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At least 307 records · Page 17

Technology and Tool Development to Support Safety and Mission Assurance

The Assurance Case approach is being adopted in a number of safety-mission-critical application domains in the U.S., e.g., medical devices, defense aviation, automotive systems, and, lately, civil aviation. This paradigm refocuses traditional, process-based approaches to assurance on demonstrating explicitly stated assurance goals, emphasizing the use of structured rationale, and concrete product-based evidence as the means for providing justified confidence that systems and software are fit for purpose in safely achieving mission objectives. NASA has also been embracing assurance cases through the concepts of Risk Informed Safety Cases (RISCs), as documented in the NASA System Safety Handbook, and Objective Hierarchies (OHs) as put forth by the Agency's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). This talk will give an overview of the work being performed by the SGT team located at NASA Ames Research Center, in developing technologies and tools to engineer and apply assurance cases in customer projects pertaining to aviation safety. We elaborate how our Assurance Case Automation Toolset (AdvoCATE) has not only extended the state-of-the-art in assurance case research, but also demonstrated its practical utility. We have successfully developed safety assurance cases for a number of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations, which underwent, and passed, scrutiny both by the aviation regulator, i.e., the FAA, as well as the applicable NASA boards for airworthiness and flight safety, flight readiness, and mission readiness. We discuss our efforts in expanding AdvoCATE capabilities to support RISCs and OHs under a project recently funded by OSMA under its Software Assurance Research Program. Finally, we speculate on the applicability of our innovations beyond aviation safety to such endeavors as robotic, and human spaceflight.

Mission Assuranc↗

Test based reliability assessment method for a safety critical software in reactor protection system - 284

Digitalization of the instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plant entails some new features which do not exist in analog systems. When the new features are applied in safety critical systems, the risk stemming from them should be quantified properly to assure the reliability of the entire power plant. Among the new features, software is considered as the most important factor because it can cause common cause failure to many redundant systems. Therefore, in this work, a test based reliability assessment method for a safety-critical software is developed. An output of a software is determined by not only inputs but also the internal state of the software at the time. In the case of safety critical software developed for usage in nuclear power plant, it is possible to directly investigate probable internal states thanks to detailed design specification and programing features, and the probable inputs also can be identified based on the physical linearity of each process parameter and hardware characteristics related to data acquisition. In this work, a development method for practical exhaustive test case consisting of investigation of internal state and probable input sets to a specific internal state are suggested. In addition to this, software logic simulator for execution of software logic test and the reliability quantification method based on the test result are developed. The feasibility of the suggested method is demonstrated via a case study. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Human machine interface (hmi) evaluation of rooms ta-50-1-60/60a at the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility (rlwtf)

This effort addressed an evaluation of human machine interfaces (HMIs) in Room TA-50-1-60/60A of the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF). The evaluation was performed in accordance with guidance outlined in DOE-STD-3009, DOE Standard Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, 2006 [DOE 2006]. Specifically, Chapter 13 of DOE 2006 highlights the 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, 2012, [CFR 2012] and DOE G 421.1-2 [DOE 2001a] requirements as they relate to the human factors process and, in this case, the safety of the RLWTF. The RLWTF is a Hazard Category 3 facility and, consequently, does not have safety-class (SSCs). However, safety-significant SSCs are identified. The transuranic (TRU) wastewater tanks and associated piping are the only safety-significant SSCs in Rooms TA-50-1-60/60A [LANL 2010]. Hence, the human factors evaluation described herein is only applicable to this particular assemblage of tanks and piping.

