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At least 307 records · Page 17

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗

A Plutonium Mass Uncertainty Assessment Using a Cherenkov-Based Neutron Multiplicity Water Detector

We present a new analysis of the sensitivity of a water Cherenkov-based neutron multiplicity counter for nondestructive assay of trace quantities of 240 Pu. The multiplicity counter [water-based neutron detector (WaND)] contains 1.0 m 3 of water doped with 0.2% gadolinium in the form of a gadolinium salt (0.4% GdCl 3 ). It can be used for testing the presence of trace quantities of 240 Pu within a sample of unknown material by observing the correlated timing behavior of neutron capture candidates in the detector. The new analysis takes advantage of the fact that the detector is comprised almost entirely of a homogeneous medium, which permits the use of a simple model to reproduce the observed neutron capture timing behavior. Finally, the results of this analysis indicate that the detector has an absolute neutron detection efficiency of 23.4 ± 1.1% and is sensitive to a 240 Pu mass as small as 2.3 mg (at 1σ) after a 1-h data acquisition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Application of Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods for Uncertainty Quantification in Inverse Transport Problems

Determination of the components of a radioactive source/shield system using the system’s radiation signature is of great importance in homeland security, material safeguards, and waste management. Although significant progress has been made toward solving this inverse transport problem in recent years, work remains to be done to quantify the uncertainty in reconstructed results. In this article we apply two Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approaches, the delayed rejection adaptive metropolis (DRAM) and differential evolution adaptive metropolis (DREAM) methods, to solve inverse problems and quantify uncertainty. The DRAM method uses delayed rejection combined with global adaptation of the proposal covariance matrix. Furthermore, the DREAM method hybridizes MCMC sampling with the differential evolution (DE) algorithm. In numerical test cases, the DRAM and DREAM methods are shown to be superior to a first-order inverse Hessian approach for problems with noisy data and multiple unknown quantities, with DREAM converging to the posterior distribution more quickly than DRAM. The DREAM and DRAM results indicate that a full posterior distribution is required to quantify uncertainty in many inverse transport problems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Learning Global Proliferation Expertise Evolution Using AI-Driven Analytics and Public Information

Detecting and anticipating global proliferation expertise and capability evolution from unstructured, noisy, and incomplete public data streams is a highly desired, but extremely challenging task. Here, in this article, we present our pioneering data-driven approach to support the non-proliferation mission to detect and explain the evolution of proliferation expertise and capability development globally from terabytes of publicly available information (PAI), focusing on our knowledge extraction pipeline and descriptive analytics. We first discuss how we fuse nine open-source data streams, including multilingual data, to convert 4 TB of unstructured data to structured knowledge and encode dynamically evolving proliferation expertise representations—content and context graphs. For this, we rely on natural language processing (NLP) and deep learning (DL) models to perform information extraction, topic modeling, and distributed text representation (aka embedding) learning. We then present interactive, usable, and explainable descriptive analytics to refine domain knowledge and present it in a human-understandable form. Finally, we introduce future work avenues that will leverage our dynamic knowledge representations and descriptive analytics to enable predictive and prescriptive inferences to achieve real-time domain understanding and contextual reasoning about global proliferation expertise and capability evolution.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Melt Blending: A Tool to Simplify Plastic Scintillator Synthesis

Plastic scintillators are widely used as radiation detection media in homeland security and nuclear physics applications. Their attributes include low cost, scalability to large detector volumes, and additive compounding to enable additional material and detection features, such as pulse shape discrimination (PSD), gamma-ray spectroscopy, aging resistance, and coincidence timing. However, traditional chemically cured plastic scintillators (CCS) require long reaction times, and hazardous wet chemical procedures performed by specially trained personnel, and can leave residual monomer, resulting in deleterious optical and material properties. Here, we synthesize melt blended scintillators (MBSs) in 2.5 days using easily accessible solid-state compounding of commercially-available poly(styrene) with 30–60 wt% fluorene-based compound “P2” to create monolithic detectors with < 100 ppm residual monomer, in several form factors. Further, the best scintillation performance was recorded for 60 wt% P2 in Styron 665, including gamma-ray light yield 139% of EJ- 200 commercial scintillator and PSD figure of merit (FOM) value of 2.65 at 478 keVee, approaching P2 organic glass scintillator (OGS). The capability of MBS to generate fog-resistant scintillators and poly(methyl methacrylate) (PMMA)-based scintillators for use in challenging environments is also demonstrated.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Simulations of Sparse Static Detector Networks for City-Scale Radiological/Nuclear Detection

