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Los Alamos National Laboratory new generation standard nuclear material storage container - the SAVY4000 design

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in defense board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based standard involving storage of nuclear material (RD003). This RD003 requirements document has sense been updated to reflect requirements as identified with recently issued DOE M 441.1-1 'Nuclear Material Packaging Manual'. The new packaging manual was issued at the encouragement of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board with a clear directive for protecting the worker from exposure due to loss of containment of stored materials. The Manual specifies a detailed and all inclusive approach to achieve a high level of protection; from package design & performance requirements, design life determinations of limited life components, authorized contents evaluations, and surveillance/maintenance to ensure in use package integrity over time. Materials in scope involve those stored outside an approved engineered-contamination barrier that would result in a worker exposure of in excess of 5 rem Committed Effective Does Equivalent (CEDE). Key aspects of meeting the challenge as developed around the SAVY-3000 vented storage container design will be discussed. Design performance and acceptance criteria against the manual, bounding conditions as established that the user must ensure are met to authorize contents in the package (based upon the activity of heat-source plutonium (90% Pu-238) oxide, which bounds the requirements for weapons-grade plutonium oxide), interface as a safety class system within the facility under the LANL plutonium facility DSA, design life determinations for limited life components, and a sense of design specific surveillance program implementation as LANL moves forward into production and use of the SAVY-3000 will all be addressed. The SAVY-3000 is intended as a work horse package for the DOE complex as a vented storage container primarily for plutonium in solid form.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Dissolution of Irradiated Commercial UO2 Fuels in Ammonium Carbonate and Hydrogen Peroxide

We propose and test a disposition path for irradiated nuclear fuel using ammonium carbonate and hydrogen peroxide media. We demonstrate on a 13 g scale that >98% of the irradiated fuel dissolves. Subsequent expulsion of carbonate from the dissolver solution precipitates >95% of the plutonium, americium, curium, and substantial amounts of fission products, effectively partitioning the fuel at the dissolution step. Uranium can be easily recovered from solution by any of several means, such as ion exchange, solvent extraction, or direct precipitation. Ammonium carbonate can be evaporated from solution and recovered for re-use, leaving an extremely compact volume of fission products, transactinides, and uranium. Stack emissions are predicted to be less toxic, less radioactive, chemically simpler, and simpler to treat than those from the conventional PUREX process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Separation of Plutonium from Irradiated Fuels and Targets

Spent nuclear fuel from power production reactors contains moderate amounts of transuranium (TRU) actinides and fission products in addition to the still slightly enriched uranium. Originally, nuclear technology was developed to chemically separate and recover fissionable plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel for military purposes. Military plutonium separations had essentially ceased by the mid-1990s. Reprocessing, however, can serve multiple purposes, and the relative importance has changed over time. In the 1960’s the vision of the introduction of plutonium-fueled fast-neutron breeder reactors drove the civilian separation of plutonium. More recently, reprocessing has been regarded as a means to facilitate the disposal of high-level nuclear waste, and thus requires development of radically different technical approaches. In the last decade or so, the principal reason for reprocessing has shifted to spent power reactor fuel being reprocessed (1) so that unused uranium and plutonium being recycled reduce the volume, gaining some 25% to 30% more energy from the original uranium in the process and thus contributing to energy security and (2) to reduce the volume and radioactivity of the waste by recovering all long-lived actinides and fission products followed by recycling them in fast reactors where they are transmuted to short-lived fission products; this reduces the volume to about 20%, reduces the long-term radioactivity level in the high-level waste, and complicates the possibility of the plutonium being diverted from civil use – thereby increasing the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle. In general, reprocessing schemes can be divided into two large categories: aqueous/hydrometallurgical systems, and pyrochemical/pyrometallurgical systems. Worldwide processing schemes are dominated by the aqueous (hydrometallurgical) systems. This document provides a historical review of both categories of reprocessing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An integrated approach for determining plutonium mass in spent fuel assemblies with nondestructive assay

