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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 307 records · Page 17
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2017

The Mesoscale Science of the Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE) project

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires the ability to understand and test how material structures, defects, and interfaces determine performance in extreme environments such as in nuclear weapons. To do this, MaRIE will be an x-ray source that is laser-like and brilliant with very fl exible and fast pulses to see at weapons-relevant time scales, and with high enough energy to study critical materials. The Department of Energy (DOE) has determined there is a mission need for MaRIE to deliver this capability. MaRIE can use some of the existing infrastructure of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its accelerator capability. MaRIE will be built as a strategic partnership of DOE national laboratories and university collaborators.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Sandia Review of High Bridge Associates Report: Comparison of Plutonium Disposition Alternatives: WIPP Diluted Plutonium Storage and MOX Fuel Irradiation

The subject report from High Bridge Associates (HBA) was issued on March 2, 2016, in reaction to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program decision to pursue down-blending of surplus Pu and geologic disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Sandia National Laboratories was requested by the DOE to review the technical arguments presented in the HBA report. Specifically, this review is organized around three technical topics: criticality safety, radiological release limits, and thermal impacts. Questions raised by the report pertaining to legal and regulatory requirements, safeguards and security, international agreements, and costing of alternatives, are beyond the scope of this review.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Review of Authentication Strategies and Trends for Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)

In this study we review literature on machine to machine (M2M) authentication and encryption pertaining to communication with grid-attached power inverters. We regard security recommendations from NIST, constrained device recommendations from CoAP, as well as influences from the existing markets. We will not focus on passwordless or multifactor schemes of user authentication, the handover/roaming authentication of mobile systems, or the group authentication of WiMAX/LTE communications. The de-facto standards for authentication and encryption are certificate-based public key cryptography and AES, respectively. While certificate-based public key cryptography is widely adopted, certificate management is seen as an Achilles heel of public key infrastructure (PKI). State of the art authentication system research includes work on certificateless authentication; however, much work in the areas of privacy preservation, efficient or lightweight systems continue to be based in public key methods. We will see efforts such as bilinear pairing, aggregate message authentication codes, one-time signatures, and Merkle trees surface and resurface with improved authentication approaches. Though research continues to produce new encryption schemes, AES prevails as a viable choice, as it can be implemented across a variety of resource constrained devices. Other lightweight encryption algorithms often employ the same fundamental addition-rotation-xor operations as AES while achieving higher efficiency, but at steep tradeoffs to security. Despite mathematical proofs of the security of cryptographic algorithms, in practice the greatest weaknesses continue to be incurred during implementation. Security researchers will find edge cases and bugs that allow unintentional behavior. In the following sections, accepted methodologies of authentication and encryption are discussed. Due diligence for securing M2M communications requires consideration during planning, design, implementation and product lifetime, as opposed to a set-it and forget-it policy. Best practices can be gleaned from published successes and failures, with no single end-all, be-all detailed solution.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Reverberation Chamber Characterization

In this study, we characterized and quantified the behavior of Sandia National Laboratories' electromagnetic reverberation chamber owned by department 1353. The primary purpose of the chamber is to measure the response of a test object to electromagnetic stimuli. The primary chamber application is qualification of nuclear weapons systems and components for the nuclear weapon qualification programs. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires a comprehensive understanding of any measurement used to qualify a nuclear weapon. Understanding includes the accuracy of every measurement used to qualify the weapon. Knowing the uncertainty of any measurement gives the information needed to estimate boundaries and tolerances of the measurement. By proper application of these measurement tolerances, weapon qualification programs can comply with uncertainty requirements. This document reports our findings. Weapons Systems Engineering Assessment Technology (WSEAT) commissioned this effort to provide support to Nuclear Weapons qualification in accordance with Realize Product Sub System (RPSS). Motivation for this effort stems from four qualification programs: B61 LEP, W88 ALT370, W80-4 LEP, and the Mk21 fuze program.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

