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Multipurpose Nuclear Spent Fuel Cask, Construction

This process builds a cask to store the nuclear spent fuel. It is designed to both store the spent fuel with the option of re-arranging the spent fuel within the cask. The cask is constructed of concrete and steel. To access the model referenced in the report, please visit https://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analysis/details?id=140EA991-A532-4369-A850-E5D9A482EFA2

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Spent Trap Media and Other Uranium Bearing Particulate Wastes at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation assesses whether the Portsmouth (PORTS) Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) Spent Trap Media and Other Uranium Bearing Particulate Wastes is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the PORTS GDP Spent Trap Media and Other Uranium Bearing Particulate Wastes meets all performance objectives in DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P. The PORTS GDP Spent Trap Media and Other Uranium Bearing Particulate Wastes are recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total technetium-99 (99Tc) activity disposed under this waste profile shall not exceed 2.1E13 Bq.

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Final Report for FY15 Spent Fuel Project Task 12: Data Authentication

The data authentication task is concerned with the ability of a user to trust the output from an unattended measurement of spent nuclear fuel intended for disposal. Five high-level requirements that are driven from a data authentication perspective need to be considered for instrument development: The instrument must be secured. All data emerging from the instrument must be signed. Instrument inputs may also need to be signed and authenticated. The instrument environment needs to be controlled. A vulnerability assessment will be necessary for the full system before deployment. Additional requirements may be necessary, especially if operational scenarios include arrangements for joint use. None of the prototype instruments currently under development yet satisfies any of these requirements. From a data authentication perspective, the selection of a preferred instrument from among the candidates under development should consider the relative ability to secure the instrument, its relative needs for ancillary instrumentation, and ability of the instrument to self-interrogate its state of health. Further work is recommended to develop advanced technologies, methods and approaches for tamper indication. Beyond the development of any particular instrument for the nondestructive assay of spent fuel, efforts should be devoted to developing the system for spent fuel verification prior to long term disposal, including likely operational scenarios for routine use of the verification system.

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Development of Mockups and Instrumentation for Spent Fuel Drying Tests

The purpose of this report is to provide updates on the experimental components, methodology, and instrumentation under development for use in advanced studies of realistic drying operations conducted on surrogate spent nuclear fuel. Validation of the extent of water removal in a dry spent nuclear fuel storage system based on drying procedures used at nuclear power plants is needed to close existing technical gaps. Operational conditions leading to incomplete drying may have potential impacts on the fuel, cladding, and other components in the system. Water remaining in canisters upon completion of drying procedures can lead to cladding corrosion, embrittlement, and breaching, as well as fuel degradation. Additional information is needed on the drying process efficacy to help evaluate the potential impacts of water retention on extended longterm dry storage. A general lack of data suitable for model validation of commercial nuclear canister drying processes necessitates additional, well-designed investigations. Smaller-scale tests that incorporate relevant physics and well-controlled boundary conditions are essential to provide insight and guidance to the simulation of prototypic systems undergoing drying processes. This report describes the implementation of moisture monitoring equipment on a pressurized, submersible system employing a single waterproof, electrically heated spent fuel rod simulator as a demonstration of analytical capabilities during a drying process. A mass spectrometer with specially designed inlets was used to monitor moisture and other gases at 150 kPa to 800 kPa for a test simulating a forced helium dehydration procedure and below 1 torr for tests mimicking a vacuum drying process. The dew point data from the mass spectrometer was found to be in good agreement with a solid-state moisture probe. A distinct advantage of the mass spectrometer system was the capability to directly sample from the hightemperature (>200 °C) head space expected in a prototypic scale experiment where a solid-state moisture probe would suffer considerable loss of accuracy or fail altogether. The operational and analytical experiences gained from this test series are poised to support an expansion to assembly-scale tests at prototypic length. These assemblies are designed to feature prototypic assembly hardware, advanced diagnostics for in situ internal rod pressure monitoring, and failed fuel rod simulators with engineered cladding defects to challenge the drying system with waterlogged fuel.