There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel. Below, five motivations are listed: (1) To verify the Pu content of spent fuel without depending on unverified information from the facility, as requested by the IAEA ('independent verification'). New spent fuel measurement techniques have the potential to allow the IAEA to recover continuity of knowledge and to better detect diversion. (2) To assure regulators that all of the nuclear material of interest leaving a nuclear facility actually arrives at another nuclear facility ('shipper/receiver'). Given the large stockpile of nuclear fuel at reactor sites around the world, it is clear that in the coming decades, spent fuel will need to be moved to either reprocessing facilities or storage sites. Safeguarding this transportation is of significant interest. (3) To quantify the Pu in spent fuel that is not considered 'self-protecting.' Fuel is considered self-protecting by some regulatory bodies when the dose that the fuel emits is above a given level. If the fuel is not self-protecting, then the Pu content of the fuel needs to be determined and the Pu mass recorded in the facility's accounting system. This subject area is of particular interest to facilities that have research-reactor spent fuel or old light-water reactor (LWR) fuel. It is also of interest to regulators considering changing the level at which fuel is considered self-protecting. (4) To determine the input accountability value at an electrochemical processing facility. It is not expected that an electrochemical reprocessing facility will have an input accountability tank, as is typical in an aqueous reprocessing facility. As such, one possible means of determining the input accountability value is to measure the Pu content in the spent fuel that arrives at the facility. (5) To fully understand the composition of the fuel in order to efficiently and safely pack spent fuel into a long-term repository. The NDA of spent fuel can be part of a system that cost-effectively meets the burnup credit needs of a repository. Behind each of these reasons is a regulatory structure with MC&A requirements. In the case of the IAEA, the accountable quantity is elemental plutonium. The material in spent fuel (fissile isotopes, fission products, etc.) emits signatures that provide information about the content and history of the fuel. A variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are available to quantify these signatures. The effort presented in this paper is investigation of the capabilities of 12 NDA techniques. For these 12, none is conceptually capable of independently determining the Pu content in a spent fuel assembly while at the same time being able to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of rods. For this reason the authors are investigating the capability of 12 NDA techniques with the end goal of integrating a few techniques together into a system that is capable of measuring Pu mass in an assembly. The work described here is the beginning of what is anticipated to be a five year effort: (1) two years of modeling to select the best technologies, (2) one year fabricating instruments and (3) two years measuring spent fuel. This paper describes the first two years of this work. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of the 12 NDA techniques, an 'assembly library' was created. The library contains the following: (a) A diverse range of PWR spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future. (b) Diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options. (c) The spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. It is our intention to make this library available to other researchers in the field for inter-comparison purposes. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library for measurements in three different media: air, water and borated water. The 12 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR&PP case study results

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design should have such features in it if it is seen to have intrinsic proliferation resistance. The technical difficulty in diverting material from the ESFR is at least as strongly impacted by the adversaries overall technical capabilities as it is by the effort required to overcome those barriers intrinsic to the nuclear fuel cycle. The intrinsic proliferation resistance of the ESFR will affect how extrinsic measures in the safeguards approach for the ESFR will provide overall proliferation resistance.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Equipment specifications for an electrochemical fuel reprocessing plant

Electrochemical reprocessing is a technique used to chemically separate and dissolve the components of spent nuclear fuel, in order to produce new metal fuel. There are several different variations to electrochemical reprocessing. These variations are accounted for by both the production of different types of spent nuclear fuel, as well as different states and organizations doing research in the field. For this electrochemical reprocessing plant, the spent fuel will be in the metallurgical form, a product of fast breeder reactors, which are used in many nuclear power plants. The equipment line for this process is divided into two main categories, the fuel refining equipment and the fuel fabrication equipment. The fuel refining equipment is responsible for separating out the plutonium and uranium together, while getting rid of the minor transuranic elements and fission products. The fuel fabrication equipment will then convert this plutonium and uranium mixture into readily usable metal fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Solvent Recovery and Management at the Savannah River Site H-Canyon Facility