A White Paper: Disposition Options for a High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

The high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) is a uranium-fueled, graphite-moderated, gas-cooled nuclear reactor design concept capable of producing very high core outlet temperatures. Both types of HTGR have the tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel kernel at the heart of the fuel design. For the prismatic block-type HTGR, the TRISO particles are overcoated with a resinated graphitic matrix and pressed into fuel compacts, which are then heat treated and placed in the fuel channels of the prismatic-block-shaped fuel assemblies. For the pebble-bed-type HTGR, the TRISO particles are dispersed in a graphitic-matrix sphere, which is the basic unit for the reactor core. Despite having very different fuel designs, both types of HTGR are graphite-moderated, gas-cooled, thermal reactors using many of the same materials. As a result, both prismatic-block-type and pebble-bed-type HTGRs have similar radioactive waste streams, all of which require safe and secure storage and eventual disposition. Modern HTGR designs are based on a long and rich operating history of several different graphite-moderated, gas-cooled, thermal reactors. Several of these reactors have been shut down, the fuel has been placed in safe storage, and they have undergone some degree of decommissioning. As such, there is significant experience in the management of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive wastes associated with operating these reactors. This white paper will, (1) identify the definitions and regulations that apply to the safe and secure management, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste; and (2) identify the key radioactive waste streams from HTGRs and their characteristics. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has significant experience in the management of SNF from HTGR predecessors. This experience should form the basis for the management and disposition efforts of the radioactive waste from any new HTGR-type small modular reactor, or microreactor intended for deployment at the INL site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Multi-fidelity equations of state and transport coefficient datasets for pulsed-power applications

Reliably simulating experiments relevant to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requires a detailed description of material properties across a wide range of conditions. Such properties include the equations of state, charged-particle transport coefficients, and optical properties like the opacity. Together, these properties make up the material models used in radiation-magnetohydrodynamic simulations of nuclear fusion experiments. Many of these models do not incorporate uncertainties in the data used to produce them. It is unknown whether these uncertainties significantly impact the interpretation of simulation results and diagnostics. The purpose of this work is to quantify how such uncertainties impact simulations of pulsed-power experiments. We accomplished this task by first assessing discrepancies between approaches used to generate the data. This included bringing together members of the high-energy-density community spanning the three NNSA laboratories and multiple universities. Then, using these data, we developed a general framework that systematically incorporates physical uncertainties within the material models suitable for uncertainty quantification analyses. The framework utilizes machine learning, Bayesian inference, and incorporates multi-fidelity datasets. We demonstrated the framework by quantifying the impact that material model uncertainties have on simulations of pulsed-power experiments underway on Z at Sandia National Laboratories. As a result of this work, we discovered that modest uncertainties in material models (roughly 20%) correspond to significant uncertainties in the outputs from simulations. Our framework has enabled rapid construction of material models through an automated procedure and allows for the generation of material models of interest to the NNSA.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

This document details the strategy proposed to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requirement for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility Sustainment and Modernization projects identified in multiple NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) reports to Congress [NNSA, 2020; 2021; 2022; 2023; 2024]. DARHT has become indispensable for the certification of the primaries of U.S. nuclear weapons since the current U.S. moratorium halted underground nuclear testing more than 30 years ago. However, aging facilities, evolving technology, and other issues are limiting or threatening the capability of DARHT to meet NNSA’s expanding mission needs now and into the future. This DARHT Capability eXpansion (DCX) strategy was developed to address NNSA needs by extending DARHT’s reliability and resilience, increasing the quality and quantity of DARHT data, and enabling hydrodynamic measurements in complex environments. The strategy can be implemented through integration of line-item projects, acquisition of major items of equipment, and other actions coordinated with the execution of the SSMP. This strategy document is intended for U.S. Government officials, particularly authorizers, appropriators, and program leaders. It may also be furnished to DARHT users, customers, collaborators, stakeholders, and visitors as needed