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The Relationship Between Dose Rate and Decay Heat for Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

Decay heat and dose rate are two important limits used for determining the allowable contents of spent fuel (SNF) in dry storage systems and transportation packages. While the decay heat limit is used to maintain fuel cladding integrity and ensure retrievability, dose rates are used to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements on radiation protection. Because both dose rate and decay heat result from decay of radioisotopes in SNF, this study is an attempt to examine the relationship between dose rate and decay heat for a given cask design. Dose rates were evaluated for 198 cask configurations, that include various SNF system designs (e.g., storage, transfer, transport), SNF characteristics (e.g., fuel types, burnup, cooling time), and loading maps (e.g., uniform loading, zone loading), while a constant decay heat was maintained. The decay heat was calculated using US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 3.54, Revision 2, and verified using ORIGEN sequence within SCALE code system. The ORIGEN outputs were used as source terms in the dose analysis using 198 different configurations. A computer script was developed to calculate the cooling time necessary to achieve a given decay heat for a given enrichment, assembly average burnup, assembly mass, and in-core history using a rootfinder algorithm. Initially the computer script was developed to provide cooling time and burnup calculations directly to the analysis of dose rates and decay heats, so a comparison between Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) results and RG3.54 data was made; results are included in the appendix to this document. However, an iterative approach was used to compute cooling time, and its accuracy did not depend on the results of the RG3.54r2 algorithm, although the algorithm was still used. The results of the evaluation presented herein clearly demonstrate that a given decay heat does not correspond to a unique dose rate for a variety of cask and package designs. There is no clear pattern to develop a correlation between decay heat and the source terms. Depending on burnup, enrichment, cask type, and loading pattern, dose rates varied for the exact same decay heat—in some cases by 400% for a given cask. For cases in which decay heat was held constant through selection of the appropriate cooling time, dose rates would decrease with increasing burnup, and in other cases, dose rates would increase. The large variation in dose rates for a constant decay heat indicates that casks loaded based on decay heat—that is allowing any burnup, cooling time, and enrichment combinations that yield the qualified decay heat limit(s) —cannot ensure that an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation or a spent fuel transportation package will meet the regulatory limits set forth by the respective regulations, i.e., 10 CFR 72 or 10 CFR 71.

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Initial Neutronics and Thermal-Hydraulic Coupling for Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister

This report documents work performed supporting the US Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology, under work breakdown structure element 1.08.01.03.05, “Direct Disposal of Dual Purpose Canisters.” In particular, this appendix fulfills the M3 milestone, M3SF-19OR010305015, “Multiphysics criticality consequence analysis capability development status report,” as Revision 1 to M3SF-19OR010305016, “Initial neutronic and thermal hydraulic coupling for waste package” within work package SF-19OR01030501, “Direct Disposal of Dual Purpose Canisters–ORNL.” This report presents the initial development status of a multiphysics criticality consequence simulation framework, Terrenus. Terrenus currently couples two physics codes: the Monte Carlo radiation transport code Shift and the thermal-hydraulics code COBRA-SFS. The coupling capability has been demonstrated using a simplified 3 x 3 fuel pin lattice. Terrenus will be developed further to include (1) general geometry package support, allowing modeling of a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cask with all structural details, (2) a depletion solver to determine the change in nuclide composition at the end of each time step, and (3) a mechanics code to determine any structural impact due to a criticality event. Future research and development works include identifying/developing a modern two-phase thermal-hydraulics code and developing an approach to solve fast neutronic transients. The goal of this multiphysics framework is to determine the feasibility of direct disposal of currently loaded SNF canisters by including or excluding a criticality event from a repository performance analysis framework in terms of consequences. The revision 1 to this report includes extending Terrenus to a 17 x 17 pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assembly. We also investigated the phenomena necessary to quench a critical reaction, and investigated the water level necessary to achieve criticality in a typical canister. Finally, we describe the initial implementation of a critical power search capability.

