed data will be securely stored, backed up, and archived. Current and historical data will accessible within and outside of a Building (location). Automated creation of reports and data visualization. Design features to facilitate the potential future integration with the Facility's physical security alarm and display system. The requirements may be used to develop an integrated conceptual design or may be used in a modular fashion to inform separate designs. The guiding principles in developing the system objectives include: For MC&A needs, remotely perform the physical inventory and evidence collection of tamper for Security Category I and II packaged material within a facility and be capable of satisfying guidelines establish by DOE M 470.4-6, “Nuclear Material Control and Accountability.” For personnel safety needs: Meet/satisfy Nuclear Explosive Safety requirements. Minimize the exposure of personnel to radiation to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) in accordance with NSTec Radiological Controls Manual. For DOE nuclear materials, Building environment shall be controlled to meet requirements for packaged nuclear materials specified in weapons laboratory literature.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a Reference Design for a Cyber-Physical System

The purpose of this thesis is to develop a reference design to assist in the selection of security practices in power electronics design. A prototype will be developed from this reference design for evaluation. This evaluation will include a brief cost/benefit analysis to gauge the efficacy of implementing each layer of security throughout the power electronics design process. This thesis will also describe the obstacles and effectiveness of integrating a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) into a cyber-hardened grid-connected device. The TPM device is a secured crypto processor that assists in generating, storing, and restricting the use of cryptographic keys. The emphasis of this research is to establish integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality within a system by providing a baseline of security concerns for segments of the system. This research considers communication, control, and hardware level securities. The scope of this thesis will review the necessary security methods as well as consider the effects these methods have on the embedded system, to assess the desired security to responsiveness trade off. Applying this approach to a design process will alleviate various unknowns of appending security to a power electronics design. This thesis describes the specific vulnerabilities introduced within this grid-edge environment, and how the liabilities within the system can be mitigated. Initially, common security techniques will be considered to establish a guideline to benchmark performance and resource costs of the system. The foundation will be a non-hardened power electronic system platform with industry standard communication protocols. Several security techniques and attack vectors will then be evaluated to contribute to the base level platform. Other fail-safe features take place to gauge progress of the selected approach, non-inclusive to the TPM. Collectively, this investigation will determine a valid experiment by appraising and categorizing resource allocation, performance overhead, and monetary cost analysis results into a reference design. The prototype will then demonstrate methods to relieve common threats that are purposefully implemented into the design.

Blair, Nicholas Paul↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Gender Mainstreaming in Nuclear Security: Strategies for Incorporating Gender Equality by Design in the IAEA Milestones Approach

Gender mainstreaming has emerged as a critical mechanism towards achieving gender equality in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and programs, including those related to national security. Gender mainstreaming is generally defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs, in all areas and at all levels, with the ultimate goal to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming, which in essence can be thought of as “gender equality by design,” is an important element for building a robust nuclear security infrastructure. To date, however, gender mainstreaming has not been fully operationalized in the nuclear sector. For instance, the IAEA Milestones Approach, which provides important guidance to states seeking to develop nuclear power programs, has not yet incorporated or addressed gender considerations in its various phases or nuclear infrastructure issues, including those related to nuclear security. Therefore, this paper will argue that specifically for nuclear newcomer states, gender mainstreaming could serve as a powerful tool to integrate gender considerations into the design of laws, policies, programs, and entities necessary to successfully implement a nuclear power program. The objective of this study is twofold: first, to explore the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to nuclear security, and second, to identify how gender can be incorporated into the IAEA Milestones Approach. The paper will emphasize the importance of developing guidance for the IAEA and nuclear newcomer states on how gender considerations could be incorporated throughout the development of a nuclear security program.

Siserman-Gray, Ioana-Cristina↗

A Physical Protection Systems Test Bed for International Counter-Trafficking System Development

Physical protection systems have a widespread impact on the nuclear industry in areas such as nuclear safeguards, arms control, and trafficking of illicit goods (e.g., nuclear materials) across international borders around the world. Many challenges must be overcome in design and deployment of foreign border security systems such as lack of infrastructure, extreme environmental conditions, limited knowledge of terrain, insider threats, and occasional cultural resistance. Successful security systems, whether it be a system designed to secure a single facility or a whole border security system, rely on the entire integrated system composed of multiple subsystems. This test bed is composed of many unique sensors and subsystems, including wireless unattended ground sensors, a buried fiber-optic acoustic sensor, a lossy coaxial distributed sensor, wireless links, pan-tilt-zoom cameras, mobile power generation systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fiber-optic-fence intrusion detection systems. A Common Operating Picture software architecture is utilized to integrate a number of these subsystems. We are currently performance testing each system for border security and perimeter security applications by examining metrics such as probability of sense and a qualitative understanding of the sensor s vulnerability of defeat. The testing process includes different soil conditions for buried sensors (e.g., dry, wet, and frozen) and an array of different tests including walking, running, stealth detection, and vehicle detection. Also, long term sustainability of systems is tested including performance differences due to seasonal variations (e.g. summer versus winter, while raining, in foggy conditions). The capabilities of the test bed are discussed. Performance testing results, both at the individual component level and integrated into a larger system for a specific deployment (in situ), help illustrate the usefulness and need for integrated testing facilities to carry out this mission. The test bed provides access to grassy fields, wooded areas, and a large waterway three distinct testing environments. The infrastructure supporting deployment of systems at the test bed includes grid power, renewable power systems, climate controlled enclosures, high bandwidth wireless links, and a fiber optic communications backbone. With over 10 acres of dedicated area and direct waterway access, the test bed is well suited for long term test and evaluation of physical protection and security systems targeting a wide range of applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Inherent secure communications using lattice based waveform design