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

History of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program – Volume 2: Lessons Learned (Final Report 2026)

The CSEP Program involved multiple federal agencies, multiple states, and numerous local units of government. The involvement of diverse agencies at different levels of government led to conflict and difficulty in resolving issues. That, in turn, led to slow progress in achieving program goals. Program management was criticized repeatedly by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). After other mechanisms for interagency coordination had failed to give the desired results, FEMA and the Army agreed to form site-specific and national-level IPTs. The IPTs worked well to break the logjam and accelerate implementation of the program. Key elements of the IPTs’ success included constant interagency communication, solving problems at the lowest level, and obtaining buy-in from higher authority. The IPT technique could be applied to other emergency management and homeland security programs that require interagency coordination.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS1975

Extractable resources

The use of information from space systems in the operation of extractive industries, particularly in exploration for mineral and fuel resources was reviewed. Conclusions and recommendations reported are based on the fundamental premise that survival of modern industrial society requires a continuing secure flow of resources for energy, construction and manufacturing, and for use as plant foods.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1986

Principles and techniques in the design of ADMS+

'ADMS+/-' is an advanced data base management system whose architecture integrates the ADSM+ mainframe data base system with a large number of work station data base systems, designated ADMS-; no communications exist between these work stations. The use of this system radically decreases the response time of locally processed queries, since the work station runs in a single-user mode, and no dynamic security checking is required for the downloaded portion of the data base. The deferred update strategy used reduces overhead due to update synchronization in message traffic.

Roussopoulos, Nick↗
NASA NTRS1987

Use of voice recognition for control of a robotic welding workcell

This paper describes work underway to evaluate the effectiveness of voice recognition systems as an element in the control of a robotic welding workcell. Factors being considered for control include program editor access security, preoperation checklist requirements, welding process variable control, and robot manipulator motion overrides. In the latter two categories, manual vocal control is being compared against manual tactile control and fully automatic control in terms of speed of response, accuracy, stability, reliability, and safety.

Watson, J. Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2002

PIMS-Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads and experiments, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center had a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and management of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to provide collaborative access to remote experimenters and International Partners. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground based electronic document configuration management and workflow system that was built to service that need. Functionally, PIMS provides the following document management related capabilities: 1. File access control, storage and retrieval from a central repository vault. 2. Collect supplemental data about files in the vault. 3. File exchange with a PMS GUI client, or any FTP connection. 4. Files placement into an FTP accessible dropbox for pickup by interfacing facilities, included files transmitted for spacecraft uplink. 5. Transmission of email messages to users notifying them of new version availability. 6. Polling of intermediate facility dropboxes for files that will automatically be processed by PIMS. 7. Provide an API that allows other POIC applications to access PIMS information. Functionally, PIMS provides the following Change Request processing capabilities: 1. Ability to create, view, manipulate, and query information about Operations Change Requests (OCRs). 2. Provides an adaptable workflow approval of OCRs with routing through developers, facility leads, POIC leads, reviewers, and implementers. Email messages can be sent to users either involving them in the workflow process or simply notifying them of OCR approval progress. All PIMS document management and OCR workflow controls are coordinated through and routed to individual user's "to do" list tasks. A user is given a task when it is their turn to perform some action relating to the approval of the Document or OCR. The user's available actions are restricted to only functions available for the assigned task. Certain actions, such as review or action implementation by non-PIMS users, can also be coordinated through automated emails.

Elmore, Ralph↗
NASA NTRS2003

Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center has a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and control of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to remote experimenters and International Partners physically located in different parts of the world. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground-based electronic document configuration management and collaborative workflow system that was built to service the POIC's information management needs. This paper discusses the application components that comprise the PIMS system, the challenges that influenced its design and architecture, and the selected technologies it employs. This paper will also touch on the advantages of the architecture, details of the user interface, and lessons learned along the way to a successful deployment. With PIMS, a sophisticated software solution has been built that is not only universally accessible for POIC customer s information management needs, but also universally adaptable in implementation and application as a generalized information management system.