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Best Practices for Shielding Analyses of Activated Metals and Spent Resins from Reactor Operation

This report investigated best practices for performing shielding evaluations of Type B waste packages, as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 regulations on packaging and transportation of radioactive material, or packages for which the contents are not defined before loading and may include a broad range of nuclides, geometries, and non-fuel materials. The following non-fuel waste streams were analyzed: Activated metals from decommissioned commercial power reactors, including Type 304 stainless steel, reactor vessel steel, and Inconel, Control blades from boiling water reactors, Neutron-activated corrosion products on surfaces of activated metals, and Spent resins from power plant operations. Measured elemental compositions, including major constituents and impurities, for steel and Inconel samples from commercial power reactors were used in activation calculations to determine radionuclide inventories in activated metals. For a simplified cask model, 60 Co contribution to the total external package dose rate at 30 days after shutdown varied from approximately 60% to 95%, depending on the activated metal, initial cobalt impurity concentration in the metal, and the thickness of the overpack gamma shield. Its maximum contribution to the total external package dose rate of approximately 100% was reached within the time interval of 2 to 5 years after shutdown and was maintained for up to 45 to 60 years after shutdown, depending on material, initial cobalt impurity concentration, and shield thickness. Thereafter, the 60 Co contribution to external package dose rate decreased with increasing decay time. Cobalt-60 is primarily produced by neutron reactions with the cobalt impurity in steel and Inconel. Other important radionuclides in activated metals contributing to package external dose rate are radionuclides with relatively short decay times, including 51 Cr, 59 Fe, 58 Co, and 54 Mn. These radionuclides may be represented as an equivalent 60 Co activity/source because 60 Co gamma ray emissions are bounding in terms of source strength and energy to other important radionuclides identified in the analyzed activated metals. Approaches for modeling the neutron-activated corrosion products that may be attached to activated reactor components were analyzed in this report. It was demonstrated that a surface source is more conservative than a uniform volumetric source for the treatment of neutron-activated corrosion products with respect to external package dose rates. An analysis of the maximum radionuclide loadings reported on spent resins identified the radionuclides 137 Cs, 60 Co, 134 Cs, 65 Zn, and 58 Co as the primary contributors to external package dose rate. For a resin cooled for 3.08 years, the external package dose rate was entirely produced by the reported 137 Cs and 60 Co inventory. The neutron sources from actinides found on spent resins or activated metals produced negligible dose rates and may be ignored in dose rate analyses. Effects of idealized waste material, source geometry, and spatial material/source distributions on external package dose rates were determined based on dose rate results for a simplified cask model under normal conditions of transport. Type 304 stainless steel, zirconium, and aluminum with adjusted mass densities based on a maximum content weight were analyzed for material modeling effects on external package dose rate. These materials produced identical external package dose rates within the statistical uncertainties of the dose rate estimates. Among four different source geometry configurations with homogeneous material of different mass densities, uniform volumetric source distribution, and the same source strength, the geometry configuration with lowest mass density (i.e., minimum self-shielding effect among the four cases) was most conservative. Spatial source distributions that better represent localized peak 60 Co activity values were more conservative than a uniform volumetric source distribution, assuming the same weight and total source strength per package. The increase in external dose rate caused by localized source peaks can be as much as the ratio between source peak activity density to average activity density, depending on the location of the activated metal with peak activity density. Therefore, the shielding analysis may be simplified if localized peak activities and the average activity per package can be measured/determined and documented at the time of cask loading. For simplicity, external package dose rates may be determined based on average source activity and a uniform volumetric source distribution. The dose rate results from that calculation model multiplied by the ratio of peak activity density to average activity density will produce maximum dose rate values for conservative estimates.