42 ENGINEERING↗

"Defense-in-Depth" Laser Safety and the National Ignition Facility

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the largest and most energetic laser in the world contained in a complex the size of a football stadium. From the initial laser pulse, provided by telecommunication style infrared nanoJoule pulsed lasers, to the final 192 laser beams (1.8 Mega Joules total energy in the ultraviolet) converging on a target the size of a pencil eraser, laser safety is of paramount concern. In addition to this, there are numerous high-powered (Class 3B and 4) diagnostic lasers in use that can potentially send their laser radiation travelling throughout the facility. With individual beam paths of up to 1500 meters and a workforce of more than one thousand, the potential for exposure is significant. Simple laser safety practices utilized in typical laser labs just don't apply. To mitigate these hazards, NIF incorporates a multi layered approach to laser safety or 'Defense in Depth.' Most typical high-powered laser operations are contained and controlled within a single room using relatively simplistic controls to protect both the worker and the public. Laser workers are trained, use a standard operating procedure, and are required to wear Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as Laser Protective Eyewear (LPE) if the system is not fully enclosed. Non-workers are protected by means of posting the room with a warning sign and a flashing light. In the best of cases, a Safety Interlock System (SIS) will be employed which will 'safe' the laser in the case of unauthorized access. This type of laser operation is relatively easy to employ and manage. As the operation becomes more complex, higher levels of control are required to ensure personnel safety. Examples requiring enhanced controls are outdoor and multi-room laser operations. At the NIF there are 192 beam lines and numerous other Class 4 diagnostic lasers that can potentially deliver their hazardous energy to locations far from the laser source. This presents a serious and complex potential hazard to personnel. Because of this, a multilayered approach to safety is taken. This paper presents the philosophy and approach taken at the NIF in the multi-layered 'defense-in-depth' approach to laser safety.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Reliability-Based Design of a Safety-Critical Automation System: A Case Study

In 1986, NASA funded a project to modernize the NASA Ames Research Center Unitary Plan Wind Tunnels, including the replacement of obsolescent controls with a modern, automated distributed control system (DCS). The project effort on this system included an independent safety analysis (ISA) of the automation system. The purpose of the ISA was to evaluate the completeness of the hazard analyses which had already been performed on the Modernization Project. The ISA approach followed a tailoring of the risk assessment approach widely used on existing nuclear power plants. The tailoring of the nuclear industry oriented risk assessment approach to the automation system and its role in reliability-based design of the automation system is the subject of this paper.

Carroll, Carol W.↗

How Safe Is Control Software

Paper examines issue of software safety. Presents four case histories of software-safety analysis. Concludes that, to be safe, software, for all practical purposes, must be free of errors. Backup systems still needed to prevent catastrophic software failures.

Dunn, William R.↗

Wildfire-fighting Use Case Requirements to Monitor

In this technical report, we provide requirements for a wildfire-fighting use-case, towards the Safety Demonstrator 1. The use case will incorporate ground and airborne assets operating in a coordinated fashion, and will comprise five activities, from detection to the execution of the initial attack. Depending on the activity and the data involved, the requirements identified may be non-probabilistic or probabilistic. In both cases, we first identify some of the requirements we wish to monitor, and then present a formalization using the language of requirements of the NASA requirements elicitation tool FRET. To formalize probabilistic requirements, we use a novel extension to FRET’s requirements language that incorporates notions of probability, and discuss how requirements can be translated into existing probabilistic temporal logics like PCTL. We exemplify how some of the requirements presented can be monitored using the existing tools Ogma and Copilot. We close with a summary and future directions.

Requirements↗

A discrete model for compressible flows in heterogeneous media

This work deals with the building of a discrete model able to describe and to predict the evolution of complex gas flows in heterogeneous media. In many physical applications, large scales numerical simulation is no longer possible because of a lack of computing resources. Indeed the medium topology may be complex due to the presence of many obstacles (walls, pipes, equipments, geometric singularities etc.). Aircraft powerplant compartments are examples where topology is complex due to the presence of pipes, ducts, coolers and other equipment. Other important examples are gas explosions and large scale dispersion of hazardous materials in urban places, cities or underground involving obstacles such as buildings and various infrastructures. In all cases efficient safety responses are required. Then a new discrete model is built and solved in reasonable execution times for large cells volumes including such obstacles. Quantitative comparisons between experimental and numerical results are shown for different significant test cases, showing excellent agreement.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Business Case Analysis for Digital Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control System Modernizations