Sparse static detector networks in urban environments can be used in efforts to detect illicit radioactive sources, such as stolen nuclear material or radioactive "dirty bombs." We use detailed simulations to evaluate multiple configurations of detector networks and their ability to detect sources moving through a $6\times 6$ km 2 area of downtown Chicago. A detector network's probability of detecting a source increases with detector density but can also be increased with strategic node placement. Here, we show that the ability to fuse correlated data from a source-carrying vehicle passing by multiple detectors can significantly contribute to the overall detection probability. In this article, we distinguish static sensor deployments operated as networks able to correlate signals between sensors, from deployments operated as arrays where each sensor is operated individually. In particular, we show that additional visual attributes of source-carrying vehicles, such as vehicle color and make, can greatly improve the ability of a detector network to detect illicit sources.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Optimization of an Energy Tuning Assembly for High Explosives Detection

The Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) system, employs neutron-induced gamma-ray spectroscopy and provides a nondestructive method for high explosives detection. In standard operation it uses Californium-252 as a neutron source. Operating PINS with a deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator has some advantages over Cf-252, including lifetime and ability to produce high-energy inelastic scattering gamma rays. However, current systems using DT neutron generators suffer from a high environmental background and reduced ability to induce neutron capture, reducing spectral quality and limiting nitrogen sensitivity. Here, this study presents the development of an energy-tuning assembly (ETA) designed to optimize the DT neutron energy spectrum to increase nitrogen reaction rates in a target, thereby improving high explosive detection capabilities. A metaheuristic optimization framework, MultiGNOWEE, coupled with MCNP, was employed to generate two ETA configurations: a single-objective ETA, which maximizes nitrogen capture reactions, and a multi-objective ETA, which balances neutron capture and inelastic scattering. Simulations demonstrated the optimized configurations achieved up to a 10-fold improvement in nitrogen capture rates compared to the bare configuration. Experimental validation was conducted using a DT neutron generator and a high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector. Two prototype ETAs were constructed and assessed on a melamine simulant. Measurements demonstrated improved nitrogen detection for both prototype ETA configurations when compared to the standard system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A structural description of the evolution of stakeholders and risk communication in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities: Historical perspective, major stakeholders, and external events

Regulators and policymakers are routinely challenged with explaining complex concepts concerning risk. Part of the challenge is helping external and internal stakeholders to understand the context behind risk-related information and decisions. Here, this paper will describe the historical evolution of the safety and regulatory framework for an important category in the nuclear industry—defense nuclear facilities owned and operated by the US Department of Energy. In parallel with describing this evolution, three major events which occurred external to the complex of defense nuclear facilities will be summarized, and their impact on the maturation of the Department's safety and regulatory framework will be discussed. Finally, integrated with these two threads of discussion will be a chronicle of the changing set of involved organizations and the expanding set of external stakeholders involved in risk decisions—and therefore, the risk communications ecosystem surrounding defense nuclear facilities. It will be noted that this system was once describable as a classic “iron triangle,” but now has progressed to a complex network of federal and state organizations, numerous congressional committees, and expanding sets of external stakeholders. It is hoped that a comprehensive discussion of the context of risk assessment in the defense nuclear facilities complex—addressing historical insights, organizational evolution, and the maturing structure of regulation—will provide enhanced opportunities for building trust and understanding in this complex environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Pressurization Analysis for Heating of a Screw Top Utility Can Loaded With Plutonium Oxide Powder by a 1273 K Fire