Elmore, Ralph B.↗
DOE OSTI2018

DETECTION OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL AS CRIMINAL/UNAUTHORIZED THREATS TO MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTS

Major Public Events (MPEs), by their nature, draw great public interest and receive intense media attention. They can be anything from sporting events (e.g., Olympics, World Cups) to political summits to large festivals. The threat of nuclear or other radiological materials out of regulatory control during these events is of particular concern. A terrorist could use this material as a dirty bomb to disperse radioactive material in a stadium, or hide dangerous radioactive sources in a garbage can to expose people to harmful radiation, leading to fear and uncertainty. The requirements for nuclear security, preparedness, and operational capabilities for nuclear/radiological detection at MPEs have steadily increased in recent years. Many countries have gained considerable experience in recent years in nuclear security operations at MPEs when hosting these events. Dozens of MPEs hosted around the world each year now provide some level of nuclear security as part of their overall security plan. Several training workshops and courses, co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and conducted through bilateral agreements, are offered each year. These workshops and courses provide the opportunity to share best practices and lessons learned and aid countries to build capacity for nuclear security at their MPEs. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency provides guidance for the detection of radiological threat materials out of regulatory control through the Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 18.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2017

A new international standard on cybersecurity for nuclear power plants: IEC 62645 - cybersecurity requirements - 161

This paper provides an overview of the IEC 62645, an actual standard by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) focused on the issue of requirements for computer security programmes and system development processes to prevent and/or minimize the impact of cyber attacks against computer-based I and C systems. Developed since 2009 and published end of 2014, the standard is intended to be used for changing or establishing new security programmes for I and C systems of operating and new Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). This paper also presents the key issues being considered in the new revision to IEC 62645, currently in process. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗
DOE OSTI2016

Regulation of the Shutdown Defueling and Decommissioning Reactors in the United Kingdom - 16576

Nuclear policy, including for decommissioning, in the United Kingdom is set by the UK Government. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, NDA, is responsible for managing the clean-up of the UK's nuclear legacy which includes the first generation of Magnox power stations. Magnox Ltd (MXL), owned by Cavendish Fluor Partnership, is the licensee and the management and operations contractor responsible for ten Magnox reactor sites and two restoration sites in the UK, working for the sites' owner, NDA. The work of the company is diverse covering electricity generation at Wylfa (until December 2015), defueling, and preparation for an interim end state, known as Care and Maintenance (C and M) which will precede the final site clearance. The C and M phase is expected to last over 75 years during which the sites are maintained in a passively safe and secure state while radiation levels are left to decay naturally. Preparations for this phase include removing fuel from the reactors and storage ponds; retrieving intermediate level waste from current stores and treating it or converting it to forms suitable for long-term storage or disposal and making sure of the integrity of critical safety systems of the de-fuelled reactors. The Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste programme within the Office for Nuclear Regulation, ONR, regulates nuclear safety in the 12 Magnox nuclear licensed sites. ONR works with the environmental regulators who are responsible for environmental protection on nuclear sites. The focus of this paper is the regulation of nuclear safety by ONR across the Magnox sites and the interactions with nuclear security and the environmental aspects required to achieve effective, proportionate and efficient regulation of these sites in the UK. ONR's strategy for regulating the Magnox defueling and decommissioning sites is focused on enabling the licensee to complete the initial stages of decommissioning and reduce the nuclear and radioactive hazards on its sites. To this effect, ONR's revised inspection guidance is centred on inspecting the (remaining) important systems for safety identified in the safety cases. Other interventions focus on engaging with the licensee on safety significant decommissioning projects to gain evidence of the licensee's readiness prior to and during these activities rather than formal assessment of the associated safety cases. In light of reduced hazards and risks across the de-fueled and decommissioning Magnox reactors, ONR's revised regulatory expectation regarding evolution of emergency arrangements during decommissioning is based on key transition points that follow electricity generation. Implementation of these revised strategies as well as organisational restructuring within the team responsible for regulation of the Magnox fleet has resulted in improved efficiency and consistency in regulatory approach whilst securing the required safety standards in managing decommissioning activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Exe-Guard Project