The commercial nuclear sector faces unprecedented financial challenges driven by low natural gas prices and subsidized renewables in a marketplace that does not reward carbon-free baseload capacity. These circumstances, along with increasingly antiquated labor-centric operating models and analog technology, have forced the premature closure of multiple nuclear facilities and placed a much larger population of nuclear power stations at risk. Nuclear plant economic survival in current and forecasted market conditions requires an efficient and technology-centric operating model that harvests the native efficiencies of advanced technology. This is analogous to transformations in nearly every other industry. In light of previous industry experience in modernizing safety Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) systems, nuclear utilities are reluctant to pursue these upgrades due to uncertainty in licensing and cost.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Considerations Related To Human Intrusion In The Context Of Disposal Of Radioactive Waste-The IAEA HIDRA Project

The principal approaches for management of radioactive waste are commonly termed ‘delay and decay’, ‘concentrate and contain’ and ‘dilute and disperse’. Containing the waste and isolating it from the human environment, by burying it, is considered to increase safety and is generally accepted as the preferred approach for managing radioactive waste. However, this approach results in concentrated sources of radioactive waste contained in one location, which can pose hazards should the facility be disrupted by human action in the future. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) agree that some form of inadvertent human intrusion (HI) needs to be considered to address the potential consequences in the case of loss of institutional control and loss of memory of the disposal facility. Requirements are reflected in national regulations governing radioactive waste disposal. However, in practice, these requirements are often different from country to country, which is then reflected in the actual implementation of HI as part of a safety case. The IAEA project on HI in the context of Disposal of RadioActive waste (HIDRA) has been started to identify potential areas for improved consistency in consideration of HI. The expected outcome is to provide recommendations on how to address human actions in the safety case in the future, and how the safety case may be used to demonstrate robustness and optimize siting, design and waste acceptance criteria within the context of a safety case.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Reference Governor for Plasma-Shape Control in Tokamaks

Tokamaks are torus-shaped devices where a high-temperature, ionized gas (i.e. a plasma) is confined by means of helical magnetic fields. The ultimate goal of tokamaks is producing net electrical energy by means of nuclear-fusion reactions within the plasma. The shape of the plasma inside the tokamak is closely related with its confinement characteristics and, therefore, with the produced fusion power. In order to achieve and maintain plasma shapes that maximize the fusion yield, feedback controllers have been successfully developed during the years. However, machine-protection and plasma-stability requirements impose hard constraints on the plasma-shape targets that can be safely achieved by a feedback controller. In this work, a reference governor is proposed to provide, in real time, plasma-shape targets that fulfill the aforementioned safety requirements. The reference governor calculates such plasma-shape targets in response to changes in the state of the closed-loop system, as well as disturbances in the plasma energy and current. Here, the reference-governor design is based on a dynamical model of the plasma electromagnetic response. Simulation tests of the reference governor have been carried out for different plasma scenarios in the DIII-D tokamak to emulate realistic cases where safety may be compromised.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

A methodology of MSL breakup analysis for Earth accidental reentry and its application to breakup analysis for Mars off-nominal entry

Vehicle breakup analysis has been performed for missions that may carry nuclear fuel for heating or power purposes to assess nuclear safety in case of launch failure leading to atmospheric reentry. Also, failure scenarios exist which could lead to breakup during Entry / Descent / Landing (EDL) at Mars due to off-nominal entries, with implications for planetary protection requirements. Since the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) spacecraft may include a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG), an analysis of breakup in case of launch failure is required. Also, breakup during Mars EDL due to off-nominal entries could release the RTG heat source that has implications for planetary protection requirements. This paper presents a methodology of MSL breakup analysis for launch failure with application to Mars off-nominal entry.

nuclear safety↗

Urban Air Mobility Conflict Resolution: Centralized or Decentralized?