NIOWAVE, Inc. is a domestic supplier of medical and industrial isotopes from uranium and radium. The Savannah River National laboratory (SRNL) is currently providing support to NIOWAVE, which plans to deploy a superconducting electron linear accelerator (LINAC) to fission uranium for Mo-99 production without the need for a nuclear reactor or HEU. The uranium from the Mo-99 production targets will be purified using a modified PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Reduction Extraction) solvent extraction process to recover the uranium in the product stream. The uranium will then be precipitated as an oxalate which is calcined to U 3 O 8 to fabricate pellets for new Mo-99 targets. In previous support provided to NIOWAVE, the SRNL demonstrated a solvent washing process to remove degradation products from the tributyl phosphate (TBP) solvent used in the modified PUREX process under development for uranium recovery. To supplement this technology demonstration, NIOWAVE requested the SRNL to provide summary information on the solvent recovery and management activities which are used at the Savannah River Site (SRS) H-Canyon facility. An existing reference document for the reprocessing of irradiated HEU fuels at the SRS was used as the primary reference for the solvent management activities; although, other reference documents were used to provide supplementary information. The information provided includes a brief summary of the solvent degradation issues which have been observed in the H-Canyon solvent extraction cycles and resulting process safety concerns. The solvent recovery processes for the three cycles of solvent extraction used in the H-Canyon were subsequently described including the process equipment which consists of the continuous and batch solvent washers, pumps, and tanks. A final section is provided on the monitoring and analysis of solvent quality based on the previous work performed at the SRNL for NIOWAVE and past research and development activities performed to support the solvent extraction processes in both the SRS F-Canyon and H-Canyon facilities.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Neutronics Simulations of 237Np Targets to Support Safety-Basis and 238Pu Production Assessment Efforts at the High Flux Isotope Reactor

Fueled by two highly enriched uranium-bearing fuel elements surrounded by a large concentric ring of beryllium reflector, the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) provides one of the highest neutron fluxes in the world and is used to produce unique isotopes like plutonium-238. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration use radioisotope thermoelectric generators powered by 238Pu for deep-space missions. As part of the US Department of Energy s task to reestablish the domestic production of 238Pu, a technology demonstration sub-project has been initiated to establish a new 238Pu supply chain. HFIR safety-basis neutronics calculations are being performed to ensure the target irradiations have no adverse impacts on reactor performance and to calculate data required as input to follow-on thermal-structural, thermal-hydraulic and radionuclide/dose analyses. Plutonium-238 production assessments are being performed to estimate the amount of 238Pu that can be produced in HFIR s permanent beryllium reflector. It is estimated that a total of 0.96 1.12 kg 238Pu (~1.28 1.49 kg PuO2 at 85% 238Pu/Pu purity) could be produced per year in HFIR s permanent beryllium reflector irradiation facilities if they are all utilized.

depletion↗

Comparison of actinide production in traveling wave and pressurized water reactors

The geopolitical problems associated with civilian nuclear energy production arise in part from the accumulation of transuranics in spent nuclear fuel. A traveling wave reactor is a type of breed-burn reactor that could, if feasible, reduce the overall production of transuranics. In one possible configuration, a cylinder of natural or depleted uranium would be subjected to a fast neutron flux at one end. The neutrons would transmute the uranium, producing plutonium and higher actinides. Under the right conditions, the reactor could become critical, at which point a self-stabilizing fission wave would form and propagate down the length of the reactor cylinder. The neutrons from the fission wave would burn the fissile nuclides and transmute uranium ahead of the wave to produce additional fuel. Fission waves in uranium are driven largely by the production and fission of {sup 239}Pu. Simulations have shown that the fuel burnup can reach values greater than 400 MWd/kgIHM, before fission products poison the reaction. In this work we compare the production of plutonium and minor actinides produced in a fission wave to that of a UOX fueled light water reactor, both on an energy normalized basis. The nuclide concentrations in the spent traveling wave reactor fuel are computed using a one-group diffusion model and are verified using Monte Carlo simulations. In the case of the pressurized water reactor, a multi-group collision probability model is used to generate the nuclide quantities. We find that the traveling wave reactor produces about 0.187 g/MWd/kgIHM of transuranics compared to 0.413 g/MWd/kgIHM for a pressurized water reactor running fuel enriched to 4.95 % and burned to 50 MWd/kgIHM. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Passive Neutron Non-Destructive Assay for Remediation of Radiological Waste at Hanford Burial Grounds- 13189