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Comparative Cost Analysis of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Alternatives

This report presents a comparative analysis of spent nuclear fuel management options to support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Specifically, a set of scenarios was constructed to represent a range of possible combinations of alternative spent fuel management approaches. Analyses were performed to provide simple and credible estimates of relative costs to the U.S. government and to the nuclear utilities for moving forward with each scenario. The analyses of alternatives and options related to spent nuclear fuel management presented in this report are based on technical and programmatic considerations and do not include an evaluation of relevant regulatory and legal considerations (e.g., needs for new or modified regulations or legislation). This report has been prepared for informational and comparison purposes only and should not be construed as a determination of the legal permissibility of specific alternatives and options. No inferences should be drawn from this report regarding future actions by DOE. To the extent this report conflicts with provisions of the Standard Contract, those provisions prevail.

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Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Fast/Epi-thermal Neutron Mapping: FY2020 Annual Report to NA241 (Annual Report)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has embarked upon development of a novel methodology for verification of spent fuel inside dry storage casks. The issue of verification of the integrity of spent fuel inside dry storage has been one of the most challenging technical problems facing IAEA for many decades. The difficulty arises because of the massive amount of shielding between the inner spent fuel and the outer surface where measurements can be performed. Despite many efforts, detection of useful gamma rays or neutrons from the outer surface has so far proven unsuccessful.

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Report on Field Test at INL Cask Farm of Single Detector Fast Neutron Spent Fuel Cask Verification System

Detecting diversion of spent fuel elements in dry storage casks is challenging due to the thick shielding used in cask construction. Measurements on top of the cask to map the underlying arrangement of the fuel elements and looking for anomalous changes over time has proven difficult to achieve using gamma rays due to the high scattering and attenuation from the thick steel structure, weakening information on the present or absence of fuel bundles. Simulations and laboratory experiments suggest that the high-energy neutron flux (>200 keV) measured directly above each fuel bundle is sufficient to produce a position map that enables detection of the present or absence of fuel bundles, and therefore diversion of a spent fuel bundle. A single-detector spent-fuel monitoring technique based on this principle was development at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The INL Cask Farm in the INTEC technical area at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) offers the capability to test this technique on an MC-10 storage cask which has a distribution of full and empty fuel positions. An experimental test plan for the single-detector verification system was developed in consultation with INL personnel to be completed in FY2021. Due to travel advisories related to COVID-19, the experimental test plan was adapted to enable INL personnel to carry out the measurements in consultation with LLNL personnel following shipment of the LLNL system to INL. Field test measurements of the single detector verification system were successfully carried out at the INL cask farm on September 7-9, 2021. This document summarizes results of the field test.

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Knowledge Management: FY22 Los Alamos National Laboratory Hydrothermal Lab for Spent Fuel Campaign R&D

The use of Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) for spent nuclear fuel disposal is being investigated by the U.S. Department of Energy as a part of the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) Campaign. Such dry spent fuel canisters would be loaded with fuel bundles, and then transported and stored at a nuclear waste repository. Once the canisters are in place underground, the space between the canister and the wall rock will be filled with bentonite clay. Recent research has prioritized high temperature interactions of EBS materials, including phase transitions in bentonite clay, in order to reduce worker dose and repository cost. Higher temperature (i.e., 200ºC) thermal limits are a new area of investigation by the U.S. and international repository science programs. The hydrothermal experimental laboratory at Los Alamos, consisting of rocking autoclaves and cold seal assemblies, is critical to the campaign and presents a significant temperature / pressure safety hazard. Therefore, working competently and safely with these systems is very important to the knowledge management procedures developed at this laboratory. Therefore, the operation of these two systems (rocking autoclaves and cold seal assemblies) will be discussed first.