The exe-Guard Project is an alliance between Dominion Virginia Power (DVP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Dartmouth University, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL). SEL is primary recipient on this project. The exe-Guard project was selected for award under DE-FOA-0000359 with CFDA number 81.122 to address Topic Area of Interest 4: Hardened platforms and Systems. The exe-Guard project developed an antivirus solution for control system embedded devices to prevent the execution of unauthorized code and maintain settings and configuration integrity. This project created a white list antivirus solution for control systems capable of running on embedded Linux® operating systems. White list antivirus methods allow only credible programs to run through the use of digital signatures and hash functions. Once a system’s secure state is baselined, white list antivirus software denies deviations from that state because of the installation of malicious code as this changes hash results. Black list antivirus software has been effective in traditional IT environments but has negative implications for control systems. Black list antivirus uses pattern matching and behavioral analysis to identify system threats while relying on regular updates to the signature file and recurrent system scanning. Black list antivirus is vulnerable to zero day exploits which have not yet been incorporated into a signature file update. System scans hamper the performance of high availability applications, as revealed in NIST special publication 1058 which summarizes the impact of blacklist antivirus on control systems: Manual or “on-demand” scanning has a major effect on control processes in that they take CPU time needed by the control process (Sometimes close to 100% of CPU time). Minimizing the antivirus software throttle setting will reduce but not eliminate this effect. Signature updates can also take up to 100% of CPU time, but for a much shorter period than a typical manual scanning process. Control systems are vulnerable to performance losses if off-the-shelf blacklist antivirus solutions aren’t implemented with care. This investment in configuration in addition to constant decommissioning to perform manual signature file updates is unprecedented and impractical. Additionally, control systems are often disconnected or islanded from the network making the delivery of signature updates difficult. Exe-Guard project developed a white list antivirus solution that mitigated the above drawbacks and allows control systems to cost-effectively apply malware protection while maintaining high reliability. The application of security patches can also be minimized since white listing maintains constant defense against unauthorized code execution. Security patches can instead be applied in less frequent intervals where system decommissioning can be scheduled and planned for. Since control systems are less dynamic than IT environments, the feasibility of maintaining a secure baselined state is more practical. Because upgrades are performed in infrequent, calculated intervals, it allows a new security baseline to be established before the system is returned to service. Exe-Guard built on the efforts of SNL under the Code Seal project. SNL demonstrated prototype Trust Anchors on the project which are independent monitoring and control devices that can be integrated into untrustworthy components. The exe-Guard team started with the lessons learned under this project then designed commercial solution for white list malware protection. Malware is a real threat, even on islanded or un-networked installations, since operators can unintentionally install infected files, plug in infected mass storage devices, or infect a piece of equipment on the islanded local area network that can then spread to other connected equipment. Protection at the device level is one of the last layers of defense in a security-in-depth defense model before an asset becomes compromised. This project provided non-destructive intrusion, isolation and automated response solution, achieving a goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Roadmap to Secure Control Systems. It also addressed CIP-007-R4 which requires asset owners to employ malicious software prevention tools on assets within the electronic security perimeter. In addition, the CIP-007-R3 requirement for security patch management is minimized because white listing narrows the impact of vulnerabilities and patch releases. The exe-Guard Project completed all tasks identified in the statement of project objective and identified additional tasks within scope that were performed and completed within the original budget. The cost share was met and all deliverables were successfully completed and submitted on time. Most importantly the technology developed and commercialized under this project has been adopted by the Energy sector and thousands of devices with exe-Guard technology integrated in them have now been deployed and are protecting our power systems today

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