This work begins to address one of the critical questions in the urban air mobility and small unmanned aircraft communities: Should the en-route conflict resolution function in an urban air mobility traffic system be centralized or decentralized? Three conflict resolution architectures are modeled and analyzed: centralized, decentralized with uniform rules, and decentralized with mixed rules. This study compares these architectures and investigates their robustness to communication and state information errors in terms of safety and efficiency metrics. Experiments are conducted using a high-fidelity Monte Carlo traffic simulator and a generic set of traffic scenarios with increasing traffic density. When no errors were modeled, the centralized architecture marginally outperformed the decentralized architecture. However, performance of the centralized architecture was found to be adversely affected by the modeled input errors to a greater degree than was the decentralized architecture. Performance of the centralized architecture also was degraded significantly by the modeled transmission errors of the centralized resolution maneuvers. In the decentralized architecture, uniform rules outperformed mixed rules because, in the mixed rules case, system safety performance was undermined and dominated by the poor performers.

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) traffic system↗

SAFETY AT FLUOR HANFORD (A) CASE STUDY - PREPARED BY THUNDERBIRD SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

By November of 1997, Fluor Hanford (Fluor) had been the site manager of the Hanford nuclear reservation for a year. The Hanford site had been established as part of the Manhattan Project in the 1940s that gave birth to the atomic bomb. Hanford produced two thirds of U.S. plutonium during the Cold War period. The Hanford site was half the size of Rhode Island and occupied 586 square miles in southeastern Washington State. The production of plutonium for more than 40 years left a huge legacy of chemical and radiological contamination: 80 square miles of contaminated groundwater; 2,300 tons of spent nuclear fuel stored in underwater basins; 20 tons of plutonium-laced contaminated materials; and 500 contaminated facilities. The cleanup involved a challenging combination of radioactive material handling within an infrastructure constructed in the 1940s and 1950s. The cleanup that began in 1988 was expected to take 30 years or more. Improving safety at Hanford had already proven to be a significant challenge. As the new site manager at Hanford, Fluor Hanford inherited lower- and mid-level managers and thousands of unionized employees, many of whom were second or third generation Hanford employees. These employees had seen many contractors come and go over the years. Some of the managers who had worked with the previous contractor saw Fluor's emphasis on safety as getting in the way of operations. Union-management relations were fractious. Hanford's culture was described as 'production driven-management told everyone what to do, and, if you didn't do it, there were consequences'. Worker involvement in designing and implementing safety programs was negligible. Fluor Hanford also was having trouble satisfying its client, the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE did not see a clear path forward for performance improvements at Hanford. Clearly, major change was necessary, but how and where should it be implemented?

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Thermal analyses of high-power advanced thermoacoustic radioisotope power system for future space exploration missions

This paper presents the results of 3-D thermal analyses of the heat source assembly of a 440 We advanced radioisotope power system (RPS) for future space exploration missions. This high thermal efficiency RPS employs a heat source assembly of eight Step 2 General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) modules and four Thermoacoustic Power Converter (TAPC) units. Each unit is thermally coupled to two GPHS modules. Here, the analyses investigated the temperatures of the Iridium (Ir) alloy cladding of the 238 PuO 2 fuel pellets and the surface of the Fine Weave Pierced Fabric (FWPF) aeroshell in the GPHS modules to ensure reliable operation and safety in case of an unlikely reentry. Conductive coupling of the GPHS modules to the heater heads of the TAPC units produces relatively uniform axial and azimuthal distributions of heat flux and temperature. However, for this case the temperature of the Ir alloy cladding is lower than the desired values of 1173 K to maintain sufficient ductility. Adding a 5 mm wide He filled gap and decreasing the thickness of the graphite sleeve to 10 mm increased Ir cladding temperature to 1197–1174 K, which are in the desired range. The maximum surface temperatures of the FWPF graphite aeroshell of 1022–1131 K is well below the NASA specified limit of 1373 K. In addition, the total mass of the heat source assembly decreased by 19.6 kg, ~43% saving compared to original design.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Scenario development for safety assessment in deep geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel: A review