The wireless communications channel is innately insecure due to the broadcast nature of the electromagnetic medium. Many techniques have been developed and implemented in order to combat insecurities and ensure the privacy of transmitted messages. Traditional methods include encrypting the data via cryptographic methods, hiding the data in the noise floor as in wideband communications, or nulling the signal in the spatial direction of the adversary using array processing techniques. This work analyzes the design of signaling constellations, i.e. modulation formats, to combat eavesdroppers from correctly decoding transmitted messages. It has been shown that in certain channel models the ability of an adversary to decode the transmitted messages can be degraded by a clever signaling constellation based on lattice theory. This work attempts to optimize certain lattice parameters in order to maximize the security of the data transmission. These techniques are of interest because they are orthogonal to, and can be used in conjunction with, traditional security techniques to create a more secure communication channel.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Inventory of Public Key Cryptography in US Electric Vehicle Charging

Electric vehicles (EVs) and charging infrastructure are networked systems, which employ high-level communications in support of charging and grid service decisions. Public key cryptography (PKC) underlies much of the security and privacy protections of the information exchange. We are entering a new epoch where quantum computing threats must be seriously considered. A sufficiently large quantum computer, so named Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (QRQC), will be able to perform the mathematical operations to efficiently attack the underpinnings of traditional PKC, thus jeopardizing the digital foundations for trust, communications security, and data security. Estimates suggest a QRQC can break public key encryption and digital signatures in the manner of tens to hundreds of hours, compared to traditional computing that would demand more than 10 18 years in a brute force-style attack. A consensus belief of quantum theorists, quantum experimenters, and cryptographers suggest that the quantum threat will be likely realized in the next twenty years. To address the threat, post-quantum cryptography, which is cryptosystems that are designed to be secure against both traditional and quantum computing threats, must be adopted. Migration from traditional PKC to quantum-resilient cryptography is a global undertaking and likely represents the largest transition in computing history. The nascent state of EV public key infrastructure, combined with limited adoption of the vehicle secure charging features, presents an opportunity to establish a preference for quantum-resistant cryptography as a step on the migration path. Delays will stunt the efforts as rapidly accelerating EVs sales and huge infrastructure investments will create large growing bases of long-lived vehicles and infrastructure. Migration preparations can commence while NIST continues the process to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which are quantum-resilient algorithms designed to be secure against traditional and quantum computing threats. The first step in preparing EV charging is to identify the presence of traditional public key cryptography algorithms and applications. With this objective in mind, this report is intended to advise the vehicle manufacturers, charging station manufacturers, charging station operators, charge network providers and other EV charging stakeholders with information on traditional PKC application and the potential risks when PKC becomes insecure. This report, the first in a series of reports discussing the topics existing at the confluence of post-quantum cryptography adoption and EV charging, identifies traditional public key applications employed and identifies potential consequences of leaving EV charging infrastructure vulnerable to quantum computing. The focus remains squarely on the of EV charging and infrastructure with respect to PKC and is believed by the authors to complement the NIST SP 1800-38 Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. While the report is centered on infrastructure, there are implications to vehicles.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Towards 5G-Enabled Operational Technology for Process Monitoring and Network Slicing

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are deployed to monitor physical processes in critical cyber-enabled services like power generation. However, CPS ecosystems are typically designed without robust security. While it is important to ensure optimal performance of the Operational Technology (OT) environments, security cannot be overlooked. To modernize traditional OT services, 5G technology is being integrated. 5G technology offers low latency and high availability, making it a suitable infrastructure for managing and monitoring physical processes. How-ever, integrating 5G mechanisms into large-scale OT networks introduces new implementation and performance challenges. Therefore, this paper presents a 5G-enabled CPS architecture (5G-CPS) that describes the necessary components, services, and communication protocols and conducts feasibility study to integrate 5G technology in industrial control system networks to understand the performance merits. The 5G-CPS architecture aims to minimize implementation and operational challenges associated with integrating 5G technology into constrained OT.

Aguayo, Jared M.↗

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

This code implements a Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) system, enabling secure computation on encrypted data without requiring decryption. It supports encryption, decryption, and homomorphic operations like matrix multiplication and addition. This code is adaptable for integrating FHE into linear-time invariant (LTI) systems, including digital control and filtering. With proper configuration from subject matter expertise, encrypted system parameters and signals can be manipulated to perform tasks like state updates, output calculations, and convolution in the encrypted domain. By preserving the structure of LTI systems while ensuring privacy, the framework facilitates secure applications in areas such as autonomous systems, signal processing, and industrial automation. The code initializes the encryption system using parameters provided in the env dictionary. These parameters include the ciphertext modulus, key dimension, plaintext fixed-point scaling factor, and noise bound. During initialization, a secret key is generated, which is essential for encrypting and decrypting data securely. The modular design allows users to tailor these parameters to specific use cases or security requirements. The code implements multiple cryptographic schemes. The learning with errors (LWE) encryption method encodes cleartext message to their plaintext fixed-point representation then encrypted into ciphertext space with additive noise. This noise ensures the security of the scheme, relying on the computational hardness of the LWE problem. The code also includes the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) scheme based off the LWE problem. Homomorphic matrix multiplication is performed between the LWE and GSW to encrypted data. This is achieved using a decomposition function on the LWE ciphertext during the multiplication operation. For higher-dimensional data, the code includes a method to encrypt entire matrices (GSWMat) using GSW encryption. These encrypted matrices can then be used for homomorphic matrix multiplications (MatMult). The decryption function uses the secret key to recover the original plaintext, removing the added noise and scaling that was originally applied during encryption.

Lois, Roberts [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Id↗

The IAEA Assistance Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