The Hanford burial grounds contains a broad spectrum of low activity radioactive wastes, transuranic (TRU) wastes, and hazardous wastes including fission products, byproduct material (thorium and uranium), plutonium and laboratory chemicals. A passive neutron non-destructive assay technique has been developed for characterization of shielded concreted drums exhumed from the burial grounds. This method facilitates the separation of low activity radiological waste containers from TRU waste containers exhumed from the burial grounds. Two identical total neutron counting systems have been deployed, each consisting of He-3 detectors surrounded by a polyethylene moderator. The counts are processed through a statistical filter that removes outliers in order to suppress cosmic spallation events and electronic noise. Upon completion of processing, a 'GO / NO GO' signal is provided to the operator based on a threshold level equivalent to 0.5 grams of weapons grade plutonium in the container being evaluated. This approach allows instantaneous decisions to be made on how to proceed with the waste. The counting systems have been set up using initial on-site measurements (neutron emitting standards loaded into surrogate waste containers) combined with Monte Carlo modeling techniques. The benefit of this approach is to allow the systems to extend their measurement ranges, in terms of applicable matrix types and container sizes, with minimal interruption to the operations at the burial grounds. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cold Testing for Characterization of Oxide Feed Impurities in Support of the ARIES Program

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program converts surplus plutonium metal components into an oxide powder form and packages the material for final disposition. In support of the ARIES program, over a metric ton (MT) of plutonium has been removed from surplus nuclear weapons since 1998 and packaged for long-term storage in 3013 cans. The oxide production rate is anticipated to increase substantially over the next decade in support of dilute and dispose goals. Analytical chemistry data from destructive analysis of the resulting 70+ blend lots to date has been reported for contaminants in the product oxide. Changes in the Pu product specification for Pu oxide product, induced by a different pit mix, the LANL swap program and processing Alternate (non-Pit Pu) Feed Stock (AFS) metals, will affect the level and the mix of these contaminants in the upcoming years. With these changes in feed material, it will be important to provide fast and efficient measurement of elemental impurities in the oxide to be certain that the process is under control and to monitor the anticipated changes from the historical blend lot data. Non-destructive methods need to be evaluated for the characterization of the plutonium oxide product and the quantification of the impurities at the current and anticipated levels. A feasibility study has begun to investigate the applicability of new spectroscopic methods for oxide impurity characterization. To this end, here we describe the preparation of surrogate materials to support these investigations, and the results of a feasibility study investigating the use of LIBS (Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy) to characterize the surrogate materials as calibration standards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for coated particle fuels encased in graphitized-carbon have not progressed beyond laboratory-scale demonstrations although key equipment that has been tested in the past (such as graphite burners and electrolytic disintegration/dissolution devices) are not listed on either the 'Trigger List' or the 'Dual Use List' for mandatory export controls. Finally, if gross burn-up determined from fission product gamma ray inspection of a discharged pebble cannot be correlated acceptably with predicted plutonium content of the pebble, development and testing may be required on detector concepts for more directly measuring the plutonium content in a discharged pebble to ensure that its placement in the spent fuel storage tanks is for an acceptable 'measured discard' of diluted plutonium.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Update on Demolition Strategy and Progress at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 17161

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is currently demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1988, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996 and material processing completed in 2004. In November 2016, the project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) began demolition of the building. CH2M and DOE-RL will demolish PFP as a Hazardous Category II nuclear facility (HazCat II). The PFP is considered one of the most hazardous buildings on the Hanford site; employees have performed some of the most hazardous work anywhere across the DOE Environmental Management complex. Since 2008, employees have removed much of the plutonium-processing infrastructure. Four main buildings make up the majority of the PFP complex. As of November 2016, one building is undergoing demolition, another is ready for demolition and, concurrently, demolition preparations continue in the remaining two buildings. That hazard mitigation work includes removing contaminated ventilation duct work, process lines and performing asbestos abatement. To ensure safe and compliant demolition, CH2M employees researched, trained and deployed personal protective equipment never before used on the Hanford Site to complete some of the most hazardous demolition preparations. Project management commissioned the development of an air dispersion model that dictated ready-for-demolition criteria and established conservative demolition parameters. Management also sequenced project work to allow demolition to occur while demolition preparations continue a safe distance away in adjacent buildings. This paper will allow CH2M and DOE-RL to share lessons learned and progress to date with other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Pu-238 Production Progress at Idaho National Laboratory From December 2023 to November 2024

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has continued in the effort to produce Pu-238 to support NASA deep space missions. In support of the production goal of contributing 700 g to the 1.5 kg per year constant rate production of Pu-238 heat source material in the United States by 2026. All available inner core positions of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) have been qualified for production for a 20% Np target, with efforts nearing completion for a 30% Np target further increasing production amounts. This includes the North East Flux Trap (NEFT), South Flux Trap (SFT), Inner A, H positions. With the completion of qualifying the inner core of ATR, work has started on the qualifying the outer core. The portion of the outer core that will produce Pu-238 includes the Large and Medium I positions. With the continued qualification work, INL is on track to contribute to the production goal by 2026.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Productivity Techniques and Quality Aspects in the Criticality Safety Evaluation of Y-12 Type-B Fissile Material Packages