Radiation and radioactive substances result in the production of radioactive wastes which require safe management and disposal to avoid risks to human health and the environment. To ensure permanent safe disposal, the performance of a deep geological repository for radioactive waste is assessed against internationally agreed risk-based standards. Assessing postclosure safety of the future system's evolution includes screening of features, events, and processes (FEPs) relevant to the situation, their subsequent development into scenarios, and finally the development and execution of safety assessment (SA) models. Global FEP catalogs describe important natural and man-made repository system features and identify events and processes that may affect these features into the future. By combining FEPs, many of which are uncertain, different possible future system evolution scenarios are derived. Repository licensing should consider both the reference or “base” evolution as well as alternative futures that may lead to radiation release, pollution, or exposures. Scenarios are used to derive and consider both base and alternative evolutions, often through production of scenario-specific SA models and the recombination of their results into an assessment of the risk of harm. Furthermore, while the FEP-based scenario development process outlined here has evolved somewhat since its development in the 1980s, the fundamental ideas remain unchanged. A spectrum of common approaches is given here (e.g., bottom–up vs. top–down scenario development, probabilistic vs. bounding handling of uncertainty), related to how individual numerical models for possible futures are converted into a determination as to whether the system is safe (i.e., how aleatoric uncertainty and scenarios are integrated through bounding or Monte Carlo approaches).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SU-E-CAMPUS-T-01: Analysis of the Precision of Patient Set-Up, and Fidelity of the Delivered Dose Distribution in Proton Therapy of Ocular Tumors

Purpose: To quantify daily set-up variations in fractionated proton therapy of ocular melanomas, and to assess the effect on the fidelity of delivered distribution to the plan. Methods: In a typical five-fraction course, daily set-up is achieved by matching the position of fiducial markers in orthogonal radiographs to the images generated by treatment planning program. A patient maintains the required gaze direction voluntarily, without the aid of fixation devices. Confirmation radiographs are acquired to assess intrafractional changes. For this study, daily radiographs were analyzed to determine the daily iso-center position and apparent gaze direction, which were then transferred to the planning system to calculate the dose delivered in individual fractions, and accumulated dose for the entire course. Dose-volume metrics were compared between the planned and accumulated distributions for the tumor and organs at risk, for representative cases that varied by location within the ocular globe. Results: The analysis of the first set of cases (3 posterior, 3 transequatorial and 4 anterior tumors) revealed varying dose deviation patterns, depending on the tumor location. For anterior and posterior tumors, the largest dose increases were observed in the lens and ciliary body, while for the equatorial tumors, macula, optic nerve and disk, were most often affected. The iso-center position error was below 1.3 mm (95%-confidence interval), and the standard deviation of daily polar and azimuthal gaze set-up were 1.5 and 3 degrees, respectively. Conclusion: We quantified interfractional and intrafractional set-up variation, and estimated their effect on the delivered dose for representative cases. Current safety margins are sufficient to maintain the target coverage, however, the dose delivered to critical structures often deviates from the plan. The ongoing analysis will further explore the patterns of dose deviation, and may help to identify particular treatment scenarios which are at a higher risk for such deviations.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

The RF Protection Interlock System Prototype Verification

The Radio Frequency Protection Interlock system plays vital role in the LLRF related/dependent accelerator sections Protection. It’s main role is to collect information from number different sensors and indicators around nearest cavities and cryomodule and provide instant RF signal termination in case of safety thresholds violation. This submission describes newly designed RFPI system tailored to the Proton Improvement Plan II (PIP-II) requirements. The proof of concept prototype of this system has been build. The paper includes also the CMTF environment evaluation tests results and findings as an input to the next full-scope prototype design.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