The documented safety analysis for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) evaluates the consequences of a postulated 1273 K fire in a glovebox. The radiological dose consequences for a pressurized release of plutonium oxide powder during such a fire depend on the maximum pressure that is attained inside the oxide storage containers. The oxide storage configuration selected for analysis is can/bag/can, comprised of oxide powder inside an 8.38 × 10 -6 m 3 stainless steel B vial inside 0.006 kg of polyethylene bagging inside a one-quart screw top utility can of the type commonly used to package solvents or rubber cements. To enable evaluation of the dose consequences, temperature and pressure transients have been calculated for exposure of a typical set of storage containers to the fire. The pressurization analysis credits venting to and from the B vial but does not credit venting or leakage from the can. Due to the low rate of venting from the B vial into the can gas space, the can pressure is nearly independent of the B vial pressure. Calculated maximum pressures are compared to the utility can burst pressure. In lieu of a structural analysis of the utility cans, burst pressures and leakage rates were measured using compressed nitrogen gas. The measured gauge burst pressure was 0.250 ± 0.043 MPa. The measured burst pressures are lower than the calculated maximum pressure due to fire exposure, indicating that the utility cans could burst during exposure to a 1273 K fire.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Force Reconstruction Using the Inverse of the Mode-Shape Matrix [Book Chapter]

A new technique for force reconstruction is developed. To estimate the externally applied force, this technique sums the weight-scaled acceleration signals, and is referred to as the Sum of Weighted Accelerations Technique (SWAT). To obtain the scalar weights the inverse of the mode shape matrix is used. Application of this technique is illustrated with both numerical calculations using a mass-spring model and experimental data from a structure impacting a rigid barrier.

055001 -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards, Inspection, ↗

A comparison of smartphone and infrasound microphone data from a fuel air explosive and a high explosive

For prompt detection of large (>1 kt) above-ground explosions, infrasound microphone networks and arrays are deployed at surveyed locations across the world. Denser regional and local networks are deployed for smaller explosions, however, they are limited in number and are often deployed temporarily for experiments. With the expanded interest in smaller yield explosions targeted at vulnerable areas such as population centers and key infrastructures, the need for more dense microphone networks has increased. An “attritable” (affordable, reusable, and replaceable) and flexible alternative can be provided by smartphone networks. Explosion signals from a fuel air explosive (thermobaric bomb) and a high explosive with trinitrotoluene equivalent yields of 6.35 and 3.63 kg, respectively, were captured on both an infrasound microphone and a network of smartphones. The resulting waveforms were compared in time, frequency, and time-frequency domains. The acoustic waveforms collected on smartphones produced a filtered explosion pulse due to the smartphone's diminishing frequency response at infrasound frequencies (<20 Hz) and was found difficult to be used with explosion characterization methods utilizing waveform features (peak overpressure, impulse, etc.). However, the similarities in time frequency representations and additional sensor inputs are promising for other explosion signal identification and analysis. As an example, a method utilizing the relative acoustic amplitudes for source localization using the smartphone sensor network is presented.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Lithologic controls on microfracturing from legacy underground nuclear explosions

Detection and verification of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) can be improved with a better understanding of the nature and extent of explosion-induced damage in rock and the effect of this damage on radionuclide migration. Much of the previous work in this area has focused on centimeter- to meter-scale manifestations of damage, but to predict the effect of damage on permeability for radionuclide migration, observations at smaller scales are needed to determine deformation mechanisms. Based on studies of tectonic deformation in tuff, we expected that the heterogeneous tuff layers would manifest explosion-induced damage differently, with welded tuffs showing more fractures and nonwelded tuffs showing more deformation bands. In comparing post-UNE samples with lithologically matched pre-UNE equivalents, we observed damage in multiple lithologies of tuff through quantitative microfracture densities. We find that the texture (e.g., from deposition, welding, alteration, etc.) affects fracture densities, with stronger units fracturing more than weaker units. While we see no evidence of expected deformation bands in the nonwelded tuffs, we do observe, as expected, much larger microfracture densities at close range (<50 m) to the explosive source. We also observe a subtle increase in microfracture densities in post-UNE samples, relative to pre-UNE equivalents, in all lithologies and depths. The fractures that are interpreted to be UNE-induced are primarily transgranular and grain-boundary microfractures, with intragranular microfracture densities being largely similar to those of pre-UNE samples. This work has implications for models of explosion-induced damage and how that damage may affect flow pathways in the subsurface.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Ni/NiO Reference Electrode Potential Measurements in Molten CaCl 2 –CaO