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Ageing Management for Extended Long-Term Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Transportation

The principal objectives of the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) and CRADA were to (1) investigate how ageing effects leading to degradation of materials used in the spent fuel dry storage systems could be managed by ageing management programs (AMPs) and (2) using existing AMPs as a basis, establish guidance on how to develop, generate, and maintain AMPs for dry storage systems of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that can be accomplished in various ways. The PI (Dr. Liu) is an internationally recognized expert on ageing management for license renewal of nuclear power plants and independent spent fuel dry storage installations. Dr. Liu was invited by IAEA to participate in this CRP and served as Chair of the Working Group, supporting the IAEA CRP Lead, with other members from Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Pakistan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Argonne’s scope of work in the CRADA for the CRP included (1) ageing management guidance documents developed by Argonne for DOE and used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry and (2) research leveraged from the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy on the mechanical properties of high-burnup fuel cladding and the ARG-US remote monitoring systems technology developed for the DOE Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management.

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Review of SCALE Validations Applicable to Spent Nuclear Fuel Shielding Calculations

This report presents a review of publicly available documents providing validations of SCALE code system capabilities for depletion and shielding calculations. The validation studies primarily used information available in the Spent Fuel Isotopic Composition Database, the Shielding Integral Benchmark Archive and Database, and the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project Handbook. Validation results based on radiochemical assay data and shielding benchmark experiments relevant to spent nuclear fuel shielding applications are summarized in this report. The information summarized in this report supports pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor spent fuel storage and transportation safety analyses.

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High-Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project: Sister Rod Final Phase II Test Plan

The Sibling Pin test campaign is a Department of Energy (DOE) research activity within the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program that is tasked with characterization of high burnup (HBU) fuel in support of the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project. Of the 25 fuel rods in the Sibling Pin inventory, approximately 9 rod lengths have been consumed during the first phase (Phase I) of the test campaign leaving approximately 16 rod lengths for the second phase (Phase II) of testing. This plan outlines the Phase II testing and the motivations for performing these tests. Priorities for Phase II testing are based on previously identified knowledge gaps, lessons-learned from Phase I work, the original objectives of the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project and the Sibling Pin test campaign, and input from external stakeholders. The priorities for Phase II testing are to obtain data to characterize the effects of annealing on cladding mechanical properties and fuel rod performance, to quantify the creep behavior of cladding materials and fuel rods and the effects of creep deformations on the performance of cladding and fuel rods, and to gather data to support the final closure of the hydride reorientation and radial hydride induced embrittlement gap for HBU fuel rods.

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Evaluation of Nuclear Spent Fuel Disposal in Clay-Bearing Rock - Process Model Development and Experimental Studies

This report represents the milestone deliverable M2SF-23SN010301072 “Evaluation of Nuclear Spent Fuel Disposal in Clay-Bearing Rock - Process Model Development and Experimental Studies” The report provides a status update of FY23 activities for the work package Argillite Disposal work packages for the DOE-NE Spent Fuel Waste Form Science and Technology (SFWST) Program. Clay-rich geological media (often referred as shale or argillite) are among the most abundant type of sedimentary rock near the Earth’s surface. Argillaceous rock formations have the following advantageous attributes for deep geological nuclear waste disposal: widespread geologic occurrence, found in stable geologic settings, low permeability, self-sealing properties, low effective diffusion coefficient, high sorption capacity, and have the appropriate depth and thickness to host nuclear waste repository concepts. The DOE R&D program under the Spent Fuel Waste Science Technology (SFWST) campaign has made key progress (through experiment, modeling, and testing) in the study of chemical and physical phenomena that could impact the long-term safety assessment of heat-generating nuclear waste disposition in clay/shale/argillaceous rock. International collaboration activities comprising field-scale heater tests, field data monitoring, and laboratory-scale experiments provide key information on changes to the engineered barrier system (EBS) material exposed high thermal loads. Moreover, consideration of direct disposal of large capacity dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) as part of the back-end SNF waste disposition strategy has generated interest in improving our understanding of the effects of elevated temperatures on the engineered barrier system (EBS) design concepts. Chemical and structural analyses of sampled bentonite material from laboratory tests at elevated temperatures are key to the characterization of thermal effects affecting bentonite clay barrier performance. The knowledge provided by these experiments is crucial to constrain the extent of sacrificial zones in the EBS design during the thermal period. Thermal, hydrologic, mechanical, and chemical (THMC) data collected from heater tests and laboratory experiments have been used in the development, validation, and calibration of THMC simulators to model near-field coupled processes. This information leads to the development of simulation approaches to assess issues on coupled processes involving porous media flow, transport, geomechanical phenomena, chemical interactions with barrier/geologic materials, and the development of EBS concepts. These lines of knowledge are central to the design of deep geological backfilled repository concepts where temperature plays a key role in the EBS behavior, potential interactions with host rock, and long-term performance in the safety assessment.