The inventory of certified Type-B fissile material packages consists of ten performance-based packages for offsite transportation purposes, serving transportation programs at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The containment vessels range from 5 to 19 in. in diameter and from 17 to 58 in. in height. The drum assembly external to the containment vessel ranges from 18 to 34 in. in diameter and from 26 to 71 in. in height. The weight of the packaging (drum assembly and containment vessel) ranges from 239 to 1550 lb. The older DT-nn series of Cellotex-based packages are being phased-out and replaced by a new generation of Kaolite-based ('Y-12 patented insulation') packages capable of withstanding the dynamic crush test 10 CFR 71.73(c)(2). Three replacement packages are in various stages of development; two are in use. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 6M specification package, which does not conform to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for Type-B packages, is no longer authorized for service on public roads. The ES-3100 shipping package is an example of a Kaolite-based Type-B fissile material package developed as a replacement package for the DOT 6M. With expanded utility, the ES-3100 is designed and licensed for transporting highly enriched uranium and plutonium materials on public roads. The ES-3100 provides added capability for air transport of up to 7-kg quantities of uranium material. This paper presents the productivity techniques and quality aspects in the criticality safety evaluation of Y-12 packages using the ES-3100 as an example.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE NUCLEAR THREAT: UNITED STATES PLUTONIUM CONSOLIDATION AND DISPOSITION

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium and larger quantities of enriched uranium that are permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) also began shutting down, stabilizing, and removing inventories from production facilities that were no longer needed to support weapons programs and non-weapons activities. The storage of 'Category I' nuclear materials at Rocky Flats, Sandia National Laboratories, and several smaller sites has been terminated to reduce costs and safeguards risks. De-inventory continues at the Hanford site and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Consolidation of inventories works in concert with the permanent disposition of excess inventories, including several tonnes of plutonium that have already been disposed to waste repositories and the preparation for transfers to the planned Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (for the bulk of the excess plutonium) and alternative disposition methods for material that cannot be used readily in the MOX fuel cycle. This report describes status of plutonium consolidation and disposition activities and their impacts on continuing operations, particularly at the Savannah River Site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Implications of Plutonium isotopic separation on closed fuel cycles and repository design

Advances in laser enrichment may enable relatively low-cost plutonium isotopic separation. This would have large impacts on LWR closed fuel cycles and waste management. If Pu-240 is removed before recycling plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, it would dramatically reduce the buildup of higher plutonium isotopes, Americium, and Curium. Pu-240 is a fertile material and thus can be replaced by U-238. Eliminating the higher plutonium isotopes in MOX fuel increases the Doppler feedback, simplifies reactor control, and allows infinite recycle of MOX plutonium in LWRs. Eliminating fertile Pu-240 and Pu-242 reduces the plutonium content in MOX fuel and simplifies fabrication. Reducing production of Pu-241 reduces production of Am-241 - the primary heat generator in spent nuclear fuels after several decades. Reducing heat generating Am-241 would reduce repository cost and waste toxicity. Avoiding Am- 241 avoids its decay product Np-237, a nuclide that partly controls long-term oxidizing repository performance. Most of these benefits also apply to LWR plutonium recycled into fast reactors. There are benefits for plutonium isotopic separation in fast reactor fuel cycles (particularly removal of Pu-242) but the benefits are less. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The role of chemical reactions in the Chernobyl accident

It is shown that chemical reactions played an essential role in the Chernobyl accident at all of its stages. It is important that the reactor before the explosion was at maximal xenon poisoning, and its reactivity, apparently, was not destroyed by the explosion. The reactivity release due to decay of Xe-235 on the second day after the explosion led to a reactor power of 80-110 MW. Owing to this power, the chemical reactions of reduction of uranium, plutonium, and other metals at a temperature of about 2000 Degree-Sign C occurred in the core. The yield of fission products thus sharply increased. Uranium and other metals flew down in the bottom water communications and rooms. After reduction of the uranium and its separation from the graphite, the chain reaction stopped, the temperature of the core decreased, and the activity yield stopped.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