A direct oxide reduction (DOR) process is used to reduce PuO 2 to Pu metal via Ca metal. Molten CaCl 2 is commonly used as the electrolyte for this reaction. As the DOR reaction proceeds, CaO accumulates in the salt and must be measured in real-time to know when the reaction has gone to completion. Open circuit potential (OCP) was measured in this report between a reference electrode consisting of Ni/NiO contained in a MgO tube and a tungsten working electrode. Two methods of CaO additions were performed over several experiments, and both methods correlated to a 0.11 to 0.23 V decrease in OCP up to 14.4 wt% CaO. CaO concentrations were separately measured via sampling and acid-base titration. A plot of OCP versus concentration of CaO fits the Nernst equation with the CaO powder additions up to 5.2 wt% and also at the higher end of the CaO pellet concentration range. While the MgO tubes were observed to be structurally stable in the molten salt, scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy showed that Mg in the tubes had been partially replaced with Ca.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Data for Training and Testing Radiation Detection Algorithms in an Urban Environment

The US government routinely performs radiological response deployments to search for the presence of illicit nuclear materials (e.g., highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium) in a specified area. The deployments can be intelligence driven, in support of law enforcement, and for planned events such as WrestleMania, presidential inaugurations, or political conventions. In a typical deployment, radiation detection systems carried by human operators or mounted on vehicles move in a clearing pattern through the search area. Search teams rely on radiation detection algorithms running on these systems in real time to alert them to the presence of an illicit threat source. The detection and identification of sources is complicated by large variation of natural radiation background throughout a search area and the potential presence of localized non-threat sources such as patients undergoing treatment with medical isotopes. As a result, detection algorithms must be carefully balanced between missing real sources (false negatives) and reporting too many false alarms (false positives).The purpose of this data set is to spur innovations in detecting, identifying, and localizing nuclear materials inurban search missions.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

The Benefits of a Software Bill of Materials Program at Nuclear Facilities

Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both information communications technology and operational technology environments. Often, a supplier or other entity discloses vulnerability information about software components and subcomponents used in a digital asset, but an asset owner is unable to quickly ascertain if the vulnerable component is installed in their facility. The generation and use of a software bill of materials (SBOM) for installed digital assets can enable an asset owner to quickly identify if and where a component is used, allowing them to evaluate the risk and determine necessary risk treatments. The integration of an SBOM program into a nuclear facility not only improves vulnerability management and risk management processes, it also benefits asset and configuration management, cybersecurity, and supply chain programs. This paper reviews the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development program’s work on integrating an SBOM program into a nuclear facility. It also provides a discussion on the benefits of such a program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Case Study of an Integrated Hydrogen Generation Plant

Strategies for securing digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems within the nuclear industry are provided by multiple standards and guidance documents. However, since selection and use of security controls outlined in these documents are frequently only considered during or after installation, there are often limitations on their use, such as technological constraints related to design or operation. Furthermore, alternative controls intended to provide the same or similar security countermeasure as the primary control may also be infeasible at these stages, leaving the I&C system vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The limitations associated with ‘bolting on’ security controls late in the systems engineering lifecycle can be reduced by integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) into the process. This paper evaluates the use of CIE during the high-level design stage of a hydrogen generation project where heat and electricity are provided by a nuclear power plant. Applying CIE to this project highlighted potential cyber vulnerabilities of the initial design, leading to recommendations for process flow and I&C system design modifications to reduce, and at times eliminate, the risk from both deliberate and unintentional cyber incidents.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-on Criticality Safety Training Courses

In 2011, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) developed and piloted a 2-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. These courses consist of classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. Each course is currently offered twice per year. The 2-week practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) (Q-cleared students). The 1-week manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and provides information about future course offerings.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Training: Needs and Efforts

Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) training is essential and required for NCS professionals to ensure that fissionable materials outside of nuclear reactors are safely processed, handled, stored, and transported. Furthermore, the requirement of training in NCS is mandated in several international and domestic documents. In this regard, management has an obligation to establish an NCS training program that provides confidence in the continuing proficiency of personnel, and supervisors must ensure that their staff is suitably trained. Training of all personnel in nuclear facilities is required to support the robust performance of operations. There is a continuing need to maintain, enhance, and develop new training courses to support the NCS community. This paper provides an outline of some of the ongoing and future training courses in the United States to support the field of NCS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