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Modeling and Analysis for Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Testing

Note: This is the final public release version of PNNL-31671 Draft, which was previously released to the sponsor for review. The intent is the public release version will be PNNL-31671. There are no significant changes from the earlier draft version. This unlimited distribution report is the deliverable for M3SF-21PN010202014: Modeling and Analysis for Spent Nuclear Fuel Seismic Testing. This report summarizes the modeling, analysis, and test plan support completed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the spent nuclear fuel dry storage system seismic test plan through May of 2021. Test plan preparation is planned to continue until the seismic test is completed in July of 2022. This report covers preliminary structural dynamic model development and computer-aided design of test hardware. Based on preliminary modeling, the strongest earthquakes under consideration in this test program provide mechanical loading on the spent nuclear fuel that is comparable to the 30 cm cask drop scenario, although the loads do not appear to be strong enough to cause significant permanent deformation of the fuel assembly spacer grids. The potential for grid deformation during the test will be assessed when the proposed shake table motion becomes available. The weakest earthquakes considered in this test are expected to be comparable to the mechanical loads witnessed in the multimodal transportation test of 2017. The horizontal canister system is predicted to provide nearly-uniform loading condition on the fuel assemblies it contains, while the vertical cask system is predicted to cause non-uniform dynamic loads on the fuel assemblies. In the horizontal case, gravity keeps the fuel assemblies in contact with one basket wall surface unless the loads are strong enough to cause a separation. In the vertical case, the fuel assemblies are relatively long and slender, and seismic motion in the anticipated test range is predicted to cause the assemblies to lean, tilt, and impact the basket walls throughout the seismic event. These gap closures are a nonlinear force transmission condition, so the vertical system is expected to have more variation and variability than the horizontal system. While the horizontal system is expected to have a relatively more linear response than the vertical system, there is still the potential for nonlinear behavior in the horizontal system because the fuel assemblies are free to slide, bounce, and impact the basket walls if the seismic loads are strong enough. One major conclusion of this study is that the use of mixed fuel assemblies in the canister will be acceptable. There are differences in overall system response when the mass, center of gravity, or gaps are changed, but the changes in response are within the bounds of a system that contains completely homogeneous fuel assemblies. One important observation is that the loading for each individual fuel assembly within the vertical canister is expected to be different from that of the others because of nonlinearities in the system. The horizontal canister system is expected to have a more uniform and more predictable response than the vertical canister, making variations in fuel assembly characteristics easier to account for. One important recommendation that comes from this modeling work is to repeat some of the strongest shake tests at different angles, particularly for the vertical cask system. Modeling predicts that strong seismic motion will cause the fuel assemblies to close initial gaps and impact the fuel basket walls when the canister is in the vertical cask configuration. Each shake test will impose a pre-defined three-dimensional time history on the cask system.

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Mechanical Loads on Spent Nuclear Fuel in the General 30 cm Package Drop Scenario

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science & Technology (SFWST) research program is guided by the high-level goal of closing prioritized knowledge gaps related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and transportation, which are summarized by Saltzstein et al. (2020). One of the high-priority knowledge gaps is the identification and quantification of mechanical loads that are expected to affect SNF during normal conditions of transportation and storage to inform the range of physical SNF test programs. This report uses modeling and analysis methods to estimate the mechanical loads on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the general 30 cm package drop scenario. The drop scenario assumes impact limiters are in place in the transportation configuration and the impact surface is perfectly rigid. The goal of this analysis is to consider the universe of potential mechanical loading conditions that can happen to SNF and present the results in a manner that is useful for materials testing, decision making, and regulatory rule making purposes. This study uses validated finite element models and methods to perform a broad parametric study of key variables that can affect the mechanical loads on SNF during a hypothetical package free drop scenario. Physical drop test data from a cask and fuel assembly drop test campaign is the basis for model validation. Additionally, the results of the parametric study are used to inform a damage model, which uses multiple nonlinear regression to estimate the relationships between input variables and output response. The parametric finite element analyses consider thousands of input variable combinations, while the damage model estimates millions of combinations. The breadth of this study provides confidence that the potential range of mechanical loads that SNF might experience during the general 30 cm package drop scenario are characterized well enough to consider this knowledge gap closed. While this report documents the overall peak values calculated in this study, the 95 th percentile values, the histograms, and the observed trends are equally important. This study covered a large range of SNF temperatures, room temperature to 300°C, and burnups, 10 GWd/MTU to 62 GWd/MTU. Each temperature and burnup combination has a different cladding yield strain, so it is more meaningful to summarize the calculated cladding strain response as its factor of safety, which is defined relative to the yield strain. The factor of safety is calculated as the yield strain divided by the peak cladding strain. A factor of safety greater than unity indicates that the cladding remains below yield, whereas a value less than unity is indicative of plastic deformation. In all cases of this study a safety factor over 1.0 was calculated, although in the most limiting case at 300°C the safety factor was only 1.01, which suggests that yielding could occur when additional loads like rod internal pressure are included. When the temperature is restricted to 200°C the limiting safety factor increases to 1.28, which has significant margin to accommodate internal pressure and potential local cladding defects that could cause a local stress concentration. An important trend in the calculated fuel rod mechanical loads is that the 2 nd highest loaded fuel rod in an assembly tends to be significantly lower than the highest loaded rod. The implication is that even if one rod in an assembly experiences a failure the loads would have to be significantly higher to cause two or more rods to fail.

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Analysis of the Reuse of Uranium Recovered from the Reprocessing of Commercial LWR Spent Fuel

This report provides an analysis of the factors involved in the reuse of uranium recovered from commercial light-water-reactor (LWR) spent fuels (1) by reenrichment and recycling as fuel to LWRs and/or (2) by recycling directly as fuel to heavy-water-reactors (HWRs), such as the CANDU (registered trade name for the Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor). Reuse is an attractive alternative to the current Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) baseline plan, which stores the reprocessed uranium (RU) for an uncertain future or attempts to dispose of it as 'greater-than-Class C' waste. Considering that the open fuel cycle currently deployed in the United States already creates a huge excess quantity of depleted uranium, the closed fuel cycle should enable the recycle of the major components of spent fuel, such as the uranium and the hazardous, long-lived transuranic (TRU) actinides, as well as the managed disposal of fission product wastes. Compared with the GNEP baseline scenario, the reuse of RU in the uranium fuel cycle has a number of potential advantages: (1) avoidance of purchase costs of 11-20% of the natural uranium feed; (2) avoidance of disposal costs for a large majority of the volume of spent fuel that is reprocessed; (3) avoidance of disposal costs for a portion of the depleted uranium from the enrichment step; (4) depending on the {sup 235}U assay of the RU, possible avoidance of separative work costs; and (5) a significant increase in the production of {sup 238}Pu due to the presence of {sup 236}U, which benefits somewhat the transmutation value of the plutonium and also provides some proliferation resistance.

DelCul, Guillermo Daniel↗